agentic-flow 1.9.0 → 1.9.2

package/docs/features/agentdb/AGENTDB-MCP-SECURITY-AUDIT.md

@@ -1,877 +0,0 @@
-# AgentDB MCP Server Security & Reliability Audit Report
-
-**Date:** 2025-10-25
-**Version:** 1.4.4
-**Scope:** MCP Server (`agentdb-mcp-server.ts`) + Database Layer
-**Auditor:** Security Analysis System
-
----
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-**Overall Security Rating: ⚠️ MODERATE RISK**
-
-The AgentDB MCP server implements 29 tools for AI agent memory management through the Model Context Protocol. While the codebase demonstrates good architectural patterns, several **critical security vulnerabilities** and **reliability concerns** were identified that require immediate attention before production deployment.
-
-### Critical Findings
-- **🔴 HIGH SEVERITY:** SQL Injection vulnerabilities in 3 locations
-- **🟠 MEDIUM SEVERITY:** Dynamic code execution via `eval()` in database layer
-- **🟠 MEDIUM SEVERITY:** Missing input validation on 15+ tools
-- **🟠 MEDIUM SEVERITY:** JSON parsing without error handling (potential DoS)
-- **🟡 LOW SEVERITY:** Information disclosure in error messages
-- **🟡 LOW SEVERITY:** Missing rate limiting and resource controls
-
----
-
-## 1. SQL Injection Vulnerabilities 🔴 CRITICAL
-
-### 1.1 Direct String Concatenation in WHERE Clauses
-
-**Location:** `src/mcp/agentdb-mcp-server.ts:889-900`
-
-```typescript
-// VULNERABLE CODE
-if (filters.session_id) {
-  conditions.session_id = filters.session_id;
-}
-
-if (filters.before_timestamp) {
-  const stmt = db.prepare('DELETE FROM episodes WHERE ts < ?');
-  const result = stmt.run(filters.before_timestamp);
-  deleted = result.changes;
-} else if (Object.keys(conditions).length > 0) {
-  deleted = batchOps.bulkDelete('episodes', conditions); // ⚠️ Unsafe
-}
-```
-
-**Vulnerability:** The `bulkDelete` method in `BatchOperations` may construct SQL dynamically without proper parameterization.
-
-**Attack Vector:**
-```javascript
-// Malicious input
-{
-  "filters": {
-    "session_id": "'; DROP TABLE episodes; --"
-  }
-}
-```
-
-**Impact:** Complete database compromise, data deletion, unauthorized access
-
-**Recommendation:**
-```typescript
-// SECURE VERSION
-const whereConditions: string[] = [];
-const params: any[] = [];
-
-if (filters.session_id) {
-  whereConditions.push('session_id = ?');
-  params.push(filters.session_id);
-}
-
-if (filters.before_timestamp) {
-  whereConditions.push('ts < ?');
-  params.push(filters.before_timestamp);
-}
-
-if (whereConditions.length > 0) {
-  const sql = `DELETE FROM episodes WHERE ${whereConditions.join(' AND ')}`;
-  const stmt = db.prepare(sql);
-  const result = stmt.run(...params);
-  deleted = result.changes;
-}
-```
-
-### 1.2 PRAGMA Injection Vulnerability
-
-**Location:** `src/db-fallback.ts:154-156`
-
-```typescript
-// VULNERABLE CODE
-pragma(pragma: string, options?: any) {
-  const result = this.db.exec(`PRAGMA ${pragma}`); // ⚠️ Direct string interpolation
-  return result[0]?.values[0]?.[0];
-}
-```
-
-**Attack Vector:**
-```javascript
-// Malicious pragma
-db.pragma("journal_mode = DELETE; DROP TABLE episodes; --")
-```
-
-**Impact:** Arbitrary SQL execution through PRAGMA commands
-
-**Recommendation:**
-```typescript
-// SECURE VERSION - Whitelist allowed PRAGMA commands
-pragma(pragma: string, options?: any) {
-  const allowedPragmas = [
-    'journal_mode',
-    'synchronous',
-    'cache_size',
-    'foreign_keys',
-    'page_count',
-    'page_size'
-  ];
-
-  const pragmaName = pragma.split(/[\s=]/)[0].toLowerCase();
-
-  if (!allowedPragmas.includes(pragmaName)) {
-    throw new Error(`Invalid PRAGMA command: ${pragmaName}`);
-  }
-
-  // Use parameterized query or validated string
-  const result = this.db.exec(`PRAGMA ${pragma}`);
-  return result[0]?.values[0]?.[0];
-}
-```
-
-### 1.3 Dynamic LIKE Clause Construction
-
-**Location:** `src/controllers/ReasoningBank.ts:172-176`
-
-```typescript
-// POTENTIALLY VULNERABLE
-if (query.filters?.tags && query.filters.tags.length > 0) {
-  const tagConditions = query.filters.tags.map(() => 'rp.tags LIKE ?').join(' OR ');
-  conditions.push(`(${tagConditions})`);
-  query.filters.tags.forEach(tag => {
-    params.push(`%"${tag}"%`); // ⚠️ String interpolation in LIKE pattern
-  });
-}
-```
-
-**Issue:** Tag values are interpolated into LIKE patterns without escaping. This could allow LIKE wildcard injection.
