visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.3

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/ssl/d1_lib.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+// Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+namespace {
+inline uint64_t ToMicros(const OPENSSL_timeval& now) {
+  uint64_t us = now.tv_sec;
+  us *= 1000000;
+  us += now.tv_usec;
+  return us;
+}
+}  // namespace
+
+DTLS1_STATE::DTLS1_STATE()
+    : has_change_cipher_spec(false),
+      outgoing_messages_complete(false),
+      flight_has_reply(false),
+      handshake_write_overflow(false),
+      handshake_read_overflow(false),
+      sending_flight(false),
+      sending_ack(false),
+      pending_flush(false),
+      queued_key_update(QueuedKeyUpdate::kNone) {}
+
+DTLS1_STATE::~DTLS1_STATE() {}
+
+bool DTLS1_STATE::Init() {
+  // Set up the initial epochs.
+  read_epoch.aead = SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher();
+  write_epoch.aead = SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher();
+  if (read_epoch.aead == nullptr || write_epoch.aead == nullptr) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool dtls1_new(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  if (!tls_new(ssl)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  UniquePtr<DTLS1_STATE> d1 = MakeUnique<DTLS1_STATE>();
+  if (!d1 || !d1->Init()) {
+    tls_free(ssl);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  ssl->d1 = d1.release();
+  return true;
+}
+
+void dtls1_free(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  tls_free(ssl);
+
+  if (ssl == nullptr) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  Delete(ssl->d1);
+  ssl->d1 = nullptr;
+}
+
+void DTLSTimer::StartMicroseconds(OPENSSL_timeval now, uint64_t microseconds) {
+  start_time_ = ToMicros(now);
+  duration_ = microseconds;
+}
+
+void DTLSTimer::Stop() { duration_ = kNever; }
+
+bool DTLSTimer::IsExpired(OPENSSL_timeval now) const {
+  return MicrosecondsRemaining(now) == 0;
+}
+
+bool DTLSTimer::IsSet() const {
+  return duration_ != kNever;
+}
+
+uint64_t DTLSTimer::MicrosecondsRemaining(OPENSSL_timeval now) const {
+  if (!IsSet()) {
+    return kNever;
+  }
+
+  uint64_t now_us = ToMicros(now);
+  uint64_t expire_us = start_time_ + duration_;
+  if (now_us > expire_us) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint64_t remain_us = expire_us - now_us;
+  // If remaining time is less than 15 ms, return 0 to prevent issues because of
+  // small divergences with socket timeouts.
+  if (remain_us < 15000) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return remain_us;
+}
+
+void dtls1_stop_timer(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  ssl->d1->num_timeouts = 0;
+  ssl->d1->retransmit_timer.Stop();
+  ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms = ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+void DTLSv1_set_initial_timeout_duration(SSL *ssl, uint32_t duration_ms) {
+  auto *ssl_impl = FromOpaque(ssl);
+  if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl_impl)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Modify the initial value for next flight.
+  ssl_impl->initial_timeout_duration_ms = duration_ms;
+
+  // Retransmit timer increase by factor of 2 at each timeout.
+  uint32_t timeout_duration_ms = duration_ms << ssl_impl->d1->num_timeouts;
+  if (timeout_duration_ms < duration_ms) {
+    timeout_duration_ms = uint32_t{60000};
+  } else {
+    timeout_duration_ms = std::min(timeout_duration_ms, uint32_t{60000});
+  }
+
+  // Modify the value used for next timeout.
+  ssl_impl->d1->timeout_duration_ms = timeout_duration_ms;
+
+  // Modify retransmit timer.
+  if (ssl_impl->d1->retransmit_timer.IsSet()) {
+    ssl_impl->d1->retransmit_timer.UpdateDuration(
+        uint64_t{timeout_duration_ms} * 1000);
+  }
+
+  // Modify ack timer.
+  if (ssl_impl->d1->ack_timer.IsSet()) {
+    ssl_impl->d1->ack_timer.UpdateDuration(uint64_t{timeout_duration_ms} *
+                                           1000 / 4);
+  }
+}
+
+int DTLSv1_get_timeout(const SSL *ssl, struct timeval *out) {
+  const auto *ssl_impl = FromOpaque(ssl);
+  if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl_impl)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_timeval now = ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl_impl->ctx.get());
+  uint64_t remaining_usec =
+      ssl_impl->d1->retransmit_timer.MicrosecondsRemaining(now);
+  remaining_usec = std::min(remaining_usec,
+                            ssl_impl->d1->ack_timer.MicrosecondsRemaining(now));
+  if (remaining_usec == DTLSTimer::kNever) {
+    return 0;  // No timeout is set.
