grpc-z 1.11.1

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/ssl_aead_ctx.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,415 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+#define FUZZER_MODE true
+#else
+#define FUZZER_MODE false
+#endif
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+SSLAEADContext::SSLAEADContext(uint16_t version_arg, bool is_dtls_arg,
+                               const SSL_CIPHER *cipher_arg)
+    : cipher_(cipher_arg),
+      version_(version_arg),
+      is_dtls_(is_dtls_arg),
+      variable_nonce_included_in_record_(false),
+      random_variable_nonce_(false),
+      omit_length_in_ad_(false),
+      omit_version_in_ad_(false),
+      omit_ad_(false),
+      xor_fixed_nonce_(false) {
+  OPENSSL_memset(fixed_nonce_, 0, sizeof(fixed_nonce_));
+}
+
+SSLAEADContext::~SSLAEADContext() {}
+
+UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher(bool is_dtls) {
+  return MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(0 /* version */, is_dtls,
+                                    nullptr /* cipher */);
+}
+
+UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::Create(
+    enum evp_aead_direction_t direction, uint16_t version, int is_dtls,
+    const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, Span<const uint8_t> enc_key,
+    Span<const uint8_t> mac_key, Span<const uint8_t> fixed_iv) {
+  const EVP_AEAD *aead;
+  uint16_t protocol_version;
+  size_t expected_mac_key_len, expected_fixed_iv_len;
+  if (!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&protocol_version, version) ||
+      !ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &expected_mac_key_len,
+                               &expected_fixed_iv_len, cipher, protocol_version,
+                               is_dtls) ||
+      // Ensure the caller returned correct key sizes.
+      expected_fixed_iv_len != fixed_iv.size() ||
+      expected_mac_key_len != mac_key.size()) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t merged_key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+  if (!mac_key.empty()) {
+    // This is a "stateful" AEAD (for compatibility with pre-AEAD cipher
+    // suites).
+    if (mac_key.size() + enc_key.size() + fixed_iv.size() >
+        sizeof(merged_key)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key, mac_key.data(), mac_key.size());
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key + mac_key.size(), enc_key.data(), enc_key.size());
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key + mac_key.size() + enc_key.size(),
+                   fixed_iv.data(), fixed_iv.size());
+    enc_key = MakeConstSpan(merged_key,
+                            enc_key.size() + mac_key.size() + fixed_iv.size());
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx =
+      MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(version, is_dtls, cipher);
+  if (!aead_ctx) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  assert(aead_ctx->ProtocolVersion() == protocol_version);
+
+  if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+          aead_ctx->ctx_.get(), aead, enc_key.data(), enc_key.size(),
+          EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, direction)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  assert(EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) <= EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH);
+  static_assert(EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH < 256,
+                "variable_nonce_len doesn't fit in uint8_t");
+  aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = (uint8_t)EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
+  if (mac_key.empty()) {
+    assert(fixed_iv.size() <= sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_, fixed_iv.data(), fixed_iv.size());
+    aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len_ = fixed_iv.size();
+
+    if (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
+      // The fixed nonce into the actual nonce (the sequence number).
+      aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce_ = true;
+      aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = 8;
+    } else {
+      // The fixed IV is prepended to the nonce.
+      assert(fixed_iv.size() <= aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_);
+      aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ -= fixed_iv.size();
+    }
+
+    // AES-GCM uses an explicit nonce.
+    if (cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM)) {
+      aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = true;
+    }
+
+    // The TLS 1.3 construction XORs the fixed nonce into the sequence number
+    // and omits the additional data.
