grpc-z 1.11.1

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/ssl_buffer.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+// BIO uses int instead of size_t. No lengths will exceed uint16_t, so this will
+// not overflow.
+static_assert(0xffff <= INT_MAX, "uint16_t does not fit in int");
+
+static_assert((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1)) == 0,
+              "SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD must be a power of 2");
+
+void SSLBuffer::Clear() {
+  free(buf_);  // Allocated with malloc().
+  buf_ = nullptr;
+  offset_ = 0;
+  size_ = 0;
+  cap_ = 0;
+}
+
+bool SSLBuffer::EnsureCap(size_t header_len, size_t new_cap) {
+  if (new_cap > 0xffff) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (cap_ >= new_cap) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Add up to |SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD| - 1 bytes of slack for alignment.
+  //
+  // Since this buffer gets allocated quite frequently and doesn't contain any
+  // sensitive data, we allocate with malloc rather than |OPENSSL_malloc| and
+  // avoid zeroing on free.
+  uint8_t *new_buf = (uint8_t *)malloc(new_cap + SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+  if (new_buf == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Offset the buffer such that the record body is aligned.
+  size_t new_offset =
+      (0 - header_len - (uintptr_t)new_buf) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+
+  if (buf_ != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(new_buf + new_offset, buf_ + offset_, size_);
+    free(buf_);  // Allocated with malloc().
+  }
+
+  buf_ = new_buf;
+  offset_ = new_offset;
+  cap_ = new_cap;
+  return true;
+}
+
+void SSLBuffer::DidWrite(size_t new_size) {
+  if (new_size > cap() - size()) {
+    abort();
+  }
+  size_ += new_size;
+}
+
+void SSLBuffer::Consume(size_t len) {
+  if (len > size_) {
+    abort();
+  }
+  offset_ += (uint16_t)len;
+  size_ -= (uint16_t)len;
+  cap_ -= (uint16_t)len;
+}
+
+void SSLBuffer::DiscardConsumed() {
+  if (size_ == 0) {
+    Clear();
+  }
+}
+
+static int dtls_read_buffer_next_packet(SSL *ssl) {
+  SSLBuffer *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
+
+  if (!buf->empty()) {
+    // It is an error to call |dtls_read_buffer_extend| when the read buffer is
+    // not empty.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // Read a single packet from |ssl->rbio|. |buf->cap()| must fit in an int.
+  int ret = BIO_read(ssl->rbio, buf->data(), static_cast<int>(buf->cap()));
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+    return ret;
+  }
+  buf->DidWrite(static_cast<size_t>(ret));
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls_read_buffer_extend_to(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
+  SSLBuffer *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
+
+  if (len > buf->cap()) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // Read until the target length is reached.
+  while (buf->size() < len) {
+    // The amount of data to read is bounded by |buf->cap|, which must fit in an
+    // int.
+    int ret = BIO_read(ssl->rbio, buf->data() + buf->size(),
+                       static_cast<int>(len - buf->size()));
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+      return ret;
+    }
+    buf->DidWrite(static_cast<size_t>(ret));
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
+  // |ssl_read_buffer_extend_to| implicitly discards any consumed data.
+  ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed();
+
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    static_assert(
+        DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH <= 0xffff,
+        "DTLS read buffer is too large");
+
+    // The |len| parameter is ignored in DTLS.
+    len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl->s3->read_buffer.EnsureCap(ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl), len)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->rbio == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  int ret;
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    // |len| is ignored for a datagram transport.
+    ret = dtls_read_buffer_next_packet(ssl);
+  } else {
+    ret = tls_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, len);
+  }
+
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    // If the buffer was empty originally and remained empty after attempting to
+    // extend it, release the buffer until the next attempt.
+    ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed();
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl_handle_open_record(SSL *ssl, bool *out_retry, ssl_open_record_t ret,
+                           size_t consumed, uint8_t alert) {
+  *out_retry = false;
+  if (ret != ssl_open_record_partial) {
+    ssl->s3->read_buffer.Consume(consumed);
+  }
+  if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
+    // Nothing was returned to the caller, so discard anything marked consumed.
