grpc 0.12.0 → 0.13.0.pre1.1

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/pkcs8/p8_pkey.c

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 1999.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+/* Minor tweak to operation: zero private key data */
+static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                   void *exarg) {
+  /* Since the structure must still be valid use ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE */
+  if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *key = (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *)*pval;
+    if (key->pkey && key->pkey->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING &&
+        key->pkey->value.octet_string) {
+      OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->value.octet_string->data,
+                      key->pkey->value.octet_string->length);
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey_cb) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkeyalg, X509_ALGOR),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey, ASN1_ANY),
+  ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO);
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO);

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8.c

@@ -0,0 +1,1217 @@
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 1999.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/pkcs8.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
+#include "../evp/internal.h"
+
+
+#define PKCS12_KEY_ID 1
+#define PKCS12_IV_ID 2
+#define PKCS12_MAC_ID 3
+
+static int ascii_to_ucs2(const char *ascii, size_t ascii_len,
+                         uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len) {
+  uint8_t *unitmp;
+  size_t ulen, i;
+
+  ulen = ascii_len * 2 + 2;
+  if (ulen < ascii_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  unitmp = OPENSSL_malloc(ulen);
+  if (unitmp == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  for (i = 0; i < ulen - 2; i += 2) {
+    unitmp[i] = 0;
+    unitmp[i + 1] = ascii[i >> 1];
+  }
+
+  /* Make result double null terminated */
+  unitmp[ulen - 2] = 0;
+  unitmp[ulen - 1] = 0;
+  *out_len = ulen;
+  *out = unitmp;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkcs12_key_gen_raw(const uint8_t *pass_raw, size_t pass_raw_len,
+                              const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
+                              int id, int iterations,
+                              size_t out_len, uint8_t *out,
+                              const EVP_MD *md_type) {
+  uint8_t *B, *D, *I, *p, *Ai;
+  int Slen, Plen, Ilen, Ijlen;
+  int i, j, v;
+  size_t u;
+  int ret = 0;
+  BIGNUM *Ij, *Bpl1; /* These hold Ij and B + 1 */
+  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+  v = EVP_MD_block_size(md_type);
+  u = EVP_MD_size(md_type);
+  D = OPENSSL_malloc(v);
+  Ai = OPENSSL_malloc(u);
+  B = OPENSSL_malloc(v + 1);
+  Slen = v * ((salt_len + v - 1) / v);
+  if (pass_raw_len) {
+    Plen = v * ((pass_raw_len + v - 1) / v);
+  } else {
+    Plen = 0;
+  }
+  Ilen = Slen + Plen;
+  I = OPENSSL_malloc(Ilen);
+  Ij = BN_new();
+  Bpl1 = BN_new();
+  if (!D || !Ai || !B || !I || !Ij || !Bpl1) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  for (i = 0; i < v; i++) {
+    D[i] = id;
+  }
+  p = I;
+  for (i = 0; i < Slen; i++) {
+    *p++ = salt[i % salt_len];
+  }
+  for (i = 0; i < Plen; i++) {
+    *p++ = pass_raw[i % pass_raw_len];
+  }
+  for (;;) {
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md_type, NULL) ||
+        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, D, v) ||
+        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, I, Ilen) ||
+        !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, Ai, NULL)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    for (j = 1; j < iterations; j++) {
+      if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md_type, NULL) ||
+          !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, Ai, u) ||
+          !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, Ai, NULL)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+    memcpy(out, Ai, out_len < u ? out_len : u);
+    if (u >= out_len) {
+      ret = 1;
+      goto end;
+    }
+    out_len -= u;
+    out += u;
+    for (j = 0; j < v; j++) {
+      B[j] = Ai[j % u];
+    }
+    /* Work out B + 1 first then can use B as tmp space */
+    if (!BN_bin2bn(B, v, Bpl1) ||
+        !BN_add_word(Bpl1, 1)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    for (j = 0; j < Ilen; j += v) {