-
-**Attack Vector:**
-```javascript
-// Malicious tag
-{
-  "tags": ["%\"; DROP TABLE reasoning_patterns; --"]
-}
-```
-
-**Recommendation:**
-```typescript
-// SECURE VERSION - Escape LIKE wildcards
-function escapeLikePattern(str: string): string {
-  return str.replace(/[%_\\]/g, '\\$&');
-}
-
-query.filters.tags.forEach(tag => {
-  const escapedTag = escapeLikePattern(tag);
-  params.push(`%"${escapedTag}"%`);
-});
-```
-
----
-
-## 2. Dynamic Code Execution Vulnerability 🟠 MEDIUM
-
-### 2.1 Use of eval() for Dynamic Require
-
-**Location:** `src/db-fallback.ts:59, 143`
-
-```typescript
-// DANGEROUS PATTERN
-const fs = eval('require')('fs');
-```
-
-**Rationale:** The code uses `eval('require')` to bypass static analysis, likely to work around bundler restrictions.
-
-**Security Risk:**
-- **Code Injection:** If any variable can influence the `eval` context, arbitrary code execution is possible
-- **Supply Chain Risk:** Obscures dependencies from security scanners
-- **Maintenance Risk:** Hard to audit and refactor
-
-**Impact:** Potential arbitrary code execution if exploited in conjunction with other vulnerabilities
-
-**Recommendation:**
-```typescript
-// SECURE VERSION - Use proper module imports
-import * as fs from 'fs';
-
-// OR use dynamic import (async)
-const fs = await import('fs');
-
-// OR use conditional require without eval
-const fs = typeof require !== 'undefined' ? require('fs') : null;
-```
-
-**Alternative for Browser Compatibility:**
-```typescript
-// Feature detection without eval
-let fs: any = null;
-if (typeof process !== 'undefined' && process.versions?.node) {
-  fs = require('fs'); // Safe in Node environment
-}
-```
-
----
-
-## 3. Input Validation Vulnerabilities 🟠 MEDIUM
-
-### 3.1 Missing Input Validation on Critical Tools
-
-**Analysis:** 15 out of 29 MCP tools lack comprehensive input validation beyond schema type checking.
