visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.3

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/internal.h

@@ -0,0 +1,810 @@
+// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+// Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BN_INTERNAL_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BN_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && defined(_MSC_VER)
+#include <intrin.h>
+#pragma intrinsic(__umulh, _umul128)
+#endif
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_64_BIT)
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_HAS_UINT128)
+// MSVC doesn't support two-word integers on 64-bit.
+#define BN_ULLONG uint128_t
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_CAN_DIVIDE_UINT128)
+#define BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#define BN_BITS2 64
+#define BN_BITS2_LG 6
+#define BN_BYTES 8
+#define BN_BITS4 32
+#define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffffffffffUL)
+#define BN_MASK2l (0xffffffffUL)
+#define BN_MASK2h (0xffffffff00000000UL)
+#define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffffffff80000000UL)
+#define BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS 1
+#define BN_DEC_CONV (10000000000000000000UL)
+#define BN_DEC_NUM 19
+#define TOBN(hi, lo) ((BN_ULONG)(hi) << 32 | (lo))
+
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT)
+
+#define BN_ULLONG uint64_t
+#define BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG
+#define BN_BITS2 32
+#define BN_BITS2_LG 5
+#define BN_BYTES 4
+#define BN_BITS4 16
+#define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffUL)
+#define BN_MASK2l (0xffffUL)
+#define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffff8000UL)
+#define BN_MASK2h (0xffff0000UL)
+// On some 32-bit platforms, Montgomery multiplication is done using 64-bit
+// arithmetic with SIMD instructions. On such platforms, `BN_MONT_CTX::n0`
+// needs to be two words long. Only certain 32-bit platforms actually make use
+// of n0[1] and shorter R value would suffice for the others. However,
+// currently only the assembly files know which is which.
+#define BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS 2
+#define BN_DEC_CONV (1000000000UL)
+#define BN_DEC_NUM 9
+#define TOBN(hi, lo) (lo), (hi)
+
+#else
+#error "Must define either OPENSSL_32_BIT or OPENSSL_64_BIT"
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__))
+#define BN_CAN_USE_INLINE_ASM
+#endif
+
+// MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN is the alignment needed for `BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime`'s
+// tables.
+//
+// TODO(davidben): Historically, this alignment came from cache line
+// assumptions, which we've since removed. Is 64-byte alignment still necessary
+// or ideal? The true alignment requirement seems to now be 32 bytes, coming
+// from RSAZ's use of VMOVDQA to a YMM register. Non-x86_64 has even fewer
+// requirements.
+#define MOD_EXP_CTIME_ALIGN 64
+
+// MOD_EXP_CTIME_STORAGE_LEN is the number of `BN_ULONG`s needed for the
+// `BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime` stack-allocated storage buffer. The buffer is
+// just the right size for the RSAZ and is about ~1KB larger than what's
+// necessary (4480 bytes) for 1024-bit inputs.
+#define MOD_EXP_CTIME_STORAGE_LEN \
+  (((320u * 3u) + (32u * 9u * 16u)) / sizeof(BN_ULONG))
+
+#define STATIC_BIGNUM(x)                                    \
+  {                                                         \
+    (BN_ULONG *)(x), sizeof(x) / sizeof(BN_ULONG),          \
+        sizeof(x) / sizeof(BN_ULONG), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA \
+  }
+
+// bn_minimal_width returns the minimal number of words needed to represent
+// `bn`.
+int bn_minimal_width(const BIGNUM *bn);
+
+// bn_set_minimal_width sets `bn->width` to `bn_minimal_width(bn)`. If `bn` is
+// zero, `bn->neg` is set to zero.
+void bn_set_minimal_width(BIGNUM *bn);
+
+// bn_wexpand ensures that `bn` has at least `words` works of space without
+// altering its value. It returns one on success or zero on allocation
+// failure.
+int bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *bn, size_t words);
+
+// bn_expand acts the same as `bn_wexpand`, but takes a number of bits rather
+// than a number of words.