+      if (!BN_bin2bn(I + j, v, Ij) ||
+          !BN_add(Ij, Ij, Bpl1) ||
+          !BN_bn2bin(Ij, B)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      Ijlen = BN_num_bytes(Ij);
+      /* If more than 2^(v*8) - 1 cut off MSB */
+      if (Ijlen > v) {
+        if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, B)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+        memcpy(I + j, B + 1, v);
+        /* If less than v bytes pad with zeroes */
+      } else if (Ijlen < v) {
+        memset(I + j, 0, v - Ijlen);
+        if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, I + j + v - Ijlen)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+      } else if (!BN_bn2bin(Ij, I + j)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+end:
+  OPENSSL_free(Ai);
+  OPENSSL_free(B);
+  OPENSSL_free(D);
+  OPENSSL_free(I);
+  BN_free(Ij);
+  BN_free(Bpl1);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int pkcs12_pbe_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *pass_raw,
+                               size_t pass_raw_len, ASN1_TYPE *param,
+                               const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,
+                               int is_encrypt) {
+  PBEPARAM *pbe;
+  int salt_len, iterations, ret;
+  uint8_t *salt;
+  const uint8_t *pbuf;
+  uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+
+  /* Extract useful info from parameter */
+  if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
+      param->value.sequence == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  pbuf = param->value.sequence->data;
+  pbe = d2i_PBEPARAM(NULL, &pbuf, param->value.sequence->length);
+  if (pbe == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!pbe->iter) {
+    iterations = 1;
+  } else {
+    iterations = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter);
+  }
+  salt = pbe->salt->data;
+  salt_len = pbe->salt->length;
+  if (!pkcs12_key_gen_raw(pass_raw, pass_raw_len, salt, salt_len, PKCS12_KEY_ID,
+                          iterations, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher), key, md)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
+    PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!pkcs12_key_gen_raw(pass_raw, pass_raw_len, salt, salt_len, PKCS12_IV_ID,
+                          iterations, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher), iv, md)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
+    PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
+  ret = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, is_encrypt);
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(key, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+typedef int (*keygen_func)(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *pass_raw,
+                           size_t pass_raw_len, ASN1_TYPE *param,
+                           const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,
+                           int is_encrypt);
+
+struct pbe_suite {
+  int pbe_nid;
+  const EVP_CIPHER* (*cipher_func)(void);
+  const EVP_MD* (*md_func)(void);
+  keygen_func keygen;
+  int flags;
+};
+
+#define PBE_UCS2_CONVERT_PASSWORD 0x1
+
+static const struct pbe_suite kBuiltinPBE[] = {
+    {
+     NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC, EVP_rc2_40_cbc, EVP_sha1,
+     pkcs12_pbe_keyivgen, PBE_UCS2_CONVERT_PASSWORD
+    },
+    {
+     NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4, EVP_rc4, EVP_sha1, pkcs12_pbe_keyivgen,
+     PBE_UCS2_CONVERT_PASSWORD
+    },
+    {
+     NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc, EVP_sha1,
+     pkcs12_pbe_keyivgen, PBE_UCS2_CONVERT_PASSWORD
+    },
+    {
+      NID_pbes2, NULL, NULL,  PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen, 0
+    },
+};
+
+static const struct pbe_suite *get_pbe_suite(int pbe_nid) {
+  unsigned i;
+  for (i = 0; i < sizeof(kBuiltinPBE) / sizeof(kBuiltinPBE[0]); i++) {
+    if (kBuiltinPBE[i].pbe_nid == pbe_nid) {
+      return &kBuiltinPBE[i];
+    }
+  }
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/* pass_to_pass_raw performs a password conversion (possibly a no-op)
+ * appropriate to the supplied |pbe_nid|. The input |pass| is treated as a
+ * NUL-terminated string if |pass_len| is -1, otherwise it is treated as a
+ * buffer of the specified length. If the supplied PBE NID sets the
+ * |PBE_UCS2_CONVERT_PASSWORD| flag, the supplied |pass| will be converted to
+ * UCS-2.