+  }
+
+  uint64_t remaining_sec = remaining_usec / 1000000;
+  remaining_usec %= 1000000;
+
+  // `timeval` uses `time_t`, which may be 32-bit.
+  const auto kTvSecMax = std::numeric_limits<decltype(out->tv_sec)>::max();
+  if (remaining_sec > static_cast<uint64_t>(kTvSecMax)) {
+    out->tv_sec = kTvSecMax;  // Saturate the output.
+    out->tv_usec = 999999;
+  } else {
+    out->tv_sec = static_cast<decltype(out->tv_sec)>(remaining_sec);
+  }
+  out->tv_usec = remaining_usec;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int DTLSv1_handle_timeout(SSL *ssl) {
+  auto *ssl_impl = FromOpaque(ssl);
+  ssl_reset_error_state(ssl_impl);
+
+  if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl_impl)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_impl->d1->ack_timer.IsSet() &&
+      !ssl_impl->d1->retransmit_timer.IsSet()) {
+    // No timers are running. Don't bother querying the clock.
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_timeval now = ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl_impl->ctx.get());
+  bool any_timer_expired = false;
+  if (ssl_impl->d1->ack_timer.IsExpired(now)) {
+    any_timer_expired = true;
+    ssl_impl->d1->sending_ack = true;
+    ssl_impl->d1->ack_timer.Stop();
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_impl->d1->retransmit_timer.IsExpired(now)) {
+    any_timer_expired = true;
+    ssl_impl->d1->sending_flight = true;
+    ssl_impl->d1->retransmit_timer.Stop();
+
+    ssl_impl->d1->num_timeouts++;
+    // Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions.
+    if (ssl_impl->d1->num_timeouts > DTLS1_MTU_TIMEOUTS &&
+        !(SSL_get_options(ssl_impl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+      long mtu = BIO_ctrl(ssl_impl->wbio.get(), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU,
+                          0, nullptr);
+      if (mtu >= 0 && mtu <= (1 << 30) && (unsigned)mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()) {
+        ssl_impl->d1->mtu = (unsigned)mtu;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!any_timer_expired) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return dtls1_flush(ssl_impl);
+}

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/ssl/d1_pkt.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
+// Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_process_ack(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                    DTLSRecordNumber ack_record_number,
+                                    Span<const uint8_t> data) {
+  // As a DTLS-1.3-capable client, it is possible to receive an ACK before we
+  // receive ServerHello and learned the server picked DTLS 1.3. Thus, tolerate
+  // but ignore ACKs before the version is set.
+  if (!ssl_has_final_version(ssl)) {
+    return ssl_open_record_discard;
+  }
+
+  // ACKs are only allowed in DTLS 1.3. Reject them if we've negotiated a
+  // version and it's not 1.3.
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  CBS cbs = data, record_numbers;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &record_numbers) ||
+      CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  while (CBS_len(&record_numbers) != 0) {
+    uint64_t epoch, seq;
+    if (!CBS_get_u64(&record_numbers, &epoch) ||
+        !CBS_get_u64(&record_numbers, &seq)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+
+    // During the handshake, records must be ACKed at the same or higher epoch.
+    // See https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid8108. Additionally, if the
+    // record does not fit in DTLSRecordNumber, it is definitely not a record
+    // number that we sent.
+    if ((ack_record_number.epoch() < ssl_encryption_application &&
+         epoch > ack_record_number.epoch()) ||
+        epoch > UINT16_MAX || seq > DTLSRecordNumber::kMaxSequence) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+
+    // Find the sent record that matches this ACK.
+    DTLSRecordNumber number(static_cast<uint16_t>(epoch), seq);
+    DTLSSentRecord *sent_record = nullptr;
+    if (ssl->d1->sent_records != nullptr) {
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < ssl->d1->sent_records->size(); i++) {
+        if ((*ssl->d1->sent_records)[i].number == number) {
+          sent_record = &(*ssl->d1->sent_records)[i];
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (sent_record == nullptr) {
+      // We may have sent this record and forgotten it, so this is not an error.
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // Mark each message as ACKed.
