grpc 0.12.0 → 0.13.0.pre1.1

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/ssl_cipher.c

@@ -0,0 +1,2003 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+/* kCiphers is an array of all supported ciphers, sorted by id. */
+static const SSL_CIPHER kCiphers[] = {
+    /* The RSA ciphers */
+    /* Cipher 02 */
+    {
+     SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 04 */
+    {
+     SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5,
+     SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_MD5,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 05 */
+    {
+     SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 0A */
+    {
+     SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+
+    /* New AES ciphersuites */
+
+    /* Cipher 2F */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 33 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 35 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 39 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+
+    /* TLS v1.2 ciphersuites */
+
+    /* Cipher 3C */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 3D */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 67 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 6B */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    /* PSK cipher suites. */
+
+    /* Cipher 8A */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 8C */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 8D */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288 */
+
+    /* Cipher 9C */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 9D */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 9E */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher 9F */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher C007 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher C009 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher C00A */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher C011 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher C013 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher C014 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+
+    /* HMAC based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+
+    /* Cipher C023 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher C024 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher C027 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher C028 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+
+    /* GCM based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289 */
+
+    /* Cipher C02B */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher C02C */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher C02F */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher C030 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+    /* ECDHE-PSK cipher suites. */
+
+    /* Cipher C035 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher C036 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    /* ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites. */
+
+#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_OLD,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_CHACHA20_POLY1305_OLD,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305_OLD,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_OLD,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_CHACHA20_POLY1305_OLD,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305_OLD,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+#endif
+
+    /* Cipher CCA8 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher CCA9 */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    /* Cipher CCAB */
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+};
+
+static const size_t kCiphersLen = sizeof(kCiphers) / sizeof(kCiphers[0]);
+
+#define CIPHER_ADD 1
+#define CIPHER_KILL 2
+#define CIPHER_DEL 3
+#define CIPHER_ORD 4
+#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5
+
+typedef struct cipher_order_st {
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+  int active;
+  int in_group;
+  struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev;
+} CIPHER_ORDER;
+
+typedef struct cipher_alias_st {
+  /* name is the name of the cipher alias. */
+  const char *name;
+
+  /* The following fields are bitmasks for the corresponding fields on
+   * |SSL_CIPHER|. A cipher matches a cipher alias iff, for each bitmask, the
+   * bit corresponding to the cipher's value is set to 1. If any bitmask is
+   * all zeroes, the alias matches nothing. Use |~0u| for the default value. */
+  uint32_t algorithm_mkey;
+  uint32_t algorithm_auth;
+  uint32_t algorithm_enc;
+  uint32_t algorithm_mac;
+
+  /* min_version, if non-zero, matches all ciphers which were added in that
+   * particular protocol version. */
+  uint16_t min_version;
+} CIPHER_ALIAS;
+
+static const CIPHER_ALIAS kCipherAliases[] = {
+    /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */
+    {"ALL", ~0u, ~0u, ~SSL_eNULL, ~0u, 0},
+
+    /* The "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" rule is omitted. It matches nothing. */
+
+    /* key exchange aliases
+     * (some of those using only a single bit here combine
+     * multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs,
+     * e.g. kEDH combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) */
+    {"kRSA", SSL_kRSA, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    {"kDHE", SSL_kDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"kEDH", SSL_kDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"DH", SSL_kDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    {"kECDHE", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"kEECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"ECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    {"kPSK", SSL_kPSK, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    /* server authentication aliases */
