@unwanted/matrix-sdk-mini 34.12.0-1

package/lib/crypto-api/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,978 @@
+import type { SecretsBundle } from "@matrix-org/matrix-sdk-crypto-wasm";
+import type { IMegolmSessionData } from "../@types/crypto.ts";
+import type { ToDeviceBatch, ToDevicePayload } from "../models/ToDeviceMessage.ts";
+import { Room } from "../models/room.ts";
+import { DeviceMap } from "../models/device.ts";
+import { UIAuthCallback } from "../interactive-auth.ts";
+import { PassphraseInfo, SecretStorageCallbacks, SecretStorageKeyDescription } from "../secret-storage.ts";
+import { VerificationRequest } from "./verification.ts";
+import { BackupTrustInfo, KeyBackupCheck, KeyBackupInfo, KeyBackupRestoreOpts, KeyBackupRestoreResult } from "./keybackup.ts";
+import { ISignatures } from "../@types/signed.ts";
+import { MatrixEvent } from "../models/event.ts";
+/**
+ * `matrix-js-sdk/lib/crypto-api`: End-to-end encryption support.
+ *
+ * The most important type is {@link CryptoApi}, an instance of which can be retrieved via
+ * {@link MatrixClient.getCrypto}.
+ *
+ * @packageDocumentation
+ */
+/**
+ * Public interface to the cryptography parts of the js-sdk
+ *
+ * @remarks Currently, this is a work-in-progress. In time, more methods will be added here.
+ */
+export interface CryptoApi {
+    /**
+     * Global override for whether the client should ever send encrypted
+     * messages to unverified devices. This provides the default for rooms which
+     * do not specify a value.
+     *
+     * If true, all unverified devices will be blacklisted by default
+     */
+    globalBlacklistUnverifiedDevices: boolean;
+    /**
+     * The {@link DeviceIsolationMode} mode to use.
+     */
+    setDeviceIsolationMode(isolationMode: DeviceIsolationMode): void;
+    /**
+     * Return the current version of the crypto module.
+     * For example: `Rust SDK ${versions.matrix_sdk_crypto} (${versions.git_sha}), Vodozemac ${versions.vodozemac}`.
+     * @returns the formatted version
+     */
+    getVersion(): string;
+    /**
+     * Get the public part of the device keys for the current device.
+     *
+     * @returns The public device keys.
+     */
+    getOwnDeviceKeys(): Promise<OwnDeviceKeys>;
+    /**
+     * Check if we believe the given room to be encrypted.
+     *
+     * This method returns true if the room has been configured with encryption. The setting is persistent, so that
+     * even if the encryption event is removed from the room state, it still returns true. This helps to guard against
+     * a downgrade attack wherein a server admin attempts to remove encryption.
+     *
+     * @returns `true` if the room with the supplied ID is encrypted. `false` if the room is not encrypted, or is unknown to
+     * us.
+     */
+    isEncryptionEnabledInRoom(roomId: string): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Perform any background tasks that can be done before a message is ready to
+     * send, in order to speed up sending of the message.
+     *
+     * @param room - the room the event is in
+     */
+    prepareToEncrypt(room: Room): void;
+    /**
+     * Discard any existing megolm session for the given room.
+     *
+     * This will ensure that a new session is created on the next call to {@link prepareToEncrypt},
+     * or the next time a message is sent.
+     *
+     * This should not normally be necessary: it should only be used as a debugging tool if there has been a
+     * problem with encryption.
+     *
+     * @param roomId - the room to discard sessions for
+     */
+    forceDiscardSession(roomId: string): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Get a list containing all of the room keys
+     *
+     * This should be encrypted before returning it to the user.
+     *
+     * @returns a promise which resolves to a list of
+     *    session export objects
+     */
+    exportRoomKeys(): Promise<IMegolmSessionData[]>;
+    /**
+     * Get a JSON list containing all of the room keys
+     *
+     * This should be encrypted before returning it to the user.
+     *
+     * @returns a promise which resolves to a JSON string
+     *    encoding a list of session export objects,
+     *    each of which is an IMegolmSessionData
+     */
+    exportRoomKeysAsJson(): Promise<string>;
+    /**
+     * Import a list of room keys previously exported by exportRoomKeys
+     *
+     * @param keys - a list of session export objects
+     * @param opts - options object
+     * @returns a promise which resolves once the keys have been imported
+     */
+    importRoomKeys(keys: IMegolmSessionData[], opts?: ImportRoomKeysOpts): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Import a JSON string encoding a list of room keys previously
+     * exported by exportRoomKeysAsJson
+     *
+     * @param keys - a JSON string encoding a list of session export
+     *    objects, each of which is an IMegolmSessionData
+     * @param opts - options object
+     * @returns a promise which resolves once the keys have been imported
+     */
+    importRoomKeysAsJson(keys: string, opts?: ImportRoomKeysOpts): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Check if the given user has published cross-signing keys.
+     *
+     * - If the user is tracked, a `/keys/query` request is made to update locally the cross signing keys.
+     * - If the user is not tracked locally and downloadUncached is set to true,
+     *   a `/keys/query` request is made to the server to retrieve the cross signing keys.
+     * - Otherwise, return false
+     *
+     * @param userId - the user ID to check. Defaults to the local user.