+    ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed();
+  }
+  switch (ret) {
+    case ssl_open_record_success:
+      return 1;
+
+    case ssl_open_record_partial: {
+      int read_ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, consumed);
+      if (read_ret <= 0) {
+        return read_ret;
+      }
+      *out_retry = true;
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+    case ssl_open_record_discard:
+      *out_retry = true;
+      return 1;
+
+    case ssl_open_record_close_notify:
+      return 0;
+
+    case ssl_open_record_error:
+      if (alert != 0) {
+        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      }
+      return -1;
+  }
+  assert(0);
+  return -1;
+}
+
+
+static_assert(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH * 2 +
+                      SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD * 2 +
+                      SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH <=
+                  0xffff,
+              "maximum TLS write buffer is too large");
+
+static_assert(DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD +
+                      SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH <=
+                  0xffff,
+              "maximum DTLS write buffer is too large");
+
+static int tls_write_buffer_flush(SSL *ssl) {
+  SSLBuffer *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
+
+  while (!buf->empty()) {
+    int ret = BIO_write(ssl->wbio, buf->data(), buf->size());
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+      return ret;
+    }
+    buf->Consume(static_cast<size_t>(ret));
+  }
+  buf->Clear();
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int dtls_write_buffer_flush(SSL *ssl) {
+  SSLBuffer *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
+  if (buf->empty()) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  int ret = BIO_write(ssl->wbio, buf->data(), buf->size());
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+    // If the write failed, drop the write buffer anyway. Datagram transports
+    // can't write half a packet, so the caller is expected to retry from the
+    // top.
+    buf->Clear();
+    return ret;
+  }
+  buf->Clear();
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_write_buffer_flush(SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->wbio == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    return dtls_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
+  } else {
+    return tls_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
+  }
+}
+
+}  // namespace bssl

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/ssl_cert.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,913 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method) {
+  CERT *ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+  ret->x509_method = x509_method;
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer_up_ref(CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer) {
+  CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buffer);
+  return buffer;
+}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) {
+  CERT *ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+  ret->chain = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_deep_copy(cert->chain, buffer_up_ref,
+                                          CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+
+  if (cert->privatekey != NULL) {
+    EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cert->privatekey);
+    ret->privatekey = cert->privatekey;
+  }
+
+  ret->key_method = cert->key_method;
+  ret->x509_method = cert->x509_method;
+
+  if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) {
+    ret->sigalgs = (uint16_t *)BUF_memdup(
+        cert->sigalgs, cert->num_sigalgs * sizeof(cert->sigalgs[0]));
+    if (ret->sigalgs == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  ret->num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs;
+
+  ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
+  ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
+
+  ret->x509_method->cert_dup(ret, cert);
+
+  if (cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL) {
+    CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+    ret->signed_cert_timestamp_list = cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list;
+  }
+
+  if (cert->ocsp_response != NULL) {
+    CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(cert->ocsp_response);
+    ret->ocsp_response = cert->ocsp_response;
+  }
+
+  ret->sid_ctx_length = cert->sid_ctx_length;
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->sid_ctx, cert->sid_ctx, sizeof(ret->sid_ctx));
+
+  ret->enable_early_data = cert->enable_early_data;
+
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  ssl_cert_free(ret);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+// Free up and clear all certificates and chains
+void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *cert) {
+  if (cert == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  cert->x509_method->cert_clear(cert);
+
+  sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(cert->chain, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+  cert->chain = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey);
+  cert->privatekey = NULL;
+  cert->key_method = NULL;
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *cert) {
+  if (cert == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  ssl_cert_clear_certs(cert);
+  cert->x509_method->cert_free(cert);
+  OPENSSL_free(cert->sigalgs);
+  CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+  CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->ocsp_response);
+
+  OPENSSL_free(cert);
+}
+
+static void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *cert, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg),
+                                 void *arg) {
+  cert->cert_cb = cb;
+  cert->cert_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+enum leaf_cert_and_privkey_result_t {
+  leaf_cert_and_privkey_error,
+  leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok,
+  leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch,
+};
+
+// check_leaf_cert_and_privkey checks whether the certificate in |leaf_buffer|
+// and the private key in |privkey| are suitable and coherent. It returns
+// |leaf_cert_and_privkey_error| and pushes to the error queue if a problem is
+// found. If the certificate and private key are valid, but incoherent, it
+// returns |leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch|. Otherwise it returns
+// |leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok|.
