awesome-grpc-that-works 0.12.2 → 0.14.0.dev

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/s3_meth.c

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+static const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD TLS_protocol_method = {
+    0 /* is_dtls */,
+    ssl3_new,
+    ssl3_free,
+    ssl3_accept,
+    ssl3_connect,
+    ssl3_get_message,
+    ssl3_read_app_data,
+    ssl3_read_change_cipher_spec,
+    ssl3_read_close_notify,
+    ssl3_write_app_data,
+    ssl3_dispatch_alert,
+    ssl3_supports_cipher,
+    SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+    ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+    ssl3_handshake_write,
+};
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLS_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD method = {
+      0,
+      &TLS_protocol_method,
+  };
+  return &method;
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void) {
+  return TLS_method();
+}
+
+/* Legacy version-locked methods. */
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD method = {
+      TLS1_2_VERSION,
+      &TLS_protocol_method,
+  };
+  return &method;
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD method = {
+      TLS1_1_VERSION,
+      &TLS_protocol_method,
+  };
+  return &method;
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD method = {
+      TLS1_VERSION,
+      &TLS_protocol_method,
+  };
+  return &method;
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD method = {
+      SSL3_VERSION,
+      &TLS_protocol_method,
+  };
+  return &method;
+}
+
+/* Legacy side-specific methods. */
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_2_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void) {
+  return SSLv3_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_2_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void) {
+  return SSLv3_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void) {
+  return SSLv23_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void) {
+  return SSLv23_method();
+}

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c

@@ -0,0 +1,732 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned len);
+
+/* kMaxWarningAlerts is the number of consecutive warning alerts that will be
+ * processed. */
+static const uint8_t kMaxWarningAlerts = 4;
+
+/* ssl3_get_record reads a new input record. On success, it places it in
+ * |ssl->s3->rrec| and returns one. Otherwise it returns <= 0 on error or if
+ * more data is needed. */
+static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *ssl) {
+  int ret;
+again:
+  /* Ensure the buffer is large enough to decrypt in-place. */
+  ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl));
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) >= ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl));
+
+  uint8_t *out = ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl);
+  size_t max_out = ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) - ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl);
+  uint8_t type, alert;
+  size_t len, consumed;
+  switch (tls_open_record(ssl, &type, out, &len, &consumed, &alert, max_out,
+                          ssl_read_buffer(ssl), ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl))) {
+    case ssl_open_record_success:
+      ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, consumed);
+
+      if (len > 0xffff) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+        return -1;
+      }
+
+      SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
+      rr->type = type;
+      rr->length = (uint16_t)len;
+      rr->data = out;
+      return 1;
+
+    case ssl_open_record_partial:
+      ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, consumed);
+      if (ret <= 0) {
+        return ret;
+      }
+      goto again;
+
+    case ssl_open_record_discard:
+      ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, consumed);
+      goto again;
+
+    case ssl_open_record_error:
+      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      return -1;
+  }
+
+  assert(0);
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int len) {
+  return ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len);
+}
+
+/* Call this to write data in records of type |type|. It will return <= 0 if
+ * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */
+int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) {
+  const uint8_t *buf = buf_;
+  unsigned int tot, n, nw;
+  int i;
+
+  s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+  assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
+  tot = s->s3->wnum;
+  s->s3->wnum = 0;
+
+  if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s) && !SSL_in_false_start(s)) {
+    i = s->handshake_func(s);
+    if (i < 0) {
+      return i;
+    }
+    if (i == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out than
+   * the the original len from a write which didn't complete for non-blocking
+   * I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for this in
+   * ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be possible to
+   * end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then promptly send
+   * beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and report the error in
+   * a way the user will notice. */
+  if (len < 0 || (size_t)len < tot) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  n = (len - tot);
+  for (;;) {
+    /* max contains the maximum number of bytes that we can put into a
+     * record. */
+    unsigned max = s->max_send_fragment;
+    if (n > max) {
+      nw = max;
+    } else {
+      nw = n;
+    }
+
+    i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
+    if (i <= 0) {
+      s->s3->wnum = tot;
+      return i;
+    }
+
+    if (i == (int)n || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+                        (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
+      return tot + i;
+    }
+
+    n -= i;
+    tot += i;
+  }
+}
+
+static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf,
+                              unsigned int len) {
+  if (s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len ||
+      (s->s3->wpend_buf != buf &&
+       !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) ||
+      s->s3->wpend_type != type) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(s);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  return s->s3->wpend_ret;
