grpc 0.12.0 → 0.13.0.pre1.1

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c

@@ -0,0 +1,578 @@
+/* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf,
+                          unsigned int len, enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch);
+
+/* dtls1_get_record reads a new input record. On success, it places it in
+ * |ssl->s3->rrec| and returns one. Otherwise it returns <= 0 on error or if
+ * more data is needed. */
+static int dtls1_get_record(SSL *ssl) {
+again:
+  /* Read a new packet if there is no unconsumed one. */
+  if (ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) == 0) {
+    int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 0 /* unused */);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+  }
+  assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) > 0);
+
+  /* Ensure the packet is large enough to decrypt in-place. */
+  if (ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) < ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl)) {
+    ssl_read_buffer_clear(ssl);
+    goto again;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *out = ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl);
+  size_t max_out = ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) - ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl);
+  uint8_t type, alert;
+  size_t len, consumed;
+  switch (dtls_open_record(ssl, &type, out, &len, &consumed, &alert, max_out,
+                           ssl_read_buffer(ssl), ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl))) {
+    case ssl_open_record_success:
+      ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, consumed);
+
+      if (len > 0xffff) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+        return -1;
+      }
+
+      SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
+      rr->type = type;
+      rr->length = (uint16_t)len;
+      rr->data = out;
+      return 1;
+
+    case ssl_open_record_discard:
+      ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, consumed);
+      goto again;
+
+    case ssl_open_record_error:
+      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      return -1;
+
+    case ssl_open_record_partial:
+      /* Impossible in DTLS. */
+      break;
+  }
+
+  assert(0);
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_read_app_data(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *buf, int len, int peek) {
+  return dtls1_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len, peek);
+}
+
+int dtls1_read_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
+  uint8_t byte;
+  int ret = dtls1_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, &byte,
+                             1 /* len */, 0 /* no peek */);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  assert(ret == 1);
+
+  if (ssl->s3->rrec.length != 0 || byte != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->msg_callback != NULL) {
+    ssl->msg_callback(0, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, &byte, 1,
+                      ssl, ssl->msg_callback_arg);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void dtls1_read_close_notify(SSL *ssl) {
+  /* Bidirectional shutdown doesn't make sense for an unordered transport. DTLS
+   * alerts also aren't delivered reliably, so we may even time out because the
+   * peer never received our close_notify. Report to the caller that the channel
+   * has fully shut down. */
+  ssl->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+}
+
+/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
+ * 'type' is one of the following:
+ *
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when dtls1_get_message calls us)
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC (when dtls1_read_change_cipher_spec calls us)
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when dtls1_read_app_data calls us)
+ *
+ * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a DTLS record first (possibly
+ * multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
+ *
+ * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
+ * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) and out of records. */
+int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) {
+  int al, i, ret;
+  unsigned int n;
+  SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+  void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL;
+
+  if ((type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
+       type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) ||
+      (peek && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
+    /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
+    i = s->handshake_func(s);
+    if (i < 0) {
+      return i;
+    }
+    if (i == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+start:
+  s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+  /* s->s3->rrec.type     - is the type of record
+   * s->s3->rrec.data     - data
+   * s->s3->rrec.off      - offset into 'data' for next read
+   * s->s3->rrec.length   - number of bytes. */
+  rr = &s->s3->rrec;
+
+  /* Check for timeout */
+  if (DTLSv1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) {
+    goto start;
+  }
+
+  /* get new packet if necessary */
+  if (rr->length == 0) {
+    ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
+      /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
+      if (ret <= 0) {
+        return ret;
+      } else {
+        goto start;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
+
+  /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
+   * 'peek' mode) */
+  if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+    rr->length = 0;
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+
+  if (type == rr->type) {
+    /* Make sure that we are not getting application data when we
+     * are doing a handshake for the first time. */
+    if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+        (s->aead_read_ctx == NULL)) {
+      /* TODO(davidben): Is this check redundant with the handshake_func
+       * check? */
+      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    /* Discard empty records. */
+    if (rr->length == 0) {
+      goto start;
+    }
+
+    if (len <= 0) {
+      return len;
+    }
+
+    if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) {
+      n = rr->length;
+    } else {
+      n = (unsigned int)len;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(buf, rr->data, n);
+    if (!peek) {
+      rr->length -= n;
+      rr->data += n;
+      if (rr->length == 0) {
+        /* The record has been consumed, so we may now clear the buffer. */
+        ssl_read_buffer_discard(s);
+      }
+    }
+
+    return n;
+  }
+
+  /* If we get here, then type != rr->type. */
+
+  /* If an alert record, process one alert out of the record. Note that we allow
+   * a single record to contain multiple alerts. */
+  if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+    /* Alerts may not be fragmented. */
+    if (rr->length < 2) {
+      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    if (s->msg_callback) {
+      s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, rr->data, 2, s,
+                      s->msg_callback_arg);
+    }
+    const uint8_t alert_level = rr->data[0];
+    const uint8_t alert_descr = rr->data[1];
+    rr->length -= 2;
+    rr->data += 2;
+
+    if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
+      cb = s->info_callback;
+    } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
+      cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+    }
+
+    if (cb != NULL) {
+      uint16_t alert = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+      cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, alert);
+    }
+
+    if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
+      s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+      if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
+        s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+        return 0;
+      }
+    } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+      char tmp[16];
+
+      s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+      s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+      BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
+      ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
+      s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+      SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
+      return 0;
+    } else {
+      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    goto start;
+  }
+
+  /* Cross-epoch records are discarded, but we may receive out-of-order
+   * application data between ChangeCipherSpec and Finished or a ChangeCipherSpec
+   * before the appropriate point in the handshake. Those must be silently
+   * discarded.