+    if (sent_record->first_msg == sent_record->last_msg) {
+      ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[sent_record->first_msg].acked.MarkRange(
+          sent_record->first_msg_start, sent_record->last_msg_end);
+    } else {
+      ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[sent_record->first_msg].acked.MarkRange(
+          sent_record->first_msg_start, SIZE_MAX);
+      for (size_t i = size_t{sent_record->first_msg} + 1;
+           i < sent_record->last_msg; i++) {
+        ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[i].acked.MarkRange(0, SIZE_MAX);
+      }
+      if (sent_record->last_msg_end != 0) {
+        ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[sent_record->last_msg].acked.MarkRange(
+            0, sent_record->last_msg_end);
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Clear the state so we don't bother re-marking the messages next time.
+    sent_record->first_msg = 0;
+    sent_record->first_msg_start = 0;
+    sent_record->last_msg = 0;
+    sent_record->last_msg_end = 0;
+  }
+
+  // If the outgoing flight is now fully ACKed, we are done retransmitting.
+  if (std::all_of(ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.begin(),
+                  ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.end(),
+                  [](const auto &msg) { return msg.IsFullyAcked(); })) {
+    dtls1_stop_timer(ssl);
+    dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(ssl);
+
+    // DTLS 1.3 defers the key update to when the message is ACKed.
+    if (ssl->s3->key_update_pending) {
+      if (!tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal)) {
+        return ssl_open_record_error;
+      }
+      ssl->s3->key_update_pending = false;
+    }
+
+    // Check for deferred messages.
+    if (ssl->d1->queued_key_update != QueuedKeyUpdate::kNone) {
+      int request_type =
+          ssl->d1->queued_key_update == QueuedKeyUpdate::kUpdateRequested
+              ? SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
+              : SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
+      ssl->d1->queued_key_update = QueuedKeyUpdate::kNone;
+      if (!tls13_add_key_update(ssl, request_type)) {
+        return ssl_open_record_error;
+      }
+    }
+  } else {
+    // We may still be able to drop unused write epochs.
+    dtls_clear_unused_write_epochs(ssl);
+
+    // TODO(crbug.com/383016430): Schedule a retransmit. The peer will have
+    // waited before sending the ACK, so a partial ACK suggests packet loss.
+  }
+
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, /*is_write=*/0, SSL3_RT_ACK, data);
+  return ssl_open_record_discard;
+}
+
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_app_data(SSLImpl *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
+                                      size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      Span<uint8_t> in) {
+  assert(!SSL_in_init(ssl));
+
+  uint8_t type;
+  DTLSRecordNumber record_number;
+  Span<uint8_t> record;
+  auto ret = dtls_open_record(ssl, &type, &record_number, &record, out_consumed,
+                              out_alert, in);
+  if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+    // Process handshake fragments for DTLS 1.3 post-handshake messages.
+    if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+      if (!dtls1_process_handshake_fragments(ssl, out_alert, record_number,
+                                             record)) {
+        return ssl_open_record_error;
+      }
+      return ssl_open_record_discard;
+    }
+
+    // Parse the first fragment header to determine if this is a pre-CCS or
+    // post-CCS handshake record. DTLS resets handshake message numbers on each
+    // handshake, so renegotiations and retransmissions are ambiguous.
+    //
+    // TODO(crbug.com/383016430): Move this logic into
+    // `dtls1_process_handshake_fragments` and integrate it into DTLS 1.3
+    // retransmit conditions.
+    CBS cbs, body;
+    DTLSHandshakeHeader msg_hdr;
+    CBS_init(&cbs, record.data(), record.size());
+    if (!dtls1_parse_fragment(&cbs, &msg_hdr, &body)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+
+    if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED &&
+        msg_hdr.seq == ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq - 1) {
+      if (!ssl->d1->sending_flight && msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) {
+        // Retransmit our last flight of messages. If the peer sends the second
+        // Finished, they may not have received ours. Only do this for the
+        // first fragment, in case the Finished was fragmented.
+        //
+        // This is not really a timeout, but increment the timeout count so we
+        // eventually give up.
+        ssl->d1->num_timeouts++;
+        ssl->d1->sending_flight = true;
+      }
+      return ssl_open_record_discard;
+    }
+
+    // Otherwise, this is a pre-CCS handshake message from an unsupported
+    // renegotiation attempt. Fall through to the error path.