-
-#### Tools Without Sufficient Validation:
-
-| Tool Name | Missing Validation | Risk Level |
-|-----------|-------------------|------------|
-| `agentdb_insert` | No max text length | DoS via memory exhaustion |
-| `agentdb_insert_batch` | No max array size | DoS via resource exhaustion |
-| `agentdb_search` | No min_similarity range check | Logic errors |
-| `learning_train` | No max epochs limit | DoS via CPU exhaustion |
-| `learning_feedback` | No reward range validation | Data corruption |
-| `agentdb_pattern_store` | No approach length limit | Database bloat |
-| `experience_record` | No metadata size limit | Storage overflow |
-
-#### Example Vulnerability: Unbounded Batch Insert
-
-**Location:** `src/mcp/agentdb-mcp-server.ts:793-830`
-
-```typescript
-case 'agentdb_insert_batch': {
-  const items = (args?.items as any[]) || []; // ⚠️ No size limit
-  const batchSize = (args?.batch_size as number) || 100;
-
-  // Attacker can send millions of items
-}
-```
-
-**Attack Vector:**
-```javascript
-// DoS attack
-{
-  "items": Array(1000000).fill({
-    "text": "a".repeat(10000000), // 10MB per item
-    "metadata": {}
-  })
-}
-```
-
-**Recommendation:**
-```typescript
-// SECURE VERSION with limits
-const MAX_BATCH_SIZE = 1000;
-const MAX_TEXT_LENGTH = 100000; // 100KB
-const MAX_METADATA_SIZE = 10000; // 10KB
-
-case 'agentdb_insert_batch': {
-  const items = (args?.items as any[]) || [];
-
-  // Validate array size
-  if (items.length > MAX_BATCH_SIZE) {
-    throw new Error(`Batch size exceeds maximum of ${MAX_BATCH_SIZE}`);
-  }
-
-  // Validate each item
-  for (const item of items) {
-    if (item.text.length > MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) {
-      throw new Error(`Text exceeds maximum length of ${MAX_TEXT_LENGTH}`);
-    }
-
-    const metadataStr = JSON.stringify(item.metadata || {});
-    if (metadataStr.length > MAX_METADATA_SIZE) {
-      throw new Error(`Metadata exceeds maximum size of ${MAX_METADATA_SIZE}`);
-    }
-  }
-
-  // ... proceed with insert
-}
-```
-
-### 3.2 Numerical Input Validation Missing
-
-**Issue:** Parameters like `reward`, `epochs`, `k` lack range validation.
-
-**Vulnerable Tools:**
-- `learning_train`: epochs could be `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER`
-- `learning_feedback`: reward could be negative infinity or NaN
-- `agentdb_search`: k could be negative or extremely large
-
-**Recommendation:**
-```typescript
-// Add validation helper
-function validateNumericRange(
-  value: number,
-  min: number,
-  max: number,
-  paramName: string
-): void {
-  if (typeof value !== 'number' || isNaN(value)) {
-    throw new Error(`${paramName} must be a valid number`);
-  }
-  if (value < min || value > max) {
-    throw new Error(`${paramName} must be between ${min} and ${max}`);
-  }
-}
-
-// Usage
-validateNumericRange(epochs, 1, 10000, 'epochs');
-validateNumericRange(reward, 0, 1, 'reward');
-validateNumericRange(k, 1, 1000, 'k');
-```
-
----
-
-## 4. Error Handling & Information Disclosure 🟡 LOW-MEDIUM
-
-### 4.1 Overly Verbose Error Messages
-
-**Location:** `src/mcp/agentdb-mcp-server.ts:1685-1695`
-
-```typescript
-catch (error: any) {
-  return {
-    content: [{
-      type: 'text',
-      text: `❌ Error: ${error.message}\n${error.stack || ''}`, // ⚠️ Exposes stack traces
-    }],
-    isError: true,
-  };
-}
-```
-
-**Issue:** Error stack traces expose:
-- Internal file paths
-- Function names revealing implementation details
-- Line numbers aiding exploit development
-- Dependency versions in stack frames
-
-**Example Leaked Information:**
-```
-Error: Failed to insert episode
-  at ReflexionMemory.storeEpisode (/workspaces/agentic-flow/packages/agentdb/dist/controllers/ReflexionMemory.js:145:13)
-  at Object.handler (agentdb-mcp-server.ts:765:42)
-```
-
-**Recommendation:**
-```typescript
-// SECURE VERSION - Generic errors for production
-catch (error: any) {
-  // Log detailed error server-side
-  console.error('MCP Tool Error:', {
-    tool: name,
-    error: error.message,
-    stack: error.stack,
-    args: args // Log args for debugging (sanitize sensitive data)
-  });
-
-  // Return generic error to client
-  const isProduction = process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production';
-
-  return {
-    content: [{
-      type: 'text',
-      text: isProduction
-        ? `❌ Operation failed. Error code: ${generateErrorCode(error)}`
-        : `❌ Error: ${error.message}\n${error.stack || ''}`,
-    }],
-    isError: true,
-  };
-}
-```
-
-### 4.2 No Try-Catch Around JSON.parse
-
-**Issue:** Multiple locations parse JSON without error handling.