+int bn_expand(BIGNUM *bn, size_t bits);
+
+// bn_resize_words adjusts `bn->width` to be `words`. It returns one on success
+// and zero on allocation error or if `bn`'s value is too large.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_resize_words(BIGNUM *bn, size_t words);
+
+// bn_select_words sets `r` to `a` if `mask` is all ones or `b` if `mask` is
+// all zeros.
+void bn_select_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG mask, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                     const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num);
+
+// bn_set_words sets `bn` to the value encoded in the `num` words in `words`,
+// least significant word first.
+int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num);
+
+// bn_set_static_words acts like `bn_set_words`, but doesn't copy the data. A
+// flag is set on `bn` so that `BN_free` won't attempt to free the data.
+//
+// The `STATIC_BIGNUM` macro is probably a better solution for this outside of
+// the FIPS module. Inside of the FIPS module that macro generates rel.ro data,
+// which doesn't work with FIPS requirements.
+void bn_set_static_words(BIGNUM *bn, const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num);
+
+// bn_fits_in_words returns one if `bn` may be represented in `num` words, plus
+// a sign bit, and zero otherwise.
+int bn_fits_in_words(const BIGNUM *bn, size_t num);
+
+// bn_copy_words copies the value of `bn` to `out` and returns one if the value
+// is representable in `num` words. Otherwise, it returns zero.
+int bn_copy_words(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, const BIGNUM *bn);
+
+// bn_assert_fits_in_bytes asserts that `bn` fits in `num` bytes. This is a
+// no-op in release builds, but triggers an assert in debug builds, and
+// declassifies all bytes which are therefore known to be zero in constant-time
+// validation.
+void bn_assert_fits_in_bytes(const BIGNUM *bn, size_t num);
+
+// bn_secret marks `bn`'s contents, but not its width or sign, as secret. See
+// `CONSTTIME_SECRET` for details.
+inline void bn_secret(BIGNUM *bn) {
+  CONSTTIME_SECRET(bn->d, bn->width * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+}
+
+// bn_declassify marks `bn`'s value as public. See `CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY` for
+// details.
+inline void bn_declassify(BIGNUM *bn) {
+  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(bn->d, bn->width * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+}
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86)
+// See asm/bn-586.pl.
+#define BN_ADD_ASM
+#define BN_MUL_ASM
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && \
+    (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__))
+// See asm/x86_64-gcc.c
+#define BN_ADD_ASM
+#define BN_MUL_ASM
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
+// See asm/bn-armv8.pl.
+#define BN_ADD_ASM
+#endif
+
+// bn_mul_add_words multiples `ap` by `w`, adds the result to `rp`, and places
+// the result in `rp`. `ap` and `rp` must both be `num` words long. It returns
+// the carry word of the operation. `ap` and `rp` may be equal but otherwise may
+// not alias.
+#if defined(BN_MUL_ASM)
+extern "C"
+#endif
+    BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, size_t num,
+                              BN_ULONG w);
+
+// bn_mul_words multiples `ap` by `w` and places the result in `rp`. `ap` and
+// `rp` must both be `num` words long. It returns the carry word of the
+// operation. `ap` and `rp` may be equal but otherwise may not alias.
+#if defined(BN_MUL_ASM)
+extern "C"
+#endif
+    BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, size_t num,
+                          BN_ULONG w);
+
+// bn_sqr_add_words computes `tmp` where `tmp[2*i]` and `tmp[2*i+1]` are
+// `ap[i]`'s square, for all `i` up to `num`, and adds the result to `rp`. If
+// the result does not fit in `2*num` words, the final carry bit is truncated.
+// `ap` is an array of `num` words and `rp` an array of `2*num` words. `ap` and
+// `rp` may not alias.
+//
+// This gives the contribution of the `ap[i]*ap[i]` terms when squaring `ap`.
+#if defined(BN_MUL_ASM)
+extern "C"
+#endif
+    void bn_sqr_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, size_t num);
+
+// bn_add_words adds `ap` to `bp` and places the result in `rp`, each of which
+// are `num` words long. It returns the carry bit, which is one if the operation
+// overflowed and zero otherwise. Any pair of `ap`, `bp`, and `rp` may be equal
+// to each other but otherwise may not alias.