+    {"aRSA", ~0u, SSL_aRSA, ~SSL_eNULL, ~0u, 0},
+    {"aECDSA", ~0u, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"ECDSA", ~0u, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"aPSK", ~0u, SSL_aPSK, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
+    {"DHE", SSL_kDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"EDH", SSL_kDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"ECDHE", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"EECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"RSA", SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, ~SSL_eNULL, ~0u, 0},
+    {"PSK", SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    /* symmetric encryption aliases */
+    {"3DES", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_3DES, ~0u, 0},
+    {"RC4", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_RC4, ~0u, 0},
+    {"AES128", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0},
+    {"AES256", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0},
+    {"AES", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES, ~0u, 0},
+    {"AESGCM", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0},
+    {"CHACHA20", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305 | SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305_OLD, ~0u,
+     0},
+
+    /* MAC aliases */
+    {"MD5", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_MD5, 0},
+    {"SHA1", ~0u, ~0u, ~SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, 0},
+    {"SHA", ~0u, ~0u, ~SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, 0},
+    {"SHA256", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA256, 0},
+    {"SHA384", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA384, 0},
+
+    /* Legacy protocol minimum version aliases. "TLSv1" is intentionally the
+     * same as "SSLv3". */
+    {"SSLv3", ~0u, ~0u, ~SSL_eNULL, ~0u, SSL3_VERSION},
+    {"TLSv1", ~0u, ~0u, ~SSL_eNULL, ~0u, SSL3_VERSION},
+    {"TLSv1.2", ~0u, ~0u, ~SSL_eNULL, ~0u, TLS1_2_VERSION},
+
+    /* Legacy strength classes. */
+    {"MEDIUM", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_RC4, ~0u, 0},
+    {"HIGH", ~0u, ~0u, ~(SSL_eNULL|SSL_RC4), ~0u, 0},
+    {"FIPS", ~0u, ~0u, ~(SSL_eNULL|SSL_RC4), ~0u, 0},
+};
+
+static const size_t kCipherAliasesLen =
+    sizeof(kCipherAliases) / sizeof(kCipherAliases[0]);
+
+static int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b) {
+  const SSL_CIPHER *a = in_a;
+  const SSL_CIPHER *b = in_b;
+
+  if (a->id > b->id) {
+    return 1;
+  } else if (a->id < b->id) {
+    return -1;
+  } else {
+    return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+static int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER **a, const SSL_CIPHER **b) {
+  return ssl_cipher_id_cmp(*a, *b);
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_cipher_by_value(uint16_t value) {
+  SSL_CIPHER c;
+
+  c.id = 0x03000000L | value;
+  return bsearch(&c, kCiphers, kCiphersLen, sizeof(SSL_CIPHER),
+                 ssl_cipher_id_cmp);
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(const EVP_AEAD **out_aead,
+                            size_t *out_mac_secret_len,
+                            size_t *out_fixed_iv_len,
+                            const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, uint16_t version) {
+  *out_aead = NULL;
+  *out_mac_secret_len = 0;
+  *out_fixed_iv_len = 0;
+
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+    case SSL_AES128GCM:
+      *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
+      *out_fixed_iv_len = 4;
+      return 1;
+
+    case SSL_AES256GCM:
+      *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm();
+      *out_fixed_iv_len = 4;
+      return 1;
+
+#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305_OLD:
+      *out_aead = EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305_old();
+      *out_fixed_iv_len = 0;
+      return 1;
+#endif
+
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+      *out_aead = EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305();
+      *out_fixed_iv_len = 12;
+      return 1;
+
+    case SSL_RC4:
+      switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) {
+        case SSL_MD5:
+          if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_rc4_md5_ssl3();
+          } else {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_rc4_md5_tls();
+          }
+          *out_mac_secret_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+          return 1;
+        case SSL_SHA1:
+          if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_rc4_sha1_ssl3();
+          } else {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_rc4_sha1_tls();
+          }
+          *out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+          return 1;
+        default:
+          return 0;
+      }
+
+    case SSL_AES128:
+      switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) {
+        case SSL_SHA1:
+          if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_ssl3();
+            *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
+          } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
+            *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
+          } else {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls();
+          }
+          *out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+          return 1;
+        case SSL_SHA256:
+          *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls();
+          *out_mac_secret_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+          return 1;
+        default:
+          return 0;
+      }
+
+    case SSL_AES256:
+      switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) {
