ring-native 0.0.0

data/vendor/ring/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c

@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2000.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+static int parse_integer(CBS *cbs, BIGNUM **out) {
+  assert(*out == NULL);
+  *out = BN_new();
+  if (*out == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return BN_cbs2unsigned(cbs, *out);
+}
+
+static int marshal_integer(CBB *cbb, BIGNUM *bn) {
+  if (bn == NULL) {
+    /* An RSA object may be missing some components. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return BN_bn2cbb(cbb, bn);
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_parse_public_key(CBS *cbs) {
+  RSA *ret = RSA_new();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  CBS child;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->n) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->e) ||
+      CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+    RSA_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_public_key_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
+  RSA *ret = RSA_parse_public_key(&cbs);
+  if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+    RSA_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_marshal_public_key(CBB *cbb, const RSA *rsa) {
+  CBB child;
+  if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->n) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->e) ||
+      !CBB_flush(cbb)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_public_key_to_bytes(uint8_t **out_bytes, size_t *out_len,
+                            const RSA *rsa) {
+  CBB cbb;
+  CBB_zero(&cbb);
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !RSA_marshal_public_key(&cbb, rsa) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, out_bytes, out_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* kVersionTwoPrime is the supported value of the version
+ * field of an RSAPrivateKey structure (RFC 3447). */
+static const uint64_t kVersionTwoPrime = 0;
+
+RSA *RSA_parse_private_key(CBS *cbs) {
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  RSA *ret = RSA_new();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  CBS child;
+  uint64_t version;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&child, &version)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (version != kVersionTwoPrime) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_VERSION);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!parse_integer(&child, &ret->n) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->e) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->d) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->p) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->q) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->dmp1) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->dmq1) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->iqmp)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  RSA_free(ret);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_private_key_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
+  RSA *ret = RSA_parse_private_key(&cbs);
+  if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+    RSA_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_marshal_private_key(CBB *cbb, const RSA *rsa) {
+  CBB child;
+  if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, kVersionTwoPrime) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->n) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->e) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->d) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->p) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->q) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->dmp1) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->dmq1) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->iqmp)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_private_key_to_bytes(uint8_t **out_bytes, size_t *out_len,
+                             const RSA *rsa) {
+  CBB cbb;
+  CBB_zero(&cbb);
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !RSA_marshal_private_key(&cbb, rsa) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, out_bytes, out_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+RSA *RSAPublicKey_dup(const RSA *rsa) {
+  uint8_t *der;
+  size_t der_len;
+  if (!RSA_public_key_to_bytes(&der, &der_len, rsa)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  RSA *ret = RSA_public_key_from_bytes(der, der_len);
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+RSA *RSAPrivateKey_dup(const RSA *rsa) {
+  uint8_t *der;
+  size_t der_len;
+  if (!RSA_private_key_to_bytes(&der, &der_len, rsa)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  RSA *ret = RSA_private_key_from_bytes(der, der_len);
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  return ret;
+}

data/vendor/ring/crypto/rsa/rsa_impl.c

@@ -0,0 +1,944 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+#define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
+#define OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS 3072
+#define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS \
+  64 /* exponent limit enforced for "large" modulus only */
+
+static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+static int rsa_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                                 size_t len);
+
+unsigned RSA_size(const RSA *rsa) {
+  return BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+}
+
+int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  BIGNUM *f, *result;
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  int i, ret = 0;
+
+  if (rsa_size > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+  if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS &&
+      BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+  if (!f || !result || !buf) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+      i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
+      break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+      i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
+      break;
+    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+      /* ring: BoringSSL supports |RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING| here, defaulting
+       * to SHA-1 for both digest algorithms, and no label. *ring* doesn't
+       * support this (yet) because it doesn't want have a hard-coded
+       * dependency on SHA-1. Also, *ring* it doesn't want to depend on the
+       * |EVP_MD| API, so the calculation of OAEP padding needs to be redone
+       * using |ring::digest|. */
+      /* fall through */
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+      goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (i <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_bin2bn(buf, rsa_size, f) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+    /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) {
+    if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
+   * modulus */
+  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, rsa_size, result)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  *out_len = rsa_size;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  if (buf != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size);
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA defines the maximum number of cached BN_BLINDINGs per
+ * RSA*. Then this limit is exceeded, BN_BLINDING objects will be created and
+ * destroyed as needed. */
+#define MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA 1024
+
+/* rsa_blinding_get returns a BN_BLINDING to use with |rsa|. It does this by
+ * allocating one of the cached BN_BLINDING objects in |rsa->blindings|. If
+ * none are free, the cache will be extended by a extra element and the new
+ * BN_BLINDING is returned.