+static enum leaf_cert_and_privkey_result_t check_leaf_cert_and_privkey(
+    CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf_buffer, EVP_PKEY *privkey) {
+  CBS cert_cbs;
+  CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(leaf_buffer, &cert_cbs);
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&cert_cbs);
+  if (!pubkey) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return leaf_cert_and_privkey_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_is_key_type_supported(pubkey->type)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+    return leaf_cert_and_privkey_error;
+  }
+
+  // An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH or ECDSA. We only support ECDSA
+  // certificates, so sanity-check the key usage extension.
+  if (pubkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
+      !ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&cert_cbs)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+    return leaf_cert_and_privkey_error;
+  }
+
+  if (privkey != NULL &&
+      // Sanity-check that the private key and the certificate match.
+      !ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(pubkey.get(), privkey)) {
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    return leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch;
+  }
+
+  return leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok;
+}
+
+static int cert_set_chain_and_key(
+    CERT *cert, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs, size_t num_certs,
+    EVP_PKEY *privkey, const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method) {
+  if (num_certs == 0 ||
+      (privkey == NULL && privkey_method == NULL)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (privkey != NULL && privkey_method != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_HAVE_BOTH_PRIVKEY_AND_METHOD);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  switch (check_leaf_cert_and_privkey(certs[0], privkey)) {
+    case leaf_cert_and_privkey_error:
+      return 0;
+    case leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_AND_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH);
+      return 0;
+    case leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok:
+      break;
+  }
+
+  STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *certs_sk = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+  if (certs_sk == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_certs; i++) {
+    if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(certs_sk, certs[i])) {
+      sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(certs_sk, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(certs[i]);
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey);
+  cert->privatekey = privkey;
+  if (privkey != NULL) {
+    EVP_PKEY_up_ref(privkey);
+  }
+  cert->key_method = privkey_method;
+
+  sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(cert->chain, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+  cert->chain = certs_sk;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_set_cert(CERT *cert, UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer) {
+  switch (check_leaf_cert_and_privkey(buffer.get(), cert->privatekey)) {
+    case leaf_cert_and_privkey_error:
+      return 0;
+    case leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch:
+      // don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private key
+      // (when switching to a different cert & key, first this function should
+      // be used, then |ssl_set_pkey|.
+      EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey);
+      cert->privatekey = NULL;
+      break;
+    case leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok:
+      break;
+  }
+
+  cert->x509_method->cert_flush_cached_leaf(cert);
+
+  if (cert->chain != NULL) {
+    CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0));
+    sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_set(cert->chain, 0, buffer.release());
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  cert->chain = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+  if (cert->chain == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!PushToStack(cert->chain, std::move(buffer))) {
+    sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->chain);
+    cert->chain = NULL;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_has_certificate(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl->cert->chain != NULL &&
+         sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(ssl->cert->chain, 0) != NULL &&
+         ssl_has_private_key(ssl);
+}
+
+bool ssl_parse_cert_chain(uint8_t *out_alert,
+                          UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> *out_chain,
+                          UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> *out_pubkey,
+                          uint8_t *out_leaf_sha256, CBS *cbs,
+                          CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
+  out_chain->reset();
+  out_pubkey->reset();
+
+  CBS certificate_list;
+  if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(cbs, &certificate_list)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(&certificate_list) == 0) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> chain(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null());
+  if (!chain) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pubkey;
+  while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
+    CBS certificate;
+    if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate) ||
+        CBS_len(&certificate) == 0) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(chain.get()) == 0) {
+      pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&certificate);
+      if (!pubkey) {
+        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return false;
+      }
+
+      // Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested.
+      if (out_leaf_sha256 != NULL) {
+        SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate), out_leaf_sha256);
+      }
+    }
+
+    UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf(
+        CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&certificate, pool));
+    if (!buf ||
+        !PushToStack(chain.get(), std::move(buf))) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *out_chain = std::move(chain);
+  *out_pubkey = std::move(pubkey);
+  return true;
+}
+
+int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
+  if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+    return CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0);
+  }
+
+  CBB certs;
+  if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &certs)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *chain = ssl->cert->chain;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(chain); i++) {
+    CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(chain, i);
+    CBB child;
+    if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certs, &child) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer),
+                       CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer)) ||
+        !CBB_flush(&certs)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return CBB_flush(cbb);
+}
+
+// ssl_cert_skip_to_spki parses a DER-encoded, X.509 certificate from |in| and
+// positions |*out_tbs_cert| to cover the TBSCertificate, starting at the
+// subjectPublicKeyInfo.