+        case SSL_SHA1:
+          if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_ssl3();
+            *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
+          } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
+            *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
+          } else {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls();
+          }
+          *out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+          return 1;
+        case SSL_SHA256:
+          *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls();
+          *out_mac_secret_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+          return 1;
+        case SSL_SHA384:
+          *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls();
+          *out_mac_secret_len = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+          return 1;
+        default:
+          return 0;
+      }
+
+    case SSL_3DES:
+      switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) {
+        case SSL_SHA1:
+          if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_ssl3();
+            *out_fixed_iv_len = 8;
+          } else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
+            *out_fixed_iv_len = 8;
+          } else {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls();
+          }
+          *out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+          return 1;
+        default:
+          return 0;
+      }
+
+    case SSL_eNULL:
+      switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) {
+        case SSL_SHA1:
+          if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_null_sha1_ssl3();
+          } else {
+            *out_aead = EVP_aead_null_sha1_tls();
+          }
+          *out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+          return 1;
+        default:
+          return 0;
+      }
+
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *ssl_get_handshake_digest(uint32_t algorithm_prf) {
+  switch (algorithm_prf) {
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT:
+      return EVP_sha1();
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256:
+      return EVP_sha256();
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384:
+      return EVP_sha384();
+    default:
+      return NULL;
+  }
+}
+
+#define ITEM_SEP(a) \
+  (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ','))
+
+/* rule_equals returns one iff the NUL-terminated string |rule| is equal to the
+ * |buf_len| bytes at |buf|. */
+static int rule_equals(const char *rule, const char *buf, size_t buf_len) {
+  /* |strncmp| alone only checks that |buf| is a prefix of |rule|. */
+  return strncmp(rule, buf, buf_len) == 0 && rule[buf_len] == '\0';
+}
+
+static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+                           CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
+  if (curr == *tail) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (curr == *head) {
+    *head = curr->next;
+  }
+  if (curr->prev != NULL) {
+    curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+  }
+  if (curr->next != NULL) {
+    curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+  }
+  (*tail)->next = curr;
+  curr->prev = *tail;
+  curr->next = NULL;
+  *tail = curr;
+}
+
+static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+                           CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
+  if (curr == *head) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (curr == *tail) {
+    *tail = curr->prev;
+  }
+  if (curr->next != NULL) {
+    curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+  }
+  if (curr->prev != NULL) {
+    curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+  }
+  (*head)->prev = curr;
+  curr->next = *head;
+  curr->prev = NULL;
+  *head = curr;
+}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *ssl_method,
+                                       CIPHER_ORDER *co_list,
+                                       CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+                                       CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
+  /* The set of ciphers is static, but some subset may be unsupported by
+   * |ssl_method|, so the list may be smaller. */
+  size_t co_list_num = 0;
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < kCiphersLen; i++) {
+    const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = &kCiphers[i];
+    if (ssl_method->supports_cipher(cipher)) {
+      co_list[co_list_num].cipher = cipher;
+      co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL;
+      co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL;
+      co_list[co_list_num].active = 0;
+      co_list[co_list_num].in_group = 0;
+      co_list_num++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Prepare linked list from list entries. */
+  if (co_list_num > 0) {
+    co_list[0].prev = NULL;
+
+    if (co_list_num > 1) {
+      co_list[0].next = &co_list[1];
+
+      for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) {
+        co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1];
+        co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1];
+      }
+
+      co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2];
+    }
+
+    co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL;
+
+    *head_p = &co_list[0];
+    *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1];
+  }
+}
+
+/* ssl_cipher_apply_rule applies the rule type |rule| to ciphers matching its
+ * parameters in the linked list from |*head_p| to |*tail_p|. It writes the new
+ * head and tail of the list to |*head_p| and |*tail_p|, respectively.
+ *
+ * - If |cipher_id| is non-zero, only that cipher is selected.
+ * - Otherwise, if |strength_bits| is non-negative, it selects ciphers
+ *   of that strength.
