novahiz 0.1.0

package/bundled-skills/senior-backend/references/backend_security_practices.md

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+# Backend Security Practices
+
+Security patterns and OWASP Top 10 mitigations for Node.js/Express applications.
+
+## Guide Index
+
+1. [OWASP Top 10 Mitigations](#1-owasp-top-10-mitigations)
+2. [Input Validation](#2-input-validation)
+3. [SQL Injection Prevention](#3-sql-injection-prevention)
+4. [XSS Prevention](#4-xss-prevention)
+5. [Authentication Security](#5-authentication-security)
+6. [Authorization Patterns](#6-authorization-patterns)
+7. [Security Headers](#7-security-headers)
+8. [Secrets Management](#8-secrets-management)
+9. [Logging and Monitoring](#9-logging-and-monitoring)
+
+---
+
+## 1. OWASP Top 10 Mitigations
+
+### A01: Broken Access Control
+
+```typescript
+// BAD: Direct object reference
+app.get('/users/:id/profile', async (req, res) => {
+  const user = await db.users.findById(req.params.id);
+  res.json(user); // Anyone can access any user!
+});
+
+// GOOD: Verify ownership
+app.get('/users/:id/profile', authenticate, async (req, res) => {
+  const userId = req.params.id;
+
+  // Verify user can only access their own data
+  if (req.user.id !== userId && !req.user.roles.includes('admin')) {
+    return res.status(403).json({ error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN' } });
+  }
+
+  const user = await db.users.findById(userId);
+  res.json(user);
+});
+```
+
+### A02: Cryptographic Failures
+
+```typescript
+// BAD: Weak hashing
+const hash = crypto.createHash('md5').update(password).digest('hex');
+
+// GOOD: bcrypt with appropriate cost factor
+import bcrypt from 'bcrypt';
+
+const SALT_ROUNDS = 12; // Adjust based on hardware
+
+async function hashPassword(password: string): Promise<string> {
+  return bcrypt.hash(password, SALT_ROUNDS);
+}
+
+async function verifyPassword(password: string, hash: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  return bcrypt.compare(password, hash);
+}
+```
+
+### A03: Injection
+
+```typescript
+// BAD: String concatenation in SQL
+const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '${email}'`;
+
+// GOOD: Parameterized queries
+const result = await db.query(
+  'SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = $1',
+  [email]
+);
+```
+
+### A04: Insecure Design
+
+```typescript
+// BAD: No rate limiting on sensitive operations
+app.post('/forgot-password', async (req, res) => {
+  await sendResetEmail(req.body.email);
+  res.json({ message: 'If email exists, reset link sent' });
+});
+
+// GOOD: Rate limit + consistent response time
+import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit';
+
+const passwordResetLimiter = rateLimit({
+  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
+  max: 3, // 3 attempts per 15 minutes
+  skipSuccessfulRequests: false,
+});
+
+app.post('/forgot-password', passwordResetLimiter, async (req, res) => {
+  const startTime = Date.now();
+
+  try {
+    const user = await db.users.findByEmail(req.body.email);
+    if (user) {
+      await sendResetEmail(user.email);
+    }
+  } catch (err) {
+    logger.error(err);
+  }
+
+  // Consistent response time prevents timing attacks
+  const elapsed = Date.now() - startTime;
+  const minDelay = 500;
+  if (elapsed < minDelay) {
+    await sleep(minDelay - elapsed);
+  }
+
+  // Same response regardless of email existence
+  res.json({ message: 'If email exists, reset link sent' });
+});
+```
+
+### A05: Security Misconfiguration
+
+```typescript
+// BAD: Detailed errors in production
+app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
+  res.status(500).json({
+    error: err.message,
+    stack: err.stack, // Exposes internals!