+   *
+   * However, only allow the out-of-order records in the correct epoch.
+   * Application data must come in the encrypted epoch, and ChangeCipherSpec in
+   * the unencrypted epoch (we never renegotiate). Other cases fall through and
+   * fail with a fatal error. */
+  if ((rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && s->aead_read_ctx != NULL) ||
+      (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && s->aead_read_ctx == NULL)) {
+    rr->length = 0;
+    goto start;
+  }
+
+  if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+    if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+      /* Out-of-order handshake record while looking for ChangeCipherSpec. Drop
+       * it silently. */
+      assert(type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+      rr->length = 0;
+      goto start;
+    }
+
+    /* Parse the first fragment header to determine if this is a pre-CCS or
+     * post-CCS handshake record. DTLS resets handshake message numbers on each
+     * handshake, so renegotiations and retransmissions are ambiguous. */
+    if (rr->length < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+    dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
+
+    if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+      if (msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) {
+        /* Retransmit our last flight of messages. If the peer sends the second
+         * Finished, they may not have received ours. Only do this for the
+         * first fragment, in case the Finished was fragmented. */
+        if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) {
+          return -1;
+        }
+
+        dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
+      }
+
+      rr->length = 0;
+      goto start;
+    }
+
+    /* Otherwise, this is a pre-CCS handshake message from an unsupported
+     * renegotiation attempt. Fall through to the error path. */
+  }
+
+  al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+
+f_err:
+  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_write_app_data(SSL *s, const void *buf_, int len) {
+  int i;
+
+  if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
+    i = s->handshake_func(s);
+    if (i < 0) {
+      return i;
+    }
+    if (i == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf_, len,
+                        dtls1_use_current_epoch);
+  return i;
+}
+
+/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if not
+ * all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */
+int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len,
+                      enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch) {
+  int i;
+
+  assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+  s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+  i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, use_epoch);
+  return i;
+}
+
+static int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf,
+                          unsigned int len, enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch) {
+  /* There should never be a pending write buffer in DTLS. One can't write half
+   * a datagram, so the write buffer is always dropped in
+   * |ssl_write_buffer_flush|. */
+  assert(!ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(s));
+
+  /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
+  if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+    int ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+    /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+  }
+
+  if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (len == 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t max_out = len + ssl_max_seal_overhead(s);
+  uint8_t *out;
+  size_t ciphertext_len;
+  if (!ssl_write_buffer_init(s, &out, max_out) ||
+      !dtls_seal_record(s, out, &ciphertext_len, max_out, type, buf, len,
+                        use_epoch)) {
+    ssl_write_buffer_clear(s);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  ssl_write_buffer_set_len(s, ciphertext_len);
+
+  int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(s);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  return (int)len;
+}
+
+int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) {
+  int i, j;
+  void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL;
+  uint8_t buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
+  uint8_t *ptr = &buf[0];
+
+  s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
+
+  memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
+  *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
+  *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
+
+  i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf),
+                     dtls1_use_current_epoch);
+  if (i <= 0) {
+    s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
+  } else {
+    if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+      (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+    }
+
+    if (s->msg_callback) {
+      s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s,
+                      s->msg_callback_arg);
+    }
+
+    if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
+      cb = s->info_callback;
+    } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
+      cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+    }
+
+    if (cb != NULL) {
+      j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
+      cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return i;
+}