grpc-z 1.11.1

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c

@@ -0,0 +1,866 @@
+/* v3_purp.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2001.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
+#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
+        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
+        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
+#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
+        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
+
+static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
+
+static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
+static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca);
+static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca);
+static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                       int ca);
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca);
+static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                       int ca);
+static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                  int ca);
+static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                        int ca);
+static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b);
+static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
+
+static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
+    {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0,
+     check_purpose_ssl_client, (char *)"SSL client", (char *)"sslclient",
+     NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
+     check_purpose_ssl_server, (char *)"SSL server", (char *)"sslserver",
+     NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
+     check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, (char *)"Netscape SSL server",
+     (char *)"nssslserver", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign,
+     (char *)"S/MIME signing", (char *)"smimesign", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0,
+     check_purpose_smime_encrypt, (char *)"S/MIME encryption",
+     (char *)"smimeencrypt", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign,
+     (char *)"CRL signing", (char *)"crlsign", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, (char *)"Any Purpose",
+     (char *)"any", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper,
+     (char *)"OCSP helper", (char *)"ocsphelper", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0,
+     check_purpose_timestamp_sign, (char *)"Time Stamp signing",
+     (char *)"timestampsign", NULL},
+};
+
+#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
+
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b)
+{
+    return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
+}
+
+/*
+ * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I
+ * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
+ * things.
+ */
+int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
+{
+    int idx;
+    const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
+    x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+    if (id == -1)
+        return 1;
+    idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
+    if (idx == -1)
+        return -1;
+    pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+    return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
+{
+    if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *p = purpose;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
+{
+    if (!xptable)
+        return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+    return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+}
+
+X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
+{
+    if (idx < 0)
+        return NULL;
+    if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT)
+        return xstandard + idx;
+    return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
+{
+    int i;
+    X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
+    for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
+        xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
+        if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname))
+            return i;
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
+{
+    X509_PURPOSE tmp;
+    size_t idx;
+
+    if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
+        return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
+    tmp.purpose = purpose;
+    if (!xptable)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &idx, &tmp))
+        return -1;
+    return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
+                     int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
+                     char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
+{
+    int idx;
+    X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+    char *name_dup, *sname_dup;
+
+    /*
+     * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
+     */
+    flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+    /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
+    flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
+    /* Get existing entry if any */
+    idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
+    /* Need a new entry */
+    if (idx == -1) {
+        if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+    } else
+        ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+
+    /* Duplicate the supplied names. */
+    name_dup = BUF_strdup(name);
+    sname_dup = BUF_strdup(sname);
+    if (name_dup == NULL || sname_dup == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        if (name_dup != NULL)
+            OPENSSL_free(name_dup);
+        if (sname_dup != NULL)
+            OPENSSL_free(sname_dup);
+        if (idx == -1)
+            OPENSSL_free(ptmp);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
+    if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
+        OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
+        OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
+    }
+    /* dup supplied name */
+    ptmp->name = name_dup;
+    ptmp->sname = sname_dup;
+    /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
+    ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+    /* Set all other flags */
+    ptmp->flags |= flags;
+
+    ptmp->purpose = id;
+    ptmp->trust = trust;
+    ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
+    ptmp->usr_data = arg;
+
+    /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
+    if (idx == -1) {
+        if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            xptable_free(ptmp);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            xptable_free(ptmp);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
+{
+    if (!p)
+        return;
+    if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) {
+        if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
+            OPENSSL_free(p->name);
+            OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(p);
+    }
+}
+
+void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
+    for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++)
+        xptable_free(xstandard + i);
+    xptable = NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+    return xp->purpose;
+}
+
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+    return xp->name;
+}
+
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+    return xp->sname;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+    return xp->trust;
+}
+
+static int nid_cmp(const void *void_a, const void *void_b)
+{
+    const int *a = void_a, *b = void_b;
+
+    return *a - *b;
+}
+
+int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
+{
+    /*
+     * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is
+     * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is
+     * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will
+     * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical
+     * order because it will be searched using bsearch.
