visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.3

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/entropy/sha512.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+// Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+#include <openssl/sha2.h>
+
+
+// This is a copy of the SHA-384 code for the purpose of isolating the jitter
+// entropy source certification from any changes to the normal implementation.
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+namespace entropy {
+namespace {
+
+constexpr size_t kSHA384Block = 128;
+constexpr size_t kSHA384DigestLength = (384 / 8);
+
+struct SHA512_CTX {
+  uint64_t h[8];
+  uint64_t Nl, Nh;
+  uint8_t p[kSHA384Block];
+  unsigned num, md_len;
+};
+
+uint64_t CRYPTO_bswap8(uint64_t x) { return __builtin_bswap64(x); }
+
+uint64_t CRYPTO_load_u64_be(const void *ptr) {
+  uint64_t ret;
+  memcpy(&ret, ptr, sizeof(ret));
+  return CRYPTO_bswap8(ret);
+}
+
+void CRYPTO_store_u64_be(void *out, uint64_t v) {
+  v = CRYPTO_bswap8(v);
+  memcpy(out, &v, sizeof(v));
+}
+
+uint64_t CRYPTO_rotr_u64(uint64_t value, int shift) {
+  return (value >> shift) | (value << ((-shift) & 63));
+}
+
+void sha512_update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *in_data, size_t len);
+void sha512_final_impl(uint8_t *out, size_t md_len, SHA512_CTX *sha);
+
+void SHA384_Init(SHA512_CTX *sha) {
+  sha->h[0] = UINT64_C(0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8);
+  sha->h[1] = UINT64_C(0x629a292a367cd507);
+  sha->h[2] = UINT64_C(0x9159015a3070dd17);
+  sha->h[3] = UINT64_C(0x152fecd8f70e5939);
+  sha->h[4] = UINT64_C(0x67332667ffc00b31);
+  sha->h[5] = UINT64_C(0x8eb44a8768581511);
+  sha->h[6] = UINT64_C(0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7);
+  sha->h[7] = UINT64_C(0x47b5481dbefa4fa4);
+
+  sha->Nl = 0;
+  sha->Nh = 0;
+  sha->num = 0;
+  sha->md_len = kSHA384DigestLength;
+  return;
+}
+
+void SHA384_Final(uint8_t out[kSHA384DigestLength], SHA512_CTX *sha) {
+  // This function must be paired with `SHA384_Init`, which sets
+  // `sha->md_len` to `kSHA384DigestLength`.
+  sha512_final_impl(out, kSHA384DigestLength, sha);
+  return;
+}
+
+void SHA384_Update(SHA512_CTX *sha, const void *data, size_t len) {
+  return sha512_update(sha, data, len);
+}
+
+void sha512_block_data_order(uint64_t state[8], const uint8_t *in,
+                             size_t num_blocks);
+
+void sha512_final_impl(uint8_t *out, size_t md_len, SHA512_CTX *sha) {
+  uint8_t *p = sha->p;
+  size_t n = sha->num;
+
+  p[n] = 0x80;  // There always is a room for one
+  n++;
+  if (n > (sizeof(sha->p) - 16)) {
+    memset(p + n, 0, sizeof(sha->p) - n);
+    n = 0;
+    sha512_block_data_order(sha->h, p, 1);
+  }
+
+  memset(p + n, 0, sizeof(sha->p) - 16 - n);
+  CRYPTO_store_u64_be(p + sizeof(sha->p) - 16, sha->Nh);
+  CRYPTO_store_u64_be(p + sizeof(sha->p) - 8, sha->Nl);
+
+  sha512_block_data_order(sha->h, p, 1);
+
+  const size_t out_words = md_len / 8;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < out_words; i++) {
+    CRYPTO_store_u64_be(out, sha->h[i]);
+    out += 8;
+  }
+}
+
+const uint64_t K512[80] = {
+    UINT64_C(0x428a2f98d728ae22), UINT64_C(0x7137449123ef65cd),
+    UINT64_C(0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f), UINT64_C(0xe9b5dba58189dbbc),
+    UINT64_C(0x3956c25bf348b538), UINT64_C(0x59f111f1b605d019),
+    UINT64_C(0x923f82a4af194f9b), UINT64_C(0xab1c5ed5da6d8118),
+    UINT64_C(0xd807aa98a3030242), UINT64_C(0x12835b0145706fbe),
+    UINT64_C(0x243185be4ee4b28c), UINT64_C(0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2),
+    UINT64_C(0x72be5d74f27b896f), UINT64_C(0x80deb1fe3b1696b1),
+    UINT64_C(0x9bdc06a725c71235), UINT64_C(0xc19bf174cf692694),
+    UINT64_C(0xe49b69c19ef14ad2), UINT64_C(0xefbe4786384f25e3),
+    UINT64_C(0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5), UINT64_C(0x240ca1cc77ac9c65),
+    UINT64_C(0x2de92c6f592b0275), UINT64_C(0x4a7484aa6ea6e483),
+    UINT64_C(0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4), UINT64_C(0x76f988da831153b5),
+    UINT64_C(0x983e5152ee66dfab), UINT64_C(0xa831c66d2db43210),
+    UINT64_C(0xb00327c898fb213f), UINT64_C(0xbf597fc7beef0ee4),
+    UINT64_C(0xc6e00bf33da88fc2), UINT64_C(0xd5a79147930aa725),
+    UINT64_C(0x06ca6351e003826f), UINT64_C(0x142929670a0e6e70),
+    UINT64_C(0x27b70a8546d22ffc), UINT64_C(0x2e1b21385c26c926),
+    UINT64_C(0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed), UINT64_C(0x53380d139d95b3df),