+}
+
+/* do_ssl3_write writes an SSL record of the given type. */
+static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned len) {
+  /* If there is still data from the previous record, flush it. */
+  if (ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(s)) {
+    return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
+  }
+
+  /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
+  if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+    int ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+    /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+  }
+
+  if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (len == 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t max_out = len + ssl_max_seal_overhead(s);
+  if (max_out < len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  uint8_t *out;
+  size_t ciphertext_len;
+  if (!ssl_write_buffer_init(s, &out, max_out) ||
+      !tls_seal_record(s, out, &ciphertext_len, max_out, type, buf, len)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  ssl_write_buffer_set_len(s, ciphertext_len);
+
+  /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries
+   * later */
+  s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
+  s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
+  s->s3->wpend_type = type;
+  s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
+
+  /* we now just need to write the buffer */
+  return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
+}
+
+int ssl3_read_app_data(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *buf, int len, int peek) {
+  return ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len, peek);
+}
+
+int ssl3_read_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
+  uint8_t byte;
+  int ret = ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, &byte, 1 /* len */,
+                            0 /* no peek */);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  assert(ret == 1);
+
+  if (ssl->s3->rrec.length != 0 || byte != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->msg_callback != NULL) {
+    ssl->msg_callback(0, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, &byte, 1,
+                      ssl, ssl->msg_callback_arg);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void ssl3_read_close_notify(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, 0, NULL, 0, 0);
+}
+
+static int ssl3_can_renegotiate(SSL *ssl) {
+  switch (ssl->renegotiate_mode) {
+    case ssl_renegotiate_never:
+      return 0;
+    case ssl_renegotiate_once:
+      return ssl->s3->total_renegotiations == 0;
+    case ssl_renegotiate_freely:
+      return 1;
+    case ssl_renegotiate_ignore:
+      return 1;
+  }
+
+  assert(0);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
+ * 'type' is one of the following:
+ *
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC (when ssl3_read_change_cipher_spec calls us)
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read_app_data calls us)
+ *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
+ *
+ * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
+ * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
+ *
+ * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
+ * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. */
+int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, uint8_t *buf, int len, int peek) {
+  int al, i, ret;
+  unsigned int n;
+  SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+  void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL;
+
+  if ((type && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
+       type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) ||
+      (peek && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* This may require multiple iterations. False Start will cause
+   * |s->handshake_func| to signal success one step early, but the handshake
+   * must be completely finished before other modes are accepted.
+   *
+   * TODO(davidben): Move this check up to a higher level. */
+  while (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
+    assert(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA);
+    i = s->handshake_func(s);
+    if (i < 0) {
+      return i;
+    }
+    if (i == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+start:
+  s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+  /* s->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
+   * s->s3->rrec.data    - data
+   * s->s3->rrec.off     - offset into 'data' for next read
+   * s->s3->rrec.length  - number of bytes. */
+  rr = &s->s3->rrec;
+
+  /* get new packet if necessary */
+  if (rr->length == 0) {
+    ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
+
+  /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
+   * 'peek' mode) */
+  if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+    rr->length = 0;
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (type != 0 && type == rr->type) {
+    s->s3->warning_alert_count = 0;
+
+    /* Make sure that we are not getting application data when we are doing a
+     * handshake for the first time. */
+    if (SSL_in_init(s) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+        s->aead_read_ctx == NULL) {
+      /* TODO(davidben): Is this check redundant with the handshake_func
+       * check? */
+      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* Discard empty records. */
+    if (rr->length == 0) {
+      goto start;
+    }
+
+    if (len <= 0) {
+      return len;
+    }
+
+    if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) {
+      n = rr->length;
+    } else {
+      n = (unsigned int)len;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(buf, rr->data, n);
+    if (!peek) {
+      rr->length -= n;
+      rr->data += n;
+      if (rr->length == 0) {
+        /* The record has been consumed, so we may now clear the buffer. */
+        ssl_read_buffer_discard(s);
+      }
+    }
+
+    return n;
+  }
+
+  /* Process unexpected records. */
+
+  if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+    /* If peer renegotiations are disabled, all out-of-order handshake records
+     * are fatal. Renegotiations as a server are never supported. */
+    if (s->server || !ssl3_can_renegotiate(s)) {
+      al = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* This must be a HelloRequest, possibly fragmented over multiple records.