+     * @param downloadUncached - If true, download the device list for users whose device list we are not
+     *    currently tracking. Defaults to false, in which case `false` will be returned for such users.
+     *
+     * @returns true if the cross signing keys are available.
+     */
+    userHasCrossSigningKeys(userId?: string, downloadUncached?: boolean): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Get the device information for the given list of users.
+     *
+     * For any users whose device lists are cached (due to sharing an encrypted room with the user), the
+     * cached device data is returned.
+     *
+     * If there are uncached users, and the `downloadUncached` parameter is set to `true`,
+     * a `/keys/query` request is made to the server to retrieve these devices.
+     *
+     * @param userIds - The users to fetch.
+     * @param downloadUncached - If true, download the device list for users whose device list we are not
+     *    currently tracking. Defaults to false, in which case such users will not appear at all in the result map.
+     *
+     * @returns A map `{@link DeviceMap}`.
+     */
+    getUserDeviceInfo(userIds: string[], downloadUncached?: boolean): Promise<DeviceMap>;
+    /**
+     * Set whether to trust other user's signatures of their devices.
+     *
+     * If false, devices will only be considered 'verified' if we have
+     * verified that device individually (effectively disabling cross-signing).
+     *
+     * `true` by default.
+     *
+     * @param val - the new value
+     */
+    setTrustCrossSignedDevices(val: boolean): void;
+    /**
+     * Return whether we trust other user's signatures of their devices.
+     *
+     * @see {@link CryptoApi.setTrustCrossSignedDevices}
+     *
+     * @returns `true` if we trust cross-signed devices, otherwise `false`.
+     */
+    getTrustCrossSignedDevices(): boolean;
+    /**
+     * Get the verification status of a given user.
+     *
+     * @param userId - The ID of the user to check.
+     *
+     */
+    getUserVerificationStatus(userId: string): Promise<UserVerificationStatus>;
+    /**
+     * "Pin" the current identity of the given user, accepting it as genuine.
+     *
+     * This is useful if the user has changed identity since we first saw them (leading to
+     * {@link UserVerificationStatus.needsUserApproval}), and we are now accepting their new identity.
+     *
+     * Throws an error if called on our own user ID, or on a user ID that we don't have an identity for.
+     */
+    pinCurrentUserIdentity(userId: string): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Get the verification status of a given device.
+     *
+     * @param userId - The ID of the user whose device is to be checked.
+     * @param deviceId - The ID of the device to check
+     *
+     * @returns `null` if the device is unknown, or has not published any encryption keys (implying it does not support
+     *     encryption); otherwise the verification status of the device.
+     */
+    getDeviceVerificationStatus(userId: string, deviceId: string): Promise<DeviceVerificationStatus | null>;
+    /**
+     * Mark the given device as locally verified.
+     *
+     * Marking a device as locally verified has much the same effect as completing the verification dance, or receiving
+     * a cross-signing signature for it.
+     *
+     * @param userId - owner of the device
+     * @param deviceId - unique identifier for the device.
+     * @param verified - whether to mark the device as verified. Defaults to 'true'.
+     *
+     * @throws an error if the device is unknown, or has not published any encryption keys.
+     *
+     * @remarks Fires {@link matrix.CryptoEvent.DeviceVerificationChanged}
+     */
+    setDeviceVerified(userId: string, deviceId: string, verified?: boolean): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Cross-sign one of our own devices.
+     *
+     * This will create a signature for the device using our self-signing key, and publish that signature.
+     * Cross-signing a device indicates, to our other devices and to other users, that we have verified that it really
+     * belongs to us.
+     *
+     * Requires that cross-signing has been set up on this device (normally by calling {@link bootstrapCrossSigning}).
+     *
+     * *Note*: Do not call this unless you have verified, somehow, that the device is genuine!
+     *
+     * @param deviceId - ID of the device to be signed.
+     */
+    crossSignDevice(deviceId: string): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Checks whether cross signing:
+     * - is enabled on this account and trusted by this device
+     * - has private keys either cached locally or stored in secret storage
+     *
+     * If this function returns false, bootstrapCrossSigning() can be used
+     * to fix things such that it returns true. That is to say, after
+     * bootstrapCrossSigning() completes successfully, this function should
+     * return true.
+     *
+     * @returns True if cross-signing is ready to be used on this device
+     *
+     * @throws May throw {@link matrix.ClientStoppedError} if the `MatrixClient` is stopped before or during the call.
+     */
+    isCrossSigningReady(): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Get the ID of one of the user's cross-signing keys, if both private and matching
+     * public parts of that key are available (ie. cached in the local crypto store).
+     *
+     * The public part may not be available if a `/keys/query` request has not yet been
+     * performed, or if the device that created the keys failed to publish them.
+     *
+     * If either part of the keypair is not available, this will return `null`.
+     *
+     * @param type - The type of key to get the ID of.  One of `CrossSigningKey.Master`, `CrossSigningKey.SelfSigning`,
+     *     or `CrossSigningKey.UserSigning`.  Defaults to `CrossSigningKey.Master`.