+  });
+});
+
+// GOOD: Environment-aware error handling
+app.use((err: Error, req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
+  const requestId = req.id;
+
+  // Always log full error internally
+  logger.error({ err, requestId }, 'Unhandled error');
+
+  // Return safe response
+  res.status(500).json({
+    error: {
+      code: 'INTERNAL_ERROR',
+      message: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development'
+        ? err.message
+        : 'An unexpected error occurred',
+      requestId,
+    },
+  });
+});
+```
+
+### A06: Vulnerable Components
+
+```bash
+# Check for vulnerabilities
+npm audit
+
+# Fix automatically where possible
+npm audit fix
+
+# Check specific package
+npm audit --package-lock-only
+
+# Use Snyk for deeper analysis
+npx snyk test
+```
+
+```typescript
+// Automated dependency updates (package.json)
+{
+  "scripts": {
+    "security:audit": "npm audit --audit-level=high",
+    "security:check": "snyk test",
+    "preinstall": "npm audit"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### A07: Authentication Failures
+
+```typescript
+// BAD: Weak session management
+app.post('/login', async (req, res) => {
+  const user = await authenticate(req.body);
+  req.session.userId = user.id; // Session fixation risk
+  res.json({ success: true });
+});
+
+// GOOD: Regenerate session on authentication
+app.post('/login', async (req, res) => {
+  const user = await authenticate(req.body);
+
+  // Regenerate session to prevent fixation
+  req.session.regenerate((err) => {
+    if (err) return next(err);
+
+    req.session.userId = user.id;
+    req.session.createdAt = Date.now();
+
+    req.session.save((err) => {
+      if (err) return next(err);
+      res.json({ success: true });
+    });
+  });
+});
+```
+
+### A08: Software and Data Integrity Failures
+
+```typescript
+// Verify webhook signatures (e.g., Stripe)
+import Stripe from 'stripe';
+
+app.post('/webhooks/stripe',
+  express.raw({ type: 'application/json' }),
+  async (req, res) => {
+    const sig = req.headers['stripe-signature'] as string;
+    const endpointSecret = process.env.STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET!;
+
+    let event: Stripe.Event;
+
+    try {
+      event = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(
+        req.body,
+        sig,
+        endpointSecret
+      );
+    } catch (err) {
+      logger.warn({ err }, 'Webhook signature verification failed');
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid signature' });
+    }
+
+    // Process verified event
+    await handleStripeEvent(event);
+    res.json({ received: true });
+  }
+);
+```
+
+### A09: Security Logging Failures
+
+```typescript
+// Comprehensive security logging
+import pino from 'pino';
+
+const logger = pino({
+  level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL || 'info',
+  redact: ['req.headers.authorization', 'req.body.password'], // Redact sensitive
+});
+
+// Log security events
+function logSecurityEvent(event: {
+  type: 'LOGIN_SUCCESS' | 'LOGIN_FAILURE' | 'ACCESS_DENIED' | 'SUSPICIOUS_ACTIVITY';
+  userId?: string;
+  ip: string;
+  userAgent: string;
+  details?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}) {
+  logger.info({
+    security: true,
+    ...event,
+    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+  }, `Security event: ${event.type}`);
+}
+
+// Usage
+app.post('/login', async (req, res) => {
+  try {
+    const user = await authenticate(req.body);
+    logSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'LOGIN_SUCCESS',
+      userId: user.id,
+      ip: req.ip,
+      userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'] || '',
+    });
+    // ...
+  } catch (err) {
+    logSecurityEvent({
+      type: 'LOGIN_FAILURE',
+      ip: req.ip,
+      userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'] || '',
+      details: { email: req.body.email },
+    });
+    // ...
+  }
+});
+```
+
+### A10: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
+
+```typescript
+// BAD: Unvalidated URL fetch
+app.post('/fetch-url', async (req, res) => {
+  const response = await fetch(req.body.url); // SSRF vulnerability!