+ * - Otherwise, it selects ciphers that match each bitmasks in |alg_*| and
+ *   |min_version|. */
+static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(
+    uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey, uint32_t alg_auth,
+    uint32_t alg_enc, uint32_t alg_mac, uint16_t min_version, int rule,
+    int strength_bits, int in_group, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+    CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
+  CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+  int reverse = 0;
+
+  if (cipher_id == 0 && strength_bits == -1 && min_version == 0 &&
+      (alg_mkey == 0 || alg_auth == 0 || alg_enc == 0 || alg_mac == 0)) {
+    /* The rule matches nothing, so bail early. */
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
+    /* needed to maintain sorting between currently deleted ciphers */
+    reverse = 1;
+  }
+
+  head = *head_p;
+  tail = *tail_p;
+
+  if (reverse) {
+    next = tail;
+    last = head;
+  } else {
+    next = head;
+    last = tail;
+  }
+
+  curr = NULL;
+  for (;;) {
+    if (curr == last) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    curr = next;
+    if (curr == NULL) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
+    cp = curr->cipher;
+
+    /* Selection criteria is either a specific cipher, the value of
+     * |strength_bits|, or the algorithms used. */
+    if (cipher_id != 0) {
+      if (cipher_id != cp->id) {
+        continue;
+      }
+    } else if (strength_bits >= 0) {
+      if (strength_bits != SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cp, NULL)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+    } else if (!(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey) ||
+               !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth) ||
+               !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc) ||
+               !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac) ||
+               (min_version != 0 &&
+                SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cp) != min_version)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */
+    if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) {
+      /* reverse == 0 */
+      if (!curr->active) {
+        ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+        curr->active = 1;
+        curr->in_group = in_group;
+      }
+    }
+
+    /* Move the added cipher to this location */
+    else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) {
+      /* reverse == 0 */
+      if (curr->active) {
+        ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+        curr->in_group = 0;
+      }
+    } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
+      /* reverse == 1 */
+      if (curr->active) {
+        /* most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions
+         * for any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop
+         * works in reverse to maintain the order) */
+        ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
+        curr->active = 0;
+        curr->in_group = 0;
+      }
+    } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) {
+      /* reverse == 0 */
+      if (head == curr) {
+        head = curr->next;
+      } else {
+        curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+      }
+
+      if (tail == curr) {
+        tail = curr->prev;
+      }
+      curr->active = 0;
+      if (curr->next != NULL) {
+        curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+      }
+      if (curr->prev != NULL) {
+        curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+      }
+      curr->next = NULL;
+      curr->prev = NULL;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *head_p = head;
+  *tail_p = tail;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+                                    CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
+  int max_strength_bits, i, *number_uses;
+  CIPHER_ORDER *curr;
+
+  /* This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting must
+   * keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting routine as
+   * '+' movement to the end of the list. */
+  max_strength_bits = 0;
+  curr = *head_p;
+  while (curr != NULL) {
+    if (curr->active &&
+        SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL) > max_strength_bits) {
+      max_strength_bits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL);
+    }
+    curr = curr->next;
+  }
+
+  number_uses = OPENSSL_malloc((max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
+  if (!number_uses) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  memset(number_uses, 0, (max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
+
+  /* Now find the strength_bits values actually used. */
+  curr = *head_p;
+  while (curr != NULL) {
+    if (curr->active) {
+      number_uses[SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL)]++;
+    }
+    curr = curr->next;
+  }
+
+  /* Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending order. */
+  for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) {
+    if (number_uses[i] > 0) {
+      ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, 0, head_p, tail_p);
+    }
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(number_uses);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *ssl_method,
+                                      const char *rule_str,
+                                      CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+                                      CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
+  uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac;
+  uint16_t min_version;
+  const char *l, *buf;
+  int multi, skip_rule, rule, retval, ok, in_group = 0, has_group = 0;
+  size_t j, buf_len;
+  uint32_t cipher_id;
+  char ch;
+
+  retval = 1;
+  l = rule_str;
+  for (;;) {
+    ch = *l;
+
+    if (ch == '\0') {
+      break; /* done */
+    }
+
+    if (in_group) {
+      if (ch == ']') {
+        if (*tail_p) {
+          (*tail_p)->in_group = 0;
+        }
+        in_group = 0;
+        l++;
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      if (ch == '|') {
+        rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+        l++;
+        continue;
+      } else if (!(ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') && !(ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') &&
+                 !(ch >= '0' && ch <= '9')) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_OPERATOR_IN_GROUP);
+        retval = in_group = 0;
+        break;
+      } else {
+        rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+      }
+    } else if (ch == '-') {
+      rule = CIPHER_DEL;
+      l++;
+    } else if (ch == '+') {
+      rule = CIPHER_ORD;
+      l++;
+    } else if (ch == '!') {
+      rule = CIPHER_KILL;
+      l++;
+    } else if (ch == '@') {
+      rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL;
+      l++;
+    } else if (ch == '[') {
+      if (in_group) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NESTED_GROUP);
+        retval = in_group = 0;
+        break;
+      }
+      in_group = 1;
+      has_group = 1;
+      l++;
+      continue;
+    } else {
+      rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+    }
+
+    /* If preference groups are enabled, the only legal operator is +.