+     *
+     * @returns If cross-signing has been initialised on this device, the ID of the given key. Otherwise, null
+     */
+    getCrossSigningKeyId(type?: CrossSigningKey): Promise<string | null>;
+    /**
+     * Bootstrap cross-signing by creating keys if needed.
+     *
+     * If everything is already set up, then no changes are made, so this is safe to run to ensure
+     * cross-signing is ready for use.
+     *
+     * This function:
+     * - creates new cross-signing keys if they are not found locally cached nor in
+     *   secret storage (if it has been set up)
+     * - publishes the public keys to the server if they are not already published
+     * - stores the private keys in secret storage if secret storage is set up.
+     *
+     * @param opts - options object
+     */
+    bootstrapCrossSigning(opts: BootstrapCrossSigningOpts): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Checks whether secret storage:
+     * - is enabled on this account
+     * - is storing cross-signing private keys
+     * - is storing session backup key (if enabled)
+     *
+     * If this function returns false, bootstrapSecretStorage() can be used
+     * to fix things such that it returns true. That is to say, after
+     * bootstrapSecretStorage() completes successfully, this function should
+     * return true.
+     *
+     * @returns True if secret storage is ready to be used on this device
+     */
+    isSecretStorageReady(): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Bootstrap the secret storage by creating a new secret storage key, add it in the secret storage and
+     * store the cross signing keys in the secret storage.
+     *
+     * - Generate a new key {@link GeneratedSecretStorageKey} with `createSecretStorageKey`.
+     *   Only if `setupNewSecretStorage` is set or if there is no AES key in the secret storage
+     * - Store this key in the secret storage and set it as the default key.
+     * - Call `cryptoCallbacks.cacheSecretStorageKey` if provided.
+     * - Store the cross signing keys in the secret storage if
+     *      - the cross signing is ready
+     *      - a new key was created during the previous step
+     *      - or the secret storage already contains the cross signing keys
+     *
+     * @param opts - Options object.
+     */
+    bootstrapSecretStorage(opts: CreateSecretStorageOpts): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Get the status of our cross-signing keys.
+     *
+     * @returns The current status of cross-signing keys: whether we have public and private keys cached locally, and
+     * whether the private keys are in secret storage.
+     *
+     * @throws May throw {@link matrix.ClientStoppedError} if the `MatrixClient` is stopped before or during the call.
+     */
+    getCrossSigningStatus(): Promise<CrossSigningStatus>;
+    /**
+     * Create a recovery key (ie, a key suitable for use with server-side secret storage).
+     *
+     * The key can either be based on a user-supplied passphrase, or just created randomly.
+     *
+     * @param password - Optional passphrase string to use to derive the key,
+     *      which can later be entered by the user as an alternative to entering the
+     *      recovery key itself. If omitted, a key is generated randomly.
+     *
+     * @returns Object including recovery key and server upload parameters.
+     *      The private key should be disposed of after displaying to the use.
+     */
+    createRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase(password?: string): Promise<GeneratedSecretStorageKey>;
+    /**
+     * Get information about the encryption of the given event.
+     *
+     * @param event - the event to get information for
+     *
+     * @returns `null` if the event is not encrypted, or has not (yet) been successfully decrypted. Otherwise, an
+     *      object with information about the encryption of the event.
+     */
+    getEncryptionInfoForEvent(event: MatrixEvent): Promise<EventEncryptionInfo | null>;
+    /**
+     * Encrypts a given payload object via Olm to-device messages to a given
+     * set of devices.
+     *
+     * @param eventType - the type of the event to send.
+     * @param devices - an array of devices to encrypt the payload for.
+     * @param payload - the payload to encrypt.
+     *
+     * @returns the batch of encrypted payloads which can then be sent via {@link matrix.MatrixClient#queueToDevice}.
+     */
+    encryptToDeviceMessages(eventType: string, devices: {
+        userId: string;
+        deviceId: string;
+    }[], payload: ToDevicePayload): Promise<ToDeviceBatch>;
+    /**
+     * Returns to-device verification requests that are already in progress for the given user id.
+     *
+     * @param userId - the ID of the user to query
+     *
+     * @returns the VerificationRequests that are in progress
+     */
+    getVerificationRequestsToDeviceInProgress(userId: string): VerificationRequest[];
+    /**
+     * Finds a DM verification request that is already in progress for the given room id
+     *
+     * @param roomId - the room to use for verification
+     *
+     * @returns the VerificationRequest that is in progress, if any
+     * @deprecated prefer `userId` parameter variant.
+     */
+    findVerificationRequestDMInProgress(roomId: string): VerificationRequest | undefined;
+    /**
+     * Finds a DM verification request that is already in progress for the given room and user.
+     *
+     * @param roomId - the room to use for verification.
+     * @param userId - search for a verification request for the given user.
+     *
+     * @returns the VerificationRequest that is in progress, if any.
+     */
+    findVerificationRequestDMInProgress(roomId: string, userId?: string): VerificationRequest | undefined;
+    /**
+     * Request a key verification from another user, using a DM.
+     *
+     * @param userId - the user to request verification with.
+     * @param roomId - the room to use for verification.
+     *
+     * @returns resolves to a VerificationRequest when the request has been sent to the other party.
+     */
+    requestVerificationDM(userId: string, roomId: string): Promise<VerificationRequest>;
+    /**
+     * Send a verification request to our other devices.