+  res.json({ data: await response.text() });
+});
+
+// GOOD: URL allowlist and validation
+import { URL } from 'url';
+
+const ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['api.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'];
+
+function isAllowedUrl(urlString: string): boolean {
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(urlString);
+
+    // Block internal IPs
+    const blockedPatterns = [
+      /^localhost$/i,
+      /^127\./,
+      /^10\./,
+      /^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\./,
+      /^192\.168\./,
+      /^0\./,
+      /^169\.254\./,
+      /^\[::1\]$/,
+      /^metadata\.google\.internal$/,
+      /^169\.254\.169\.254$/,
+    ];
+
+    if (blockedPatterns.some(p => p.test(url.hostname))) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // Only allow HTTPS
+    if (url.protocol !== 'https:') {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // Check allowlist
+    return ALLOWED_HOSTS.includes(url.hostname);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+app.post('/fetch-url', async (req, res) => {
+  const { url } = req.body;
+
+  if (!isAllowedUrl(url)) {
+    return res.status(400).json({ error: { code: 'INVALID_URL' } });
+  }
+
+  const response = await fetch(url, {
+    timeout: 5000,
+    follow: 0, // Don't follow redirects
+  });
+
+  res.json({ data: await response.text() });
+});
+```
+
+---
+
+## 2. Input Validation
+
+### Schema Validation with Zod
+
+```typescript
+import { z } from 'zod';
+
+// Define schemas
+const CreateUserSchema = z.object({
+  email: z.string().email().max(255).toLowerCase(),
+  password: z.string()
+    .min(8, 'Password must be at least 8 characters')
+    .max(72, 'Password must be at most 72 characters') // bcrypt limit
+    .regex(/[A-Z]/, 'Password must contain uppercase letter')
+    .regex(/[a-z]/, 'Password must contain lowercase letter')
+    .regex(/[0-9]/, 'Password must contain number'),
+  name: z.string().min(1).max(100).trim(),
+  age: z.number().int().min(18).max(120).optional(),
+});
+
+const PaginationSchema = z.object({
+  limit: z.coerce.number().int().min(1).max(100).default(20),
+  offset: z.coerce.number().int().min(0).default(0),
+  sort: z.enum(['asc', 'desc']).default('desc'),
+});
+
+// Validation middleware
+function validate<T>(schema: z.ZodSchema<T>) {
+  return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
+    const result = schema.safeParse(req.body);
+
+    if (!result.success) {
+      const details = result.error.errors.map(err => ({
+        field: err.path.join('.'),
+        code: err.code,
+        message: err.message,
+      }));
+
+      return res.status(400).json({
+        error: {
+          code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR',
+          message: 'Request validation failed',
+          details,
+        },
+      });
+    }
+
+    req.body = result.data;
+    next();
+  };
+}
+
+// Usage
+app.post('/users', validate(CreateUserSchema), async (req, res) => {
+  // req.body is now typed and validated
+  const user = await userService.create(req.body);
+  res.status(201).json(user);
+});
+```
+
+### Sanitization
+
+```typescript
+import DOMPurify from 'isomorphic-dompurify';
+import xss from 'xss';
+
+// HTML sanitization for rich text fields
+function sanitizeHtml(dirty: string): string {
+  return DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, {
+    ALLOWED_TAGS: ['b', 'i', 'em', 'strong', 'a', 'p', 'br'],
+    ALLOWED_ATTR: ['href'],
+  });
+}
+
+// Plain text sanitization (strip all HTML)
+function sanitizePlainText(dirty: string): string {
+  return xss(dirty, {
+    whiteList: {},
+    stripIgnoreTag: true,
+    stripIgnoreTagBody: ['script'],
+  });
+}
+
+// File path sanitization
+import path from 'path';
+
+function sanitizePath(userPath: string, baseDir: string): string | null {
+  const resolved = path.resolve(baseDir, userPath);
+
+  // Prevent directory traversal
+  if (!resolved.startsWith(baseDir)) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  return resolved;