+ *
+ * It sets |*out_pass_raw| to a new buffer that must be freed by the caller. It
+ * returns one on success and zero on error. */
+static int pass_to_pass_raw(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int pass_len,
+                            uint8_t **out_pass_raw, size_t *out_pass_raw_len) {
+  if (pass == NULL) {
+    *out_pass_raw = NULL;
+    *out_pass_raw_len = 0;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (pass_len == -1) {
+    pass_len = strlen(pass);
+  } else if (pass_len < 0 || pass_len > 2000000000) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const struct pbe_suite *suite = get_pbe_suite(pbe_nid);
+  if (suite != NULL && (suite->flags & PBE_UCS2_CONVERT_PASSWORD)) {
+    if (!ascii_to_ucs2(pass, pass_len, out_pass_raw, out_pass_raw_len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    *out_pass_raw = BUF_memdup(pass, pass_len);
+    if (*out_pass_raw == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    *out_pass_raw_len = (size_t)pass_len;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pbe_cipher_init(ASN1_OBJECT *pbe_obj,
+                           const uint8_t *pass_raw, size_t pass_raw_len,
+                           ASN1_TYPE *param,
+                           EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int is_encrypt) {
+  const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+  const EVP_MD *md;
+
+  const struct pbe_suite *suite = get_pbe_suite(OBJ_obj2nid(pbe_obj));
+  if (suite == NULL) {
+    char obj_str[80];
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM);
+    if (!pbe_obj) {
+      strncpy(obj_str, "NULL", sizeof(obj_str));
+    } else {
+      i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_str, sizeof(obj_str), pbe_obj);
+    }
+    ERR_add_error_data(2, "TYPE=", obj_str);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (suite->cipher_func == NULL) {
+    cipher = NULL;
+  } else {
+    cipher = suite->cipher_func();
+    if (!cipher) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (suite->md_func == NULL) {
+    md = NULL;
+  } else {
+    md = suite->md_func();
+    if (!md) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!suite->keygen(ctx, pass_raw, pass_raw_len, param, cipher, md,
+                     is_encrypt)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pbe_crypt(const X509_ALGOR *algor,
+                     const uint8_t *pass_raw, size_t pass_raw_len,
+                     const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                     uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len,
+                     int is_encrypt) {
+  uint8_t *buf;
+  int n, ret = 0;
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+  unsigned block_size;
+
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+
+  if (!pbe_cipher_init(algor->algorithm, pass_raw, pass_raw_len,
+                       algor->parameter, &ctx, is_encrypt)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_ALGORITHM);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&ctx);
+
+  if (in_len + block_size < in_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_TOO_LONG);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(in_len + block_size);
+  if (buf == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx, buf, &n, in, in_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  *out_len = n;
+
+  if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&ctx, buf + n, &n)) {
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  *out_len += n;
+  *out = buf;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static void *pkcs12_item_decrypt_d2i(X509_ALGOR *algor, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                     const uint8_t *pass_raw,
+                                     size_t pass_raw_len,
+                                     ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct) {
+  uint8_t *out;
+  const uint8_t *p;
+  void *ret;
+  size_t out_len;
+
+  if (!pbe_crypt(algor, pass_raw, pass_raw_len, oct->data, oct->length,
+                 &out, &out_len, 0 /* decrypt */)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_CRYPT_ERROR);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  p = out;
+  ret = ASN1_item_d2i(NULL, &p, out_len, it);
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(out, out_len);
+  if (!ret) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(out);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS8_decrypt(X509_SIG *pkcs8, const char *pass,
+                                   int pass_len) {
+  uint8_t *pass_raw = NULL;
+  size_t pass_raw_len = 0;
+  if (!pass_to_pass_raw(OBJ_obj2nid(pkcs8->algor->algorithm), pass, pass_len,
+                        &pass_raw, &pass_raw_len)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *ret = PKCS8_decrypt_pbe(pkcs8, pass_raw, pass_raw_len);
+
+  if (pass_raw) {
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(pass_raw, pass_raw_len);
+    OPENSSL_free(pass_raw);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS8_decrypt_pbe(X509_SIG *pkcs8, const uint8_t *pass_raw,
+                                       size_t pass_raw_len) {
+  return pkcs12_item_decrypt_d2i(pkcs8->algor,
+                                 ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO), pass_raw,