+    UINT64_C(0x650a73548baf63de), UINT64_C(0x766a0abb3c77b2a8),
+    UINT64_C(0x81c2c92e47edaee6), UINT64_C(0x92722c851482353b),
+    UINT64_C(0xa2bfe8a14cf10364), UINT64_C(0xa81a664bbc423001),
+    UINT64_C(0xc24b8b70d0f89791), UINT64_C(0xc76c51a30654be30),
+    UINT64_C(0xd192e819d6ef5218), UINT64_C(0xd69906245565a910),
+    UINT64_C(0xf40e35855771202a), UINT64_C(0x106aa07032bbd1b8),
+    UINT64_C(0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8), UINT64_C(0x1e376c085141ab53),
+    UINT64_C(0x2748774cdf8eeb99), UINT64_C(0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8),
+    UINT64_C(0x391c0cb3c5c95a63), UINT64_C(0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb),
+    UINT64_C(0x5b9cca4f7763e373), UINT64_C(0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3),
+    UINT64_C(0x748f82ee5defb2fc), UINT64_C(0x78a5636f43172f60),
+    UINT64_C(0x84c87814a1f0ab72), UINT64_C(0x8cc702081a6439ec),
+    UINT64_C(0x90befffa23631e28), UINT64_C(0xa4506cebde82bde9),
+    UINT64_C(0xbef9a3f7b2c67915), UINT64_C(0xc67178f2e372532b),
+    UINT64_C(0xca273eceea26619c), UINT64_C(0xd186b8c721c0c207),
+    UINT64_C(0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e), UINT64_C(0xf57d4f7fee6ed178),
+    UINT64_C(0x06f067aa72176fba), UINT64_C(0x0a637dc5a2c898a6),
+    UINT64_C(0x113f9804bef90dae), UINT64_C(0x1b710b35131c471b),
+    UINT64_C(0x28db77f523047d84), UINT64_C(0x32caab7b40c72493),
+    UINT64_C(0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc), UINT64_C(0x431d67c49c100d4c),
+    UINT64_C(0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6), UINT64_C(0x597f299cfc657e2a),
+    UINT64_C(0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec), UINT64_C(0x6c44198c4a475817),
+};
+
+#define Sigma0(x)                                        \
+  (CRYPTO_rotr_u64((x), 28) ^ CRYPTO_rotr_u64((x), 34) ^ \
+   CRYPTO_rotr_u64((x), 39))
+#define Sigma1(x)                                        \
+  (CRYPTO_rotr_u64((x), 14) ^ CRYPTO_rotr_u64((x), 18) ^ \
+   CRYPTO_rotr_u64((x), 41))
+#define sigma0(x) \
+  (CRYPTO_rotr_u64((x), 1) ^ CRYPTO_rotr_u64((x), 8) ^ ((x) >> 7))
+#define sigma1(x) \
+  (CRYPTO_rotr_u64((x), 19) ^ CRYPTO_rotr_u64((x), 61) ^ ((x) >> 6))
+
+#define Ch(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z)))
+#define Maj(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
+
+#define ROUND_00_15(i, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h)   \
+  do {                                           \
+    T1 += h + Sigma1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[i]; \
+    h = Sigma0(a) + Maj(a, b, c);                \
+    d += T1;                                     \
+    h += T1;                                     \
+  } while (0)
+
+#define ROUND_16_80(i, j, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, X)   \
+  do {                                                 \
+    s0 = X[(j + 1) & 0x0f];                            \
+    s0 = sigma0(s0);                                   \
+    s1 = X[(j + 14) & 0x0f];                           \
+    s1 = sigma1(s1);                                   \
+    T1 = X[(j) & 0x0f] += s0 + s1 + X[(j + 9) & 0x0f]; \
+    ROUND_00_15(i + j, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h);        \
+  } while (0)
+
+void sha512_block_data_order(uint64_t state[8], const uint8_t *in, size_t num) {
+  uint64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1, T1;
+  uint64_t X[16];
+  int i;
+
+  while (num--) {
+    a = state[0];
+    b = state[1];
+    c = state[2];
+    d = state[3];
+    e = state[4];
+    f = state[5];
+    g = state[6];
+    h = state[7];
+
+    T1 = X[0] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in);
+    ROUND_00_15(0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h);
+    T1 = X[1] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g);
+    T1 = X[2] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 2 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f);
+    T1 = X[3] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 3 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e);
+    T1 = X[4] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 4 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d);
+    T1 = X[5] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 5 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c);
+    T1 = X[6] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 6 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b);