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## 3. SQL Injection Prevention
+
+### Parameterized Queries
+
+```typescript
+// BAD: String interpolation
+const email = "'; DROP TABLE users; --";
+db.query(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '${email}'`);
+
+// GOOD: Parameterized query (pg)
+const result = await db.query(
+  'SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = $1',
+  [email]
+);
+
+// GOOD: Parameterized query (mysql2)
+const [rows] = await connection.execute(
+  'SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ?',
+  [email]
+);
+```
+
+### Query Builders
+
+```typescript
+// Using Knex.js
+const users = await knex('users')
+  .where('email', email) // Automatically parameterized
+  .andWhere('status', 'active')
+  .select('id', 'name', 'email');
+
+// Dynamic WHERE with safe column names
+const ALLOWED_COLUMNS = ['name', 'email', 'created_at'] as const;
+
+function buildUserQuery(filters: Record<string, string>) {
+  let query = knex('users').select('id', 'name', 'email');
+
+  for (const [column, value] of Object.entries(filters)) {
+    // Validate column name against allowlist
+    if (ALLOWED_COLUMNS.includes(column as any)) {
+      query = query.where(column, value);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return query;
+}
+```
+
+### ORM Safety
+
+```typescript
+// Prisma (safe by default)
+const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({
+  where: { email }, // Automatically escaped
+});
+
+// TypeORM (safe by default)
+const user = await userRepository.findOne({
+  where: { email }, // Automatically escaped
+});
+
+// DANGER: Raw queries still require parameterization
+// BAD
+await prisma.$queryRawUnsafe(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '${email}'`);
+
+// GOOD
+await prisma.$queryRaw`SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ${email}`;
+```
+
+---
+
+## 4. XSS Prevention
+
+### Output Encoding
+
+```typescript
+// Server-side template rendering (EJS)
+// In template: <%= userInput %> (escaped)
+// NOT: <%- userInput %> (raw, dangerous)
+
+// Manual HTML encoding
+function escapeHtml(str: string): string {
+  return str
+    .replace(/&/g, '&amp;')
+    .replace(/</g, '&lt;')
+    .replace(/>/g, '&gt;')
+    .replace(/"/g, '&quot;')
+    .replace(/'/g, '&#039;');
+}
+
+// JSON response (automatically safe in modern frameworks)
+res.json({ message: userInput }); // JSON.stringify escapes by default
+```
+
+### Content Security Policy
+
+```typescript
+import helmet from 'helmet';
+
+app.use(helmet.contentSecurityPolicy({
+  directives: {
+    defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
+    scriptSrc: ["'self'", "'strict-dynamic'"],
+    styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"], // Consider using nonces
+    imgSrc: ["'self'", "data:", "https:"],
+    fontSrc: ["'self'"],
+    objectSrc: ["'none'"],
+    frameAncestors: ["'none'"],
+    baseUri: ["'self'"],
+    formAction: ["'self'"],
+    upgradeInsecureRequests: [],
+  },
+}));
+```
+
+### API Response Safety
+
+```typescript
+// Set correct Content-Type for JSON APIs
+app.use((req, res, next) => {
+  res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json; charset=utf-8');
+  res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
+  next();
+});
+
+// Disable JSONP (if not needed)
+// Don't implement callback parameter handling
+
+// Safe JSON response
+res.json({
+  data: sanitizedData,
+  // Never reflect raw user input
+});
+```
+
+---
+
+## 5. Authentication Security
+
+### Password Storage
+
+```typescript
+import bcrypt from 'bcrypt';
+import { randomBytes } from 'crypto';
+
+const SALT_ROUNDS = 12;
+
+async function hashPassword(password: string): Promise<string> {
+  return bcrypt.hash(password, SALT_ROUNDS);
+}
+
+async function verifyPassword(password: string, hash: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  return bcrypt.compare(password, hash);
+}
+
+// For password reset tokens
+function generateSecureToken(): string {
+  return randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
+}
+
+// Token expiration (store in DB)