+#if defined(BN_ADD_ASM)
+extern "C"
+#endif
+    BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                          size_t num);
+
+// bn_sub_words subtracts `bp` from `ap` and places the result in `rp`. It
+// returns the borrow bit, which is one if the computation underflowed and zero
+// otherwise. Any pair of `ap`, `bp`, and `rp` may be equal to each other but
+// otherwise may not alias.
+#if defined(BN_ADD_ASM)
+extern "C"
+#endif
+    BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
+                          size_t num);
+
+// bn_mul_comba4 sets `r` to the product of `a` and `b`.
+#if defined(BN_MUL_ASM)
+extern "C"
+#endif
+    void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG r[8], const BN_ULONG a[4], const BN_ULONG b[4]);
+
+// bn_mul_comba8 sets `r` to the product of `a` and `b`.
+#if defined(BN_MUL_ASM)
+extern "C"
+#endif
+    void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG r[16], const BN_ULONG a[8],
+                       const BN_ULONG b[8]);
+
+// bn_sqr_comba8 sets `r` to `a`².
+#if defined(BN_MUL_ASM)
+extern "C"
+#endif
+    void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG r[16], const BN_ULONG a[8]);
+
+// bn_sqr_comba4 sets `r` to `a`².
+#if defined(BN_MUL_ASM)
+extern "C"
+#endif
+    void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG r[8], const BN_ULONG a[4]);
+
+// bn_add_carry_words adds `carry` to `ap` and places the result in `rp`. `ap`
+// and `rp` are `num` words long and may alias. `carry` must be 0 or 1. It
+// returns the carry bit, which is one if the operation overflowed and zero
+// otherwise.
+BN_ULONG bn_add_carry_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG carry,
+                            size_t num);
+
+// bn_less_than_words returns one if `a` < `b` and zero otherwise, where `a`
+// and `b` both are `len` words long. It runs in constant time.
+int bn_less_than_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, size_t len);
+
+// bn_in_range_words returns one if `min_inclusive` <= `a` < `max_exclusive`,
+// where `a` and `max_exclusive` both are `len` words long. `a` and
+// `max_exclusive` are treated as secret.
+int bn_in_range_words(const BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG min_inclusive,
+                      const BN_ULONG *max_exclusive, size_t len);
+
+// bn_rand_range_words sets `out` to a uniformly distributed random number from
+// `min_inclusive` to `max_exclusive`. Both `out` and `max_exclusive` are `len`
+// words long.
+//
+// This function runs in time independent of the result, but `min_inclusive` and
+// `max_exclusive` are public data. (Information about the range is unavoidably
+// leaked by how many iterations it took to select a number.)
+int bn_rand_range_words(BN_ULONG *out, BN_ULONG min_inclusive,
+                        const BN_ULONG *max_exclusive, size_t len,
+                        const uint8_t additional_data[32]);
+
+// bn_range_secret_range behaves like `BN_rand_range_ex`, but treats
+// `max_exclusive` as secret. Because of this constraint, the distribution of
+// values returned is more complex.
+//
+// Rather than repeatedly generating values until one is in range, which would
+// leak information, it generates one value. If the value is in range, it sets
+// `*out_is_uniform` to one. Otherwise, it sets `*out_is_uniform` to zero,
+// fixing up the value to force it in range.
+//
+// The subset of calls to `bn_rand_secret_range` which set `*out_is_uniform` to
+// one are uniformly distributed in the target range. Calls overall are not.
+// This function is intended for use in situations where the extra values are
+// still usable and where the number of iterations needed to reach the target
+// number of uniform outputs may be blinded for negligible probabilities of
+// timing leaks.
+//
+// Although this function treats `max_exclusive` as secret, it treats the number
+// of bits in `max_exclusive` as public.
+int bn_rand_secret_range(BIGNUM *r, int *out_is_uniform, BN_ULONG min_inclusive,
+                         const BIGNUM *max_exclusive);
+
+// BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS is the maximum number of words allowed in a `BIGNUM`
+// used with Montgomery reduction. Ideally this limit would be applied to all
+// `BIGNUM`s, in `bn_wexpand`, but the exactfloat library needs to create 8 MiB
+// values for other operations.