+                                 pass_raw_len, pkcs8->digest);
+}
+
+static ASN1_OCTET_STRING *pkcs12_item_i2d_encrypt(X509_ALGOR *algor,
+                                                  const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                                  const uint8_t *pass_raw,
+                                                  size_t pass_raw_len, void *obj) {
+  ASN1_OCTET_STRING *oct;
+  uint8_t *in = NULL;
+  int in_len;
+  size_t crypt_len;
+
+  oct = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+  if (oct == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  in_len = ASN1_item_i2d(obj, &in, it);
+  if (!in) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (!pbe_crypt(algor, pass_raw, pass_raw_len, in, in_len, &oct->data, &crypt_len,
+                 1 /* encrypt */)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_free(in);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  oct->length = crypt_len;
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(in, in_len);
+  OPENSSL_free(in);
+  return oct;
+}
+
+X509_SIG *PKCS8_encrypt(int pbe_nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const char *pass,
+                        int pass_len, uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
+                        int iterations, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf) {
+  uint8_t *pass_raw = NULL;
+  size_t pass_raw_len = 0;
+  if (!pass_to_pass_raw(pbe_nid, pass, pass_len, &pass_raw, &pass_raw_len)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  X509_SIG *ret = PKCS8_encrypt_pbe(pbe_nid, cipher, pass_raw, pass_raw_len,
+                                    salt, salt_len, iterations, p8inf);
+
+  if (pass_raw) {
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(pass_raw, pass_raw_len);
+    OPENSSL_free(pass_raw);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+X509_SIG *PKCS8_encrypt_pbe(int pbe_nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+                            const uint8_t *pass_raw, size_t pass_raw_len,
+                            uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
+                            int iterations, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf) {
+  X509_SIG *pkcs8 = NULL;
+  X509_ALGOR *pbe;
+
+  pkcs8 = X509_SIG_new();
+  if (pkcs8 == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (pbe_nid == -1) {
+    pbe = PKCS5_pbe2_set(cipher, iterations, salt, salt_len);
+  } else {
+    pbe = PKCS5_pbe_set(pbe_nid, iterations, salt, salt_len);
+  }
+  if (!pbe) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  X509_ALGOR_free(pkcs8->algor);
+  pkcs8->algor = pbe;
+  M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(pkcs8->digest);
+  pkcs8->digest = pkcs12_item_i2d_encrypt(
+      pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO), pass_raw, pass_raw_len, p8inf);
+  if (!pkcs8->digest) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  return pkcs8;
+
+err:
+  X509_SIG_free(pkcs8);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKCS82PKEY(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) {
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  ASN1_OBJECT *algoid;
+  char obj_tmp[80];
+
+  if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(&algoid, NULL, NULL, NULL, p8)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+  if (pkey == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, OBJ_obj2nid(algoid))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHM);
+    i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(obj_tmp, 80, algoid);
+    ERR_add_error_data(2, "TYPE=", obj_tmp);
+    goto error;
+  }
+
+  if (pkey->ameth->priv_decode) {
+    if (!pkey->ameth->priv_decode(pkey, p8)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR);
+      goto error;
+    }
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    goto error;
+  }
+
+  return pkey;
+
+error:
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
+
+  p8 = PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new();
+  if (p8 == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  p8->broken = PKCS8_OK;
+
+  if (pkey->ameth) {
+    if (pkey->ameth->priv_encode) {
+      if (!pkey->ameth->priv_encode(p8, pkey)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR);
+        goto error;
+      }
+    } else {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+      goto error;
+    }
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHM);
+    goto error;
+  }
+  return p8;
+
+error:
+  PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+struct pkcs12_context {
+  EVP_PKEY **out_key;
+  STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs;
+  uint8_t *password;
+  size_t password_len;
+};
+
+static int PKCS12_handle_content_info(CBS *content_info, unsigned depth,
+                                      struct pkcs12_context *ctx);
+
+/* PKCS12_handle_content_infos parses a series of PKCS#7 ContentInfos in a
+ * SEQUENCE. */
+static int PKCS12_handle_content_infos(CBS *content_infos,
+                                       unsigned depth,
+                                       struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
+  uint8_t *der_bytes = NULL;
+  size_t der_len;