+interface PasswordResetToken {
+  token: string; // Hashed
+  userId: string;
+  expiresAt: Date; // 1 hour from creation
+}
+```
+
+### JWT Best Practices
+
+```typescript
+import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
+
+// Use asymmetric keys in production
+const PRIVATE_KEY = process.env.JWT_PRIVATE_KEY!;
+const PUBLIC_KEY = process.env.JWT_PUBLIC_KEY!;
+
+interface AccessTokenPayload {
+  sub: string; // User ID
+  email: string;
+  roles: string[];
+  iat: number;
+  exp: number;
+}
+
+function generateAccessToken(user: User): string {
+  const payload: Omit<AccessTokenPayload, 'iat' | 'exp'> = {
+    sub: user.id,
+    email: user.email,
+    roles: user.roles,
+  };
+
+  return jwt.sign(payload, PRIVATE_KEY, {
+    algorithm: 'RS256',
+    expiresIn: '15m',
+    issuer: 'api.example.com',
+    audience: 'example.com',
+  });
+}
+
+function verifyAccessToken(token: string): AccessTokenPayload {
+  return jwt.verify(token, PUBLIC_KEY, {
+    algorithms: ['RS256'],
+    issuer: 'api.example.com',
+    audience: 'example.com',
+  }) as AccessTokenPayload;
+}
+
+// Refresh tokens should be stored in DB and rotated
+interface RefreshToken {
+  id: string;
+  token: string; // Hashed
+  userId: string;
+  expiresAt: Date;
+  family: string; // For rotation detection
+  isRevoked: boolean;
+}
+```
+
+### Session Management
+
+```typescript
+import session from 'express-session';
+import RedisStore from 'connect-redis';
+import { createClient } from 'redis';
+
+const redisClient = createClient({ url: process.env.REDIS_URL });
+
+app.use(session({
+  store: new RedisStore({ client: redisClient }),
+  name: 'sessionId', // Don't use default 'connect.sid'
+  secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET!,
+  resave: false,
+  saveUninitialized: false,
+  cookie: {
+    secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
+    httpOnly: true,
+    sameSite: 'strict',
+    maxAge: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 24 hours
+    domain: process.env.COOKIE_DOMAIN,
+  },
+}));
+
+// Regenerate session on privilege change
+async function elevateSession(req: Request): Promise<void> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const userId = req.session.userId;
+    req.session.regenerate((err) => {
+      if (err) return reject(err);
+      req.session.userId = userId;
+      req.session.elevated = true;
+      req.session.elevatedAt = Date.now();
+      resolve();
+    });
+  });
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## 6. Authorization Patterns
+
+### Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
+
+```typescript
+type Role = 'user' | 'moderator' | 'admin';
+type Permission = 'read:users' | 'write:users' | 'delete:users' | 'read:admin';
+
+const ROLE_PERMISSIONS: Record<Role, Permission[]> = {
+  user: ['read:users'],
+  moderator: ['read:users', 'write:users'],
+  admin: ['read:users', 'write:users', 'delete:users', 'read:admin'],
+};
+
+function hasPermission(userRoles: Role[], required: Permission): boolean {
+  return userRoles.some(role =>
+    ROLE_PERMISSIONS[role]?.includes(required)
+  );
+}
+
+// Middleware
+function requirePermission(permission: Permission) {
+  return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
+    if (!hasPermission(req.user.roles, permission)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({
+        error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Insufficient permissions' },
+      });
+    }
+    next();
+  };
+}
+
+// Usage
+app.delete('/users/:id',
+  authenticate,
+  requirePermission('delete:users'),
+  deleteUserHandler
+);
+```
+
+### Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
+
+```typescript
+interface AccessContext {
+  user: { id: string; roles: string[]; department: string };
+  resource: { ownerId: string; department: string; sensitivity: string };
+  action: 'read' | 'write' | 'delete';
+  environment: { time: Date; ip: string };
+}
+
+interface Policy {
+  name: string;
+  condition: (ctx: AccessContext) => boolean;
+}
+
+const policies: Policy[] = [
+  {