+     *
+     * This is normally used when the current device is new, and we want to ask another of our devices to cross-sign.
+     *
+     * If an all-devices verification is already in flight, returns it. Otherwise, initiates a new one.
+     *
+     * To control the methods offered, set {@link matrix.ICreateClientOpts.verificationMethods} when creating the
+     * `MatrixClient`.
+     *
+     * @returns a VerificationRequest when the request has been sent to the other party.
+     */
+    requestOwnUserVerification(): Promise<VerificationRequest>;
+    /**
+     * Request an interactive verification with the given device.
+     *
+     * This is normally used on one of our own devices, when the current device is already cross-signed, and we want to
+     * validate another device.
+     *
+     * If a verification for this user/device is already in flight, returns it. Otherwise, initiates a new one.
+     *
+     * To control the methods offered, set {@link  matrix.ICreateClientOpts.verificationMethods} when creating the
+     * `MatrixClient`.
+     *
+     * @param userId - ID of the owner of the device to verify
+     * @param deviceId - ID of the device to verify
+     *
+     * @returns a VerificationRequest when the request has been sent to the other party.
+     */
+    requestDeviceVerification(userId: string, deviceId: string): Promise<VerificationRequest>;
+    /**
+     * Fetch the backup decryption key we have saved in our store.
+     *
+     * This can be used for gossiping the key to other devices.
+     *
+     * @returns the key, if any, or null
+     */
+    getSessionBackupPrivateKey(): Promise<Uint8Array | null>;
+    /**
+     * Store the backup decryption key.
+     *
+     * This should be called if the client has received the key from another device via secret sharing (gossiping).
+     * It is the responsability of the caller to check that the decryption key is valid for the current backup version.
+     *
+     * @param key - the backup decryption key
+     *
+     * @deprecated prefer the variant with a `version` parameter.
+     */
+    storeSessionBackupPrivateKey(key: Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Store the backup decryption key.
+     *
+     * This should be called if the client has received the key from another device via secret sharing (gossiping).
+     * It is the responsability of the caller to check that the decryption key is valid for the given backup version.
+     *
+     * @param key - the backup decryption key
+     * @param version - the backup version corresponding to this decryption key
+     */
+    storeSessionBackupPrivateKey(key: Uint8Array, version: string): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Attempt to fetch the backup decryption key from secret storage.
+     *
+     * If the key is found in secret storage, checks it against the latest backup on the server;
+     * if they match, stores the key in the crypto store by calling {@link storeSessionBackupPrivateKey},
+     * which enables automatic restore of individual keys when an Unable-to-decrypt error is encountered.
+     *
+     * If we are unable to fetch the key from secret storage, there is no backup on the server, or the key
+     * does not match, throws an exception.
+     */
+    loadSessionBackupPrivateKeyFromSecretStorage(): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Get the current status of key backup.
+     *
+     * @returns If automatic key backups are enabled, the `version` of the active backup. Otherwise, `null`.
+     */
+    getActiveSessionBackupVersion(): Promise<string | null>;
+    /**
+     * Determine if a key backup can be trusted.
+     *
+     * @param info - key backup info dict from {@link matrix.MatrixClient.getKeyBackupVersion}.
+     */
+    isKeyBackupTrusted(info: KeyBackupInfo): Promise<BackupTrustInfo>;
+    /**
+     * Return the details of the latest backup on the server, when we last checked.
+     *
+     * This normally returns a cached value, but if we haven't yet made a request to the server, it will fire one off.
+     * It will always return the details of the active backup if key backup is enabled.
+     *
+     * Return null if there is no backup.
+     *
+     * @returns the key backup information
+     */
+    getKeyBackupInfo(): Promise<KeyBackupInfo | null>;
+    /**
+     * Force a re-check of the key backup and enable/disable it as appropriate.
+     *
+     * Fetches the current backup information from the server. If there is a backup, and it is trusted, starts
+     * backing up to it; otherwise, disables backups.
+     *
+     * @returns `null` if there is no backup on the server. Otherwise, data on the backup as returned by the server,
+     *   and trust information (as returned by {@link isKeyBackupTrusted}).
+     */
+    checkKeyBackupAndEnable(): Promise<KeyBackupCheck | null>;
+    /**
+     * Creates a new key backup version.
+     *
+     * If there are existing backups they will be replaced.
+     *
+     * The decryption key will be saved in Secret Storage (the {@link matrix.SecretStorage.SecretStorageCallbacks.getSecretStorageKey} Crypto
+     * callback will be called)
+     * and the backup engine will be started.
+     */
+    resetKeyBackup(): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Deletes the given key backup.
+     *
+     * @param version - The backup version to delete.
+     */
+    deleteKeyBackupVersion(version: string): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Download and restore the full key backup from the homeserver.
+     *
+     * Before calling this method, a decryption key, and the backup version to restore,
+     * must have been saved in the crypto store. This happens in one of the following ways:
+     *
+     * - When a new backup version is created with {@link CryptoApi.resetKeyBackup}, a new key is created and cached.
+     * - The key can be loaded from secret storage with {@link CryptoApi.loadSessionBackupPrivateKeyFromSecretStorage}.
+     * - The key can be received from another device via secret sharing, typically as part of the interactive verification flow.