+ *
+ * On success, the index of the assigned BN_BLINDING is written to
+ * |*index_used| and must be passed to |rsa_blinding_release| when finished. */
+static BN_BLINDING *rsa_blinding_get(RSA *rsa, unsigned *index_used,
+                                     BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+  BN_BLINDING **new_blindings;
+  uint8_t *new_blindings_inuse;
+  char overflow = 0;
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
+
+  unsigned i;
+  for (i = 0; i < rsa->num_blindings; i++) {
+    if (rsa->blindings_inuse[i] == 0) {
+      rsa->blindings_inuse[i] = 1;
+      ret = rsa->blindings[i];
+      *index_used = i;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ret != NULL) {
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&rsa->lock);
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  overflow = rsa->num_blindings >= MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA;
+
+  /* We didn't find a free BN_BLINDING to use so increase the length of
+   * the arrays by one and use the newly created element. */
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&rsa->lock);
+  ret = rsa_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (overflow) {
+    /* We cannot add any more cached BN_BLINDINGs so we use |ret|
+     * and mark it for destruction in |rsa_blinding_release|. */
+    *index_used = MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA;
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
+
+  new_blindings =
+      OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_BLINDING *) * (rsa->num_blindings + 1));
+  if (new_blindings == NULL) {
+    goto err1;
+  }
+  memcpy(new_blindings, rsa->blindings,
+         sizeof(BN_BLINDING *) * rsa->num_blindings);
+  new_blindings[rsa->num_blindings] = ret;
+
+  new_blindings_inuse = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa->num_blindings + 1);
+  if (new_blindings_inuse == NULL) {
+    goto err2;
+  }
+  memcpy(new_blindings_inuse, rsa->blindings_inuse, rsa->num_blindings);
+  new_blindings_inuse[rsa->num_blindings] = 1;
+  *index_used = rsa->num_blindings;
+
+  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings);
+  rsa->blindings = new_blindings;
+  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings_inuse);
+  rsa->blindings_inuse = new_blindings_inuse;
+  rsa->num_blindings++;
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&rsa->lock);
+  return ret;
+
+err2:
+  OPENSSL_free(new_blindings);
+
+err1:
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&rsa->lock);
+  BN_BLINDING_free(ret);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/* rsa_blinding_release marks the cached BN_BLINDING at the given index as free
+ * for other threads to use. */
+static void rsa_blinding_release(RSA *rsa, BN_BLINDING *blinding,
+                                 unsigned blinding_index) {
+  if (blinding_index == MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA) {
+    /* This blinding wasn't cached. */
+    BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
+  rsa->blindings_inuse[blinding_index] = 0;
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&rsa->lock);
+}
+
+/* signing */
+int RSA_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                 const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  int i, ret = 0;
+
+  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+  if (buf == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+      i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
+      break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+      i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
+      break;
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+      goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (i <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!rsa_private_transform(rsa, out, buf, rsa_size)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  *out_len = rsa_size;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (buf != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size);
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_decrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  int r = -1;
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+    buf = out;
+  } else {
+    /* Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext. */
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in_len != rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!rsa_private_transform(rsa, buf, in, rsa_size)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+      r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(out, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size);
+      break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+      r = rsa_size;
+      break;
+    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+      /* ring: BoringSSL supports |RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING| here, defaulting
+       * to SHA-1 for both digest algorithms, and no label. *ring* doesn't
+       * support this (yet) because it doesn't want have a hard-coded
+       * dependency on SHA-1. Also, *ring* it doesn't want to depend on the
+       * |EVP_MD| API, so the calculation of OAEP padding needs to be redone
+       * using |ring::digest|. */
+      /* fall through */
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+      goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (r < 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+  } else {
+    *out_len = r;
+    ret = 1;
+  }
+
+err:
+  if (padding != RSA_NO_PADDING && buf != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size);
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                   const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  BIGNUM *f, *result;
+  int ret = 0;
+  int r = -1;
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+  if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+  if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS &&
+      BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+    buf = out;
+  } else {
+    /* Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext. */
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!f || !result) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (in_len != rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_bin2bn(in, in_len, f) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) {
+    if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(buf, rsa_size, result)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+      r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(out, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size);
+      break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+      r = rsa_size;
+      break;
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+      goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (r < 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+  } else {
+    *out_len = r;
+    ret = 1;
+  }
+
+err:
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  if (padding != RSA_NO_PADDING && buf != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size);
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* rsa_private_transform takes a big-endian integer from |in|, calculates the
+ * d'th power of it, modulo the RSA modulus and writes the result as a
+ * big-endian integer to |out|. Both |in| and |out| are |len| bytes long and
+ * |len| is always equal to |RSA_size(rsa)|. If the result of the transform can
+ * be represented in fewer than |len| bytes, then |out| must be zero padded on
+ * the left.