+     * Consume data from the handshake protocol until it is complete. */
+    static const uint8_t kHelloRequest[] = {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0};
+    while (s->s3->hello_request_len < sizeof(kHelloRequest)) {
+      if (rr->length == 0) {
+        /* Get a new record. */
+        goto start;
+      }
+      if (rr->data[0] != kHelloRequest[s->s3->hello_request_len]) {
+        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+        goto f_err;
+      }
+      rr->data++;
+      rr->length--;
+      s->s3->hello_request_len++;
+    }
+    s->s3->hello_request_len = 0;
+
+    if (s->msg_callback) {
+      s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, kHelloRequest,
+                      sizeof(kHelloRequest), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s) || !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+      /* This cannot happen. If a handshake is in progress, |type| must be
+       * |SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE|. */
+      assert(0);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (s->renegotiate_mode == ssl_renegotiate_ignore) {
+      goto start;
+    }
+
+    /* Renegotiation is only supported at quiescent points in the application
+     * protocol, namely in HTTPS, just before reading the HTTP response. Require
+     * the record-layer be idle and avoid complexities of sending a handshake
+     * record while an application_data record is being written. */
+    if (ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(s)) {
+      al = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* Begin a new handshake. */
+    s->s3->total_renegotiations++;
+    s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+    i = s->handshake_func(s);
+    if (i < 0) {
+      return i;
+    }
+    if (i == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* The handshake completed synchronously. Continue reading records. */
+    goto start;
+  }
+
+  /* If an alert record, process one alert out of the record. Note that we allow
+   * a single record to contain multiple alerts. */
+  if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+    /* Alerts may not be fragmented. */
+    if (rr->length < 2) {
+      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (s->msg_callback) {
+      s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, rr->data, 2, s,
+                      s->msg_callback_arg);
+    }
+    const uint8_t alert_level = rr->data[0];
+    const uint8_t alert_descr = rr->data[1];
+    rr->length -= 2;
+    rr->data += 2;
+
+    if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
+      cb = s->info_callback;
+    } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
+      cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+    }
+
+    if (cb != NULL) {
+      uint16_t alert = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+      cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, alert);
+    }
+
+    if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
+      s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+      if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
+        s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+        return 0;
+      }
+
+      /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested renegotiation and
+       * the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal alert because if
+       * application tried to renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
+       * expects it to succeed.
+       *
+       * In future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if the
+       * peer refused it where we carry on. */
+      else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
+        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+        goto f_err;
+      }
+
+      s->s3->warning_alert_count++;
+      if (s->s3->warning_alert_count > kMaxWarningAlerts) {
+        al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARNING_ALERTS);
+        goto f_err;
+      }
+    } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+      char tmp[16];
+
+      s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+      s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+      BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr);
+      ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
+      s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+      SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
+      return 0;
+    } else {
+      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    goto start;
+  }
+
+  if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
+    /* close_notify has been sent, so discard all records other than alerts. */
+    rr->length = 0;
+    goto start;
+  }
+
+  al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+
+f_err:
+  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+err:
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) {
+  int i;
+
+  if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) {
+    i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
+  } else {
+    i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
+  }
+
+  if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
+    if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
+      /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+    if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!s->enc_method->change_cipher_state(s, i)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) {
+  /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
+  desc = s->enc_method->alert_value(desc);
+  if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
+    /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
+    desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+  }
+  if (desc < 0) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
+  if (level == 2 && s->session != NULL) {
+    SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
+  }
+
+  s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
+  s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
+  s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
+  if (!ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(s)) {
+    /* Nothing is being written out, so the alert may be dispatched
+     * immediately. */
+    return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+  }
+
+  /* else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in the
+   * future */
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) {
+  int i, j;
+  void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL;
+
+  s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
+  i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2);
+  if (i <= 0) {
+    s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
+  } else {
+    /* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now. If the message
+     * does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not worry too much. */
+    if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+      BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+    }
+
+    if (s->msg_callback) {
+      s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s,
+                      s->msg_callback_arg);
+    }
+
+    if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
+      cb = s->info_callback;
+    } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
+      cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+    }
+
+    if (cb != NULL) {
+      j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
+      cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return i;
+}