+     * - The key and backup version can also be set explicitly via {@link CryptoApi.storeSessionBackupPrivateKey},
+     *   though this is not expected to be a common operation.
+     *
+     * Warning: the full key backup may be quite large, so this operation may take several hours to complete.
+     * Use of {@link KeyBackupRestoreOpts.progressCallback} is recommended.
+     *
+     * @param opts
+     */
+    restoreKeyBackup(opts?: KeyBackupRestoreOpts): Promise<KeyBackupRestoreResult>;
+    /**
+     * Restores a key backup using a passphrase.
+     * The decoded key (derived from the passphrase) is stored locally by calling {@link CryptoApi#storeSessionBackupPrivateKey}.
+     *
+     * @param passphrase - The passphrase to use to restore the key backup.
+     * @param opts
+     *
+     * @deprecated Deriving a backup key from a passphrase is not part of the matrix spec. Instead, a random key is generated and stored/shared via 4S.
+     */
+    restoreKeyBackupWithPassphrase(passphrase: string, opts?: KeyBackupRestoreOpts): Promise<KeyBackupRestoreResult>;
+    /**
+     * Returns whether MSC3814 dehydrated devices are supported by the crypto
+     * backend and by the server.
+     *
+     * This should be called before calling `startDehydration`, and if this
+     * returns `false`, `startDehydration` should not be called.
+     */
+    isDehydrationSupported(): Promise<boolean>;
+    /**
+     * Start using device dehydration.
+     *
+     * - Rehydrates a dehydrated device, if one is available.
+     * - Creates a new dehydration key, if necessary, and stores it in Secret
+     *   Storage.
+     *   - If `createNewKey` is set to true, always creates a new key.
+     *   - If a dehydration key is not available, creates a new one.
+     * - Creates a new dehydrated device, and schedules periodically creating
+     *   new dehydrated devices.
+     *
+     * This function must not be called unless `isDehydrationSupported` returns
+     * `true`, and must not be called until after cross-signing and secret
+     * storage have been set up.
+     *
+     * @param createNewKey - whether to force creation of a new dehydration key.
+     *   This can be used, for example, if Secret Storage is being reset.  Defaults
+     *   to false.
+     */
+    startDehydration(createNewKey?: boolean): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Export secrets bundle for transmitting to another device as part of OIDC QR login
+     */
+    exportSecretsBundle?(): Promise<Awaited<ReturnType<SecretsBundle["to_json"]>>>;
+    /**
+     * Import secrets bundle transmitted from another device.
+     * @param secrets - The secrets bundle received from the other device
+     */
+    importSecretsBundle?(secrets: Awaited<ReturnType<SecretsBundle["to_json"]>>): Promise<void>;
+}
+/** A reason code for a failure to decrypt an event. */
+export declare enum DecryptionFailureCode {
+    /** Message was encrypted with a Megolm session whose keys have not been shared with us. */
+    MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID = "MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID",
+    /** A special case of {@link MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID}: the sender has told us it is withholding the key. */
+    MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD = "MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD",
+    /** A special case of {@link MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD}: the sender has told us it is withholding the key, because the current device is unverified. */
+    MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD_FOR_UNVERIFIED_DEVICE = "MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD_FOR_UNVERIFIED_DEVICE",
+    /** Message was encrypted with a Megolm session which has been shared with us, but in a later ratchet state. */
+    OLM_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX = "OLM_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX",
+    /**
+     * Message was sent before the current device was created; there is no key backup on the server, so this
+     * decryption failure is expected.
+     */
+    HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_NO_KEY_BACKUP = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_NO_KEY_BACKUP",
+    /**
+     * Message was sent before the current device was created; there was a key backup on the server, but we don't
+     * seem to have access to the backup. (Probably we don't have the right key.)
+     */
+    HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_BACKUP_UNCONFIGURED = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_BACKUP_UNCONFIGURED",
+    /**
+     * Message was sent before the current device was created; there was a (usable) key backup on the server, but we
+     * still can't decrypt. (Either the session isn't in the backup, or we just haven't gotten around to checking yet.)
+     */
+    HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_WORKING_BACKUP = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_WORKING_BACKUP",
+    /**
+     * Message was sent when the user was not a member of the room.
+     */
+    HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_USER_NOT_JOINED = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_USER_NOT_JOINED",
+    /**
+     * The sender's identity is not verified, but was previously verified.
+     */
+    SENDER_IDENTITY_PREVIOUSLY_VERIFIED = "SENDER_IDENTITY_PREVIOUSLY_VERIFIED",
+    /**
+     * The sender device is not cross-signed.  This will only be used if the
+     * device isolation mode is set to `OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode`.
+     */
+    UNSIGNED_SENDER_DEVICE = "UNSIGNED_SENDER_DEVICE",
+    /**
+     * We weren't able to link the message back to any known device.  This will
+     * only be used if the device isolation mode is set to `OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode`.
