visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.3

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/ec/simple.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+// Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+// Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+// Most method functions in this file are designed to work with non-trivial
+// representations of field elements if necessary (see ec_montgomery.cc.inc):
+// while standard modular addition and subtraction are used, the field_mul and
+// field_sqr methods will be used for multiplication, and field_encode and
+// field_decode (if defined) will be used for converting between
+// representations.
+//
+// Functions here specifically assume that if a non-trivial representation is
+// used, it is a Montgomery representation (i.e. 'encoding' means multiplying
+// by some factor R).
+//
+// TODO(crbug.com/505908440): ec_montgomery.cc.inc is now the only field element
+// representation. Fold these files together.
+
+int bssl::ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p,
+                                        const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                                        BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  // p must be a prime > 3
+  if (BN_num_bits(p) <= 2 || !BN_is_odd(p)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (tmp == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(&group->field, p, ctx) ||
+      !ec_bignum_to_felem(group, &group->a, a) ||
+      !ec_bignum_to_felem(group, &group->b, b) ||
+      // Reuse Z from the generator to cache the value one.
+      !ec_bignum_to_felem(group, &group->generator.raw.Z, BN_value_one())) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_copy(tmp, a) || !BN_add_word(tmp, 3)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  group->a_is_minus3 = (0 == BN_cmp(tmp, &group->field.N));
+  group->field_is_3_mod_4 = (group->field.N.d[0] & 3) == 3;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int bssl::ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p,
+                                        BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b) {
+  if ((p != nullptr && !BN_copy(p, &group->field.N)) ||
+      (a != nullptr && !ec_felem_to_bignum(group, a, &group->a)) ||
+      (b != nullptr && !ec_felem_to_bignum(group, b, &group->b))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void bssl::ec_GFp_simple_point_init(EC_JACOBIAN *point) {
+  OPENSSL_memset(&point->X, 0, sizeof(EC_FELEM));
+  OPENSSL_memset(&point->Y, 0, sizeof(EC_FELEM));
+  OPENSSL_memset(&point->Z, 0, sizeof(EC_FELEM));
+}
+
+void bssl::ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(EC_JACOBIAN *dest, const EC_JACOBIAN *src) {
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&dest->X, &src->X, sizeof(EC_FELEM));
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&dest->Y, &src->Y, sizeof(EC_FELEM));
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&dest->Z, &src->Z, sizeof(EC_FELEM));
+}
+
+void bssl::ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                               EC_JACOBIAN *point) {
+  // Although it is strictly only necessary to zero Z, we zero the entire point
+  // in case `point` was stack-allocated and yet to be initialized.
+  ec_GFp_simple_point_init(point);
+}
+
+void bssl::ec_GFp_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *point) {
+  ec_felem_neg(group, &point->Y, &point->Y);
+}
+
+int bssl::ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                       const EC_JACOBIAN *point) {
+  return ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &point->Z) == 0;
+}
+
+int bssl::ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                    const EC_JACOBIAN *point) {
+  // We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
+  //      y² = x³ + a⋅x + b.
+  // The point to consider is given in Jacobian projective coordinates
+  // where  (X, Y, Z)  represents  (x, y) = (X/Z², Y/Z³).
+  // Substituting this and multiplying by  Z⁶  transforms the above equation
+  // into
+  //      Y² = X³ + a⋅X⋅Z⁴ + b⋅Z⁶.
+  // To test this, we add up the right-hand side in 'rh'.
+  //
+  // This function may be used when double-checking the secret result of a point
+  // multiplication, so we proceed in constant-time.