+  }
+
+  if (type == SSL3_RT_ACK) {
+    return dtls1_process_ack(ssl, out_alert, record_number, record);
+  }
+
+  if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  if (record.empty()) {
+    return ssl_open_record_discard;
+  }
+
+  *out = record;
+  return ssl_open_record_success;
+}
+
+int dtls1_write_app_data(SSLImpl *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake,
+                         size_t *out_bytes_written, Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+  assert(!SSL_in_init(ssl));
+  *out_needs_handshake = false;
+
+  if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // DTLS does not split the input across records.
+  if (in.size() > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (in.empty()) {
+    *out_bytes_written = 0;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // TODO(crbug.com/381113363): Use the 0-RTT epoch if writing 0-RTT.
+  int ret = dtls1_write_record(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, in,
+                               ssl->d1->write_epoch.epoch());
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  *out_bytes_written = in.size();
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_write_record(SSLImpl *ssl, int type, Span<const uint8_t> in,
+                       uint16_t epoch) {
+  SSLBuffer *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
+  assert(in.size() <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+  // There should never be a pending write buffer in DTLS. One can't write half
+  // a datagram, so the write buffer is always dropped in
+  // `ssl_write_buffer_flush`.
+  assert(buf->empty());
+
+  if (in.size() > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  DTLSRecordNumber record_number;
+  size_t ciphertext_len;
+  if (!buf->EnsureCap(dtls_seal_prefix_len(ssl, epoch),
+                      in.size() + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl)) ||
+      !dtls_seal_record(ssl, &record_number, buf->remaining().data(),
+                        &ciphertext_len, buf->remaining().size(), type,
+                        in.data(), in.size(), epoch)) {
+    buf->Clear();
+    return -1;
+  }
+  buf->DidWrite(ciphertext_len);
+
+  int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  int ret = dtls1_write_record(ssl, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert,
+                               ssl->d1->write_epoch.epoch());
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = false;
+
+  // If the alert is fatal, flush the BIO now.
+  if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+    BIO_flush(ssl->wbio.get());
+  }
+
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert);
+
+  int alert = (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | ssl->s3->send_alert[1];
+  ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, alert);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/ssl/d1_srtp.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+// Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+// Copyright (C) 2006, Network Resonance, Inc.
+// Copyright (C) 2011, RTFM, Inc.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+// DTLS code by Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+static const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE kSRTPProfiles[] = {
+    {"SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80", SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80},
+    {"SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32", SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32},
+    {"SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM", SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM},
+    {"SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM", SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM},
+    {nullptr, 0},
+};
+
+static int find_profile_by_name(const char *profile_name,
+                                const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr,
+                                size_t len) {
+  const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p = kSRTPProfiles;
+  while (p->name) {
+    if (len == strlen(p->name) && !strncmp(p->name, profile_name, len)) {
+      *pptr = p;
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+    p++;
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(
+    const char *profiles_string,
+    UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE)> *out) {
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE)> profiles(
+      sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null());
+  if (profiles == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const char *col;
+  const char *ptr = profiles_string;
+  do {
+    col = strchr(ptr, ':');
+
+    const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *profile;
+    if (!find_profile_by_name(ptr, &profile,
+                              col ? (size_t)(col - ptr) : strlen(ptr))) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles.get(), profile)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (col) {
+      ptr = col + 1;
+    }
+  } while (col);
+
+  *out = std::move(profiles);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_srtp_profiles(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles) {
+  return ssl_ctx_make_profiles(profiles, &FromOpaque(ctx)->srtp_profiles);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl, const char *profiles) {
+  auto *ssl_impl = FromOpaque(ssl);
+  return ssl_impl->config != nullptr &&
+         ssl_ctx_make_profiles(profiles, &ssl_impl->config->srtp_profiles);
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(const SSL *ssl) {
+  auto *ssl_impl = FromOpaque(ssl);
+  if (ssl_impl == nullptr) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_impl->config == nullptr) {
+    assert(0);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  return ssl_impl->config->srtp_profiles != nullptr
+             ? ssl_impl->config->srtp_profiles.get()
+             : ssl_impl->ctx->srtp_profiles.get();
+}
+
+const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *ssl) {
+  return FromOpaque(ssl)->s3->srtp_profile;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *profiles) {
+  // This API inverts its return value.
+  return !SSL_CTX_set_srtp_profiles(ctx, profiles);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp(SSL *ssl, const char *profiles) {
+  // This API inverts its return value.
+  return !SSL_set_srtp_profiles(ssl, profiles);
+}