-
-**Vulnerable Locations:**
-```typescript
-// src/controllers/LearningSystem.ts:400
-config: JSON.parse(row.config), // ⚠️ Can throw
-
-// src/controllers/ReasoningBank.ts:220
-tags: row.tags ? JSON.parse(row.tags) : [], // ⚠️ Can throw
-```
-
-**Impact:** Corrupted database data causes server crashes
-
-**Recommendation:**
-```typescript
-// Safe JSON parsing helper
-function safeJSONParse<T>(json: string | null, defaultValue: T): T {
-  if (!json) return defaultValue;
-
-  try {
-    return JSON.parse(json);
-  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('JSON parse error:', error);
-    return defaultValue;
-  }
-}
-
-// Usage
-config: safeJSONParse(row.config, {}),
-tags: safeJSONParse(row.tags, []),
-```
-
----
-
-## 5. Resource Exhaustion & DoS Vulnerabilities 🟠 MEDIUM
-
-### 5.1 No Rate Limiting
-
-**Issue:** MCP server has no rate limiting on tool calls.
-
-**Attack Scenarios:**
-1. **CPU Exhaustion:** Spam `learning_train` with high epochs
-2. **Memory Exhaustion:** Spam `agentdb_insert_batch` with large payloads
-3. **Disk Exhaustion:** Flood database with pattern storage
-4. **Embedding DoS:** Trigger expensive embedding generation repeatedly
-
-**Recommendation:**
-```typescript
-// Implement rate limiting with sliding window
-class RateLimiter {
-  private requests: Map<string, number[]> = new Map();
-
-  checkLimit(clientId: string, maxRequests: number, windowMs: number): boolean {
-    const now = Date.now();
-    const timestamps = this.requests.get(clientId) || [];
-
-    // Remove old timestamps outside window
-    const validTimestamps = timestamps.filter(ts => now - ts < windowMs);
-
-    if (validTimestamps.length >= maxRequests) {
-      return false; // Rate limit exceeded
-    }
-
-    validTimestamps.push(now);
-    this.requests.set(clientId, validTimestamps);
-    return true;
-  }
-}
-
-const rateLimiter = new RateLimiter();
-
-// Apply to handler
-server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request) => {
-  const clientId = request.meta?.clientId || 'anonymous';
-
-  if (!rateLimiter.checkLimit(clientId, 100, 60000)) { // 100 req/min
-    throw new Error('Rate limit exceeded. Try again later.');
-  }
-
-  // ... handle request
-});
-```
-
-### 5.2 Unbounded Database Growth
-
-**Issue:** No mechanisms to prevent unbounded database growth.
-
-**Risks:**
-- Episodes table grows indefinitely
-- Pattern embeddings consume disk space
-- Learning experiences accumulate without cleanup
-
-**Recommendation:**
-```typescript
-// Add automatic cleanup jobs
-class DatabaseMaintenance {
-  constructor(private db: Database) {}
-
-  // Clean up old episodes (keep last 90 days)
-  cleanupOldEpisodes(retentionDays: number = 90): number {
-    const cutoff = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - (retentionDays * 86400);
-
-    const stmt = this.db.prepare(`
-      DELETE FROM episodes WHERE ts < ?
-    `);
-
-    return stmt.run(cutoff).changes;
-  }
-
-  // Vacuum database to reclaim space
-  vacuum(): void {
-    this.db.exec('VACUUM');
-  }
-
-  // Analyze tables for query optimization
-  analyze(): void {
-    this.db.exec('ANALYZE');
-  }
-}
-
-// Schedule maintenance
-setInterval(() => {
-  const maintenance = new DatabaseMaintenance(db);
-  maintenance.cleanupOldEpisodes(90);
-  maintenance.analyze();
-}, 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000); // Daily
-```
-
-### 5.3 No Memory Limits for Embeddings
-
-**Location:** `src/controllers/EmbeddingService.ts`
-
-**Issue:** Embedding generation can consume unbounded memory for large batches.
-
-**Recommendation:** Add batch size limits and streaming processing for large datasets.