+static int ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(const CBS *in, CBS *out_tbs_cert) {
+  /* From RFC 5280, section 4.1
+   *    Certificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
+   *      tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate,
+   *      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
+   *      signatureValue       BIT STRING  }
+
+   * TBSCertificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
+   *      version         [0]  EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
+   *      serialNumber         CertificateSerialNumber,
+   *      signature            AlgorithmIdentifier,
+   *      issuer               Name,
+   *      validity             Validity,
+   *      subject              Name,
+   *      subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
+   *      ... } */
+  CBS buf = *in;
+
+  CBS toplevel;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&buf, &toplevel, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      CBS_len(&buf) != 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1(&toplevel, out_tbs_cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      // version
+      !CBS_get_optional_asn1(
+          out_tbs_cert, NULL, NULL,
+          CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) ||
+      // serialNumber
+      !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
+      // signature algorithm
+      !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      // issuer
+      !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      // validity
+      !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      // subject
+      !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(const CBS *in) {
+  CBS buf = *in, tbs_cert;
+  if (!ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(&buf, &tbs_cert)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  return UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY>(EVP_parse_public_key(&tbs_cert));
+}
+
+int ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *pubkey,
+                                       const EVP_PKEY *privkey) {
+  if (EVP_PKEY_is_opaque(privkey)) {
+    // We cannot check an opaque private key and have to trust that it
+    // matches.
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  switch (EVP_PKEY_cmp(pubkey, privkey)) {
+    case 1:
+      ret = 1;
+      break;
+    case 0:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
+      break;
+    case -1:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+      break;
+    case -2:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+      break;
+    default:
+      assert(0);
+      break;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_check_private_key(const CERT *cert, const EVP_PKEY *privkey) {
+  if (privkey == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (cert->chain == NULL ||
+      sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0) == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  CBS cert_cbs;
+  CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0), &cert_cbs);
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&cert_cbs);
+  if (!pubkey) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(pubkey.get(), privkey);
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(const CBS *in) {
+  CBS buf = *in;
+
+  CBS tbs_cert, outer_extensions;
+  int has_extensions;
+  if (!ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(&buf, &tbs_cert) ||
+      // subjectPublicKeyInfo
+      !CBS_get_asn1(&tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      // issuerUniqueID
+      !CBS_get_optional_asn1(
+          &tbs_cert, NULL, NULL,
+          CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1) ||
+      // subjectUniqueID
+      !CBS_get_optional_asn1(
+          &tbs_cert, NULL, NULL,
+          CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2) ||
+      !CBS_get_optional_asn1(
+          &tbs_cert, &outer_extensions, &has_extensions,
+          CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 3)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!has_extensions) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBS extensions;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&outer_extensions, &extensions, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) {
+    CBS extension, oid, contents;
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&extensions, &extension, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&extension, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+        (CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&extension, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) &&
+         !CBS_get_asn1(&extension, NULL, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&extension, &contents, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    static const uint8_t kKeyUsageOID[3] = {0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f};
+    if (CBS_len(&oid) != sizeof(kKeyUsageOID) ||
+        OPENSSL_memcmp(CBS_data(&oid), kKeyUsageOID, sizeof(kKeyUsageOID)) !=
+            0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    CBS bit_string;
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &bit_string, CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING) ||
+        CBS_len(&contents) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    // This is the KeyUsage extension. See
+    // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
+    if (!CBS_is_valid_asn1_bitstring(&bit_string)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!CBS_asn1_bitstring_has_bit(&bit_string, 0)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // No KeyUsage extension found.