+     * Otherwise the in_group bits will get mixed up. */
+    if (has_group && rule != CIPHER_ADD) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MIXED_SPECIAL_OPERATOR_WITH_GROUPS);
+      retval = in_group = 0;
+      break;
+    }
+
+    if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) {
+      l++;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    multi = 0;
+    cipher_id = 0;
+    alg_mkey = ~0u;
+    alg_auth = ~0u;
+    alg_enc = ~0u;
+    alg_mac = ~0u;
+    min_version = 0;
+    skip_rule = 0;
+
+    for (;;) {
+      ch = *l;
+      buf = l;
+      buf_len = 0;
+      while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) || ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) ||
+             ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.')) {
+        ch = *(++l);
+        buf_len++;
+      }
+
+      if (buf_len == 0) {
+        /* We hit something we cannot deal with, it is no command or separator
+         * nor alphanumeric, so we call this an error. */
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+        retval = in_group = 0;
+        l++;
+        break;
+      }
+
+      if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      /* Look for a matching exact cipher. These aren't allowed in multipart
+       * rules. */
+      if (!multi && ch != '+') {
+        for (j = 0; j < kCiphersLen; j++) {
+          const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = &kCiphers[j];
+          if (rule_equals(cipher->name, buf, buf_len)) {
+            cipher_id = cipher->id;
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      if (cipher_id == 0) {
+        /* If not an exact cipher, look for a matching cipher alias. */
+        for (j = 0; j < kCipherAliasesLen; j++) {
+          if (rule_equals(kCipherAliases[j].name, buf, buf_len)) {
+            alg_mkey &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_mkey;
+            alg_auth &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_auth;
+            alg_enc &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_enc;
+            alg_mac &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_mac;
+
+            if (min_version != 0 &&
+                min_version != kCipherAliases[j].min_version) {
+              skip_rule = 1;
+            } else {
+              min_version = kCipherAliases[j].min_version;
+            }
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+        if (j == kCipherAliasesLen) {
+          skip_rule = 1;
+        }
+      }
+
+      /* Check for a multipart rule. */
+      if (ch != '+') {
+        break;
+      }
+      l++;
+      multi = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* If one of the CHACHA20_POLY1305 variants is selected, include the other
+     * as well. They have the same name to avoid requiring changes in
+     * configuration. Apply this transformation late so that the cipher name
+     * still behaves as an exact name and not an alias in multipart rules.
+     *
+     * This is temporary and will be removed when the pre-standard construction
+     * is removed. */
+    if (cipher_id == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_CHACHA20_POLY1305_OLD ||
+        cipher_id == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) {
+      cipher_id = 0;
+      alg_mkey = SSL_kECDHE;
+      alg_auth = SSL_aRSA;
+      alg_enc = SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305|SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305_OLD;
+      alg_mac = SSL_AEAD;
+    } else if (cipher_id == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_CHACHA20_POLY1305_OLD ||
+               cipher_id == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256) {
+      cipher_id = 0;
+      alg_mkey = SSL_kECDHE;
+      alg_auth = SSL_aECDSA;
+      alg_enc = SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305|SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305_OLD;
+      alg_mac = SSL_AEAD;
+    }
+
+    /* Ok, we have the rule, now apply it. */
+    if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
+      /* special command */
+      ok = 0;
+      if (buf_len == 8 && !strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8)) {
+        ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p);
+      } else {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+      }
+
+      if (ok == 0) {
+        retval = 0;
+      }
+
+      /* We do not support any "multi" options together with "@", so throw away
+       * the rest of the command, if any left, until end or ':' is found. */
+      while (*l != '\0' && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) {
+        l++;
+      }
+    } else if (!skip_rule) {
+      ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac,
+                            min_version, rule, -1, in_group, head_p, tail_p);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in_group) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+    retval = 0;
+  }
+
+  return retval;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *
+ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *ssl_method,
+                       struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st **out_cipher_list,
+                       STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **out_cipher_list_by_id,
+                       const char *rule_str) {
+  int ok;
+  STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack = NULL, *tmp_cipher_list = NULL;
+  const char *rule_p;
+  CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr;
+  uint8_t *in_group_flags = NULL;
+  unsigned int num_in_group_flags = 0;
+  struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *pref_list = NULL;
+
+  /* Return with error if nothing to do. */
+  if (rule_str == NULL || out_cipher_list == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  /* Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled in ciphers.
