ring-native 0.0.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- checksums.yaml +7 -0
- data/.gitignore +9 -0
- data/Gemfile +3 -0
- data/README.md +22 -0
- data/Rakefile +1 -0
- data/ext/ring/extconf.rb +29 -0
- data/lib/ring/native.rb +8 -0
- data/lib/ring/native/version.rb +5 -0
- data/ring-native.gemspec +25 -0
- data/vendor/ring/BUILDING.md +40 -0
- data/vendor/ring/Cargo.toml +43 -0
- data/vendor/ring/LICENSE +185 -0
- data/vendor/ring/Makefile +35 -0
- data/vendor/ring/PORTING.md +163 -0
- data/vendor/ring/README.md +113 -0
- data/vendor/ring/STYLE.md +197 -0
- data/vendor/ring/appveyor.yml +27 -0
- data/vendor/ring/build.rs +108 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/aes.c +1142 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/aes_test.Windows.vcxproj +25 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/aes_test.cc +93 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl +2368 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/asm/aes-armv4.pl +1249 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl +2246 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl +1318 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl +2084 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl +675 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl +1364 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl +1565 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86.pl +841 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl +1116 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/internal.h +87 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/aes/mode_wrappers.c +61 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/add.c +394 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl +694 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/asm/armv8-mont.pl +1503 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/asm/bn-586.pl +774 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/asm/co-586.pl +287 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl +1882 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl +592 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c +599 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl +1393 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl +3507 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/bn.c +352 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/bn_asn1.c +74 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/bn_test.Windows.vcxproj +25 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/bn_test.cc +1696 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/cmp.c +200 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/convert.c +433 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/ctx.c +311 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/div.c +594 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/exponentiation.c +1335 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/gcd.c +711 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/generic.c +1019 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/internal.h +316 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/montgomery.c +516 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/mul.c +888 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/prime.c +829 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/random.c +334 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c +262 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h +53 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bn/shift.c +276 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bytestring/bytestring_test.Windows.vcxproj +25 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bytestring/bytestring_test.cc +421 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bytestring/cbb.c +399 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bytestring/cbs.c +227 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/bytestring/internal.h +46 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/chacha/chacha_generic.c +140 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/chacha/chacha_vec.c +323 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/chacha/chacha_vec_arm.S +1447 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/chacha/chacha_vec_arm_generate.go +153 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cipher/cipher_test.Windows.vcxproj +25 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cipher/e_aes.c +390 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cipher/e_chacha20poly1305.c +208 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cipher/internal.h +173 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cipher/test/aes_128_gcm_tests.txt +543 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cipher/test/aes_128_key_wrap_tests.txt +9 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cipher/test/aes_256_gcm_tests.txt +475 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cipher/test/aes_256_key_wrap_tests.txt +23 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cipher/test/chacha20_poly1305_old_tests.txt +422 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cipher/test/chacha20_poly1305_tests.txt +484 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cipher/test/cipher_test.txt +100 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/constant_time_test.Windows.vcxproj +25 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/constant_time_test.c +304 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cpu-arm-asm.S +32 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cpu-arm.c +199 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/cpu-intel.c +261 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/crypto.c +151 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/curve25519/asm/x25519-arm.S +2118 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.c +4888 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/curve25519/x25519_test.cc +128 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/digest/md32_common.h +181 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/asm/p256-x86_64-asm.pl +2725 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/ec.c +193 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/ec_curves.c +61 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/ec_key.c +228 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/ec_montgomery.c +114 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/example_mul.Windows.vcxproj +25 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/internal.h +243 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/oct.c +253 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/p256-64.c +1794 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/p256-x86_64-table.h +9548 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/p256-x86_64.c +509 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/simple.c +1007 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/util-64.c +183 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ec/wnaf.c +508 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ecdh/ecdh.c +155 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.c +304 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_asn1.c +193 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_test.Windows.vcxproj +25 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_test.cc +327 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/header_removed.h +17 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/internal.h +495 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/libring.Windows.vcxproj +101 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/mem.c +98 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl +1045 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl +517 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl +1393 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl +1741 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl +422 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/modes/ctr.c +226 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/modes/gcm.c +1206 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/modes/gcm_test.Windows.vcxproj +25 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/modes/gcm_test.c +348 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/modes/internal.h +299 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/perlasm/arm-xlate.pl +170 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/perlasm/readme +100 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl +1164 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/perlasm/x86asm.pl +292 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/perlasm/x86gas.pl +263 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/perlasm/x86masm.pl +200 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/perlasm/x86nasm.pl +187 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.c +331 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_arm.c +301 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_arm_asm.S +2015 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_test.Windows.vcxproj +25 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_test.cc +80 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_test.txt +52 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_vec.c +892 