+     */
+
+    static const int supported_nids[] = {
+        NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
+        NID_key_usage,          /* 83 */
+        NID_subject_alt_name,   /* 85 */
+        NID_basic_constraints,  /* 87 */
+        NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
+        NID_ext_key_usage,      /* 126 */
+        NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
+        NID_proxyCertInfo,      /* 663 */
+        NID_name_constraints,   /* 666 */
+        NID_policy_mappings,    /* 747 */
+        NID_inhibit_any_policy  /* 748 */
+    };
+
+    int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
+
+    if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (bsearch
+        (&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int),
+         sizeof(int), nid_cmp) != NULL)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
+{
+    X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
+    size_t i;
+    if (dp->reasons) {
+        if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
+            dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
+        if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
+            dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
+        dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+    } else
+        dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+    if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
+        return;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
+        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+        if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
+            iname = gen->d.directoryName;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!iname)
+        iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+
+    DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
+
+}
+
+static void setup_crldp(X509 *x)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
+        setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
+}
+
+static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
+{
+    BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
+    PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
+    EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+    size_t i;
+    int j;
+
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&x->lock);
+    const int is_set = x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET;
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&x->lock);
+
+    if (is_set) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&x->lock);
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
+        CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
+    /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
+    if (!X509_get_version(x))
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
+    /* Handle basic constraints */
+    if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
+        if (bs->ca)
+            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
+        if (bs->pathlen) {
+            if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
+                || !bs->ca) {
+                x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+                x->ex_pathlen = 0;
+            } else
+                x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
+        } else
+            x->ex_pathlen = -1;
+        BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
+    }
+    /* Handle proxy certificates */
+    if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
+        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
+            || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
+            || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
+            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+        }
+        if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
+            x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
+        } else
+            x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
+        PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
+    }
+    /* Handle key usage */
+    if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
+        if (usage->length > 0) {
+            x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
+            if (usage->length > 1)
+                x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
+        } else
+            x->ex_kusage = 0;
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
+        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
+    }
+    x->ex_xkusage = 0;
+    if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
+            switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
+            case NID_server_auth:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_client_auth:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_email_protect:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_code_sign:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_ms_sgc:
+            case NID_ns_sgc:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_OCSP_sign:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_time_stamp:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_dvcs:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
+                break;
+
+            case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
+                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+    }
+
+    if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
+        if (ns->length > 0)
+            x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
+        else
+            x->ex_nscert = 0;
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
+        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
+    }
+    x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
+    x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
+    /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
+    if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
+        /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */
+        if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
+            !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
+            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
+    }
+    x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+    x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL);
+    if (!x->nc && (j != -1))
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+    setup_crldp(x);
+
+    for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++) {
+        ex = X509_get_ext(x, j);
+        if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
+            == NID_freshest_crl)
+            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
+        if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
+            continue;
+        if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) {
+            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * CA checks common to all purposes return codes: 0 not a CA 1 is a CA 2
+ * basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA 3 basicConstraints absent but self
+ * signed V1. 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign
+ * asserted.
+ */
+
+static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
+{
+    /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
+        return 0;
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
+        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
+            return 1;
+        /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
+        else
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        /* we support V1 roots for...  uh, I don't really know why. */
+        if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT)
+            return 3;
+        /*
+         * If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it
+         */
+        else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
+            return 4;
+        /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
+        else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA)
+            return 5;
+        /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate?  I doubt it */
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
+{
+    x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+    return check_ca(x);
+}
+
+/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
+static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
+{
+    int ca_ret;
+    ca_ret = check_ca(x);
+    if (!ca_ret)
+        return 0;
+    /* check nsCertType if present */
+    if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA)
+        return ca_ret;
+    else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca)
+{
+    if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT))
+        return 0;
+    if (ca)
+        return check_ssl_ca(x);
+    /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
+        return 0;
+    /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
+    if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
+ * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
+ * key types.
+ */
+#define KU_TLS \
+        (KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)
+
+static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca)
+{
+    if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC))
+        return 0;
+    if (ca)
+        return check_ssl_ca(x);
+
+    if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER))
+        return 0;
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                       int ca)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
+    if (!ret || ca)
+        return ret;
+    /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
+        return 0;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* common S/MIME checks */
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+    if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME))
+        return 0;
+    if (ca) {
+        int ca_ret;
+        ca_ret = check_ca(x);
+        if (!ca_ret)
+            return 0;
+        /* check nsCertType if present */
+        if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA)
+            return ca_ret;
+        else
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
+        if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME)
+            return 1;
+        /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
+        if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT)
+            return 2;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
+    if (!ret || ca)
+        return ret;
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION))
+        return 0;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                       int ca)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
+    if (!ret || ca)
+        return ret;
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
+        return 0;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                  int ca)
+{
+    if (ca) {
+        int ca_ret;
+        if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2)
+            return ca_ret;
+        else
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA
+ * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
+ */
+
+static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+    /*
+     * Must be a valid CA.  Should we really support the "I don't know" value
+     * (2)?
+     */
+    if (ca)
+        return check_ca(x);
+    /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                        int ca)
+{
+    int i_ext;
+
+    /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
+    if (ca)
+        return check_ca(x);
+
+    /*
+     * Check the optional key usage field:
+     * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
+     * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
+     * be rejected).
+     */
+    if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
+        && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
+            !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
+    if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
+    i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
+    if (i_ext >= 0) {
+        X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext);
+        if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. This can be
+ * used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which have been looked
+ * up using some simple method such as by subject name. These are: 1. Check
+ * issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) 2. If akid(subject) exists
+ * check it matches issuer 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports
+ * certificate signing returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch,
+ * reasons match codes for X509_verify_cert()
+ */
+
+int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
+{
+    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
+                      X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
+        return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
+    x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
+    x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
+
+    if (subject->akid) {
+        int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
+        if (ret != X509_V_OK)
+            return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+        if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
+            return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
+    } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
+        return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
+    return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
+{
+
+    if (!akid)
+        return X509_V_OK;
+
+    /* Check key ids (if present) */
+    if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid))
+        return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
+    /* Check serial number */
+    if (akid->serial &&
+        ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
+        return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+    /* Check issuer name */
+    if (akid->issuer) {
+        /*
+         * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF
+         * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but
+         * we only take any notice of the first.
+         */
+        GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
+        GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+        X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+        size_t i;
+        gens = akid->issuer;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+            gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+            if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
+                nm = gen->d.dirn;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
+            return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+    }
+    return X509_V_OK;
+}