+   * We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so it is used for
+   * allocation. */
+  co_list = (CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * kCiphersLen);
+  if (co_list == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, co_list, &head, &tail);
+
+  /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference:
+   * TODO(davidben): Compute this order once and copy it. */
+
+  /* Everything else being equal, prefer ECDHE_ECDSA then ECDHE_RSA over other
+   * key exchange mechanisms */
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+                        0, &head, &tail);
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
+                        &head, &tail);
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, 0,
+                        &head, &tail);
+
+  /* Order the bulk ciphers. First the preferred AEAD ciphers. We prefer
+   * CHACHA20 unless there is hardware support for fast and constant-time
+   * AES_GCM. Of the two CHACHA20 variants, the new one is preferred over the
+   * old one. */
+  if (EVP_has_aes_hardware()) {
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
+                          &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
+                          &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
+                          -1, 0, &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305_OLD, ~0u, 0,
+                          CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head, &tail);
+  } else {
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
+                          -1, 0, &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305_OLD, ~0u, 0,
+                          CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
+                          &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
+                          &head, &tail);
+  }
+
+  /* Then the legacy non-AEAD ciphers: AES_256_CBC, AES-128_CBC, RC4_128_SHA,
+   * RC4_128_MD5, 3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA. */
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
+                        &head, &tail);
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
+                        &head, &tail);
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_RC4, ~SSL_MD5, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
+                        &head, &tail);
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
+                        &head, &tail);
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_3DES, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head,
+                        &tail);
+
+  /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head,
+                        &tail);
+
+  /* Move ciphers without forward secrecy to the end. */
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~(SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE), ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0,
+                        CIPHER_ORD, -1, 0, &head, &tail);
+
+  /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, 0, &head,
+                        &tail);
+
+  /* If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule before
+   * using the (possibly available) additional rules. */
+  ok = 1;
+  rule_p = rule_str;
+  if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) {
+    ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(ssl_method, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, &head,
+                                    &tail);
+    rule_p += 7;
+    if (*rule_p == ':') {
+      rule_p++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ok && strlen(rule_p) > 0) {
+    ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(ssl_method, rule_p, &head, &tail);
+  }
+
+  if (!ok) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
+   * if we cannot get one. */
+  cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
+  if (cipherstack == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  in_group_flags = OPENSSL_malloc(kCiphersLen);
+  if (!in_group_flags) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
+   * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER). */
+  for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) {
+    if (curr->active) {
+      if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      in_group_flags[num_in_group_flags++] = curr->in_group;
+    }
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */
+  co_list = NULL;
+
+  tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack);
+  if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  pref_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st));
+  if (!pref_list) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  pref_list->ciphers = cipherstack;
+  pref_list->in_group_flags = OPENSSL_malloc(num_in_group_flags);
+  if (!pref_list->in_group_flags) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  memcpy(pref_list->in_group_flags, in_group_flags, num_in_group_flags);
+  OPENSSL_free(in_group_flags);
+  in_group_flags = NULL;
+  if (*out_cipher_list != NULL) {
+    ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(*out_cipher_list);
+  }
+  *out_cipher_list = pref_list;
+  pref_list = NULL;
+
+  if (out_cipher_list_by_id != NULL) {
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*out_cipher_list_by_id);
+    *out_cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
+    tmp_cipher_list = NULL;
+    (void) sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*out_cipher_list_by_id,
+                                      ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*out_cipher_list_by_id);
+  } else {
+    sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(tmp_cipher_list);
+    tmp_cipher_list = NULL;
+  }
+
+  return cipherstack;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+  OPENSSL_free(in_group_flags);