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/rand/asm/rdrand-x86_64.pl +75 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/rand/internal.h +32 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/rand/rand.c +189 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/rand/urandom.c +219 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/rand/windows.c +56 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/refcount_c11.c +66 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/refcount_lock.c +53 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/refcount_test.Windows.vcxproj +25 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/refcount_test.c +58 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/rsa/blinding.c +462 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/rsa/internal.h +108 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/rsa/padding.c +300 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/rsa/rsa.c +450 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c +261 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/rsa/rsa_impl.c +944 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.Windows.vcxproj +25 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/rsa/rsa_test.cc +437 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/sha/asm/sha-armv8.pl +436 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/sha/asm/sha-x86_64.pl +2390 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl +1275 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl +735 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv8.pl +14 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-x86_64.pl +14 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl +911 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv4.pl +666 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl +14 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-x86_64.pl +14 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/sha/sha1.c +271 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/sha/sha256.c +204 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/sha/sha512.c +355 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/test/file_test.cc +326 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/test/file_test.h +181 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/test/malloc.cc +150 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/test/scoped_types.h +95 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/test/test.Windows.vcxproj +35 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/test/test_util.cc +46 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/test/test_util.h +41 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/thread_none.c +55 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/thread_pthread.c +165 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/thread_test.Windows.vcxproj +25 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/thread_test.c +200 -0
- data/vendor/ring/crypto/thread_win.c +282 -0
- data/vendor/ring/examples/checkdigest.rs +103 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/aes.h +121 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/arm_arch.h +129 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/base.h +156 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/bn.h +794 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/buffer.h +18 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/bytestring.h +235 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/chacha.h +37 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/cmac.h +76 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/cpu.h +184 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/crypto.h +43 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/curve25519.h +88 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/ec.h +225 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/ec_key.h +129 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/ecdh.h +110 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/ecdsa.h +156 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/err.h +201 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/mem.h +101 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/obj_mac.h +71 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/opensslfeatures.h +68 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/opensslv.h +18 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h +18 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/poly1305.h +51 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/rand.h +70 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/rsa.h +399 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/thread.h +133 -0
- data/vendor/ring/include/openssl/type_check.h +71 -0
- data/vendor/ring/mk/Common.props +63 -0
- data/vendor/ring/mk/Windows.props +42 -0
- data/vendor/ring/mk/WindowsTest.props +18 -0
- data/vendor/ring/mk/appveyor.bat +62 -0
- data/vendor/ring/mk/bottom_of_makefile.mk +54 -0
- data/vendor/ring/mk/ring.mk +266 -0
- data/vendor/ring/mk/top_of_makefile.mk +214 -0
- data/vendor/ring/mk/travis.sh +40 -0
- data/vendor/ring/mk/update-travis-yml.py +229 -0
- data/vendor/ring/ring.sln +153 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/aead.rs +682 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/agreement.rs +248 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/c.rs +129 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/constant_time.rs +37 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/der.rs +96 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/digest.rs +690 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/digest_tests.txt +57 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/ecc.rs +28 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/ecc_build.rs +279 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/ecc_curves.rs +117 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/ed25519_tests.txt +2579 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/exe_tests.rs +46 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/ffi.rs +29 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/file_test.rs +187 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/hkdf.rs +153 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/hkdf_tests.txt +59 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/hmac.rs +414 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/hmac_tests.txt +97 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/input.rs +312 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/lib.rs +41 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/pbkdf2.rs +265 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/pbkdf2_tests.txt +113 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/polyfill.rs +57 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/rand.rs +28 -0
- data/vendor/ring/src/signature.rs +314 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/README.md +9 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA1LongMsg.rsp +263 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA1Monte.rsp +309 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA1ShortMsg.rsp +267 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA224LongMsg.rsp +263 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA224Monte.rsp +309 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA224ShortMsg.rsp +267 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA256LongMsg.rsp +263 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA256Monte.rsp +309 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA256ShortMsg.rsp +267 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA384LongMsg.rsp +519 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA384Monte.rsp +309 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA384ShortMsg.rsp +523 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA512LongMsg.rsp +519 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA512Monte.rsp +309 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/SHAVS/SHA512ShortMsg.rsp +523 -0
- data/vendor/ring/third-party/NIST/sha256sums.txt +1 -0
- metadata +333 -0
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// Copyright 2015 Brian Smith.
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//
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// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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//
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// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
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// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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// SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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// OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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// CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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//! Key agreement: ECDH.
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use super::{c, digest, ecc, ffi};
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use super::input::Input;
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use std;
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/// A key agreement algorithm.