+//
+// This limit is set so that one number fits within 2 KiB, giving room to
+// allocate a few of them on the stack. It is also set to limit the DoS impact
+// of large RSA, DH, and DSA keys, which scale cubically.
+#define BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS (16384 / BN_BITS2)
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+struct bn_mont_ctx_st {
+  // RR is R², reduced modulo `N`. It is used to convert to Montgomery form. It
+  // is guaranteed to have the same width as `N`.
+  BIGNUM RR;
+  // N is the modulus. It is always stored in minimal form, so `N.width`
+  // determines R.
+  BIGNUM N;
+  BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS];  // least significant words of (R*Ri-1)/N
+};
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) &&                         \
+    (defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || \
+     defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64))
+#define OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT
+// bn_mul_mont_words writes `ap` * `bp` mod `np` to `rp`, each `num` words
+// long. Inputs and outputs are in Montgomery form. `n0` is a pointer to the
+// corresponding field in `BN_MONT_CTX`.
+//
+// If at least one of `ap` or `bp` is fully reduced, `rp` will be fully reduced.
+// If neither is fully-reduced, the output may not be either.
+//
+// This function allocates up to 2 * `num` words (plus a constant allocation) on
+// the stack, so `num` should be at most `BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS`.
+// Additionally, `num` must be at least 128 / `BN_BITS2`.
+//
+// TODO(davidben): The x86_64 implementation expects a 32-bit input and masks
+// off upper bits. The aarch64 implementation expects a 64-bit input and does
+// not. `size_t` is the safer option but not strictly correct for x86_64. But
+// the `BN_MONTGOMERY_MAX_WORDS` bound makes this moot.
+//
+// See also discussion in `ToWord` in abi_test.h for notes on smaller-than-word
+// inputs.
+extern "C" void bn_mul_mont_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                  const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                  const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS],
+                                  size_t num);
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
+inline int bn_mulx_adx_capable() {
+  // MULX is in BMI2.
+  return CRYPTO_is_BMI2_capable() && CRYPTO_is_ADX_capable();
+}
+extern "C" void bn_mul_mont_nohw(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                 const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                 const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS],
+                                 size_t num);
+inline int bn_mul4x_mont_capable(size_t num) {
+  return num >= 8 && (num & 3) == 0;
+}
+extern "C" void bn_mul4x_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                              const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                              const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS],
+                              size_t num);
+inline int bn_mulx4x_mont_capable(size_t num) {
+  return bn_mul4x_mont_capable(num) && bn_mulx_adx_capable();
+}
+extern "C" void bn_mulx4x_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                               const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                               const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS],
+                               size_t num);
+inline int bn_sqr8x_mont_capable(size_t num) {
+  return num >= 8 && (num & 7) == 0;
+}
+extern "C" void bn_sqr8x_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                              BN_ULONG mulx_adx_capable, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                              const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS],
+                              size_t num);
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_ARM)
+inline int bn_mul8x_mont_neon_capable(size_t num) {
+  return (num & 7) == 0 && CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable();
+}
+extern "C" void bn_mul8x_mont_neon(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                   const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                   const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS],
+                                   size_t num);
+extern "C" void bn_mul_mont_nohw(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                 const BN_ULONG *bp, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                 const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS],
+                                 size_t num);
+#endif
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
+#define OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5
+
+// The following functions implement `bn_mul_mont_gather5`. See
+// `bn_mul_mont_gather5` for details.
+inline int bn_mul4x_mont_gather5_capable(int num) { return (num & 7) == 0; }
+extern "C" void bn_mul4x_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                      const BN_ULONG *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                      const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS],
+                                      int num, int power);
+
+inline int bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5_capable(int num) {
+  return bn_mul4x_mont_gather5_capable(num) && CRYPTO_is_ADX_capable() &&
+         CRYPTO_is_BMI1_capable() && CRYPTO_is_BMI2_capable();
+}
+extern "C" void bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                                       const BN_ULONG *table,
+                                       const BN_ULONG *np,
+                                       const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS],
+                                       int num, int power);
+
+extern "C" void bn_mul_mont_gather5_nohw(
+    BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
+    const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], int num, int power);
+
+// bn_scatter5 stores `inp` to index `power` of `table`. `inp` and each entry of
+// `table` are `num` words long. `power` must be less than 32 and is treated as
+// public. `table` must be 32*`num` words long. `table` must be aligned to at
+// least 16 bytes.