+  sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
+  sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(tmp_cipher_list);
+  if (pref_list) {
+    OPENSSL_free(pref_list->in_group_flags);
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(pref_list);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { return cipher->id; }
+
+uint16_t ssl_cipher_get_value(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  uint32_t id = cipher->id;
+  /* All ciphers are SSLv3. */
+  assert((id & 0xff000000) == 0x03000000);
+  return id & 0xffff;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_AES(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_AES) != 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_has_MD5_HMAC(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_mac & SSL_MD5) != 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_has_SHA1_HMAC(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_mac & SSL_SHA1) != 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_AESGCM(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM)) != 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_AES128GCM(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_AES128GCM) != 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_AES128CBC(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_AES128) != 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_AES256CBC(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_AES256) != 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_CHACHA20POLY1305(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_enc &
+          (SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305 | SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305_OLD)) != 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_NULL(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) != 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_RC4(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_RC4) != 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_block_cipher(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  /* Neither stream cipher nor AEAD. */
+  return (cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_RC4 | SSL_eNULL)) == 0 &&
+      cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_ECDSA(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) != 0;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (cipher->algorithm_prf != SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT) {
+    /* Cipher suites before TLS 1.2 use the default PRF, while all those added
+     * afterwards specify a particular hash. */
+    return TLS1_2_VERSION;
+  }
+  return SSL3_VERSION;
+}
+
+/* return the actual cipher being used */
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (cipher != NULL) {
+    return cipher->name;
+  }
+
+  return "(NONE)";
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (cipher == NULL) {
+    return "";
+  }
+
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) {
+    case SSL_kRSA:
+      return "RSA";
+
+    case SSL_kDHE:
+      switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
+        case SSL_aRSA:
+          return "DHE_RSA";
+        default:
+          assert(0);
+          return "UNKNOWN";
+      }
+
+    case SSL_kECDHE:
+      switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
+        case SSL_aECDSA:
+          return "ECDHE_ECDSA";
+        case SSL_aRSA:
+          return "ECDHE_RSA";
+        case SSL_aPSK:
+          return "ECDHE_PSK";
+        default:
+          assert(0);
+          return "UNKNOWN";
+      }
+
+    case SSL_kPSK:
+      assert(cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aPSK);
+      return "PSK";
+
+    default:
+      assert(0);
+      return "UNKNOWN";
+  }
+}
+
+static const char *ssl_cipher_get_enc_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+    case SSL_3DES:
+      return "3DES_EDE_CBC";
+    case SSL_RC4:
+      return "RC4";
+    case SSL_AES128:
+      return "AES_128_CBC";
+    case SSL_AES256:
+      return "AES_256_CBC";
+    case SSL_AES128GCM:
+      return "AES_128_GCM";
+    case SSL_AES256GCM:
+      return "AES_256_GCM";
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305_OLD:
+      return "CHACHA20_POLY1305";
+      break;
+    default:
+      assert(0);
+      return "UNKNOWN";
+  }
+}
+
+static const char *ssl_cipher_get_prf_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_prf) {
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT:
+      /* Before TLS 1.2, the PRF component is the hash used in the HMAC, which is
+       * only ever MD5 or SHA-1. */
+      switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) {
+        case SSL_MD5:
+          return "MD5";
+        case SSL_SHA1:
+          return "SHA";
+      }
+      break;
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256:
+      return "SHA256";
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384:
+      return "SHA384";
+  }
+  assert(0);
+  return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+char *SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (cipher == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  const char *kx_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_name(cipher);
+  const char *enc_name = ssl_cipher_get_enc_name(cipher);
+  const char *prf_name = ssl_cipher_get_prf_name(cipher);
+
+  /* The final name is TLS_{kx_name}_WITH_{enc_name}_{prf_name}. */
+  size_t len = 4 + strlen(kx_name) + 6 + strlen(enc_name) + 1 +
+      strlen(prf_name) + 1;
+  char *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (BUF_strlcpy(ret, "TLS_", len) >= len ||
+      BUF_strlcat(ret, kx_name, len) >= len ||
+      BUF_strlcat(ret, "_WITH_", len) >= len ||
+      BUF_strlcat(ret, enc_name, len) >= len ||
+      BUF_strlcat(ret, "_", len) >= len ||
+      BUF_strlcat(ret, prf_name, len) >= len) {
+    assert(0);