+
+  // rh := X²
+  EC_FELEM rh;
+  ec_felem_sqr(group, &rh, &point->X);
+
+  EC_FELEM tmp, Z4, Z6;
+  ec_felem_sqr(group, &tmp, &point->Z);
+  ec_felem_sqr(group, &Z4, &tmp);
+  ec_felem_mul(group, &Z6, &Z4, &tmp);
+
+  // rh := rh + a⋅Z⁴
+  if (group->a_is_minus3) {
+    ec_felem_add(group, &tmp, &Z4, &Z4);
+    ec_felem_add(group, &tmp, &tmp, &Z4);
+    ec_felem_sub(group, &rh, &rh, &tmp);
+  } else {
+    ec_felem_mul(group, &tmp, &Z4, &group->a);
+    ec_felem_add(group, &rh, &rh, &tmp);
+  }
+
+  // rh := (rh + a⋅Z⁴)⋅X
+  ec_felem_mul(group, &rh, &rh, &point->X);
+
+  // rh := rh + b⋅Z⁶
+  ec_felem_mul(group, &tmp, &group->b, &Z6);
+  ec_felem_add(group, &rh, &rh, &tmp);
+
+  // 'lh' := Y²
+  ec_felem_sqr(group, &tmp, &point->Y);
+
+  ec_felem_sub(group, &tmp, &tmp, &rh);
+  BN_ULONG not_equal = ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &tmp);
+
+  // If Z = 0, the point is infinity, which is always on the curve.
+  BN_ULONG not_infinity = ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &point->Z);
+
+  return 1 & ~(not_infinity & not_equal);
+}
+
+int bssl::ec_GFp_simple_points_equal(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                     const EC_JACOBIAN *a,
+                                     const EC_JACOBIAN *b) {
+  // This function is implemented in constant-time for two reasons. First,
+  // although EC points are usually public, their Jacobian Z coordinates may be
+  // secret, or at least are not obviously public. Second, more complex
+  // protocols will sometimes manipulate secret points.
+  //
+  // This does mean that we pay a 6M+2S Jacobian comparison when comparing two
+  // publicly affine points costs no field operations at all. If needed, we can
+  // restore this optimization by keeping better track of affine vs. Jacobian
+  // forms. See https://crbug.com/boringssl/326.
+
+  // If neither `a` or `b` is infinity, we have to decide whether
+  //     (X_a/Z_a², Y_a/Z_a³) = (X_b/Z_b², Y_b/Z_b³),
+  // or equivalently, whether
+  //     (X_a⋅Z_b², Y_a⋅Z_b³) = (X_b⋅Z_a², Y_b⋅Z_a³).
+
+  EC_FELEM tmp1, tmp2, Za23, Zb23;
+  ec_felem_sqr(group, &Zb23, &b->Z);         // Zb23 = Z_b²
+  ec_felem_mul(group, &tmp1, &a->X, &Zb23);  // tmp1 = X_a ⋅ Z_b²
+  ec_felem_sqr(group, &Za23, &a->Z);         // Za23 = Z_a²
+  ec_felem_mul(group, &tmp2, &b->X, &Za23);  // tmp2 = X_b ⋅ Z_a²
+  ec_felem_sub(group, &tmp1, &tmp1, &tmp2);
+  const BN_ULONG x_not_equal = ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &tmp1);
+
+  ec_felem_mul(group, &Zb23, &Zb23, &b->Z);  // Zb23 = Z_b³
+  ec_felem_mul(group, &tmp1, &a->Y, &Zb23);  // tmp1 = Y_a ⋅ Z_b³
+  ec_felem_mul(group, &Za23, &Za23, &a->Z);  // Za23 = Z_a³
+  ec_felem_mul(group, &tmp2, &b->Y, &Za23);  // tmp2 = Y_b ⋅ Z_a³
+  ec_felem_sub(group, &tmp1, &tmp1, &tmp2);
+  const BN_ULONG y_not_equal = ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &tmp1);
+  const BN_ULONG x_and_y_equal = ~(x_not_equal | y_not_equal);
+
+  const BN_ULONG a_not_infinity = ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &a->Z);
+  const BN_ULONG b_not_infinity = ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &b->Z);
+  const BN_ULONG a_and_b_infinity = ~(a_not_infinity | b_not_infinity);
+
+  const BN_ULONG equal =
+      a_and_b_infinity | (a_not_infinity & b_not_infinity & x_and_y_equal);
+  return equal & 1;
+}
+
+int bssl::ec_affine_jacobian_equal(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_AFFINE *a,
+                                   const EC_JACOBIAN *b) {
+  // If `b` is not infinity, we have to decide whether
+  //     (X_a, Y_a) = (X_b/Z_b², Y_b/Z_b³),
+  // or equivalently, whether
+  //     (X_a⋅Z_b², Y_a⋅Z_b³) = (X_b, Y_b).
