awesome-grpc-that-works 0.12.2 → 0.14.0.dev

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c

@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+/* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems
+ * Laboratories. */
+
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void) { return EC_KEY_new_method(NULL); }
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
+  EC_KEY *ret = (EC_KEY *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_KEY));
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  memset(ret, 0, sizeof(EC_KEY));
+
+  if (engine) {
+    ret->ecdsa_meth = ENGINE_get_ECDSA_method(engine);
+  }
+  if (ret->ecdsa_meth) {
+    METHOD_ref(ret->ecdsa_meth);
+  }
+
+  ret->version = 1;
+  ret->conv_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
+  ret->references = 1;
+
+  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data);
+
+  if (ret->ecdsa_meth && ret->ecdsa_meth->init && !ret->ecdsa_meth->init(ret)) {
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+    if (ret->ecdsa_meth) {
+      METHOD_unref(ret->ecdsa_meth);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid) {
+  EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+  if (ret->group == NULL) {
+    EC_KEY_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r) {
+  if (r == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&r->references)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (r->ecdsa_meth) {
+    if (r->ecdsa_meth->finish) {
+      r->ecdsa_meth->finish(r);
+    }
+    METHOD_unref(r->ecdsa_meth);
+  }
+
+  EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
+  EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
+  BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
+
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, r, &r->ex_data);
+
+  OPENSSL_cleanse((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
+  OPENSSL_free(r);
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src) {
+  if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  /* Copy the parameters. */
+  if (src->group) {
+    /* TODO(fork): duplicating the group seems wasteful. */
+    EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
+    dest->group = EC_GROUP_dup(src->group);
+    if (dest->group == NULL) {
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Copy the public key. */
+  if (src->pub_key && src->group) {
+    EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
+    dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(src->pub_key, src->group);
+    if (dest->pub_key == NULL) {
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* copy the private key */
+  if (src->priv_key) {
+    if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
+      dest->priv_key = BN_new();
+      if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+      }
+    }
+    if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key)) {
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  }
+  /* copy method/extra data */
+  if (src->ecdsa_meth) {
+      METHOD_unref(dest->ecdsa_meth);
+      dest->ecdsa_meth = src->ecdsa_meth;
+      METHOD_ref(dest->ecdsa_meth);
+  }
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dest, &dest->ex_data);
+  if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, &dest->ex_data,
+                          &src->ex_data)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  /* copy the rest */
+  dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
+  dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
+  dest->version = src->version;
+  dest->flags = src->flags;
+
+  return dest;
+}
+
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key) {
+  EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) {
+    EC_KEY_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r) {
+  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&r->references);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_is_opaque(const EC_KEY *key) {
+  return key->ecdsa_meth && (key->ecdsa_meth->flags & ECDSA_FLAG_OPAQUE);
+}
+
+const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->group; }
+
+int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group) {
+  EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
+  /* TODO(fork): duplicating the group seems wasteful but see
+   * |EC_KEY_set_conv_form|. */
+  key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
+  if (key->group == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  /* XXX: |BN_cmp| is not constant time. */
+  if (key->priv_key != NULL &&
+      BN_cmp(key->priv_key, EC_GROUP_get0_order(group)) >= 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key) {
+  return key->priv_key;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key) {
+  /* XXX: |BN_cmp| is not constant time. */
+  if (key->group != NULL &&
+      BN_cmp(priv_key, EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group)) >= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
+  key->priv_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
+  return (key->priv_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key) {
+  return key->pub_key;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key) {
+  EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
+  key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
+  return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->enc_flag; }
+
+void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags) {
+  key->enc_flag = flags;
+}
+
+point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key) {
+  return key->conv_form;
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform) {
+  key->conv_form = cform;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey) {
+  int ok = 0;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+
+  if (!eckey || !eckey->group || !eckey->pub_key) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
+  if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  /* TODO(fork): can this be skipped if the cofactor is one or if we're about
+   * to check the private key, below? */
+  if (eckey->group->meth->check_pub_key_order != NULL &&
+      !eckey->group->meth->check_pub_key_order(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key,
+                                               ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  /* in case the priv_key is present :
+   * check if generator * priv_key == pub_key
+   */
+  if (eckey->priv_key) {
+    /* XXX: |BN_cmp| is not constant time. */
+    if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, EC_GROUP_get0_order(eckey->group)) >= 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
+    if (point == NULL ||
+        !EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  EC_POINT_free(point);
+  return ok;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
+                                             BIGNUM *y) {
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
+  EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+  int ok = 0;
+
+  if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
+
+  if (ctx == NULL ||
+      point == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+  if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point, x, y, ctx) ||
+      !EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Check if retrieved coordinates match originals: if not values
+   * are out of range. */
+  if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (EC_KEY_check_key(key) == 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  EC_POINT_free(point);
+  return ok;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey) {
+  int ok = 0;
+  BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
+  EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
+
+  if (!eckey || !eckey->group) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+    priv_key = BN_new();
+    if (priv_key == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else {
+    priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
+  }
+
+  const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(eckey->group);
+  do {
+    if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, order)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } while (BN_is_zero(priv_key));
+
+  if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
+    pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
+    if (pub_key == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else {
+    pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
+  }
+
+  if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
+  eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
+    EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
+  }
+  if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+    BN_free(priv_key);
+  }
+  return ok;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+                            CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+                            CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+  int index;
+  if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, dup_func,
+                               free_func)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return index;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_set_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx, void *arg) {
+  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *EC_KEY_get_ex_data(const EC_KEY *d, int idx) {
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag) {}