-
----
-
-## 6. Reliability & Stability Issues 🟡 MEDIUM
-
-### 6.1 Single Global Error Handler
-
-**Location:** `src/mcp/agentdb-mcp-server.ts:1712`
-
-```typescript
-main().catch(console.error); // ⚠️ Only logs error, doesn't recover
-```
-
-**Issue:** Uncaught promise rejections will crash the server without recovery.
-
-**Recommendation:**
-```typescript
-// Robust error handling with recovery
-async function main() {
-  try {
-    const transport = new StdioServerTransport();
-    await server.connect(transport);
-
-    console.error('🚀 AgentDB MCP Server started');
-
-    // Keep server alive
-    await new Promise(() => {}); // Wait indefinitely
-
-  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Fatal server error:', error);
-    process.exit(1);
-  }
-}
-
-// Handle unhandled rejections
-process.on('unhandledRejection', (reason, promise) => {
-  console.error('Unhandled Promise Rejection:', reason);
-  // Log but don't crash - MCP server should stay running
-});
-
-process.on('uncaughtException', (error) => {
-  console.error('Uncaught Exception:', error);
-  // Attempt graceful shutdown
-  db.close();
-  process.exit(1);
-});
-
-main();
-```
-
-### 6.2 No Graceful Shutdown
-
-**Issue:** Server doesn't handle SIGTERM/SIGINT for graceful shutdown.
-
-**Recommendation:**
-```typescript
-// Graceful shutdown handler
-let isShuttingDown = false;
-
-async function gracefulShutdown() {
-  if (isShuttingDown) return;
-  isShuttingDown = true;
-
-  console.error('🛑 Shutting down gracefully...');
-
-  try {
-    // Close database connection
-    db.close();
-
-    // Close MCP transport
-    await server.close();
-
-    console.error('✅ Shutdown complete');
-    process.exit(0);
-  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error during shutdown:', error);
-    process.exit(1);
-  }
-}
-
-process.on('SIGTERM', gracefulShutdown);
-process.on('SIGINT', gracefulShutdown);
-```
-
-### 6.3 Database Connection Pooling Missing
-
-**Issue:** Single database connection with no connection pooling or timeout handling.
-
-**Risk:** Concurrent tool calls may block each other, leading to timeouts.
-
-**Recommendation:** Implement connection pooling or use WAL mode optimizations (already enabled, good!).
-
-### 6.4 Missing Transaction Safety for Batch Operations
-
-**Location:** `src/mcp/agentdb-mcp-server.ts:811-816`
-
-```typescript
-const batchOpsConfig = new BatchOperations(db, embeddingService, {
-  batchSize,
-  parallelism: 4,
-});
-
-const inserted = await batchOpsConfig.insertEpisodes(episodes);
-```
-
-**Issue:** Need to verify that `BatchOperations.insertEpisodes` uses transactions.
-
-**Recommendation:** Ensure all batch operations are wrapped in transactions for atomicity.