+     */
+    UNKNOWN_SENDER_DEVICE = "UNKNOWN_SENDER_DEVICE",
+    /** Unknown or unclassified error. */
+    UNKNOWN_ERROR = "UNKNOWN_ERROR",
+    /** @deprecated only used in legacy crypto */
+    MEGOLM_BAD_ROOM = "MEGOLM_BAD_ROOM",
+    /** @deprecated only used in legacy crypto */
+    MEGOLM_MISSING_FIELDS = "MEGOLM_MISSING_FIELDS",
+    /** @deprecated only used in legacy crypto */
+    OLM_DECRYPT_GROUP_MESSAGE_ERROR = "OLM_DECRYPT_GROUP_MESSAGE_ERROR",
+    /** @deprecated only used in legacy crypto */
+    OLM_BAD_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE = "OLM_BAD_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE",
+    /** @deprecated only used in legacy crypto */
+    OLM_BAD_RECIPIENT = "OLM_BAD_RECIPIENT",
+    /** @deprecated only used in legacy crypto */
+    OLM_BAD_RECIPIENT_KEY = "OLM_BAD_RECIPIENT_KEY",
+    /** @deprecated only used in legacy crypto */
+    OLM_BAD_ROOM = "OLM_BAD_ROOM",
+    /** @deprecated only used in legacy crypto */
+    OLM_BAD_SENDER_CHECK_FAILED = "OLM_BAD_SENDER_CHECK_FAILED",
+    /** @deprecated only used in legacy crypto */
+    OLM_BAD_SENDER = "OLM_BAD_SENDER",
+    /** @deprecated only used in legacy crypto */
+    OLM_FORWARDED_MESSAGE = "OLM_FORWARDED_MESSAGE",
+    /** @deprecated only used in legacy crypto */
+    OLM_MISSING_CIPHERTEXT = "OLM_MISSING_CIPHERTEXT",
+    /** @deprecated only used in legacy crypto */
+    OLM_NOT_INCLUDED_IN_RECIPIENTS = "OLM_NOT_INCLUDED_IN_RECIPIENTS",
+    /** @deprecated only used in legacy crypto */
+    UNKNOWN_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM = "UNKNOWN_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM"
+}
+/** Base {@link DeviceIsolationMode} kind. */
+export declare enum DeviceIsolationModeKind {
+    AllDevicesIsolationMode = 0,
+    OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode = 1
+}
+/**
+ * A type of {@link DeviceIsolationMode}.
+ *
+ * Message encryption keys are shared with all devices in the room, except in case of
+ * verified user problems (see {@link errorOnVerifiedUserProblems}).
+ *
+ * Events from all senders are always decrypted (and should be decorated with message shields in case
+ * of authenticity warnings, see {@link EventEncryptionInfo}).
+ */
+export declare class AllDevicesIsolationMode {
+    readonly errorOnVerifiedUserProblems: boolean;
+    readonly kind = DeviceIsolationModeKind.AllDevicesIsolationMode;
+    /**
+     *
+     * @param errorOnVerifiedUserProblems - Behavior when sharing keys to remote devices.
+     *
+     * If set to `true`, sharing keys will fail (i.e. message sending will fail) with an error if:
+     *   - The user was previously verified but is not anymore, or:
+     *   - A verified user has some unverified devices (not cross-signed).
+     *
+     * If `false`, the keys will be distributed as usual. In this case, the client UX should display
+     * warnings to inform the user about problematic devices/users, and stop them hitting this case.
+     */
+    constructor(errorOnVerifiedUserProblems: boolean);
+}
+/**
+ * A type of {@link DeviceIsolationMode}.
+ *
+ * Message encryption keys are only shared with devices that have been cross-signed by their owner.
+ * Encryption will throw an error if a verified user replaces their identity.
+ *
+ * Events are decrypted only if they come from a cross-signed device. Other events will result in a decryption
+ * failure. (To access the failure reason, see {@link MatrixEvent.decryptionFailureReason}.)
+ */
+export declare class OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode {
+    readonly kind = DeviceIsolationModeKind.OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode;
+}
+/**
+ * DeviceIsolationMode represents the mode of device isolation used when encrypting or decrypting messages.
+ * It can be one of two types: {@link AllDevicesIsolationMode} or {@link OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode}.
+ *
+ * Only supported by rust Crypto.
+ */
+export type DeviceIsolationMode = AllDevicesIsolationMode | OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode;
+/**
+ * Options object for `CryptoApi.bootstrapCrossSigning`.
+ */
+export interface BootstrapCrossSigningOpts {
+    /** Optional. Reset the cross-signing keys even if keys already exist. */
+    setupNewCrossSigning?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * An application callback to collect the authentication data for uploading the keys. If not given, the keys
+     * will not be uploaded to the server (which seems like a bad thing?).
+     */
+    authUploadDeviceSigningKeys?: UIAuthCallback<void>;
+}
+/**
+ * Represents the ways in which we trust a user
+ */
+export declare class UserVerificationStatus {
+    private readonly crossSigningVerified;
+    private readonly crossSigningVerifiedBefore;
+    private readonly tofu;
+    /**
+     * Indicates if the identity has changed in a way that needs user approval.
+     *
+     * This happens if the identity has changed since we first saw it, *unless* the new identity has also been verified
+     * by our user (eg via an interactive verification).
+     *
+     * To rectify this, either:
+     *
+     *  * Conduct a verification of the new identity via {@link CryptoApi.requestVerificationDM}.