+ *
+ * It returns one on success and zero otherwise.
+ */
+static int rsa_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                                 size_t len) {
+  BIGNUM *f, *result;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  unsigned blinding_index = 0;
+  BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+  if (f == NULL || result == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_bin2bn(in, len, f) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+    /* Usually the padding functions would catch this. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
+    blinding = rsa_blinding_get(rsa, &blinding_index, ctx);
+    if (blinding == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, blinding, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if ((rsa->p != NULL) && (rsa->q != NULL) && (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
+       (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) {
+    if (!mod_exp(result, f, rsa, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else {
+    BIGNUM local_d;
+    BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+
+    BN_init(&local_d);
+    d = &local_d;
+    BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) {
+      if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) == NULL) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(result, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (blinding) {
+    if (!BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(result, NULL, blinding, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, len, result)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  if (blinding != NULL) {
+    rsa_blinding_release(rsa, blinding, blinding_index);
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
+  BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1;
+  BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+  {
+    BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
+    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
+
+    /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
+     * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag. */
+    BN_init(&local_p);
+    p = &local_p;
+    BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    BN_init(&local_q);
+    q = &local_q;
+    BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
+      if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_p, &rsa->lock, p, ctx) == NULL) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_q, &rsa->lock, q, ctx) == NULL) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) {
+    if (BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* compute I mod q */
+  c = &local_c;
+  BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+  if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
+  dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
+  BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->mont_q)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* compute I mod p */
+  c = &local_c;
+  BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+  if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
+  dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
+  BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->mont_p)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
+   * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
+  if (BN_is_negative(r0)) {
+    if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
+  pr1 = &local_r1;
+  BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+  if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
+   * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
+   * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
+   * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
+   * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
+   * they ensure p > q [steve] */
+  if (BN_is_negative(r0)) {
+    if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
+     * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
+     * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
+     * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
+    if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) {
+      if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+    if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
+      /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+       * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
+       * mod_exp and return that instead. */
+
+      BIGNUM local_d;
+      BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+
+      d = &local_d;
+      BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+      if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) {
+  BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
+  BIGNUM local_r0, local_d, local_p;
+  BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p;
+  int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (r0 == NULL || r1 == NULL || r2 == NULL || r3 == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2;
+  bitsq = bits - bitsp;
+
+  /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
+  if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* generate p and q */
+  for (;;) {
+    if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb) ||
+        !BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) ||
+        !BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_one(r1)) {
+      break;
+    }
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  for (;;) {
+    /* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
+     * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for
+     * this and bail if it happens 3 times. */
+    unsigned int degenerate = 0;
+    do {
+      if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    } while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
+    if (degenerate == 3) {
+      ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) ||
+        !BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_one(r1)) {
+      break;
+    }
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
+    tmp = rsa->p;
+    rsa->p = rsa->q;
+    rsa->q = tmp;
+  }
+
+  /* calculate n */
+  if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* calculate d */
+  if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) {
+    goto err; /* p-1 */
+  }
+  if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) {
+    goto err; /* q-1 */
+  }
+  if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) {
+    goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
+  }
+  pr0 = &local_r0;
+  BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+  if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) {
+    goto err; /* d */
+  }
+
+  /* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
+  d = &local_d;
+  BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+  /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
+  if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* calculate d mod (q-1) */
+  if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
+  p = &local_p;
+  BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+  if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (ok == -1) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+    ok = 0;
+  }
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+
+  return ok;
+}