+    name: 'owner-full-access',
+    condition: (ctx) => ctx.resource.ownerId === ctx.user.id,
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'same-department-read',
+    condition: (ctx) =>
+      ctx.action === 'read' &&
+      ctx.resource.department === ctx.user.department,
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'admin-override',
+    condition: (ctx) => ctx.user.roles.includes('admin'),
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'no-sensitive-outside-hours',
+    condition: (ctx) => {
+      const hour = ctx.environment.time.getHours();
+      return ctx.resource.sensitivity !== 'high' || (hour >= 9 && hour <= 17);
+    },
+  },
+];
+
+function evaluateAccess(ctx: AccessContext): boolean {
+  return policies.some(policy => policy.condition(ctx));
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## 7. Security Headers
+
+### Complete Helmet Configuration
+
+```typescript
+import helmet from 'helmet';
+
+app.use(helmet({
+  // Content Security Policy
+  contentSecurityPolicy: {
+    directives: {
+      defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
+      scriptSrc: ["'self'"],
+      styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"],
+      imgSrc: ["'self'", "data:", "https:"],
+      connectSrc: ["'self'", "https://api.example.com"],
+      fontSrc: ["'self'"],
+      objectSrc: ["'none'"],
+      mediaSrc: ["'none'"],
+      frameSrc: ["'none'"],
+    },
+  },
+  // Strict Transport Security
+  hsts: {
+    maxAge: 31536000,
+    includeSubDomains: true,
+    preload: true,
+  },
+  // Prevent clickjacking
+  frameguard: { action: 'deny' },
+  // Prevent MIME sniffing
+  noSniff: true,
+  // XSS filter (legacy browsers)
+  xssFilter: true,
+  // Hide X-Powered-By
+  hidePoweredBy: true,
+  // Referrer policy
+  referrerPolicy: { policy: 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin' },
+  // Cross-origin policies
+  crossOriginEmbedderPolicy: false, // Enable if using SharedArrayBuffer
+  crossOriginOpenerPolicy: { policy: 'same-origin' },
+  crossOriginResourcePolicy: { policy: 'same-origin' },
+}));
+
+// CORS configuration
+import cors from 'cors';
+
+app.use(cors({
+  origin: ['https://example.com', 'https://app.example.com'],
+  methods: ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH'],
+  allowedHeaders: ['Content-Type', 'Authorization'],
+  credentials: true,
+  maxAge: 86400, // 24 hours
+}));
+```
+
+### Header Reference
+
+| Header | Purpose | Value |
+|--------|---------|-------|
+| `Strict-Transport-Security` | Force HTTPS | `max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload` |
+| `Content-Security-Policy` | Prevent XSS | See above |
+| `X-Content-Type-Options` | Prevent MIME sniffing | `nosniff` |
+| `X-Frame-Options` | Prevent clickjacking | `DENY` |
+| `Referrer-Policy` | Control referrer info | `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` |
+| `Permissions-Policy` | Feature restrictions | `geolocation=(), microphone=()` |
+
+---
+
+## 8. Secrets Management
+
+### Environment Variables
+
+```typescript
+// config/secrets.ts
+import { z } from 'zod';
+
+const SecretsSchema = z.object({
+  DATABASE_URL: z.string().url(),
+  JWT_SECRET: z.string().min(32),
+  JWT_PRIVATE_KEY: z.string(),
+  JWT_PUBLIC_KEY: z.string(),
+  REDIS_URL: z.string().url(),
+  STRIPE_SECRET_KEY: z.string().startsWith('sk_'),
+  STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET: z.string().startsWith('whsec_'),
+});
+
+// Validate on startup
+export const secrets = SecretsSchema.parse(process.env);
+
+// NEVER log secrets
+console.log('Config loaded:', {
+  database: secrets.DATABASE_URL.replace(/\/\/.*@/, '//***@'),
+  redis: 'configured',
+  stripe: 'configured',
+});
+```
+
+### Secret Rotation
+
+```typescript
+// Support multiple keys during rotation
+const JWT_SECRETS = [
+  process.env.JWT_SECRET_CURRENT!,
+  process.env.JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS!, // Keep for grace period
+].filter(Boolean);
+
+function verifyTokenWithRotation(token: string): TokenPayload | null {
+  for (const secret of JWT_SECRETS) {
