grpc 0.12.0 → 0.13.0.pre1.1

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/evp/p_rsa_asn1.c

@@ -0,0 +1,737 @@
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2006.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "../rsa/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+static int rsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  uint8_t *encoded;
+  size_t encoded_len;
+  if (!RSA_public_key_to_bytes(&encoded, &encoded_len, pkey->pkey.rsa)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL,
+                              encoded, encoded_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_free(encoded);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) {
+  const uint8_t *p;
+  int pklen;
+  if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, pubkey)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Estonian IDs issued between September 2014 to September 2015 are
+   * broken. See https://crbug.com/532048 and https://crbug.com/534766.
+   *
+   * TODO(davidben): Switch this to the strict version in March 2016 or when
+   * Chromium can force client certificates down a different codepath, whichever
+   * comes first. */
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, p, pklen);
+  RSA *rsa = RSA_parse_public_key_buggy(&cbs);
+  if (rsa == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) {
+  return BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->n, a->pkey.rsa->n) == 0 &&
+         BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->e, a->pkey.rsa->e) == 0;
+}
+
+static int rsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  uint8_t *encoded;
+  size_t encoded_len;
+  if (!RSA_private_key_to_bytes(&encoded, &encoded_len, pkey->pkey.rsa)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* TODO(fork): const correctness in next line. */
+  if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, (ASN1_OBJECT *)OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), 0,
+                       V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, encoded, encoded_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_free(encoded);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) {
+  const uint8_t *p;
+  int pklen;
+  if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, p8)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  RSA *rsa = RSA_private_key_from_bytes(p, pklen);
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_opaque(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  return RSA_is_opaque(pkey->pkey.rsa);
+}
+
+static int rsa_supports_digest(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md) {
+  return RSA_supports_digest(pkey->pkey.rsa, md);
+}
+
+static int int_rsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  return RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa);
+}
+
+static int rsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n);
+}
+
+static void int_rsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { RSA_free(pkey->pkey.rsa); }
+
+static void update_buflen(const BIGNUM *b, size_t *pbuflen) {
+  size_t i;
+
+  if (!b) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  i = BN_num_bytes(b);
+  if (*pbuflen < i) {
+    *pbuflen = i;
+  }
+}
+
+static int do_rsa_print(BIO *out, const RSA *rsa, int off,
+                        int include_private) {
+  char *str;
+  const char *s;
+  uint8_t *m = NULL;
+  int ret = 0, mod_len = 0;
+  size_t buf_len = 0;
+
+  update_buflen(rsa->n, &buf_len);
+  update_buflen(rsa->e, &buf_len);
+
+  if (include_private) {
+    update_buflen(rsa->d, &buf_len);
+    update_buflen(rsa->p, &buf_len);
+    update_buflen(rsa->q, &buf_len);
+    update_buflen(rsa->dmp1, &buf_len);
+    update_buflen(rsa->dmq1, &buf_len);
+    update_buflen(rsa->iqmp, &buf_len);
+
+    if (rsa->additional_primes != NULL) {
+      size_t i;
+
+      for (i = 0; i < sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(rsa->additional_primes);
+           i++) {
+        const RSA_additional_prime *ap =
+            sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(rsa->additional_primes, i);
+        update_buflen(ap->prime, &buf_len);
+        update_buflen(ap->exp, &buf_len);
+        update_buflen(ap->coeff, &buf_len);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  m = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len + 10);
+  if (m == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (rsa->n != NULL) {
+    mod_len = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
+  }
+
+  if (!BIO_indent(out, off, 128)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (include_private && rsa->d) {
+    if (BIO_printf(out, "Private-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    str = "modulus:";
+    s = "publicExponent:";
+  } else {
+    if (BIO_printf(out, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    str = "Modulus:";
+    s = "Exponent:";
+  }
+  if (!ASN1_bn_print(out, str, rsa->n, m, off) ||
+      !ASN1_bn_print(out, s, rsa->e, m, off)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (include_private) {
+    if (!ASN1_bn_print(out, "privateExponent:", rsa->d, m, off) ||
+        !ASN1_bn_print(out, "prime1:", rsa->p, m, off) ||
+        !ASN1_bn_print(out, "prime2:", rsa->q, m, off) ||
+        !ASN1_bn_print(out, "exponent1:", rsa->dmp1, m, off) ||
+        !ASN1_bn_print(out, "exponent2:", rsa->dmq1, m, off) ||
+        !ASN1_bn_print(out, "coefficient:", rsa->iqmp, m, off)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (rsa->additional_primes != NULL &&
+        sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(rsa->additional_primes) > 0) {
+      size_t i;
+
+      if (BIO_printf(out, "otherPrimeInfos:\n") <= 0) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      for (i = 0; i < sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(rsa->additional_primes);
+           i++) {
+        const RSA_additional_prime *ap =
+            sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(rsa->additional_primes, i);