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pub struct Algorithm {
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ec_group_fn: unsafe extern fn () -> *const ecc::EC_GROUP,
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encoded_public_key_len: usize,
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nid: c::int,
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}
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/// An ephemeral key pair for use (only) with `agree_ephemeral`. The
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/// signature of `agree_ephemeral` ensures that an `EphemeralKeyPair` can be
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/// used for at most one key agreement.
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pub struct EphemeralKeyPair {
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key: *mut EC_KEY,
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algorithm: &'static Algorithm
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}
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impl EphemeralKeyPair {
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/// Generate a new ephemeral key pair for the given algorithm.
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///
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/// C analog: `EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name` + `EC_KEY_generate_key`.
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pub fn generate(algorithm: &'static Algorithm)
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-> Result<EphemeralKeyPair, ()> {
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let key = try!(ffi::map_bssl_ptr_result(unsafe {
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EC_KEY_generate_key_ex((algorithm.ec_group_fn)())
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}));
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Ok(EphemeralKeyPair { key: key, algorithm: algorithm })
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}
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/// The size in bytes of the encoded public key returned from `public_key`.
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pub fn public_point_len(&self) -> usize {
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}
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/// algorithm.
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///
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/// `out.len()` must be equal to the value returned by `public_point_len`.
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pub fn fill_with_encoded_public_key(&self, out: &mut [u8])
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-> Result<(), ()> {
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match unsafe {
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} {
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}
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}
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}
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impl Drop for EphemeralKeyPair {
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fn drop(&mut self) {
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unsafe {
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}
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}
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}
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/// Performs a key agreement with an ephemeral key pair's private key and the
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///
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/// `my_key_pair` is the ephemeral key pair to use. Since `my_key_pair` is
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/// moved, it will not be usable after calling `agree_ephemeral`, thus
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/// guaranteeing that the key is used for only one key agreement.
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|
+
/// `peer_algorithm` is the algorithm/curve for the peer's public key point;
|
|
84
|
+
/// `agree_ephemeral` will return `Err(())` if it does not match `my_key_pair's`
|
|
85
|
+
/// algorithm/curve. `peer_encoded_pubic_key` is the peer's public key. It
|
|
86
|
+
/// must be encoded in the standard form for the algorithm; see the algorithm's
|
|
87
|
+
/// documentation for details. `error_value` is the value to return if an error
|
|
88
|
+
/// occurs before `kdf` is called, e.g. when decoding of the peer's public key
|
|
89
|
+
/// fails. After the key agreement is done, `agree_ephemeral` calls `kdf` with
|
|
90
|
+
/// the raw key material from the key agrement operation and then returns what
|
|
91
|
+
/// `kdf` returns.
|
|
92
|
+
///
|
|
93
|
+
/// C analogs: `ECDH_compute_key_ex` (*ring* only), `EC_POINT_oct2point` +
|
|
94
|
+
/// `ECDH_compute_key`.
|
|
95
|
+
//
|
|
96
|
+
// TODO: If the key is authenticated then we don't necessarily need to verify
|
|
97
|
+
// that the peer's public point is on the curve since a malicious
|
|
98
|
+
// authenticated peer could just as easily give us a bad public point that is
|
|
99
|
+
// on the curve. Also, given that our key pair is ephemeral, we're not risking
|
|
100
|
+
// the leakage of a long-term key via invalid point attacks. Accordingly, even
|
|
101
|
+
// though the lower-level C code does check that the peer's point is on the
|
|
102
|
+
// curve, that check seems like overkill, at least for the most typical uses
|
|
103
|
+
// of this function. On the other hand, some users may feel that it is
|
|
104
|
+
// worthwhile to do point validity check even if it seems to be unnecssary.
|
|
105
|
+
// Accordingly, it might be worthwhile to change this interface in the future
|
|
106
|
+
// so that the caller can choose how much validation of the peer's public
|
|
107
|
+
// point is done.