+
+  EC_FELEM tmp, Zb2;
+  ec_felem_sqr(group, &Zb2, &b->Z);        // Zb2 = Z_b²
+  ec_felem_mul(group, &tmp, &a->X, &Zb2);  // tmp = X_a ⋅ Z_b²
+  ec_felem_sub(group, &tmp, &tmp, &b->X);
+  const BN_ULONG x_not_equal = ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &tmp);
+
+  ec_felem_mul(group, &tmp, &a->Y, &Zb2);  // tmp = Y_a ⋅ Z_b²
+  ec_felem_mul(group, &tmp, &tmp, &b->Z);  // tmp = Y_a ⋅ Z_b³
+  ec_felem_sub(group, &tmp, &tmp, &b->Y);
+  const BN_ULONG y_not_equal = ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &tmp);
+  const BN_ULONG x_and_y_equal = ~(x_not_equal | y_not_equal);
+
+  const BN_ULONG b_not_infinity = ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, &b->Z);
+
+  const BN_ULONG equal = b_not_infinity & x_and_y_equal;
+  return equal & 1;
+}
+
+int bssl::ec_GFp_simple_cmp_x_coordinate(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                         const EC_JACOBIAN *p,
+                                         const EC_SCALAR *r) {
+  if (ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity(group, p)) {
+    // `ec_get_x_coordinate_as_scalar` will check this internally, but this way
+    // we do not push to the error queue.
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EC_SCALAR x;
+  return ec_get_x_coordinate_as_scalar(group, &x, p) &&
+         ec_scalar_equal_vartime(group, &x, r);
+}

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/ec/simple_mul.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <iterator>
+#include <type_traits>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../bn/internal.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+void bssl::ec_GFp_mont_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *r,
+                           const EC_JACOBIAN *p, const EC_SCALAR *scalar) {
+  // This is a generic implementation for uncommon curves that not do not
+  // warrant a tuned one. It uses unsigned digits so that the doubling case in
+  // `ec_GFp_mont_add` is always unreachable, erring on safety and simplicity.
+
+  // Compute a table of the first 32 multiples of `p` (including infinity).
+  EC_JACOBIAN precomp[32];
+  ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(group, &precomp[0]);
+  ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(&precomp[1], p);
+  for (size_t j = 2; j < std::size(precomp); j++) {
+    if (j & 1) {
+      ec_GFp_mont_add(group, &precomp[j], &precomp[1], &precomp[j - 1]);
+    } else {
+      ec_GFp_mont_dbl(group, &precomp[j], &precomp[j / 2]);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Divide bits in `scalar` into windows.
+  unsigned bits =  EC_GROUP_order_bits(group);
+  int r_is_at_infinity = 1;
+  for (unsigned i = bits - 1; i < bits; i--) {
+    if (!r_is_at_infinity) {
+      ec_GFp_mont_dbl(group, r, r);
+    }
+    if (i % 5 == 0) {
+      // Compute the next window value.
+      const size_t width = group->order.N.width;
+      uint8_t window = bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, i + 4) << 4;
+      window |= bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, i + 3) << 3;
+      window |= bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, i + 2) << 2;
+      window |= bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, i + 1) << 1;
+      window |= bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, i);
+
+      // Select the entry in constant-time.
+      EC_JACOBIAN tmp;
+      OPENSSL_memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(EC_JACOBIAN));
+      for (size_t j = 0; j < std::size(precomp); j++) {
+        BN_ULONG mask = constant_time_eq_w(j, window);
+        ec_point_select(group, &tmp, mask, &precomp[j], &tmp);
+      }
+
+      if (r_is_at_infinity) {
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(r, &tmp);
+        r_is_at_infinity = 0;
+      } else {
+        ec_GFp_mont_add(group, r, r, &tmp);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  if (r_is_at_infinity) {
+    ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(group, r);
+  }
+}
+
+void bssl::ec_GFp_mont_mul_base(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *r,
+                                const EC_SCALAR *scalar) {
+  ec_GFp_mont_mul(group, r, &group->generator.raw, scalar);
+}
+
+static void ec_GFp_mont_batch_precomp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *out,
+                                      size_t num, const EC_JACOBIAN *p) {
+  assert(num > 1);
+  ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(group, &out[0]);
+  ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(&out[1], p);
+  for (size_t j = 2; j < num; j++) {
+    if (j & 1) {
+      ec_GFp_mont_add(group, &out[j], &out[1], &out[j - 1]);
+    } else {
+      ec_GFp_mont_dbl(group, &out[j], &out[j / 2]);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+static void ec_GFp_mont_batch_get_window(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                         EC_JACOBIAN *out,
+                                         const EC_JACOBIAN precomp[17],
+                                         const EC_SCALAR *scalar, unsigned i) {
+  const size_t width = group->order.N.width;
+  uint8_t window = bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, i + 4) << 5;
+  window |= bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, i + 3) << 4;
+  window |= bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, i + 2) << 3;
+  window |= bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, i + 1) << 2;
+  window |= bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, i) << 1;
+  if (i > 0) {
+    window |= bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, i - 1);
+  }
+  crypto_word_t sign, digit;
+  ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, window);
+
+  // Select the entry in constant-time.