+  return 1;
+}
+
+UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> ssl_parse_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl,
+                                                            uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                            CBS *cbs) {
+  CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *const pool = ssl->ctx->pool;
+
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> ret(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null());
+  if (!ret) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  CBS child;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &child)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) {
+    CBS distinguished_name;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &distinguished_name)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer(
+        CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&distinguished_name, pool));
+    if (!buffer ||
+        !PushToStack(ret.get(), std::move(buffer))) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->check_client_CA_list(ret.get())) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+bool ssl_has_client_CAs(SSL *ssl) {
+  STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names = ssl->client_CA;
+  if (names == NULL) {
+    names = ssl->ctx->client_CA;
+  }
+  if (names == NULL) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(names) > 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_add_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
+  CBB child, name_cbb;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names = ssl->client_CA;
+  if (names == NULL) {
+    names = ssl->ctx->client_CA;
+  }
+  if (names == NULL) {
+    return CBB_flush(cbb);
+  }
+
+  for (const CRYPTO_BUFFER *name : names) {
+    if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &name_cbb) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&name_cbb, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(name),
+                       CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(name))) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return CBB_flush(cbb);
+}
+
+int ssl_check_leaf_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                               const CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  assert(ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION);
+
+  // Check the certificate's type matches the cipher.
+  if (!(hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth & ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(pkey))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Check key usages for all key types but RSA. This is needed to distinguish
+  // ECDH certificates, which we do not support, from ECDSA certificates. In
+  // principle, we should check RSA key usages based on cipher, but this breaks
+  // buggy antivirus deployments. Other key types are always used for signing.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): Get more recent data on RSA key usages.
+  if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+    CBS leaf_cbs;
+    CBS_init(&leaf_cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(leaf), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(leaf));
+    if (!ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&leaf_cbs)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+    // Check the key's group and point format are acceptable.
+    EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+    uint16_t group_id;
+    if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id(
+            &group_id, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key))) ||
+        !tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id) ||
+        EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec_key) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_on_certificate_selected(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+    // Nothing to do.
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_auto_chain_if_needed(ssl)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  CBS leaf;
+  CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(ssl->cert->chain, 0), &leaf);
+
+  hs->local_pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&leaf);
+  return hs->local_pubkey != NULL;
+}
+
+}  // namespace bssl
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+int SSL_set_chain_and_key(SSL *ssl, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs,
+                          size_t num_certs, EVP_PKEY *privkey,
+                          const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method) {
+  return cert_set_chain_and_key(ssl->cert, certs, num_certs, privkey,
+                                privkey_method);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_chain_and_key(SSL_CTX *ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs,
+                              size_t num_certs, EVP_PKEY *privkey,
+                              const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method) {
+  return cert_set_chain_and_key(ctx->cert, certs, num_certs, privkey,
+                                privkey_method);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t der_len,
+                                 const uint8_t *der) {
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(der, der_len, NULL));
+  if (!buffer) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, std::move(buffer));
+}
+
+int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len) {
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(der, der_len, NULL));
+  if (!buffer) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert, std::move(buffer));
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg),
+                         void *arg) {
+  ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ctx->cert, cb, arg);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) {
+  ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ssl->cert, cb, arg);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *SSL_get0_peer_certificates(const SSL *ssl) {
+  SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  if (session == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return session->certs;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *SSL_get0_server_requested_CAs(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return ssl->s3->hs->ca_names.get();
+}
+
+static int set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(CERT *cert, const uint8_t *list,
+                                           size_t list_len) {
+  CBS sct_list;
+  CBS_init(&sct_list, list, list_len);
+  if (!ssl_is_sct_list_valid(&sct_list)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SCT_LIST);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+  cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list =
+      CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(CBS_data(&sct_list), CBS_len(&sct_list), NULL);
+  return cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *list,
+                                           size_t list_len) {
+  return set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(ctx->cert, list, list_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *list,
+                                       size_t list_len) {
+  return set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(ssl->cert, list, list_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *response,
+                              size_t response_len) {
+  CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ctx->cert->ocsp_response);
+  ctx->cert->ocsp_response = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(response, response_len, NULL);
+  return ctx->cert->ocsp_response != NULL;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ocsp_response(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *response,
+                          size_t response_len) {
+  CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ssl->cert->ocsp_response);
+  ssl->cert->ocsp_response = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(response, response_len, NULL);
+  return ssl->cert->ocsp_response != NULL;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set0_client_CAs(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *name_list) {
+  ctx->x509_method->ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA(ctx);
+  sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ctx->client_CA, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+  ctx->client_CA = name_list;
+}
+
+void SSL_set0_client_CAs(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *name_list) {
+  ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_flush_cached_client_CA(ssl);
+  sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ssl->client_CA, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+  ssl->client_CA = name_list;
+}