|
|
108
|
+
pub fn agree_ephemeral<F, R, E>(my_key_pair: EphemeralKeyPair,
|
|
109
|
+
peer_alg: &Algorithm,
|
|
110
|
+
peer_encoded_public_point: Input,
|
|
111
|
+
error_value: E, kdf: F) -> Result<R, E>
|
|
112
|
+
where F: FnOnce(&[u8]) -> Result<R, E> {
|
|
113
|
+
let mut shared_key = [0u8; MAX_COORDINATE_LEN];
|
|
114
|
+
let mut shared_key_len = 0;
|
|
115
|
+
let peer_encoded_public_point =
|
|
116
|
+
peer_encoded_public_point.as_slice_less_safe();
|
|
117
|
+
match unsafe {
|
|
118
|
+
ECDH_compute_key_ex(shared_key.as_mut_ptr(), &mut shared_key_len,
|
|
119
|
+
shared_key.len(), my_key_pair.key, peer_alg.nid,
|
|
120
|
+
peer_encoded_public_point.as_ptr(),
|
|
121
|
+
peer_encoded_public_point.len())
|
|
122
|
+
} {
|
|
123
|
+
1 => kdf(&shared_key[0..shared_key_len]),
|
|
124
|
+
_ => Err(error_value)
|
|
125
|
+
}
|
|
126
|
+
}
|
|
127
|
+
|
|
128
|
+
// TODO: After ecdsa_test.cc is removed, this function should be removed and
|
|
129
|
+
// the caller should be changed to call `SHA512_5` directly. Also, the
|
|
130
|
+
// alternative implementation of this in crypto/test should be removed at
|
|
131
|
+
// that time.
|
|
132
|
+
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
|
|
133
|
+
#[doc(hidden)]
|
|
134
|
+
#[no_mangle]
|
|
135
|
+
pub extern fn BN_generate_dsa_nonce_digest(
|
|
136
|
+
out: *mut u8, out_len: c::size_t,
|
|
137
|
+
part1: *const u8, part1_len: c::size_t,
|
|
138
|
+
part2: *const u8, part2_len: c::size_t,
|
|
139
|
+
part3: *const u8, part3_len: c::size_t,
|
|
140
|
+
part4: *const u8, part4_len: c::size_t,
|
|
141
|
+
part5: *const u8, part5_len: c::size_t)
|
|
142
|
+
-> c::int {
|
|
143
|
+
SHA512_5(out, out_len, part1, part1_len, part2, part2_len, part3,
|
|
144
|
+
part3_len, part4, part4_len, part5, part5_len);
|
|
145
|
+
1
|
|
146
|
+
}
|
|
147
|
+
|
|
148
|
+
/// SHA512_5 calculates the SHA-512 digest of the concatenation of |part1|
|
|
149
|
+
/// through |part5|. Any part<N> may be null if and only if the corresponding
|
|
150
|
+
/// part<N>_len is zero. This ugliness exists in order to allow some of the
|
|
151
|
+
/// C ECC code to calculate SHA-512 digests.
|
|
152
|
+
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
|
|
153
|
+
#[doc(hidden)]
|
|
154
|
+
#[no_mangle]
|
|
155
|
+
pub extern fn SHA512_5(out: *mut u8, out_len: c::size_t,
|
|
156
|
+
part1: *const u8, part1_len: c::size_t,
|
|
157
|
+
part2: *const u8, part2_len: c::size_t,
|
|
158
|
+
part3: *const u8, part3_len: c::size_t,
|
|
159
|
+
part4: *const u8, part4_len: c::size_t,
|
|
160
|
+
part5: *const u8, part5_len: c::size_t) {
|
|
161
|
+
fn maybe_update(ctx: &mut digest::Context, part: *const u8,
|
|
162
|
+
part_len: c::size_t) {
|
|
163
|
+
if part_len != 0 {
|
|
164
|
+
assert!(!part.is_null());
|
|
165
|
+
ctx.update(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(part, part_len) });
|
|
166
|
+
}
|
|
167
|
+
}
|
|
168
|
+
|
|
169
|
+
let mut ctx = digest::Context::new(&digest::SHA512);
|
|
170
|
+
maybe_update(&mut ctx, part1, part1_len);
|
|
171
|
+
maybe_update(&mut ctx, part2, part2_len);
|
|
172
|
+
maybe_update(&mut ctx, part3, part3_len);
|
|
173
|
+
maybe_update(&mut ctx, part4, part4_len);
|
|
174
|
+
maybe_update(&mut ctx, part5, part5_len);
|
|
175
|
+
let digest = ctx.finish();
|
|
176
|
+
let digest = digest.as_ref();
|
|
177
|
+
let out = unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts_mut(out, out_len) };
|
|
178
|
+
assert_eq!(out.len(), digest.len());
|
|
179
|
+
for i in 0..digest.len() {
|
|
180
|
+
out[i] = digest[i];
|
|
181
|
+
}
|
|
182
|
+
}
|
|
183
|
+
|
|
184
|
+
// XXX: Replace with `const fn` when `const fn` is stable:
|
|
185
|
+
// https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/24111
|
|
186
|
+
macro_rules! encoded_public_key_len {
|
|
187
|
+
( $bits:expr ) => ( 1 + (2 * (($bits + 7) / 8)) )
|
|
188
|
+
}
|
|
189
|
+
|
|
190
|
+
/// ECDH using the NIST P-256 (secp256r1) curve.