+  CBS in;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  /* Generally we only expect depths 0 (the top level, with a
+   * pkcs7-encryptedData and a pkcs7-data) and depth 1 (the various PKCS#12
+   * bags). */
+  if (depth > 3) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_PKCS12_TOO_DEEPLY_NESTED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Although a BER->DER conversion is done at the beginning of |PKCS12_parse|,
+   * the ASN.1 data gets wrapped in OCTETSTRINGs and/or encrypted and the
+   * conversion cannot see through those wrappings. So each time we step
+   * through one we need to convert to DER again. */
+  if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(content_infos, &der_bytes, &der_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (der_bytes != NULL) {
+    CBS_init(&in, der_bytes, der_len);
+  } else {
+    CBS_init(&in, CBS_data(content_infos), CBS_len(content_infos));
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &in, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  while (CBS_len(&in) > 0) {
+    CBS content_info;
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &content_info, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!PKCS12_handle_content_info(&content_info, depth + 1, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* NSS includes additional data after the SEQUENCE, but it's an (unwrapped)
+   * copy of the same encrypted private key (with the same IV and
+   * ciphertext)! */
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(der_bytes);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* PKCS12_handle_content_info parses a single PKCS#7 ContentInfo element in a
+ * PKCS#12 structure. */
+static int PKCS12_handle_content_info(CBS *content_info, unsigned depth,
+                                      struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
+  CBS content_type, wrapped_contents, contents, content_infos;
+  int nid, ret = 0;
+
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &wrapped_contents,
+                        CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  nid = OBJ_cbs2nid(&content_type);
+  if (nid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+    /* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-13.
+     *
+     * PKCS#7 encrypted data inside a PKCS#12 structure is generally an
+     * encrypted certificate bag and it's generally encrypted with 40-bit
+     * RC2-CBC. */
+    CBS version_bytes, eci, contents_type, ai, encrypted_contents;
+    X509_ALGOR *algor = NULL;
+    const uint8_t *inp;
+    uint8_t *out;
+    size_t out_len;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &contents, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &version_bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
+        /* EncryptedContentInfo, see
+         * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-10.1 */
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &eci, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &contents_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+        /* AlgorithmIdentifier, see
+         * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.1.2 */
+        !CBS_get_asn1_element(&eci, &ai, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &encrypted_contents,
+                      CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (OBJ_cbs2nid(&contents_type) != NID_pkcs7_data ||
+        CBS_len(&ai) > LONG_MAX) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    inp = CBS_data(&ai);
+    algor = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &inp, (long)CBS_len(&ai));
+    if (algor == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (inp != CBS_data(&ai) + CBS_len(&ai)) {
+      X509_ALGOR_free(algor);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!pbe_crypt(algor, ctx->password, ctx->password_len,
+                   CBS_data(&encrypted_contents), CBS_len(&encrypted_contents),
+                   &out, &out_len, 0 /* decrypt */)) {
+      X509_ALGOR_free(algor);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    X509_ALGOR_free(algor);
+
+    CBS_init(&content_infos, out, out_len);
+    ret = PKCS12_handle_content_infos(&content_infos, depth + 1, ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(out);
+  } else if (nid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
+    CBS octet_string_contents;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &octet_string_contents,
+                          CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = PKCS12_handle_content_infos(&octet_string_contents, depth + 1, ctx);
+  } else if (nid == NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag) {
+    /* See ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1.pdf, section
+     * 4.2.2. */
+    const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&wrapped_contents);
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *pki = NULL;
+    X509_SIG *encrypted = NULL;
+
+    if (*ctx->out_key) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MULTIPLE_PRIVATE_KEYS_IN_PKCS12);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (CBS_len(&wrapped_contents) > LONG_MAX) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* encrypted isn't actually an X.509 signature, but it has the same