+    try {
+      return jwt.verify(token, secret) as TokenPayload;
+    } catch {
+      continue;
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+```
+
+### Vault Integration
+
+```typescript
+import Vault from 'node-vault';
+
+const vault = Vault({
+  endpoint: process.env.VAULT_ADDR,
+  token: process.env.VAULT_TOKEN,
+});
+
+async function getSecret(path: string): Promise<string> {
+  const result = await vault.read(`secret/data/${path}`);
+  return result.data.data.value;
+}
+
+// Cache secrets with TTL
+const secretsCache = new Map<string, { value: string; expiresAt: number }>();
+const CACHE_TTL = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 minutes
+
+async function getCachedSecret(path: string): Promise<string> {
+  const cached = secretsCache.get(path);
+  if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {
+    return cached.value;
+  }
+
+  const value = await getSecret(path);
+  secretsCache.set(path, { value, expiresAt: Date.now() + CACHE_TTL });
+  return value;
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## 9. Logging and Monitoring
+
+### Security Event Logging
+
+```typescript
+import pino from 'pino';
+
+const logger = pino({
+  level: 'info',
+  redact: {
+    paths: [
+      'req.headers.authorization',
+      'req.headers.cookie',
+      'req.body.password',
+      'req.body.token',
+      '*.password',
+      '*.secret',
+      '*.apiKey',
+    ],
+    censor: '[REDACTED]',
+  },
+});
+
+// Security event types
+type SecurityEventType =
+  | 'AUTH_SUCCESS'
+  | 'AUTH_FAILURE'
+  | 'AUTH_LOCKOUT'
+  | 'PASSWORD_CHANGED'
+  | 'PASSWORD_RESET_REQUEST'
+  | 'PERMISSION_DENIED'
+  | 'RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED'
+  | 'SUSPICIOUS_ACTIVITY'
+  | 'TOKEN_REVOKED';
+
+interface SecurityEvent {
+  type: SecurityEventType;
+  userId?: string;
+  ip: string;
+  userAgent: string;
+  path: string;
+  details?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+function logSecurityEvent(event: SecurityEvent): void {
+  logger.info({
+    security: true,
+    ...event,
+    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+  }, `Security: ${event.type}`);
+}
+```
+
+### Request Logging
+
+```typescript
+import pinoHttp from 'pino-http';
+
+app.use(pinoHttp({
+  logger,
+  genReqId: (req) => req.headers['x-request-id'] || crypto.randomUUID(),
+  serializers: {
+    req: (req) => ({
+      id: req.id,
+      method: req.method,
+      url: req.url,
+      remoteAddress: req.remoteAddress,
+      // Don't log headers by default (may contain sensitive data)
+    }),
+    res: (res) => ({
+      statusCode: res.statusCode,
+    }),
+  },
+  customLogLevel: (req, res, err) => {
+    if (res.statusCode >= 500 || err) return 'error';
+    if (res.statusCode >= 400) return 'warn';
+    return 'info';
+  },
+}));
+```
+
+### Alerting Thresholds
+
+| Metric | Warning | Critical |
+|--------|---------|----------|
+| Failed logins per IP (15 min) | > 5 | > 10 |
+| Failed logins per account (1 hour) | > 3 | > 5 |
+| 403 responses per IP (5 min) | > 10 | > 50 |
+| 500 errors (5 min) | > 5 | > 20 |
+| Request rate per IP (1 min) | > 100 | > 500 |
+
+---
+
+## Quick Reference: Security Checklist
+
+### Authentication
+- [ ] bcrypt with cost >= 12 for password hashing
+- [ ] JWT with RS256, short expiry (15-30 min)
+- [ ] Refresh token rotation with family detection
+- [ ] Session regeneration on login
+- [ ] Secure cookie flags (httpOnly, secure, sameSite)
+
+### Input Validation
+- [ ] Schema validation on all inputs (Zod)
+- [ ] Parameterized queries (never string concat)
+- [ ] File path sanitization
+- [ ] Content-Type validation
+
+### Headers
+- [ ] Strict-Transport-Security
+- [ ] Content-Security-Policy
+- [ ] X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
+- [ ] X-Frame-Options: DENY
+- [ ] CORS with specific origins
+
+### Logging
+- [ ] Redact sensitive fields
+- [ ] Log security events
+- [ ] Include request IDs
+- [ ] Alert on anomalies
+
+### Dependencies
+- [ ] npm audit in CI
+- [ ] Automated dependency updates
+- [ ] Lock file committed