-
----
-
-## 7. Integration & MCP Protocol Compliance ✅ GOOD
-
-### 7.1 MCP Protocol Implementation - SECURE ✅
-
-**Strengths:**
-- ✅ Proper use of `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk`
-- ✅ Correct schema validation with `CallToolRequestSchema` and `ListToolsRequestSchema`
-- ✅ Well-structured tool definitions with JSON Schema
-- ✅ Stdio transport for Claude Desktop compatibility
-
-**No issues found in MCP protocol implementation.**
-
-### 7.2 Tool Schema Validation - GOOD ✅
-
-**Strengths:**
-- ✅ All 29 tools have proper `inputSchema` definitions
-- ✅ Required parameters are correctly marked
-- ✅ Type definitions match implementation
-- ✅ Descriptions are clear and comprehensive
-
-**Minor Improvement:**
-```typescript
-// Add schema validation before processing
-import { z } from 'zod';
-
-const agentdbInsertSchema = z.object({
-  text: z.string().min(1).max(100000),
-  metadata: z.record(z.any()).optional(),
-  session_id: z.string().default('default'),
-  tags: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
-});
-
-// Validate before processing
-const validated = agentdbInsertSchema.parse(args);
-```
-
----
-
-## 8. Security Best Practices Assessment
-
-### ✅ Good Practices Found
-
-1. **Parameterized Queries:** Most SQL queries use parameter binding correctly
-2. **WAL Mode:** Database configured with Write-Ahead Logging for better concurrency
-3. **Foreign Key Constraints:** Proper use of `ON DELETE CASCADE`
-4. **Index Usage:** Appropriate indexes for query optimization
-5. **Embedding Serialization:** Secure BLOB storage for embeddings
-6. **Immutable Data Patterns:** Good use of timestamps and provenance tracking
-
-### ❌ Missing Best Practices
-
-1. **No Input Sanitization:** Missing XSS protection for text inputs
-2. **No Authentication:** MCP server has no auth layer (relies on Claude Desktop)
-3. **No Authorization:** No permission checks on tool usage
-4. **No Audit Logging:** No comprehensive audit trail for security events
-5. **No Encryption:** Database stored unencrypted on disk
-6. **No Backup Strategy:** No automated backup mechanism
-7. **No Health Checks:** No monitoring endpoints for server health
-
----
-
-## 9. Recommendations Summary
-
-### 🔴 CRITICAL - Fix Immediately
-
-1. **SQL Injection:** Fix all SQL injection vulnerabilities (Section 1)
-2. **eval() Usage:** Remove `eval('require')` and use proper imports (Section 2.1)
-3. **Input Validation:** Add comprehensive input validation on all tools (Section 3)
-
-### 🟠 HIGH PRIORITY - Fix Before Production
-
-4. **Rate Limiting:** Implement rate limiting to prevent DoS (Section 5.1)
-5. **Error Handling:** Improve error handling and reduce information disclosure (Section 4)
-6. **Resource Limits:** Add limits for batch operations and database growth (Section 5.2)
-7. **Graceful Shutdown:** Implement proper shutdown handlers (Section 6.2)
-
-### 🟡 MEDIUM PRIORITY - Improve Over Time
-
-8. **Audit Logging:** Add comprehensive audit logging for security events
-9. **Database Encryption:** Consider SQLCipher for at-rest encryption
-10. **Health Checks:** Add health check endpoints
-11. **Testing:** Increase test coverage (currently minimal)
-12. **Documentation:** Document security considerations and deployment guidelines
-
-### 🟢 LOW PRIORITY - Nice to Have
-
-13. **Performance Monitoring:** Add metrics collection
-14. **Connection Pooling:** Implement if concurrent load increases
-15. **Schema Migrations:** Add migration system for schema updates
-
----
-
-## 10. Risk Assessment Matrix
-
-| Vulnerability | Severity | Likelihood | Risk Score | Mitigated? |
-|---------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|
-| SQL Injection (DELETE) | CRITICAL | MEDIUM | **HIGH** | ❌ No |
-| PRAGMA Injection | HIGH | LOW | MEDIUM | ❌ No |
-| eval() Code Execution | HIGH | LOW | MEDIUM | ❌ No |
-| DoS via Batch Insert | MEDIUM | HIGH | MEDIUM | ❌ No |
-| Information Disclosure | MEDIUM | MEDIUM | MEDIUM | ❌ No |
-| Missing Rate Limiting | MEDIUM | HIGH | MEDIUM | ❌ No |
-| No Graceful Shutdown | LOW | HIGH | LOW | ❌ No |
-| JSON Parse Errors | LOW | MEDIUM | LOW | ❌ No |
-
-**Overall Risk Score: HIGH** ⚠️
-
----
-
-## 11. Compliance & Standards
-
-### ✅ Meets Standards
-- **OWASP Top 10:** Addresses most common vulnerabilities (after fixes)
-- **MCP Specification:** Fully compliant with Model Context Protocol
-- **TypeScript Best Practices:** Good type safety
-
-### ❌ Does Not Meet