+     *  * Pin the new identity, via {@link CryptoApi.pinCurrentUserIdentity}.
+     *
+     * @returns true if the identity has changed in a way that needs user approval.
+     */
+    readonly needsUserApproval: boolean;
+    constructor(crossSigningVerified: boolean, crossSigningVerifiedBefore: boolean, tofu: boolean, needsUserApproval?: boolean);
+    /**
+     * @returns true if this user is verified via any means
+     */
+    isVerified(): boolean;
+    /**
+     * @returns true if this user is verified via cross signing
+     */
+    isCrossSigningVerified(): boolean;
+    /**
+     * @returns true if we ever verified this user before (at least for
+     * the history of verifications observed by this device).
+     */
+    wasCrossSigningVerified(): boolean;
+    /**
+     * @returns true if this user's key is trusted on first use
+     *
+     * @deprecated No longer supported, with the Rust crypto stack.
+     */
+    isTofu(): boolean;
+}
+export declare class DeviceVerificationStatus {
+    /**
+     * True if this device has been signed by its owner (and that signature verified).
+     *
+     * This doesn't necessarily mean that we have verified the device, since we may not have verified the
+     * owner's cross-signing key.
+     */
+    readonly signedByOwner: boolean;
+    /**
+     * True if this device has been verified via cross signing.
+     *
+     * This does *not* take into account `trustCrossSignedDevices`.
+     */
+    readonly crossSigningVerified: boolean;
+    /**
+     * TODO: tofu magic wtf does this do?
+     */
+    readonly tofu: boolean;
+    /**
+     * True if the device has been marked as locally verified.
+     */
+    readonly localVerified: boolean;
+    /**
+     * True if the client has been configured to trust cross-signed devices via {@link CryptoApi#setTrustCrossSignedDevices}.
+     */
+    private readonly trustCrossSignedDevices;
+    constructor(opts: Partial<DeviceVerificationStatus> & {
+        /**
+         * True if cross-signed devices should be considered verified for {@link DeviceVerificationStatus#isVerified}.
+         */
+        trustCrossSignedDevices?: boolean;
+    });
+    /**
+     * Check if we should consider this device "verified".
+     *
+     * A device is "verified" if either:
+     *  * it has been manually marked as such via {@link matrix.MatrixClient.setDeviceVerified}.
+     *  * it has been cross-signed with a verified signing key, **and** the client has been configured to trust
+     *    cross-signed devices via {@link CryptoApi.setTrustCrossSignedDevices}.
+     *
+     * @returns true if this device is verified via any means.
+     */
+    isVerified(): boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Room key import progress report.
+ * Used when calling {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeys},
+ * {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeysAsJson} or {@link CryptoApi#restoreKeyBackup} as the parameter of
+ * the progressCallback. Used to display feedback.
+ */
+export interface ImportRoomKeyProgressData {
+    stage: string;
+    successes?: number;
+    failures?: number;
+    total?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Options object for {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeys} and
+ * {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeysAsJson}.
+ */
+export interface ImportRoomKeysOpts {
+    /** Reports ongoing progress of the import process. Can be used for feedback. */
+    progressCallback?: (stage: ImportRoomKeyProgressData) => void;
+    /** @deprecated the rust SDK will always such imported keys as untrusted */
+    untrusted?: boolean;
+    /** @deprecated not useful externally */
+    source?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * The result of a call to {@link CryptoApi.getCrossSigningStatus}.
+ */
+export interface CrossSigningStatus {
+    /**
+     * True if the public master, self signing and user signing keys are available on this device.
+     */
+    publicKeysOnDevice: boolean;
+    /**
+     * True if the private keys are stored in the secret storage.
+     */
+    privateKeysInSecretStorage: boolean;
+    /**
+     * True if the private keys are stored locally.
+     */
+    privateKeysCachedLocally: {
+        masterKey: boolean;
+        selfSigningKey: boolean;
+        userSigningKey: boolean;
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Crypto callbacks provided by the application
+ */
+export interface CryptoCallbacks extends SecretStorageCallbacks {
+    /** @deprecated: unused with the Rust crypto stack. */
+    getCrossSigningKey?: (keyType: string, pubKey: string) => Promise<Uint8Array | null>;
+    /** @deprecated: unused with the Rust crypto stack. */
+    saveCrossSigningKeys?: (keys: Record<string, Uint8Array>) => void;
+    /** @deprecated: unused with the Rust crypto stack. */
+    shouldUpgradeDeviceVerifications?: (users: Record<string, any>) => Promise<string[]>;
+    /**
+     * Called by {@link CryptoApi#bootstrapSecretStorage}
+     * @param keyId - secret storage key id
+     * @param keyInfo - secret storage key info
+     * @param key - private key to store
+     */
+    cacheSecretStorageKey?: (keyId: string, keyInfo: SecretStorageKeyDescription, key: Uint8Array) => void;
+    /** @deprecated: unused with the Rust crypto stack. */
+    onSecretRequested?: (userId: string, deviceId: string, requestId: string, secretName: string, deviceTrust: DeviceVerificationStatus) => Promise<string | undefined>;
+    /** @deprecated: unused with the Rust crypto stack. */
+    getDehydrationKey?: (keyInfo: SecretStorageKeyDescription, checkFunc: (key: Uint8Array) => void) => Promise<Uint8Array>;
+    /** @deprecated: unused with the Rust crypto stack. */
+    getBackupKey?: () => Promise<Uint8Array>;
+}
+/**
+ * Parameter of {@link CryptoApi#bootstrapSecretStorage}
+ */
+export interface CreateSecretStorageOpts {
+    /**
+     * Function called to await a secret storage key creation flow.