+
+        if (BIO_printf(out, "otherPrimeInfo (prime %u):\n",
+                       (unsigned)(i + 3)) <= 0 ||
+            !ASN1_bn_print(out, "prime:", ap->prime, m, off) ||
+            !ASN1_bn_print(out, "exponent:", ap->exp, m, off) ||
+            !ASN1_bn_print(out, "coeff:", ap->coeff, m, off)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(m);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                         ASN1_PCTX *ctx) {
+  return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 0);
+}
+
+
+static int rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
+                          ASN1_PCTX *ctx) {
+  return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 1);
+}
+
+/* Given an MGF1 Algorithm ID decode to an Algorithm Identifier */
+static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg) {
+  const uint8_t *p;
+  int plen;
+
+  if (alg == NULL || alg->parameter == NULL ||
+      OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1 ||
+      alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
+  plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
+  return d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
+}
+
+static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
+                                      X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash) {
+  const uint8_t *p;
+  int plen;
+  RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+
+  *pmaskHash = NULL;
+
+  if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
+  plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
+  pss = d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen);
+
+  if (!pss) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  *pmaskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
+
+  return pss;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
+                               X509_ALGOR *maskHash, int indent) {
+  int rv = 0;
+
+  if (!pss) {
+    if (BIO_puts(bp, " (INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0 ||
+      !BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128) ||
+      BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (pss->hashAlgorithm) {
+    if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0 ||
+      !BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128) ||
+      BIO_puts(bp, "Mask Algorithm: ") <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
+    if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0 ||
+        BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (maskHash) {
+      if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+  if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128) ||
+      BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (pss->saltLength) {
+    if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+  if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128) ||
+      BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (pss->trailerField) {
+    if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
+
+  rv = 1;
+
+err:
+  return rv;
+}
+
+static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
+                         const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx) {
+  if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == NID_rsassaPss) {
+    int rv;
+    RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+    X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
+
+    pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
+    rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, pss, maskHash, indent);
+    RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
+    if (!rv) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (sig) {
+    return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int old_rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t **pder,
+                               int derlen) {
+  RSA *rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen);
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int old_rsa_priv_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, uint8_t **pder) {
+  return i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, pder);
+}
+
+/* allocate and set algorithm ID from EVP_MD, default SHA1 */
+static int rsa_md_to_algor(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *md) {
+  if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_sha1) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  *palg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+  if (!*palg) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  X509_ALGOR_set_md(*palg, md);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* Allocate and set MGF1 algorithm ID from EVP_MD */
+static int rsa_md_to_mgf1(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) {
+  X509_ALGOR *algtmp = NULL;
+  ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL;
+  *palg = NULL;
+
+  if (EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) == NID_sha1) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  /* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */
+  if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&algtmp, mgf1md) ||
+      !ASN1_item_pack(algtmp, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), &stmp)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  *palg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+  if (!*palg) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  X509_ALGOR_set0(*palg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_mgf1), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, stmp);
+  stmp = NULL;
+
+err:
+  ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
+  X509_ALGOR_free(algtmp);
+  if (*palg) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* convert algorithm ID to EVP_MD, default SHA1 */
+static const EVP_MD *rsa_algor_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg) {
+  const EVP_MD *md;
+  if (!alg) {
+    return EVP_sha1();
+  }