+  OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, sizeof(EC_JACOBIAN));
+  for (size_t j = 0; j < 17; j++) {
+    BN_ULONG mask = constant_time_eq_w(j, digit);
+    ec_point_select(group, out, mask, &precomp[j], out);
+  }
+
+  // Negate if necessary.
+  EC_FELEM neg_Y;
+  ec_felem_neg(group, &neg_Y, &out->Y);
+  crypto_word_t sign_mask = sign;
+  sign_mask = 0u - sign_mask;
+  ec_felem_select(group, &out->Y, sign_mask, &neg_Y, &out->Y);
+}
+
+void bssl::ec_GFp_mont_mul_batch(
+    const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *r, const EC_JACOBIAN *p0,
+    const EC_SCALAR *scalar0, const EC_JACOBIAN *p1, const EC_SCALAR *scalar1,
+    const EC_JACOBIAN *p2, const EC_SCALAR *scalar2) {
+  EC_JACOBIAN precomp[3][17];
+  ec_GFp_mont_batch_precomp(group, precomp[0], 17, p0);
+  ec_GFp_mont_batch_precomp(group, precomp[1], 17, p1);
+  if (p2 != nullptr) {
+    ec_GFp_mont_batch_precomp(group, precomp[2], 17, p2);
+  }
+
+  // Divide bits in `scalar` into windows.
+  unsigned bits = EC_GROUP_order_bits(group);
+  int r_is_at_infinity = 1;
+  for (unsigned i = bits; i <= bits; i--) {
+    if (!r_is_at_infinity) {
+      ec_GFp_mont_dbl(group, r, r);
+    }
+    if (i % 5 == 0) {
+      EC_JACOBIAN tmp;
+      ec_GFp_mont_batch_get_window(group, &tmp, precomp[0], scalar0, i);
+      if (r_is_at_infinity) {
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(r, &tmp);
+        r_is_at_infinity = 0;
+      } else {
+        ec_GFp_mont_add(group, r, r, &tmp);
+      }
+
+      ec_GFp_mont_batch_get_window(group, &tmp, precomp[1], scalar1, i);
+      ec_GFp_mont_add(group, r, r, &tmp);
+
+      if (p2 != nullptr) {
+        ec_GFp_mont_batch_get_window(group, &tmp, precomp[2], scalar2, i);
+        ec_GFp_mont_add(group, r, r, &tmp);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  if (r_is_at_infinity) {
+    ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(group, r);
+  }
+}
+
+static unsigned ec_GFp_mont_comb_stride(const EC_GROUP *group) {
+  return (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + EC_MONT_PRECOMP_COMB_SIZE - 1) /
+         EC_MONT_PRECOMP_COMB_SIZE;
+}
+
+int bssl::ec_GFp_mont_init_precomp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_PRECOMP *out,
+                                   const EC_JACOBIAN *p) {
+  // comb[i - 1] stores the ith element of the comb. That is, if i is
+  // b4 * 2^4 + b3 * 2^3 + ... + b0 * 2^0, it stores k * |p|, where k is
+  // b4 * 2^(4*stride) + b3 * 2^(3*stride) + ... + b0 * 2^(0*stride). stride
+  // here is `ec_GFp_mont_comb_stride`. We store at index i - 1 because the 0th
+  // comb entry is always infinity.