+    OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  assert(strlen(ret) + 1 == len);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, int *out_alg_bits) {
+  if (cipher == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int alg_bits, strength_bits;
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+    case SSL_AES128:
+    case SSL_AES128GCM:
+    case SSL_RC4:
+      alg_bits = 128;
+      strength_bits = 128;
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES256:
+    case SSL_AES256GCM:
+#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305_OLD:
+#endif
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+      alg_bits = 256;
+      strength_bits = 256;
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_3DES:
+      alg_bits = 168;
+      strength_bits = 112;
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_eNULL:
+      alg_bits = 0;
+      strength_bits = 0;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      assert(0);
+      alg_bits = 0;
+      strength_bits = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (out_alg_bits != NULL) {
+    *out_alg_bits = alg_bits;
+  }
+  return strength_bits;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf,
+                                   int len) {
+  const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac;
+  uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac;
+  static const char *format = "%-23s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n";
+
+  alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+  alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+  alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
+  alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
+
+  switch (alg_mkey) {
+    case SSL_kRSA:
+      kx = "RSA";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_kDHE:
+      kx = "DH";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_kECDHE:
+      kx = "ECDH";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_kPSK:
+      kx = "PSK";
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      kx = "unknown";
+  }
+
+  switch (alg_auth) {
+    case SSL_aRSA:
+      au = "RSA";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_aECDSA:
+      au = "ECDSA";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_aPSK:
+      au = "PSK";
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      au = "unknown";
+      break;
+  }
+
+  switch (alg_enc) {
+    case SSL_3DES:
+      enc = "3DES(168)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_RC4:
+      enc = "RC4(128)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES128:
+      enc = "AES(128)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES256:
+      enc = "AES(256)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES128GCM:
+      enc = "AESGCM(128)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES256GCM:
+      enc = "AESGCM(256)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305_OLD:
+      enc = "ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+      enc = "ChaCha20-Poly1305";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_eNULL:
+      enc="None";
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      enc = "unknown";
+      break;
+  }
+
+  switch (alg_mac) {
+    case SSL_MD5:
+      mac = "MD5";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_SHA1:
+      mac = "SHA1";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_SHA256:
+      mac = "SHA256";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_SHA384:
+      mac = "SHA384";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AEAD:
+      mac = "AEAD";
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      mac = "unknown";
+      break;
+  }
+
+  if (buf == NULL) {
+    len = 128;
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  } else if (len < 128) {
+    return "Buffer too small";
+  }
+
+  BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, kx, au, enc, mac);
+  return buf;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return "TLSv1/SSLv3";
+}
+
+COMP_METHOD *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) { return NULL; }
+
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) { return 1; }
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) { return NULL; }
+
+int ssl_cipher_get_key_type(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  uint32_t alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+  if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
+    return EVP_PKEY_EC;
+  } else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
+    return EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+  }
+
+  return EVP_PKEY_NONE;
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  /* PSK-authenticated ciphers do not use a certificate. (RSA_PSK is not
+   * supported.) */
+  if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* All other ciphers include it. */
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  /* Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchanges require a ServerKeyExchange. */
+  if (cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kDHE || cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  /* It is optional in all others. */
+  return 0;
+}
+
+size_t ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  size_t block_size;
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+    case SSL_3DES:
+      block_size = 8;
+      break;
+    case SSL_AES128:
+    case SSL_AES256:
+      block_size = 16;
+      break;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t mac_len;
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) {
+    case SSL_MD5:
+      mac_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+      break;
+    case SSL_SHA1:
+      mac_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+      break;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t ret = 1 + mac_len;
+  ret += block_size - (ret % block_size);
+  return ret;
+}