+  md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(alg->algorithm);
+  if (md == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+  }
+  return md;
+}
+
+/* convert MGF1 algorithm ID to EVP_MD, default SHA1 */
+static const EVP_MD *rsa_mgf1_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, X509_ALGOR *maskHash) {
+  const EVP_MD *md;
+  if (!alg) {
+    return EVP_sha1();
+  }
+  /* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */
+  if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (!maskHash) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm);
+  if (md == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return md;
+}
+
+/* rsa_ctx_to_pss converts EVP_PKEY_CTX in PSS mode into corresponding
+ * algorithm parameter, suitable for setting as an AlgorithmIdentifier. */
+static ASN1_STRING *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx) {
+  const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
+  RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = NULL;
+  ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
+  int saltlen, rv = 0;
+
+  if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &sigmd) ||
+      !EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) ||
+      !EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (saltlen == -1) {
+    saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd);
+  } else if (saltlen == -2) {
+    saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
+    if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0) {
+      saltlen--;
+    }
+  } else {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new();
+  if (!pss) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (saltlen != 20) {
+    pss->saltLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+    if (!pss->saltLength ||
+        !ASN1_INTEGER_set(pss->saltLength, saltlen)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd) ||
+      !rsa_md_to_mgf1(&pss->maskGenAlgorithm, mgf1md)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Finally create string with pss parameter encoding. */
+  if (!ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), &os)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  rv = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (pss) {
+    RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+  }
+  if (rv) {
+    return os;
+  }
+  if (os) {
+    ASN1_STRING_free(os);
+  }
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/* From PSS AlgorithmIdentifier set public key parameters. */
+static int rsa_pss_to_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR *sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  int ret = 0;
+  int saltlen;
+  const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
+  RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+  X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
+  EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
+
+  /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
+  if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  /* Decode PSS parameters */
+  pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
+  if (pss == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  mgf1md = rsa_mgf1_to_md(pss->maskGenAlgorithm, maskHash);
+  if (!mgf1md) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  md = rsa_algor_to_md(pss->hashAlgorithm);
+  if (!md) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  saltlen = 20;
+  if (pss->saltLength) {
+    saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
+
+    /* Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main
+     * RSA routines will trap other invalid values anyway. */
+    if (saltlen < 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1)
+   * and PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway. */
+  if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey) ||
+      !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
+      !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) ||
+      !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
+  if (maskHash) {
+    X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* Customised RSA AlgorithmIdentifier handling. This is called when a signature
+ * is encountered requiring special handling. We currently only handle PSS. */
+static int rsa_digest_verify_init_from_algorithm(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
+                                                 EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  /* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
+  if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, sigalg, pkey);
+}
+
+static evp_digest_sign_algorithm_result_t rsa_digest_sign_algorithm(
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR *sigalg) {
+  int pad_mode;
+  EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = ctx->pctx;
+  if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode)) {
+    return EVP_DIGEST_SIGN_ALGORITHM_ERROR;
+  }
+  if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+    ASN1_STRING *os1 = rsa_ctx_to_pss(pkctx);
+    if (!os1) {
+      return EVP_DIGEST_SIGN_ALGORITHM_ERROR;
+    }
+    X509_ALGOR_set0(sigalg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1);
+    return EVP_DIGEST_SIGN_ALGORITHM_SUCCESS;
+  }
+
+  /* Other padding schemes use the default behavior. */
+  return EVP_DIGEST_SIGN_ALGORITHM_DEFAULT;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meth = {
+  EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+  EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+  ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL,
+
+  "RSA",
+
+  rsa_pub_decode,
+  rsa_pub_encode,
+  rsa_pub_cmp,
+  rsa_pub_print,
+
+  rsa_priv_decode,
+  rsa_priv_encode,
+  rsa_priv_print,
+
+  rsa_opaque,
+  rsa_supports_digest,
+
+  int_rsa_size,
+  rsa_bits,
+
+  0,0,0,0,0,0,
+
+  rsa_sig_print,
+  int_rsa_free,
+
+  old_rsa_priv_decode,
+  old_rsa_priv_encode,
+
+  rsa_digest_verify_init_from_algorithm,
+  rsa_digest_sign_algorithm,
+};