grpc 0.12.0 → 0.13.0.pre1.1

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.c

@@ -0,0 +1,808 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
+
+RSA *RSA_new(void) { return RSA_new_method(NULL); }
+
+RSA *RSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
+  RSA *rsa = (RSA *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA));
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  memset(rsa, 0, sizeof(RSA));
+
+  if (engine) {
+    rsa->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA_method(engine);
+  }
+
+  if (rsa->meth == NULL) {
+    rsa->meth = (RSA_METHOD*) &RSA_default_method;
+  }
+  METHOD_ref(rsa->meth);
+
+  rsa->references = 1;
+  rsa->flags = rsa->meth->flags;
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&rsa->lock);
+  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data);
+
+  if (rsa->meth->init && !rsa->meth->init(rsa)) {
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, rsa, &rsa->ex_data);
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&rsa->lock);
+    METHOD_unref(rsa->meth);
+    OPENSSL_free(rsa);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return rsa;
+}
+
+void RSA_additional_prime_free(RSA_additional_prime *ap) {
+  if (ap == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  BN_clear_free(ap->prime);
+  BN_clear_free(ap->exp);
+  BN_clear_free(ap->coeff);
+  BN_clear_free(ap->r);
+  BN_MONT_CTX_free(ap->mont);
+  OPENSSL_free(ap);
+}
+
+void RSA_free(RSA *rsa) {
+  unsigned u;
+
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&rsa->references)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (rsa->meth->finish) {
+    rsa->meth->finish(rsa);
+  }
+  METHOD_unref(rsa->meth);
+
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, rsa, &rsa->ex_data);
+
+  BN_clear_free(rsa->n);
+  BN_clear_free(rsa->e);
+  BN_clear_free(rsa->d);
+  BN_clear_free(rsa->p);
+  BN_clear_free(rsa->q);
+  BN_clear_free(rsa->dmp1);
+  BN_clear_free(rsa->dmq1);
+  BN_clear_free(rsa->iqmp);
+  BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_n);
+  BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_p);
+  BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->mont_q);
+  for (u = 0; u < rsa->num_blindings; u++) {
+    BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blindings[u]);
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings);
+  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings_inuse);
+  if (rsa->additional_primes != NULL) {
+    sk_RSA_additional_prime_pop_free(rsa->additional_primes,
+                                     RSA_additional_prime_free);
+  }
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&rsa->lock);
+  OPENSSL_free(rsa);
+}
+
+int RSA_up_ref(RSA *rsa) {
+  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&rsa->references);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) {
+  if (rsa->meth->keygen) {
+    return rsa->meth->keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+  }
+
+  return rsa_default_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+}
+
+int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int num_primes,
+                                 BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) {
+  if (rsa->meth->multi_prime_keygen) {
+    return rsa->meth->multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, num_primes, e_value, cb);
+  }
+
+  return rsa_default_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, num_primes, e_value, cb);
+}
+
+int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  if (rsa->meth->encrypt) {
+    return rsa->meth->encrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+  }
+
+  return rsa_default_encrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_public_encrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
+                       int padding) {
+  size_t out_len;
+
+  if (!RSA_encrypt(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (out_len > INT_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return out_len;
+}
+
+int RSA_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                 const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  if (rsa->meth->sign_raw) {
+    return rsa->meth->sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+  }
+
+  return rsa_default_sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_private_encrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
+                        int padding) {
+  size_t out_len;
+
+  if (!RSA_sign_raw(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (out_len > INT_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return out_len;
+}
+
+int RSA_decrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  if (rsa->meth->decrypt) {
+    return rsa->meth->decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+  }
+
+  return rsa_default_decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_private_decrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
+                        int padding) {
+  size_t out_len;
+
+  if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (out_len > INT_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return out_len;