+  EC_JACOBIAN comb[(1 << EC_MONT_PRECOMP_COMB_SIZE) - 1];
+  unsigned stride = ec_GFp_mont_comb_stride(group);
+
+  // We compute the comb sequentially by the highest set bit. Initially, all
+  // entries up to 2^0 are filled.
+  comb[(1 << 0) - 1] = *p;
+  for (unsigned i = 1; i < EC_MONT_PRECOMP_COMB_SIZE; i++) {
+    // Compute entry 2^i by doubling the entry for 2^(i-1) `stride` times.
+    unsigned bit = 1 << i;
+    ec_GFp_mont_dbl(group, &comb[bit - 1], &comb[bit / 2 - 1]);
+    for (unsigned j = 1; j < stride; j++) {
+      ec_GFp_mont_dbl(group, &comb[bit - 1], &comb[bit - 1]);
+    }
+    // Compute entries from 2^i + 1 to 2^i + (2^i - 1) by adding entry 2^i to
+    // a previous entry.
+    for (unsigned j = 1; j < bit; j++) {
+      ec_GFp_mont_add(group, &comb[bit + j - 1], &comb[bit - 1], &comb[j - 1]);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Store the comb in affine coordinates to shrink the table. (This reduces
+  // cache pressure and makes the constant-time selects faster.)
+  static_assert(
+      std::extent_v<decltype(comb)> == std::extent_v<decltype(out->comb)>,
+      "comb sizes did not match");
+  return ec_jacobian_to_affine_batch(group, out->comb, comb, std::size(comb));
+}
+
+static void ec_GFp_mont_get_comb_window(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                        EC_JACOBIAN *out,
+                                        const EC_PRECOMP *precomp,
+                                        const EC_SCALAR *scalar, unsigned i) {
+  const size_t width = group->order.N.width;
+  unsigned stride = ec_GFp_mont_comb_stride(group);
+  // Select the bits corresponding to the comb shifted up by `i`.
+  unsigned window = 0;
+  for (unsigned j = 0; j < EC_MONT_PRECOMP_COMB_SIZE; j++) {
+    window |= bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, width, j * stride + i)
+              << j;
+  }
+
+  // Select precomp->comb[window - 1]. If `window` is zero, `match` will always
+  // be zero, which will leave `out` at infinity.
+  OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, sizeof(EC_JACOBIAN));
+  for (unsigned j = 0; j < std::size(precomp->comb); j++) {
+    BN_ULONG match = constant_time_eq_w(window, j + 1);
+    ec_felem_select(group, &out->X, match, &precomp->comb[j].X, &out->X);
+    ec_felem_select(group, &out->Y, match, &precomp->comb[j].Y, &out->Y);
+  }
+  BN_ULONG is_infinity = constant_time_is_zero_w(window);
+  ec_felem_select(group, &out->Z, is_infinity, &out->Z, ec_felem_one(group));
+}
+
+void bssl::ec_GFp_mont_mul_precomp(
+    const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *r, const EC_PRECOMP *p0,
+    const EC_SCALAR *scalar0, const EC_PRECOMP *p1, const EC_SCALAR *scalar1,
+    const EC_PRECOMP *p2, const EC_SCALAR *scalar2) {
+  unsigned stride = ec_GFp_mont_comb_stride(group);
+  int r_is_at_infinity = 1;
+  for (unsigned i = stride - 1; i < stride; i--) {
+    if (!r_is_at_infinity) {
+      ec_GFp_mont_dbl(group, r, r);
+    }
+
+    EC_JACOBIAN tmp;
+    ec_GFp_mont_get_comb_window(group, &tmp, p0, scalar0, i);
+    if (r_is_at_infinity) {
+      ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(r, &tmp);
+      r_is_at_infinity = 0;
+    } else {
+      ec_GFp_mont_add(group, r, r, &tmp);
+    }
+
+    if (p1 != nullptr) {
+      ec_GFp_mont_get_comb_window(group, &tmp, p1, scalar1, i);
+      ec_GFp_mont_add(group, r, r, &tmp);
+    }
+
+    if (p2 != nullptr) {
+      ec_GFp_mont_get_comb_window(group, &tmp, p2, scalar2, i);
+      ec_GFp_mont_add(group, r, r, &tmp);
+    }
+  }
+  if (r_is_at_infinity) {
+    ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(group, r);
+  }
+}