|
|
191
|
+
///
|
|
192
|
+
/// Public keys are encoding in uncompressed form using the
|
|
193
|
+
/// Octet-String-to-Elliptic-Curve-Point algorithm in [SEC 1: Elliptic Curve
|
|
194
|
+
/// Cryptography, Version 2.0](http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf).
|
|
195
|
+
///
|
|
196
|
+
/// C analogs: `EC_GROUP_P256` (*ring* only),
|
|
197
|
+
/// `EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)`")
|
|
198
|
+
pub static ECDH_P256: Algorithm = Algorithm {
|
|
199
|
+
ec_group_fn: ecc::EC_GROUP_P256,
|
|
200
|
+
encoded_public_key_len: encoded_public_key_len!(256),
|
|
201
|
+
nid: 415, // NID_X9_62_prime256v1
|
|
202
|
+
};
|
|
203
|
+
|
|
204
|
+
/// ECDH using the NIST P-384 (secp384r1) curve.
|
|
205
|
+
///
|
|
206
|
+
/// Public keys are encoding in uncompressed form using the
|
|
207
|
+
/// Octet-String-to-Elliptic-Curve-Point algorithm in [SEC 1: Elliptic Curve
|
|
208
|
+
/// Cryptography, Version 2.0](http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf).
|
|
209
|
+
///
|
|
210
|
+
/// C analogs: `EC_GROUP_P384` (*ring* only),
|
|
211
|
+
/// `EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1)`")
|
|
212
|
+
pub static ECDH_P384: Algorithm = Algorithm {
|
|
213
|
+
ec_group_fn: ecc::EC_GROUP_P384,
|
|
214
|
+
encoded_public_key_len: encoded_public_key_len!(384),
|
|
215
|
+
nid: 715, // NID_secp384r1
|
|
216
|
+
};
|
|
217
|
+
|
|
218
|
+
/// ECDH using the NIST P-521 (secp521r1) curve.
|
|
219
|
+
///
|
|
220
|
+
/// Public keys are encoding in uncompressed form using the
|
|
221
|
+
/// Octet-String-to-Elliptic-Curve-Point algorithm in [SEC 1: Elliptic Curve
|
|
222
|
+
/// Cryptography, Version 2.0](http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf).
|
|
223
|
+
///
|
|
224
|
+
/// C analogs: `EC_GROUP_new_p521` (*ring* only),
|
|
225
|
+
/// `EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1)`")
|
|
226
|
+
pub static ECDH_P521: Algorithm = Algorithm {
|
|
227
|
+
ec_group_fn: ecc::EC_GROUP_P521,
|
|
228
|
+
encoded_public_key_len: encoded_public_key_len!(521),
|
|
229
|
+
nid: 716, // NID_secp521r1
|
|
230
|
+
};
|
|
231
|
+
|
|
232
|
+
const MAX_COORDINATE_LEN: usize = (521 + 7) / 8;
|
|
233
|
+
|
|
234
|
+
#[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
|
|
235
|
+
enum EC_KEY { }
|
|
236
|
+
|
|
237
|
+
extern {
|
|
238
|
+
fn EC_KEY_generate_key_ex(group: *const ecc::EC_GROUP) -> *mut EC_KEY;
|
|
239
|
+
fn EC_KEY_public_key_to_oct(key: *const EC_KEY, out: *mut u8,
|
|
240
|
+
out_len: c::size_t) -> c::size_t;
|
|
241
|
+
fn EC_KEY_free(key: *mut EC_KEY);
|
|
242
|
+
|
|
243
|
+
fn ECDH_compute_key_ex(out: *mut u8, out_len: *mut c::size_t,
|
|
244
|
+
max_out_len: c::size_t, my_key_pair: *const EC_KEY,
|
|
245
|
+
peer_curve_nid: c::int,
|
|
246
|
+
peer_pub_point_bytes: *const u8,
|
|
247
|
+
peer_pub_point_bytes_len: c::size_t) -> c::int;
|
|
248
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
// Copyright 2015 Brian Smith.
|
|
2
|
+
//
|
|
3
|
+
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
|
|
4
|
+
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
|
|
5
|
+
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
|
|
6
|
+
//
|
|
7
|
+
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
|
|
8
|
+
// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
|
|
9
|
+
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR
|
|
10
|
+
// ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
|
|
11
|
+
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
|
|
12
|
+
// ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
|
|
13
|
+
// OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
//! TODO: Module-level documentation.