+}
+
+int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                   const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  if (rsa->meth->verify_raw) {
+    return rsa->meth->verify_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+  }
+
+  return rsa_default_verify_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len,
+                                padding);
+}
+
+int RSA_public_decrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa,
+                       int padding) {
+  size_t out_len;
+
+  if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (out_len > INT_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return out_len;
+}
+
+unsigned RSA_size(const RSA *rsa) {
+  if (rsa->meth->size) {
+    return rsa->meth->size(rsa);
+  }
+
+  return rsa_default_size(rsa);
+}
+
+int RSA_is_opaque(const RSA *rsa) {
+  return rsa->meth && (rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_OPAQUE);
+}
+
+int RSA_supports_digest(const RSA *rsa, const EVP_MD *md) {
+  if (rsa->meth && rsa->meth->supports_digest) {
+    return rsa->meth->supports_digest(rsa, md);
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+                         CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+  int index;
+  if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, dup_func,
+                               free_func)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return index;
+}
+
+int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *d, int idx, void *arg) {
+  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *d, int idx) {
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+/* SSL_SIG_LENGTH is the size of an SSL/TLS (prior to TLS 1.2) signature: it's
+ * the length of an MD5 and SHA1 hash. */
+static const unsigned SSL_SIG_LENGTH = 36;
+
+/* pkcs1_sig_prefix contains the ASN.1, DER encoded prefix for a hash that is
+ * to be signed with PKCS#1. */
+struct pkcs1_sig_prefix {
+  /* nid identifies the hash function. */
+  int nid;
+  /* len is the number of bytes of |bytes| which are valid. */
+  uint8_t len;
+  /* bytes contains the DER bytes. */
+  uint8_t bytes[19];
+};
+
+/* kPKCS1SigPrefixes contains the ASN.1 prefixes for PKCS#1 signatures with
+ * different hash functions. */
+static const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix kPKCS1SigPrefixes[] = {
+    {
+     NID_md5,
+     18,
+     {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
+      0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10},
+    },
+    {
+     NID_sha1,
+     15,
+     {0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05,
+      0x00, 0x04, 0x14},
+    },
+    {
+     NID_sha224,
+     19,
+     {0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+      0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c},
+    },
+    {
+     NID_sha256,
+     19,
+     {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+      0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20},
+    },
+    {
+     NID_sha384,
+     19,
+     {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+      0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30},
+    },
+    {
+     NID_sha512,
+     19,
+     {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+      0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40},
+    },
+    {
+     NID_undef, 0, {0},
+    },
+};
+
+int RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(uint8_t **out_msg, size_t *out_msg_len,
+                         int *is_alloced, int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg,
+                         size_t msg_len) {
+  unsigned i;
+
+  if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1) {
+    /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length. */
+    if (msg_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    *out_msg = (uint8_t*) msg;
+    *out_msg_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+    *is_alloced = 0;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i].nid != NID_undef; i++) {
+    const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix *sig_prefix = &kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i];
+    if (sig_prefix->nid != hash_nid) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    const uint8_t* prefix = sig_prefix->bytes;
+    unsigned prefix_len = sig_prefix->len;
+    unsigned signed_msg_len;
+    uint8_t *signed_msg;
+
+    signed_msg_len = prefix_len + msg_len;
+    if (signed_msg_len < prefix_len) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_TOO_LONG);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    signed_msg = OPENSSL_malloc(signed_msg_len);
+    if (!signed_msg) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(signed_msg, prefix, prefix_len);
+    memcpy(signed_msg + prefix_len, msg, msg_len);
+
+    *out_msg = signed_msg;
+    *out_msg_len = signed_msg_len;
+    *is_alloced = 1;
+
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int RSA_sign(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, uint8_t *out,
+             unsigned *out_len, RSA *rsa) {