+extern "C" void bn_scatter5(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num, BN_ULONG *table,
+                            size_t power);
+
+// bn_gather5 loads index `power` of `table` and stores it in `out`. `out` and
+// each entry of `table` are `num` words long. `power` must be less than 32 and
+// is treated as secret. `table` must be aligned to at least 16 bytes.
+extern "C" void bn_gather5(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, const BN_ULONG *table,
+                           size_t power);
+
+// The following functions implement `bn_power5`. See `bn_power5` for details.
+extern "C" void bn_power5_nohw(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                               const BN_ULONG *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                               const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], int num,
+                               int power);
+
+inline int bn_power5_capable(int num) { return (num & 7) == 0; }
+
+inline int bn_powerx5_capable(int num) {
+  return bn_power5_capable(num) && CRYPTO_is_ADX_capable() &&
+         CRYPTO_is_BMI1_capable() && CRYPTO_is_BMI2_capable();
+}
+extern "C" void bn_powerx5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
+                           const BN_ULONG *table, const BN_ULONG *np,
+                           const BN_ULONG n0[BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS], int num,
+                           int power);
+
+#endif  // !OPENSSL_NO_ASM && OPENSSL_X86_64
+
+uint64_t bn_mont_n0(const BIGNUM *n);
+
+// bn_mont_ctx_set_RR_consttime initializes `mont->RR`. It returns one on
+// success and zero on error. `mont->N` and `mont->n0` must have been
+// initialized already. The bit width of `mont->N` is assumed public, but
+// `mont->N` is otherwise treated as secret.
+int bn_mont_ctx_set_RR_consttime(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
+#define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low, high, a, b) ((low) = _umul128((a), (b), &(high)))
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
+#define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low, high, a, b) \
+  do {                                 \
+    const BN_ULONG _a = (a);           \
+    const BN_ULONG _b = (b);           \
+    (low) = _a * _b;                   \
+    (high) = __umulh(_a, _b);          \
+  } while (0)
+#endif
+#endif  // _MSC_VER
+
+#if !defined(BN_ULLONG) && !defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI)
+#error "Either BN_ULLONG or BN_UMULT_LOHI must be defined on every platform."
+#endif
+
+// bn_jacobi returns the Jacobi symbol of `a` and `b` (which is -1, 0 or 1), or
+// -2 on error.
+int bn_jacobi(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_is_bit_set_words returns one if bit `bit` is set in `a` and zero
+// otherwise.
+int bn_is_bit_set_words(const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num, size_t bit);
+
+// bn_one_to_montgomery sets `r` to one in Montgomery form. It returns one on
+// success and zero on error. This function treats the bit width of the modulus
+// as public.
+int bn_one_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_less_than_montgomery_R returns one if `bn` is less than the Montgomery R
+// value for `mont` and zero otherwise.
+int bn_less_than_montgomery_R(const BIGNUM *bn, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+
+// bn_mod_u16_consttime returns `bn` mod `d`, ignoring `bn`'s sign bit. It runs
+// in time independent of the value of `bn`, but it treats `d` as public.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t bn_mod_u16_consttime(const BIGNUM *bn, uint16_t d);
+
+// bn_odd_number_is_obviously_composite returns one if `bn` is divisible by one
+// of the first several odd primes and zero otherwise.
+int bn_odd_number_is_obviously_composite(const BIGNUM *bn);
+
+// A BN_MILLER_RABIN stores state common to each Miller-Rabin iteration. It is
+// initialized within an existing `BN_CTX` scope and may not be used after
+// that scope is released with `BN_CTX_end`. Field names match those in FIPS
+// 186-5, section B.3.1.
+typedef struct {
+  // w1 is w-1.
+  BIGNUM *w1;
+  // m is (w-1)/2^a.
+  BIGNUM *m;
+  // one_mont is 1 (mod w) in Montgomery form.
+  BIGNUM *one_mont;
+  // w1_mont is w-1 (mod w) in Montgomery form.