-- **PCI DSS:** No encryption at rest (if handling sensitive data)
-- **GDPR:** No data deletion mechanisms for user data
-- **SOC 2:** Missing audit logging and access controls
-
----
-
-## 12. Testing Coverage
-
-### Current State
-- ✅ Unit tests exist for frontier features
-- ❌ No security-specific tests
-- ❌ No fuzzing or penetration testing
-- ❌ No integration tests for MCP protocol
-- ❌ No load testing for DoS scenarios
-
-### Recommended Tests
-
-```typescript
-// Security test suite
-describe('Security Tests', () => {
-  test('SQL Injection Protection', async () => {
-    const maliciousInput = {
-      filters: {
-        session_id: "'; DROP TABLE episodes; --"
-      }
-    };
-
-    await expect(mcpServer.callTool('agentdb_delete', maliciousInput))
-      .rejects.toThrow(); // Should reject, not execute
-  });
-
-  test('Batch Size Limit', async () => {
-    const oversizedBatch = {
-      items: Array(100000).fill({ text: 'test' })
-    };
-
-    await expect(mcpServer.callTool('agentdb_insert_batch', oversizedBatch))
-      .rejects.toThrow('exceeds maximum');
-  });
-
-  test('Rate Limiting', async () => {
-    // Make 101 rapid requests
-    const requests = Array(101).fill(null).map(() =>
-      mcpServer.callTool('db_stats', {})
-    );
-
-    const results = await Promise.allSettled(requests);
-    const rejected = results.filter(r => r.status === 'rejected');
-
-    expect(rejected.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
-  });
-});
-```
-
----
-
-## 13. Deployment Security Checklist
-
-### Pre-Production Checklist
-
-- [ ] Fix all SQL injection vulnerabilities
-- [ ] Remove `eval()` usage
-- [ ] Add input validation on all tools
-- [ ] Implement rate limiting
-- [ ] Add graceful shutdown handlers
-- [ ] Configure error handling for production
-- [ ] Set up audit logging
-- [ ] Configure database backups
-- [ ] Set resource limits (CPU, memory, disk)
-- [ ] Review and minimize error information disclosure
-- [ ] Add health check endpoint
-- [ ] Configure monitoring and alerting
-- [ ] Document security incident response plan
-- [ ] Perform penetration testing
-- [ ] Review third-party dependencies for vulnerabilities
-
-### Production Configuration
-
-```bash
-# Environment variables for production
-NODE_ENV=production
-AGENTDB_PATH=/secure/path/agentdb.db
-MAX_BATCH_SIZE=1000
-RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE=100
-LOG_LEVEL=warn
-ENABLE_AUDIT_LOG=true
-```
-
----
-
-## 14. Conclusion
-
-The AgentDB MCP server provides powerful AI agent memory capabilities but requires **significant security hardening** before production deployment. The identified SQL injection vulnerabilities and missing input validation pose **critical security risks** that must be addressed immediately.
-
-### Positive Aspects
-- Well-architected codebase with clear separation of concerns
-- Proper use of MCP protocol and TypeScript type safety
-- Good database optimization with WAL mode and indexes
-- Comprehensive feature set with 29 well-documented tools
-
-### Areas Requiring Immediate Attention
-- **Critical:** SQL injection vulnerabilities
-- **Critical:** Input validation missing on 15+ tools
-- **High:** Dynamic code execution via eval()
-- **High:** Missing rate limiting and resource controls
-
-### Timeline Recommendation
-- **Week 1:** Fix critical SQL injection and input validation issues
-- **Week 2:** Remove eval(), add rate limiting, improve error handling
-- **Week 3:** Add graceful shutdown, audit logging, testing
-- **Week 4:** Security audit, penetration testing, documentation
-
-**Status:** ⚠️ **NOT PRODUCTION-READY** - Requires security fixes before deployment
-
----
-
-## Appendix A: Security Contact
-
-For security issues, please contact:
-- **GitHub Security Advisories:** https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow/security/advisories
-- **Email:** [security contact needed]
-
-## Appendix B: References
-
-- [OWASP Top 10](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)
-- [OWASP SQL Injection Prevention](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)
-- [Model Context Protocol Specification](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/)
-- [SQLite Security Best Practices](https://www.sqlite.org/security.html)
-- [Node.js Security Best Practices](https://nodejs.org/en/docs/guides/security/)
-
----
-
-**Report Generated:** 2025-10-25
-**Next Review:** After critical fixes implemented
-**Version:** 1.0