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  int ret = 0;
+  uint8_t *signed_msg;
+  size_t signed_msg_len;
+  int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0;
+  size_t size_t_out_len;
+
+  if (rsa->meth->sign) {
+    return rsa->meth->sign(hash_nid, in, in_len, out, out_len, rsa);
+  }
+
+  if (!RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len,
+                            &signed_msg_is_alloced, hash_nid, in, in_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (rsa_size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE ||
+      signed_msg_len > rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
+    goto finish;
+  }
+
+  if (RSA_sign_raw(rsa, &size_t_out_len, out, rsa_size, signed_msg,
+                   signed_msg_len, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) {
+    *out_len = size_t_out_len;
+    ret = 1;
+  }
+
+finish:
+  if (signed_msg_is_alloced) {
+    OPENSSL_free(signed_msg);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_verify(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+               const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa) {
+  const size_t rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  int ret = 0;
+  uint8_t *signed_msg = NULL;
+  size_t signed_msg_len, len;
+  int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0;
+
+  if (rsa->meth->verify) {
+    return rsa->meth->verify(hash_nid, msg, msg_len, sig, sig_len, rsa);
+  }
+
+  if (sig_len != rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1 && msg_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+  if (!buf) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &len, buf, rsa_size, sig, sig_len,
+                      RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) {
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  if (!RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len,
+                            &signed_msg_is_alloced, hash_nid, msg, msg_len)) {
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  if (len != signed_msg_len || CRYPTO_memcmp(buf, signed_msg, len) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+out:
+  OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  if (signed_msg_is_alloced) {
+    OPENSSL_free(signed_msg);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static void bn_free_and_null(BIGNUM **bn) {
+  BN_free(*bn);
+  *bn = NULL;
+}
+
+int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
+  BIGNUM n, pm1, qm1, lcm, gcd, de, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp;
+  BN_CTX *ctx;
+  int ok = 0, has_crt_values;
+
+  if (RSA_is_opaque(key)) {
+    /* Opaque keys can't be checked. */
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if ((key->p != NULL) != (key->q != NULL)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ONLY_ONE_OF_P_Q_GIVEN);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!key->n || !key->e) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!key->d || !key->p) {
+    /* For a public key, or without p and q, there's nothing that can be
+     * checked. */
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_init(&n);
+  BN_init(&pm1);
+  BN_init(&qm1);
+  BN_init(&lcm);
+  BN_init(&gcd);
+  BN_init(&de);
+  BN_init(&dmp1);
+  BN_init(&dmq1);
+  BN_init(&iqmp);
+
+  if (!BN_mul(&n, key->p, key->q, ctx) ||
+      /* lcm = lcm(prime-1, for all primes) */
+      !BN_sub(&pm1, key->p, BN_value_one()) ||
+      !BN_sub(&qm1, key->q, BN_value_one()) ||
+      !BN_mul(&lcm, &pm1, &qm1, ctx) ||
+      !BN_gcd(&gcd, &pm1, &qm1, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  size_t num_additional_primes = 0;
+  if (key->additional_primes != NULL) {
+    num_additional_primes = sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(key->additional_primes);
+  }
+
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < num_additional_primes; i++) {
+    const RSA_additional_prime *ap =
+        sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(key->additional_primes, i);
+    if (!BN_mul(&n, &n, ap->prime, ctx) ||
+        !BN_sub(&pm1, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) ||
+        !BN_mul(&lcm, &lcm, &pm1, ctx) ||
+        !BN_gcd(&gcd, &gcd, &pm1, ctx)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+      goto out;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_div(&lcm, NULL, &lcm, &gcd, ctx) ||
+      !BN_gcd(&gcd, &pm1, &qm1, ctx) ||
+      /* de = d*e mod lcm(prime-1, for all primes). */
+      !BN_mod_mul(&de, key->d, key->e, &lcm, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_cmp(&n, key->n) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_is_one(&de)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1);
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  has_crt_values = key->dmp1 != NULL;
+  if (has_crt_values != (key->dmq1 != NULL) ||
+      has_crt_values != (key->iqmp != NULL)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INCONSISTENT_SET_OF_CRT_VALUES);
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  if (has_crt_values && num_additional_primes == 0) {
+    if (/* dmp1 = d mod (p-1) */
+        !BN_mod(&dmp1, key->d, &pm1, ctx) ||