+  BIGNUM *w1_mont;
+  // w_bits is BN_num_bits(w).
+  int w_bits;
+  // a is the largest integer such that 2^a divides w-1.
+  int a;
+} BN_MILLER_RABIN;
+
+// bn_miller_rabin_init initializes `miller_rabin` for testing if `mont->N` is
+// prime. It returns one on success and zero on error.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_miller_rabin_init(BN_MILLER_RABIN *miller_rabin,
+                                        const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_miller_rabin_iteration performs one Miller-Rabin iteration, checking if
+// `b` is a composite witness for `mont->N`. `miller_rabin` must have been
+// initialized with `bn_miller_rabin_setup`. On success, it returns one and sets
+// `*out_is_possibly_prime` to one if `mont->N` may still be prime or zero if
+// `b` shows it is composite. On allocation or internal failure, it returns
+// zero.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_miller_rabin_iteration(
+    const BN_MILLER_RABIN *miller_rabin, int *out_is_possibly_prime,
+    const BIGNUM *b, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_rshift1_words sets `r` to `a` >> 1, where both arrays are `num` bits wide.
+void bn_rshift1_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num);
+
+// bn_rshift_words sets `r` to `a` >> `shift`, where both arrays are `num` bits
+// wide.
+void bn_rshift_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, unsigned shift,
+                     size_t num);
+
+// bn_rshift_secret_shift behaves like `BN_rshift` but runs in time independent
+// of both `a` and `n`.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_rshift_secret_shift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                          unsigned n, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_reduce_once sets `r` to `a` mod `m` where 0 <= `a` < 2*`m`. It returns
+// zero if `a` < `m` and a mask of all ones if `a` >= `m`. Each array is `num`
+// words long, but `a` has an additional word specified by `carry`. `carry` must
+// be zero or one, as implied by the bounds on `a`.
+//
+// `r`, `a`, and `m` may not alias. Use `bn_reduce_once_in_place` if `r` and `a`
+// must alias.
+BN_ULONG bn_reduce_once(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG carry,
+                        const BN_ULONG *m, size_t num);
+
+// bn_reduce_once_in_place behaves like `bn_reduce_once` but acts in-place on
+// `r`, using `tmp` as scratch space. `r`, `tmp`, and `m` may not alias.
+BN_ULONG bn_reduce_once_in_place(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG carry, const BN_ULONG *m,
+                                 BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num);
+
+
+// Constant-time non-modular arithmetic.
+//
+// The following functions implement non-modular arithmetic in constant-time
+// and pessimally set `r->width` to the largest possible word size.
+//
+// Note this means that, e.g., repeatedly multiplying by one will cause widths
+// to increase without bound. The corresponding public API functions minimize
+// their outputs to avoid regressing calculator consumers.
+
+// bn_uadd_consttime behaves like `BN_uadd`, but it pessimally sets
+// `r->width` = `a->width` + `b->width` + 1.
+int bn_uadd_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+
+// bn_usub_consttime behaves like `BN_usub`, but it pessimally sets
+// `r->width` = `a->width`.
+int bn_usub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
+
+// bn_abs_sub_consttime sets `r` to the absolute value of `a` - `b`, treating
+// both inputs as secret. It returns one on success and zero on error.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_abs_sub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                        const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_mul_consttime behaves like `BN_mul`, but it rejects negative inputs and
+// pessimally sets `r->width` to `a->width` + `b->width`, to avoid leaking
+// information about `a` and `b`.
+int bn_mul_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_sqrt_consttime behaves like `BN_sqrt`, but it pessimally sets `r->width`
+// to 2*`a->width`, to avoid leaking information about `a` and `b`.
+int bn_sqr_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_div_consttime behaves like `BN_div`, but it rejects negative inputs and
+// treats both inputs, including their magnitudes, as secret. It is, as a
+// result, much slower than `BN_div` and should only be used for rare operations
+// where Montgomery reduction is not available. `divisor_min_bits` is a
+// public lower bound for `BN_num_bits(divisor)`. When `divisor`'s bit width is
+// public, this can speed up the operation.