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
#![allow(non_camel_case_types)]
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
macro_rules! define_type {
|
|
20
|
+
( $name:ident, $builtin:ty, $test_c_metrics:ident, $get_c_align_fn:ident,
|
|
21
|
+
$get_c_size_fn:ident, $doc:expr ) =>
|
|
22
|
+
{
|
|
23
|
+
#[doc = $doc]
|
|
24
|
+
pub type $name = $builtin;
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
define_metrics_tests!($name, $test_c_metrics, $get_c_align_fn,
|
|
27
|
+
$get_c_size_fn);
|
|
28
|
+
}
|
|
29
|
+
}
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
macro_rules! define_metrics_tests {
|
|
32
|
+
( $name:ident, $test_c_metrics:ident, $get_c_align_fn:ident,
|
|
33
|
+
$get_c_size_fn:ident ) =>
|
|
34
|
+
{
|
|
35
|
+
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
36
|
+
extern {
|
|
37
|
+
// We can't use `size_t` because we need to test that our
|
|
38
|
+
// definition of `size_t` is correct using this code! We use `u16`
|
|
39
|
+
// because even 8-bit and 16-bit microcontrollers have no trouble
|
|
40
|
+
// with it, and because `u16` is always as smaller or smaller than
|
|
41
|
+
// `usize`.
|
|
42
|
+
fn $get_c_align_fn() -> u16;
|
|
43
|
+
fn $get_c_size_fn() -> u16;
|
|
44
|
+
}
|
|
45
|
+
|
|
46
|
+
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
47
|
+
#[test]
|
|
48
|
+
fn $test_c_metrics() {
|
|
49
|
+
use std::mem;
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
let c_align = unsafe { $get_c_align_fn() };
|
|
52
|
+
let c_size = unsafe { $get_c_size_fn() };
|
|
53
|
+
|
|
54
|
+
// XXX: Remove these assertions and these uses of `as` when Rust
|
|
55
|
+
// supports implicit coercion of `u16` to `usize`.
|
|
56
|
+
assert!(mem::size_of_val(&c_align) <= mem::size_of::<usize>());
|
|
57
|
+
assert!(mem::size_of_val(&c_size) <= mem::size_of::<usize>());
|
|
58
|
+
assert_eq!((mem::align_of::<$name>(), mem::size_of::<$name>()),
|
|
59
|
+
(c_align as usize, c_size as usize));
|
|
60
|
+
}
|
|
61
|
+
}
|
|
62
|
+
}
|
|
63
|
+
|
|
64
|
+
define_type!(int, i32, test_int_metrics, ring_int_align, ring_int_size,
|
|
65
|
+
"The C `int` type. Equivalent to `libc::int`.");
|
|
66
|
+
|
|
67
|
+
define_type!(
|
|
68
|
+
size_t, usize, test_size_t_metrics, ring_size_t_align, ring_size_t_size,
|
|
69
|
+
"The C `size_t` type from `<stdint.h>`.
|
|
70
|
+
|
|
71
|
+
ISO C's `size_t` is defined to be the type of the result of the
|
|
72
|
+
`sizeof` operator and the type of the size parameter to `malloc`. That
|
|
73
|
+
is, C's `size_t` is only required to hold the size of the largest object
|
|
74
|
+
that can be allocated. In particular, it is legal for a C implementation
|
|
75
|
+
to have a maximum object size smaller than the entire address space. For
|
|
76
|
+
example, a C implementation may have an maximum object size of 2^32
|
|
77
|
+
bytes with a 64-bit address space, and typedef `size_t` as `uint32_t` so
|
|
78
|
+
that `sizeof(size_t) == 4` and `sizeof(void*) == 8`.
|
|
79
|
+
|
|
80
|
+
Rust's `usize`, on the other hand, is defined to always be the same size
|
|
81
|
+
as a pointer. This means that it is possible, in theory, to have a platform
|
|
82
|
+
where `usize` can represent values that `size_t` cannot represent. However,
|
|
83
|
+
on the vast majority of systems, `usize` and `size_t` are represented the
|
|
84
|
+
same way. If it were required to explicitly cast `usize` to `size_t` on
|
|
85
|
+
common platforms, then many programmers would habitually write expressions
|
|
86
|
+
such as `my_slice.len() as libc::size_t` expecting this to always work and
|
|
87
|
+
be safe. But such a cast is *not* safe on the uncommon platforms where
|
|
88
|
+
`mem::sizeof(libc::size_t) < mem::size_t(usize)`. Consequently, to reduce
|
|
89
|
+
the chances of programmers becoming habituated to such casts that would be
|
|
90
|
+
unsafe on unusual platforms, we have adopted the following convention:
|
|
91
|
+
|
|
92
|
+
* On common platforms where C's `size_t` is the same size as `usize`,
|
|
93
|
+
`ring::c::size_t` must be a type alias of `usize`.