+    T1 = X[7] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 7 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a);
+    T1 = X[8] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 8 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(8, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h);
+    T1 = X[9] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 9 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(9, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g);
+    T1 = X[10] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 10 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(10, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f);
+    T1 = X[11] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 11 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(11, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e);
+    T1 = X[12] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 12 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(12, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d);
+    T1 = X[13] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 13 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(13, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c);
+    T1 = X[14] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 14 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(14, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b);
+    T1 = X[15] = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in + 15 * 8);
+    ROUND_00_15(15, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a);
+
+    for (i = 16; i < 80; i += 16) {
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 1, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 2, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 3, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 4, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 5, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 6, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 7, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 8, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 9, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 10, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 11, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 12, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 13, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 14, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, X);
+      ROUND_16_80(i, 15, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, X);
+    }
+
+    state[0] += a;
+    state[1] += b;
+    state[2] += c;
+    state[3] += d;
+    state[4] += e;
+    state[5] += f;
+    state[6] += g;
+    state[7] += h;
+
+    in += 16 * 8;
+  }
+}
+
+#undef Sigma0
+#undef Sigma1
+#undef sigma0
+#undef sigma1
+#undef Ch
+#undef Maj
+#undef ROUND_00_15
+#undef ROUND_16_80
+
+void sha512_update(SHA512_CTX *c, const void *in_data, size_t len) {
+  uint64_t l;
+  uint8_t *p = c->p;
+  const uint8_t *data = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(in_data);
+
+  if (len == 0) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  l = (c->Nl + (((uint64_t)len) << 3)) & UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff);
+  if (l < c->Nl) {
+    c->Nh++;
+  }
+  if (sizeof(len) >= 8) {
+    c->Nh += (((uint64_t)len) >> 61);
+  }
+  c->Nl = l;
+
+  if (c->num != 0) {
+    size_t n = sizeof(c->p) - c->num;
+
+    if (len < n) {
+      memcpy(p + c->num, data, len);
+      c->num += (unsigned int)len;
+      return;
+    } else {
+      memcpy(p + c->num, data, n), c->num = 0;
+      len -= n;
+      data += n;
+      sha512_block_data_order(c->h, p, 1);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (len >= sizeof(c->p)) {
+    sha512_block_data_order(c->h, data, len / sizeof(c->p));
+    data += len;
+    len %= sizeof(c->p);
+    data -= len;
+  }
+
+  if (len != 0) {
+    memcpy(p, data, len);
+    c->num = (int)len;
+  }
+
+  return;
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+}  // namespace entropy
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/fips_shared_support.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+// Copyright 2019 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS) && defined(BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY)
+// BORINGSSL_bcm_text_hash is the default hash value for the FIPS integrity
+// check that must be replaced with the real value during the build process.