+//
+// Note that `quotient->width` will be set pessimally to `numerator->width`.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_div_consttime(BIGNUM *quotient, BIGNUM *remainder,
+                                    const BIGNUM *numerator,
+                                    const BIGNUM *divisor,
+                                    unsigned divisor_min_bits, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_is_relatively_prime checks whether GCD(`x`, `y`) is one. On success, it
+// returns one and sets `*out_relatively_prime` to one if the GCD was one and
+// zero otherwise. On error, it returns zero.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_is_relatively_prime(int *out_relatively_prime,
+                                          const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y,
+                                          BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_lcm_consttime sets `r` to LCM(`a`, `b`). It returns one and success and
+// zero on error. `a` and `b` are both treated as secret.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_lcm_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                                    BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_mont_ctx_init zero-initialies `mont`.
+void bn_mont_ctx_init(BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+
+// bn_mont_ctx_cleanup releases memory associated with `mont`, without freeing
+// `mont` itself.
+void bn_mont_ctx_cleanup(BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+
+
+// Constant-time modular arithmetic.
+//
+// The following functions implement basic constant-time modular arithmetic.
+
+// bn_mod_add_words sets `r` to `a` + `b` (mod `m`), using `tmp` as scratch
+// space. Each array is `num` words long. `a` and `b` must be < `m`. Any pair of
+// `r`, `a`, and `b` may alias.
+void bn_mod_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                      const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num);
+
+// bn_mod_add_consttime acts like `BN_mod_add_quick` but takes a `BN_CTX`.
+int bn_mod_add_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                         const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_mod_sub_words sets `r` to `a` - `b` (mod `m`), using `tmp` as scratch
+// space. Each array is `num` words long. `a` and `b` must be < `m`. Any pair of
+// `r`, `a`, and `b` may alias.
+void bn_mod_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                      const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num);
+
+// bn_mod_sub_consttime acts like `BN_mod_sub_quick` but takes a `BN_CTX`.
+int bn_mod_sub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                         const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_mod_lshift1_consttime acts like `BN_mod_lshift1_quick` but takes a
+// `BN_CTX`.
+int bn_mod_lshift1_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m,
+                             BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_mod_lshift_consttime acts like `BN_mod_lshift_quick` but takes a `BN_CTX`.
+int bn_mod_lshift_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m,
+                            BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_mod_inverse_consttime sets `r` to `a`^-1, mod `n`. `a` must be non-
+// negative and less than `n`. It returns one on success and zero on error. On
+// failure, if the failure was caused by `a` having no inverse mod `n` then
+// `*out_no_inverse` will be set to one; otherwise it will be set to zero.
+//
+// This function treats both `a` and `n` as secret, provided they are both non-
+// zero and the inverse exists. It should only be used for even moduli where
+// none of the less general implementations are applicable.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int bn_mod_inverse_consttime(BIGNUM *r, int *out_no_inverse,
+                                            const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
+                                            BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+// bn_mod_inverse_prime sets `out` to the modular inverse of `a` modulo `p`,
+// computed with Fermat's Little Theorem. It returns one on success and zero on
+// error. If `mont_p` is NULL, one will be computed temporarily.
+int bn_mod_inverse_prime(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                         BN_CTX *ctx, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p);
+
+// bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime behaves like `bn_mod_inverse_prime` but uses
+// `BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime` instead of `BN_mod_exp_mont` in hopes of
+// protecting the exponent.
+int bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                BN_CTX *ctx, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p);
+
+// BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked takes `lock` and checks whether `*pmont` is NULL. If
+// so, it creates a new `BN_MONT_CTX` and sets the modulus for it to `mod`. It
+// then stores it as `*pmont`. It returns one on success and zero on error. Note
+// this function assumes `mod` is public.
+//
+// If `*pmont` is already non-NULL then it does nothing and returns one.
+int BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(UniquePtr<BN_MONT_CTX> *pmont, Mutex *lock,
+                           const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *bn_ctx);
+
+
+// Low-level operations for small numbers.
+//
+// The following functions implement algorithms suitable for use with scalars
+// and field elements in elliptic curves. They rely on the number being small
+// both to stack-allocate various temporaries and because they do not implement
+// optimizations useful for the larger values used in RSA.