|
|
94
|
+
|
|
95
|
+
* On uncommon platforms where C's `size_t` is not the same size as `usize`,
|
|
96
|
+
`ring::c::size_t` must be a type alias for a type other than `usize`.
|
|
97
|
+
|
|
98
|
+
* Code that was written without consideration for the uncommon platforms
|
|
99
|
+
should not do any explicit casting between `size_t` and `usize`. Such
|
|
100
|
+
code will fail to compile on the uncommon platforms; this is better than
|
|
101
|
+
executing with unsafe truncations.
|
|
102
|
+
|
|
103
|
+
* Code that was written with full consideration of the uncommon platforms
|
|
104
|
+
should have explicit casts using `num::cast` or other methods that avoid
|
|
105
|
+
unintended truncation. Such code will then work on all platforms.");
|
|
106
|
+
|
|
107
|
+
// XXX: MSVC's `alignof` returns strange values for `int8_t`.
|
|
108
|
+
#[cfg(not(windows))]
|
|
109
|
+
define_metrics_tests!(i8, test_i8_metrics, ring_int8_t_align, ring_int8_t_size);
|
|
110
|
+
|
|
111
|
+
// XXX: MSVC's `alignof` returns strange values for `uint8_t`.
|
|
112
|
+
#[cfg(not(windows))]
|
|
113
|
+
define_metrics_tests!(u8, test_u8_metrics, ring_uint8_t_align,
|
|
114
|
+
ring_uint8_t_size);
|
|
115
|
+
|
|
116
|
+
define_metrics_tests!(i16, test_i16_metrics, ring_int16_t_align,
|
|
117
|
+
ring_int16_t_size);
|
|
118
|
+
define_metrics_tests!(u16, test_u16_metrics, ring_uint16_t_align,
|
|
119
|
+
ring_uint16_t_size);
|
|
120
|
+
|
|
121
|
+
define_metrics_tests!(i32, test_i32_metrics, ring_int32_t_align,
|
|
122
|
+
ring_int32_t_size);
|
|
123
|
+
define_metrics_tests!(u32, test_u32_metrics, ring_uint32_t_align,
|
|
124
|
+
ring_uint32_t_size);
|
|
125
|
+
|
|
126
|
+
define_metrics_tests!(i64, test_i64_metrics, ring_int64_t_align,
|
|
127
|
+
ring_int64_t_size);
|
|
128
|
+
define_metrics_tests!(u64, test_u64_metrics, ring_uint64_t_align,
|
|
129
|
+
ring_uint64_t_size);
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
// Copyright 2015 Brian Smith.
|
|
2
|
+
//
|
|
3
|
+
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
|
|
4
|
+
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
|
|
5
|
+
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
|
|
6
|
+
//
|
|
7
|
+
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
|
|
8
|
+
// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
|
|
9
|
+
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR
|
|
10
|
+
// ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
|
|
11
|
+
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
|
|
12
|
+
// ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
|
|
13
|
+
// OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
//! Constant-time operations.
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
use super::c;
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
/// Returns `Ok(())` if `a == b` and `Err(())` otherwise. The comparison of
|
|
20
|
+
/// `a` and `b` is done in constant time with respect to the contents of each,
|
|
21
|
+
/// but NOT in constant time with respect to the lengths of `a` and `b`.
|
|
22
|
+
pub fn verify_slices_are_equal(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ()> {
|
|
23
|
+
if a.len() != b.len() {
|
|
24
|
+
return Err(());
|
|
25
|
+
}
|
|
26
|
+
let result = unsafe {
|
|
27
|
+
CRYPTO_memcmp(a.as_ptr(), b.as_ptr(), a.len())
|
|
28
|
+
};
|
|
29
|
+
match result {
|
|
30
|
+
0 => Ok(()),
|
|
31
|
+
_ => Err(())
|
|
32
|
+
}
|
|
33
|
+
}
|
|
34
|
+
|
|
35
|
+
extern {
|
|
36
|
+
fn CRYPTO_memcmp(a: *const u8, b: *const u8, len: c::size_t) -> c::int;
|
|
37
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
// Copyright 2015 Brian Smith.
|
|
2
|
+
//
|
|
3
|
+
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
|
|
4
|
+
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
|
|
5
|
+
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
|
|
6
|
+
//
|
|
7
|
+
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
|
|
8
|
+
// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
|
|
9
|
+
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR
|
|
10
|
+
// ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
|
|
11
|
+
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
|
|
12
|
+
// ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
|
|
13
|
+
// OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
//! Building blocks for parsing DER-encoded ASN.1 structures.
|
|
16
|
+
//!
|
|
17
|
+
//! This module contains the foundational parts of an ASN.1 DER parser.