+// This value need only be distinct, i.e. so that we can safely
+// search-and-replace it in an object file.
+extern const uint8_t BORINGSSL_bcm_text_hash[32] = {
+    0xae, 0x2c, 0xea, 0x2a, 0xbd, 0xa6, 0xf3, 0xec, 0x97, 0x7f, 0x9b,
+    0xf6, 0x94, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0x83, 0x68, 0x27, 0xcb, 0xa0, 0xa0, 0x9f,
+    0x6b, 0x6f, 0xde, 0x52, 0xcd, 0xe2, 0xcd, 0xff, 0x31, 0x80,
+};
+#endif  // FIPS && SHARED_LIBRARY

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/hkdf/hkdf.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+// Copyright 2014 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+int HKDF(uint8_t *out_key, size_t out_len, const EVP_MD *digest,
+         const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, const uint8_t *salt,
+         size_t salt_len, const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len) {
+  // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2
+  uint8_t prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t prk_len;
+
+  if (!HKDF_extract(prk, &prk_len, digest, secret, secret_len, salt,
+                    salt_len) ||
+      !HKDF_expand(out_key, out_len, digest, prk, prk_len, info, info_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int HKDF_extract(uint8_t *out_key, size_t *out_len, const EVP_MD *digest,
+                 const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, const uint8_t *salt,
+                 size_t salt_len) {
+  // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.2
+
+  // If salt is not given, HashLength zeros are used. However, HMAC does that
+  // internally already so we can ignore it.
+  unsigned len;
+  if (HMAC(digest, salt, salt_len, secret, secret_len, out_key, &len) ==
+      nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(HKDF, ERR_R_HMAC_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *out_len = len;
+  assert(*out_len == EVP_MD_size(digest));
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int HKDF_expand(uint8_t *out_key, size_t out_len, const EVP_MD *digest,
+                const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_len, const uint8_t *info,
+                size_t info_len) {
+  // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.3
+  const size_t digest_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+  uint8_t previous[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t n, done = 0;
+  unsigned i;
+  int ret = 0;
+  HMAC_CTX hmac;
+
+  // Expand key material to desired length.
+  n = (out_len + digest_len - 1) / digest_len;
+  if (out_len + digest_len < out_len || n > 255) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(HKDF, HKDF_R_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac);
+  if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, prk, prk_len, digest, nullptr)) {
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+    uint8_t ctr = i + 1;
+    size_t todo;
+
+    if (i != 0 && (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, nullptr, 0, nullptr, nullptr) ||
+                   !HMAC_Update(&hmac, previous, digest_len))) {
+      goto out;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Update(&hmac, info, info_len) || !HMAC_Update(&hmac, &ctr, 1) ||
+        !HMAC_Final(&hmac, previous, nullptr)) {
+      goto out;
+    }
+
+    todo = digest_len;
+    if (todo > out_len - done) {
+      todo = out_len - done;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out_key + done, previous, todo);
+    done += todo;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+out:
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+  if (ret != 1) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(HKDF, ERR_R_HMAC_LIB);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/hmac/hmac.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
+#include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+uint8_t *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, size_t key_len,
+              const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len, uint8_t *out,
+              unsigned int *out_len) {
+  HMAC_CTX ctx;
+  HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
+
+  // The underlying hash functions should not set the FIPS service indicator
+  // until all operations have completed.