+        /* dmq1 = d mod (q-1) */
+        !BN_mod(&dmq1, key->d, &qm1, ctx) ||
+        /* iqmp = q^-1 mod p */
+        !BN_mod_inverse(&iqmp, key->q, key->p, ctx)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+      goto out;
+    }
+
+    if (BN_cmp(&dmp1, key->dmp1) != 0 ||
+        BN_cmp(&dmq1, key->dmq1) != 0 ||
+        BN_cmp(&iqmp, key->iqmp) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_CRT_VALUES_INCORRECT);
+      goto out;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+out:
+  BN_free(&n);
+  BN_free(&pm1);
+  BN_free(&qm1);
+  BN_free(&lcm);
+  BN_free(&gcd);
+  BN_free(&de);
+  BN_free(&dmp1);
+  BN_free(&dmq1);
+  BN_free(&iqmp);
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+  return ok;
+}
+
+int RSA_recover_crt_params(RSA *rsa) {
+  BN_CTX *ctx;
+  BIGNUM *totient, *rem, *multiple, *p_plus_q, *p_minus_q;
+  int ok = 0;
+
+  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL || rsa->d == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_EMPTY_PUBLIC_KEY);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (rsa->p || rsa->q || rsa->dmp1 || rsa->dmq1 || rsa->iqmp) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_CRT_PARAMS_ALREADY_GIVEN);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (rsa->additional_primes != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_CANNOT_RECOVER_MULTI_PRIME_KEY);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* This uses the algorithm from section 9B of the RSA paper:
+   * http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rsapaper.pdf */
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  totient = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  rem = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  multiple = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  p_plus_q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  p_minus_q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+  if (totient == NULL || rem == NULL || multiple == NULL || p_plus_q == NULL ||
+      p_minus_q == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* ed-1 is a small multiple of φ(n). */
+  if (!BN_mul(totient, rsa->e, rsa->d, ctx) ||
+      !BN_sub_word(totient, 1) ||
+      /* φ(n) =
+       * pq - p - q + 1 =
+       * n - (p + q) + 1
+       *
+       * Thus n is a reasonable estimate for φ(n). So, (ed-1)/n will be very
+       * close. But, when we calculate the quotient, we'll be truncating it
+       * because we discard the remainder. Thus (ed-1)/multiple will be >= n,
+       * which the totient cannot be. So we add one to the estimate.
+       *
+       * Consider ed-1 as:
+       *
+       * multiple * (n - (p+q) + 1) =
+       * multiple*n - multiple*(p+q) + multiple
+       *
+       * When we divide by n, the first term becomes multiple and, since
+       * multiple and p+q is tiny compared to n, the second and third terms can
+       * be ignored. Thus I claim that subtracting one from the estimate is
+       * sufficient. */
+      !BN_div(multiple, NULL, totient, rsa->n, ctx) ||
+      !BN_add_word(multiple, 1) ||
+      !BN_div(totient, rem, totient, multiple, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_is_zero(rem)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  rsa->p = BN_new();
+  rsa->q = BN_new();
+  rsa->dmp1 = BN_new();
+  rsa->dmq1 = BN_new();
+  rsa->iqmp = BN_new();
+  if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL || rsa->dmp1 == NULL || rsa->dmq1 ==
+      NULL || rsa->iqmp == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* φ(n) = n - (p + q) + 1 =>
+   * n - totient + 1 = p + q */
+  if (!BN_sub(p_plus_q, rsa->n, totient) ||
+      !BN_add_word(p_plus_q, 1) ||
+      /* p - q = sqrt((p+q)^2 - 4n) */
+      !BN_sqr(rem, p_plus_q, ctx) ||
+      !BN_lshift(multiple, rsa->n, 2) ||
+      !BN_sub(rem, rem, multiple) ||
+      !BN_sqrt(p_minus_q, rem, ctx) ||
+      /* q is 1/2 (p+q)-(p-q) */
+      !BN_sub(rsa->q, p_plus_q, p_minus_q) ||
+      !BN_rshift1(rsa->q, rsa->q) ||
+      !BN_div(rsa->p, NULL, rsa->n, rsa->q, ctx) ||
+      !BN_mul(multiple, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_cmp(multiple, rsa->n) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_sub(rem, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) ||
+      !BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, rem, ctx) ||
+      !BN_sub(rem, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) ||
+      !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, rem, ctx) ||
+      !BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  if (!ok) {
+    bn_free_and_null(&rsa->p);
+    bn_free_and_null(&rsa->q);
+    bn_free_and_null(&rsa->dmp1);
+    bn_free_and_null(&rsa->dmq1);
+    bn_free_and_null(&rsa->iqmp);
+  }
+  return ok;
+}
+
+int RSA_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                          size_t len) {
+  if (rsa->meth->private_transform) {
+    return rsa->meth->private_transform(rsa, out, in, len);
+  }
+
+  return rsa_default_private_transform(rsa, out, in, len);
+}
+
+int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  return 1;
+}