+     * structure as one and so |X509_SIG| is reused to store it. */
+    encrypted = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &inp, (long)CBS_len(&wrapped_contents));
+    if (encrypted == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (inp != CBS_data(&wrapped_contents) + CBS_len(&wrapped_contents)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      X509_SIG_free(encrypted);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    pki = PKCS8_decrypt_pbe(encrypted, ctx->password, ctx->password_len);
+    X509_SIG_free(encrypted);
+    if (pki == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    *ctx->out_key = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(pki);
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(pki);
+
+    if (ctx->out_key == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+  } else if (nid == NID_certBag) {
+    CBS cert_bag, cert_type, wrapped_cert, cert;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &cert_bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &cert_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &wrapped_cert,
+                      CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_cert, &cert, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (OBJ_cbs2nid(&cert_type) == NID_x509Certificate) {
+      if (CBS_len(&cert) > LONG_MAX) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&cert);
+      X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &inp, (long)CBS_len(&cert));
+      if (!x509) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (inp != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+        X509_free(x509);
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      if (0 == sk_X509_push(ctx->out_certs, x509)) {
+        X509_free(x509);
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+    ret = 1;
+  } else {
+    /* Unknown element type - ignore it. */
+    ret = 1;
+  }
+
+err:
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(EVP_PKEY **out_key, STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs,
+                             CBS *ber_in, const char *password) {
+  uint8_t *der_bytes = NULL;
+  size_t der_len;
+  CBS in, pfx, mac_data, authsafe, content_type, wrapped_authsafes, authsafes;
+  uint64_t version;
+  int ret = 0;
+  struct pkcs12_context ctx;
+  const size_t original_out_certs_len = sk_X509_num(out_certs);
+
+  /* The input may be in BER format. */
+  if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(ber_in, &der_bytes, &der_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (der_bytes != NULL) {
+    CBS_init(&in, der_bytes, der_len);
+  } else {
+    CBS_init(&in, CBS_data(ber_in), CBS_len(ber_in));
+  }
+
+  *out_key = NULL;
+  memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+
+  /* See ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1.pdf, section
+   * four. */
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &pfx, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      CBS_len(&in) != 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pfx, &version)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (version < 3) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_VERSION);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &authsafe, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(&pfx) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MISSING_MAC);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &mac_data, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* authsafe is a PKCS#7 ContentInfo. See
+   * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-7. */
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &wrapped_authsafes,
+                        CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* The content type can either be |NID_pkcs7_data| or |NID_pkcs7_signed|. The
+   * latter indicates that it's signed by a public key, which isn't
+   * supported. */
+  if (OBJ_cbs2nid(&content_type) != NID_pkcs7_data) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_PKCS12_PUBLIC_KEY_INTEGRITY_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_authsafes, &authsafes, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ctx.out_key = out_key;
+  ctx.out_certs = out_certs;
+  if (!ascii_to_ucs2(password, strlen(password), &ctx.password,
+                     &ctx.password_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Verify the MAC. */
+  {
+    CBS mac, hash_type_seq, hash_oid, salt, expected_mac;
+    uint64_t iterations;
+    int hash_nid;
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    uint8_t hmac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    uint8_t hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned hmac_len;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &mac, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&mac, &hash_type_seq, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&hash_type_seq, &hash_oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&mac, &expected_mac, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &salt, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* The iteration count is optional and the default is one. */
+    iterations = 1;
+    if (CBS_len(&mac_data) > 0) {
+      if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&mac_data, &iterations) ||