+  FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
+  const int ok = HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, key, key_len, evp_md, nullptr) &&
+                 HMAC_Update(&ctx, data, data_len) &&
+                 HMAC_Final(&ctx, out, out_len);
+  FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
+
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+  if (!ok) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  HMAC_verify_service_indicator(evp_md);
+  return out;
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
+  ctx->md = nullptr;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->i_ctx);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->o_ctx);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->md_ctx);
+}
+
+HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new() {
+  HMAC_CTX *ctx = New<HMAC_CTX>();
+  if (ctx != nullptr) {
+    HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
+  }
+  return ctx;
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->i_ctx);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->o_ctx);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->md_ctx);
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_cleanse(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(&ctx->i_ctx);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(&ctx->o_ctx);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(&ctx->md_ctx);
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+  Delete(ctx);
+}
+
+int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t key_len,
+                 const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl) {
+  int ret = 0;
+  FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
+
+  if (md == nullptr) {
+    md = ctx->md;
+  }
+
+  // If either `key` is non-NULL or `md` has changed, initialize with a new key
+  // rather than rewinding the previous one.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben,eroman): Passing the previous `md` with a NULL `key` is
+  // ambiguous between using the empty key and reusing the previous key. There
+  // exist callers which intend the latter, but the former is an awkward edge
+  // case. Fix to API to avoid this.
+  if (md != ctx->md || key != nullptr) {
+    uint8_t pad[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    uint8_t key_block[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned key_block_len;
+
+    size_t block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(md);
+    assert(block_size <= sizeof(key_block));
+    assert(EVP_MD_size(md) <= block_size);
+    if (block_size < key_len) {
+      // Long keys are hashed.
+      if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, md, impl) ||
+          !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, key, key_len) ||
+          !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, key_block, &key_block_len)) {
+        goto out;
+      }
+    } else {
+      assert(key_len <= sizeof(key_block));
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(key_block, key, key_len);
+      key_block_len = (unsigned)key_len;
+    }
+    // Keys are then padded with zeros.
+    OPENSSL_memset(key_block + key_block_len, 0, block_size - key_block_len);
+
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < block_size; i++) {
+      pad[i] = 0x36 ^ key_block[i];
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->i_ctx, md, impl) ||
+        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->i_ctx, pad, block_size)) {
+      goto out;
+    }
+
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < block_size; i++) {
+      pad[i] = 0x5c ^ key_block[i];
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->o_ctx, md, impl) ||
+        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->o_ctx, pad, block_size)) {
+      goto out;
+    }
+
+    ctx->md = md;
+  }
+
+  ret = EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->i_ctx);
+
+out:
+  FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
+  return EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, data, data_len);
+}
+
+int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, unsigned int *out_len) {
+  int ret = 0;
+  unsigned int i;
+  uint8_t buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+  FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
+  // TODO(davidben): The only thing that can officially fail here is
+  // `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex`, but even that should be impossible in this case.
+  if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i) ||
+      !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->o_ctx) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, i) ||
+      !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, out, out_len)) {
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+out:
+  FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
+  if (ret) {
+    HMAC_verify_service_indicator(ctx->md);
+  } else if (out_len) {
+    *out_len = 0;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+size_t HMAC_size(const HMAC_CTX *ctx) { return EVP_MD_size(ctx->md); }
+
+const EVP_MD *HMAC_CTX_get_md(const HMAC_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->md; }
+
+int HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(HMAC_CTX *dest, const HMAC_CTX *src) {
+  if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->i_ctx, &src->i_ctx) ||
+      !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->o_ctx, &src->o_ctx) ||
+      !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->md_ctx, &src->md_ctx)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  dest->md = src->md;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_reset(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+  HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
+}
+
+int HMAC_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, const EVP_MD *md) {
+  if (key && md) {
+    HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
+  }
+  return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, key_len, md, nullptr);
+}
+
+int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dest, const HMAC_CTX *src) {
+  HMAC_CTX_init(dest);
+  return HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(dest, src);
+}