+
+// BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS is the largest size input these functions handle. This
+// limit allows temporaries to be more easily stack-allocated. This limit is set
+// to accommodate P-521.
+#if defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT)
+#define BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS 17
+#else
+#define BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS 9
+#endif
+
+// bn_mul_small sets `r` to `a`*`b`. `num_r` must be `num_a` + `num_b`. `r` may
+// not alias with `a` or `b`.
+void bn_mul_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num_a,
+                 const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num_b);
+
+// bn_sqr_small sets `r` to `a`². `num_r` must be `num_a`*2. `r` and `a` may
+// not alias.
+void bn_sqr_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num_a);
+
+// In the following functions, the modulus must be at most `BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS`
+// words long.
+
+// bn_to_montgomery_small sets `r` to `a` translated to the Montgomery domain.
+// `r` and `a` are `num` words long, which must be `mont->N.width`. `a` must be
+// fully reduced and may alias `r`.
+void bn_to_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num,
+                            const BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+
+// bn_from_montgomery_small sets `r` to `a` translated out of the Montgomery
+// domain. `r` and `a` are `num_r` and `num_a` words long, respectively. `num_r`
+// must be `mont->N.width`. `a` must be at most `mont->N`² and may alias `r`.
+//
+// Unlike most of these functions, only `num_r` is bounded by
+// `BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS`. `num_a` may exceed it, but must be at most 2 * `num_r`.
+void bn_from_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                              size_t num_a, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+
+// bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small sets `r` to `a` * `b` mod `mont->N`. Both inputs
+// and outputs are in the Montgomery domain. Each array is `num` words long,
+// which must be `mont->N.width`. Any two of `r`, `a`, and `b` may alias. `a`
+// and `b` must be reduced on input.
+void bn_mod_mul_montgomery_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                                 const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num,
+                                 const BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+
+// bn_mod_exp_mont_small sets `r` to `a`^`p` mod `mont->N`. It returns one on
+// success and zero on programmer or internal error. Both inputs and outputs are
+// in the Montgomery domain. `r` and `a` are `num` words long, which must be
+// `mont->N.width` and at most `BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS`. `num_p`, measured in bits,
+// must fit in `size_t`. `a` must be fully-reduced. This function runs in time
+// independent of `a`, but `p` and `mont->N` are public values. `a` must be
+// fully-reduced and may alias with `r`.
+//
+// Note this function differs from `BN_mod_exp_mont` which uses Montgomery
+// reduction but takes input and output outside the Montgomery domain. Combine
+// this function with `bn_from_montgomery_small` and `bn_to_montgomery_small`
+// if necessary.
+void bn_mod_exp_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num,
+                           const BN_ULONG *p, size_t num_p,
+                           const BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+
+// bn_mod_inverse0_prime_mont_small sets `r` to `a`^-1 mod `mont->N`. If `a` is
+// zero, `r` is set to zero. `mont->N` must be a prime. `r` and `a` are `num`
+// words long, which must be `mont->N.width` and at most `BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS`.
+// `a` must be fully-reduced and may alias `r`. This function runs in time
+// independent of `a`, but `mont->N` is a public value.
+void bn_mod_inverse0_prime_mont_small(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                                      size_t num, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
+
+
+// Word-based byte conversion functions.
+
+// bn_big_endian_to_words interprets `in_len` bytes from `in` as a big-endian,
+// unsigned integer and writes the result to `out_len` words in `out`. `out_len`
+// must be large enough to represent any `in_len`-byte value. That is, `in_len`
+// must be at most `BN_BYTES * out_len`.
+void bn_big_endian_to_words(BN_ULONG *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *in,
+                            size_t in_len);
+
+// bn_words_to_big_endian represents `in_len` words from `in` as a big-endian,
+// unsigned integer in `out_len` bytes. It writes the result to `out`. `out_len`
+// must be large enough to represent `in` without truncation.
+//
+// Note `out_len` may be less than `BN_BYTES * in_len` if `in` is known to have
+// leading zeros.
+void bn_words_to_big_endian(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const BN_ULONG *in,
+                            size_t in_len);
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_BN_INTERNAL_H