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
use super::input::*;
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
pub const CONSTRUCTED : u8 = 1 << 5;
|
|
22
|
+
pub const CONTEXT_SPECIFIC : u8 = 2 << 6;
|
|
23
|
+
|
|
24
|
+
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
|
|
25
|
+
#[repr(u8)]
|
|
26
|
+
pub enum Tag {
|
|
27
|
+
Boolean = 0x01,
|
|
28
|
+
Integer = 0x02,
|
|
29
|
+
BitString = 0x03,
|
|
30
|
+
OctetString = 0x04,
|
|
31
|
+
Null = 0x05,
|
|
32
|
+
OID = 0x06,
|
|
33
|
+
Sequence = CONSTRUCTED | 0x10, // 0x30
|
|
34
|
+
UTCTime = 0x17,
|
|
35
|
+
GeneralizedTime = 0x18,
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
37
|
+
ContextSpecificConstructed0 = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CONSTRUCTED | 0,
|
|
38
|
+
ContextSpecificConstructed1 = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CONSTRUCTED | 1,
|
|
39
|
+
ContextSpecificConstructed3 = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CONSTRUCTED | 3,
|
|
40
|
+
}
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
pub fn expect_tag_and_get_value<'a>(input: &mut Reader<'a>, tag: Tag)
|
|
43
|
+
-> Result<Input<'a>, ()> {
|
|
44
|
+
let (actual_tag, inner) = try!(read_tag_and_get_value(input));
|
|
45
|
+
if (tag as usize) != (actual_tag as usize) {
|
|
46
|
+
return Err(());
|
|
47
|
+
}
|
|
48
|
+
Ok(inner)
|
|
49
|
+
}
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
pub fn read_tag_and_get_value<'a>(input: &mut Reader<'a>)
|
|
52
|
+
-> Result<(u8, Input<'a>), ()> {
|
|
53
|
+
let tag = try!(input.read_byte());
|
|
54
|
+
if (tag & 0x1F) == 0x1F {
|
|
55
|
+
return Err(()) // High tag number form is not allowed.
|
|
56
|
+
}
|
|
57
|
+
|
|
58
|
+
// If the high order bit of the first byte is set to zero then the length
|
|
59
|
+
// is encoded in the seven remaining bits of that byte. Otherwise, those
|
|
60
|
+
// seven bits represent the number of bytes used to encode the length.
|
|
61
|
+
let length = match try!(input.read_byte()) {
|
|
62
|
+
n if (n & 0x80) == 0 => n as usize,
|
|
63
|
+
0x81 => {
|
|
64
|
+
let second_byte = try!(input.read_byte());
|
|
65
|
+
if second_byte < 128 {
|
|
66
|
+
return Err(()) // Not the canonical encoding.
|
|
67
|
+
}
|
|
68
|
+
second_byte as usize
|
|
69
|
+
},
|
|
70
|
+
0x82 => {
|
|
71
|
+
let second_byte = try!(input.read_byte()) as usize;
|
|
72
|
+
let third_byte = try!(input.read_byte()) as usize;
|
|
73
|
+
let combined = (second_byte << 8) | third_byte;
|
|
74
|
+
if combined < 256 {
|
|
75
|
+
return Err(()); // Not the canonical encoding.
|
|
76
|
+
}
|
|
77
|
+
combined
|
|
78
|
+
},
|
|
79
|
+
_ => {
|
|
80
|
+
return Err(()); // We don't support longer lengths.
|
|
81
|
+
}
|
|
82
|
+
};
|
|
83
|
+
|
|
84
|
+
let inner = try!(input.skip_and_get_input(length));
|
|
85
|
+
Ok((tag, inner))
|
|
86
|
+
}
|
|
87
|
+
|
|
88
|
+
// TODO: investigate taking decoder as a reference to reduce generated code
|
|
89
|
+
// size.
|
|
90
|
+
pub fn nested<'a, F, R, E: Copy>(input: &mut Reader<'a>, tag: Tag, error: E,
|
|
91
|
+
decoder: F) -> Result<R, E>
|
|
92
|
+
where F : FnOnce(&mut Reader<'a>)
|
|
93
|
+
-> Result<R, E> {
|
|
94
|
+
let inner = try!(expect_tag_and_get_value(input, tag).map_err(|_| error));
|
|
95
|
+
read_all(inner, error, decoder)
|
|
96
|
+
}
|