+          iterations > INT_MAX) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    hash_nid = OBJ_cbs2nid(&hash_oid);
+    if (hash_nid == NID_undef ||
+        (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(hash_nid)) == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNKNOWN_HASH);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!pkcs12_key_gen_raw(ctx.password, ctx.password_len, CBS_data(&salt),
+                            CBS_len(&salt), PKCS12_MAC_ID, iterations,
+                            EVP_MD_size(md), hmac_key, md)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (NULL == HMAC(md, hmac_key, EVP_MD_size(md), CBS_data(&authsafes),
+                     CBS_len(&authsafes), hmac, &hmac_len)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!CBS_mem_equal(&expected_mac, hmac, hmac_len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_INCORRECT_PASSWORD);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* authsafes contains a series of PKCS#7 ContentInfos. */
+  if (!PKCS12_handle_content_infos(&authsafes, 0, &ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(ctx.password);
+  OPENSSL_free(der_bytes);
+  if (!ret) {
+    EVP_PKEY_free(*out_key);
+    *out_key = NULL;
+    while (sk_X509_num(out_certs) > original_out_certs_len) {
+      X509 *x509 = sk_X509_pop(out_certs);
+      X509_free(x509);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void PKCS12_PBE_add(void) {}
+
+struct pkcs12_st {
+  uint8_t *ber_bytes;
+  size_t ber_len;
+};
+
+PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12(PKCS12 **out_p12, const uint8_t **ber_bytes, size_t ber_len) {
+  PKCS12 *p12;
+
+  /* out_p12 must be NULL because we don't export the PKCS12 structure. */
+  assert(out_p12 == NULL);
+
+  p12 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(PKCS12));
+  if (!p12) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  p12->ber_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(ber_len);
+  if (!p12->ber_bytes) {
+    OPENSSL_free(p12);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  memcpy(p12->ber_bytes, *ber_bytes, ber_len);
+  p12->ber_len = ber_len;
+  *ber_bytes += ber_len;
+
+  return p12;
+}
+
+PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bio, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
+  size_t used = 0;
+  BUF_MEM *buf;
+  const uint8_t *dummy;
+  static const size_t kMaxSize = 256 * 1024;
+  PKCS12 *ret = NULL;
+
+  buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+  if (buf == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (BUF_MEM_grow(buf, 8192) == 0) {
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    int n = BIO_read(bio, &buf->data[used], buf->length - used);
+    if (n < 0) {
+      goto out;
+    }
+
+    if (n == 0) {
+      break;
+    }
+    used += n;
+
+    if (used < buf->length) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (buf->length > kMaxSize ||
+        BUF_MEM_grow(buf, buf->length * 2) == 0) {
+      goto out;
+    }
+  }
+
+  dummy = (uint8_t*) buf->data;
+  ret = d2i_PKCS12(out_p12, &dummy, used);
+
+out:
+  BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
+  BIO *bio;
+  PKCS12 *ret;
+
+  bio = BIO_new_fp(fp, 0 /* don't take ownership */);
+  if (!bio) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  ret = d2i_PKCS12_bio(bio, out_p12);
+  BIO_free(bio);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_parse(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey,
+                 X509 **out_cert, STACK_OF(X509) **out_ca_certs) {
+  CBS ber_bytes;
+  STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL;
+  char ca_certs_alloced = 0;
+
+  if (out_ca_certs != NULL && *out_ca_certs != NULL) {
+    ca_certs = *out_ca_certs;
+  }
+
+  if (!ca_certs) {
+    ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+    if (ca_certs == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    ca_certs_alloced = 1;
+  }
+
+  CBS_init(&ber_bytes, p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len);
+  if (!PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(out_pkey, ca_certs, &ber_bytes, password)) {
+    if (ca_certs_alloced) {
+      sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
+    }
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_cert = NULL;
+  if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) > 0) {
+    *out_cert = sk_X509_shift(ca_certs);
+  }
+
+  if (out_ca_certs) {
+    *out_ca_certs = ca_certs;
+  } else {
+    sk_X509_pop_free(ca_certs, X509_free);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_verify_mac(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password,
+                      int password_len) {
+  if (password == NULL) {
+    if (password_len != 0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else if (password_len != -1 &&
+             (password[password_len] != 0 ||
+              memchr(password, 0, password_len) != NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  X509 *cert = NULL;
+  if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, password, &pkey, &cert, NULL)) {
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  X509_free(cert);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void PKCS12_free(PKCS12 *p12) {
+  OPENSSL_free(p12->ber_bytes);
+  OPENSSL_free(p12);
+}