+     * @returns Promise resolving to an object with public key metadata, encoded private
+     *     recovery key which should be disposed of after displaying to the user,
+     *     and raw private key to avoid round tripping if needed.
+     */
+    createSecretStorageKey?: () => Promise<GeneratedSecretStorageKey>;
+    /**
+     * The current key backup object. If passed,
+     * the passphrase and recovery key from this backup will be used.
+     * @deprecated Not used by the Rust crypto stack.
+     */
+    keyBackupInfo?: KeyBackupInfo;
+    /**
+     * If true, a new key backup version will be
+     * created and the private key stored in the new SSSS store. Ignored if keyBackupInfo
+     * is supplied.
+     */
+    setupNewKeyBackup?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Reset even if keys already exist.
+     */
+    setupNewSecretStorage?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Function called to get the user's current key backup passphrase.
+     *
+     * Should return a promise that resolves with a Uint8Array
+     * containing the key, or rejects if the key cannot be obtained.
+     *
+     * Only used when the client has existing key backup, but no secret storage.
+     *
+     * @deprecated Not used by the Rust crypto stack.
+     */
+    getKeyBackupPassphrase?: () => Promise<Uint8Array>;
+}
+/** Types of cross-signing key */
+export declare enum CrossSigningKey {
+    Master = "master",
+    SelfSigning = "self_signing",
+    UserSigning = "user_signing"
+}
+/**
+ * Information on one of the cross-signing keys.
+ * @see https://spec.matrix.org/v1.7/client-server-api/#post_matrixclientv3keysdevice_signingupload
+ */
+export interface CrossSigningKeyInfo {
+    keys: {
+        [algorithm: string]: string;
+    };
+    signatures?: ISignatures;
+    usage: string[];
+    user_id: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Recovery key created by {@link CryptoApi#createRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase} or {@link CreateSecretStorageOpts#createSecretStorageKey}.
+ */
+export interface GeneratedSecretStorageKey {
+    keyInfo?: {
+        /** If the key was derived from a passphrase, information (algorithm, salt, etc) on that derivation. */
+        passphrase?: PassphraseInfo;
+        /** Optional human-readable name for the key, to be stored in account_data. */
+        name?: string;
+    };
+    /** The raw generated private key. */
+    privateKey: Uint8Array;
+    /** The generated key, encoded for display to the user per https://spec.matrix.org/v1.7/client-server-api/#key-representation. */
+    encodedPrivateKey?: string;
+}
+/**
+ *  Result type of {@link CryptoApi#getEncryptionInfoForEvent}.
+ */
+export interface EventEncryptionInfo {
+    /** "Shield" to be shown next to this event representing its verification status */
+    shieldColour: EventShieldColour;
+    /**
+     * `null` if `shieldColour` is `EventShieldColour.NONE`; otherwise a reason code for the shield in `shieldColour`.
+     */
+    shieldReason: EventShieldReason | null;
+}
+/**
+ * Types of shield to be shown for {@link EventEncryptionInfo#shieldColour}.
+ */
+export declare enum EventShieldColour {
+    NONE = 0,
+    GREY = 1,
+    RED = 2
+}
+/**
+ * Reason codes for {@link EventEncryptionInfo#shieldReason}.
+ */
+export declare enum EventShieldReason {
+    /** An unknown reason from the crypto library (if you see this, it is a bug in matrix-js-sdk). */
+    UNKNOWN = 0,
+    /** "Encrypted by an unverified user." */
+    UNVERIFIED_IDENTITY = 1,
+    /** "Encrypted by a device not verified by its owner." */
+    UNSIGNED_DEVICE = 2,
+    /** "Encrypted by an unknown or deleted device." */
+    UNKNOWN_DEVICE = 3,
+    /**
+     * "The authenticity of this encrypted message can't be guaranteed on this device."
+     *
+     * ie: the key has been forwarded, or retrieved from an insecure backup.
+     */
+    AUTHENTICITY_NOT_GUARANTEED = 4,
+    /**
+     * The (deprecated) sender_key field in the event does not match the Ed25519 key of the device that sent us the
+     * decryption keys.
+     */
+    MISMATCHED_SENDER_KEY = 5
+}
+/** The result of a call to {@link CryptoApi.getOwnDeviceKeys} */
+export interface OwnDeviceKeys {
+    /** Public part of the Ed25519 fingerprint key for the current device, base64 encoded. */
+    ed25519: string;
+    /** Public part of the Curve25519 identity key for the current device, base64 encoded. */
+    curve25519: string;
+}
+export * from "./verification.ts";
+export type * from "./keybackup.ts";
+export * from "./recovery-key.ts";
+export * from "./key-passphrase.ts";
+export * from "./CryptoEvent.ts";
+export type * from "./CryptoEventHandlerMap.ts";
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map