+    if (protocol_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+      aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce_ = true;
+      aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = 8;
+      aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = false;
+      aead_ctx->omit_ad_ = true;
+      assert(fixed_iv.size() >= aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_);
+    }
+  } else {
+    assert(protocol_version < TLS1_3_VERSION);
+    aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = true;
+    aead_ctx->random_variable_nonce_ = true;
+    aead_ctx->omit_length_in_ad_ = true;
+    aead_ctx->omit_version_in_ad_ = (protocol_version == SSL3_VERSION);
+  }
+
+  return aead_ctx;
+}
+
+void SSLAEADContext::SetVersionIfNullCipher(uint16_t version) {
+  if (is_null_cipher()) {
+    version_ = version;
+  }
+}
+
+uint16_t SSLAEADContext::ProtocolVersion() const {
+  uint16_t protocol_version;
+  if(!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&protocol_version, version_)) {
+    assert(false);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return protocol_version;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSLAEADContext::RecordVersion() const {
+  if (version_ == 0) {
+    assert(is_null_cipher());
+    return is_dtls_ ? DTLS1_VERSION : TLS1_VERSION;
+  }
+
+  if (ProtocolVersion() <= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    return version_;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_is_resumption_record_version_experiment(version_)) {
+    return TLS1_2_VERSION;
+  }
+  return TLS1_VERSION;
+}
+
+size_t SSLAEADContext::ExplicitNonceLen() const {
+  if (!FUZZER_MODE && variable_nonce_included_in_record_) {
+    return variable_nonce_len_;
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+bool SSLAEADContext::SuffixLen(size_t *out_suffix_len, const size_t in_len,
+                               const size_t extra_in_len) const {
+  if (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE) {
+    *out_suffix_len = extra_in_len;
+    return true;
+  }
+  return !!EVP_AEAD_CTX_tag_len(ctx_.get(), out_suffix_len, in_len,
+                                extra_in_len);
+}
+
+size_t SSLAEADContext::MaxOverhead() const {
+  return ExplicitNonceLen() +
+         (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE
+              ? 0
+              : EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(EVP_AEAD_CTX_aead(ctx_.get())));
+}
+
+size_t SSLAEADContext::GetAdditionalData(uint8_t out[13], uint8_t type,
+                                         uint16_t record_version,
+                                         const uint8_t seqnum[8],
+                                         size_t plaintext_len) {
+  if (omit_ad_) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out, seqnum, 8);
+  size_t len = 8;
+  out[len++] = type;
+  if (!omit_version_in_ad_) {
+    out[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>((record_version >> 8));
+    out[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>(record_version);
+  }
+  if (!omit_length_in_ad_) {
+    out[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>((plaintext_len >> 8));
+    out[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>(plaintext_len);
+  }
+  return len;
+}
+
+bool SSLAEADContext::Open(Span<uint8_t> *out, uint8_t type,
+                          uint16_t record_version, const uint8_t seqnum[8],
+                          Span<uint8_t> in) {
+  if (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE) {
+    // Handle the initial NULL cipher.
+    *out = in;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // TLS 1.2 AEADs include the length in the AD and are assumed to have fixed
+  // overhead. Otherwise the parameter is unused.
+  size_t plaintext_len = 0;
+  if (!omit_length_in_ad_) {
+    size_t overhead = MaxOverhead();
+    if (in.size() < overhead) {
+      // Publicly invalid.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+      return false;
+    }
+    plaintext_len = in.size() - overhead;
+  }
+  uint8_t ad[13];
+  size_t ad_len =
+      GetAdditionalData(ad, type, record_version, seqnum, plaintext_len);
+
+  // Assemble the nonce.
+  uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
+  size_t nonce_len = 0;
+
+  // Prepend the fixed nonce, or left-pad with zeros if XORing.
+  if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
+    nonce_len = fixed_nonce_len_ - variable_nonce_len_;
+    OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 0, nonce_len);
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, fixed_nonce_, fixed_nonce_len_);
+    nonce_len += fixed_nonce_len_;
+  }
+
+  // Add the variable nonce.
+  if (variable_nonce_included_in_record_) {
+    if (in.size() < variable_nonce_len_) {
+      // Publicly invalid.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+      return false;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce + nonce_len, in.data(), variable_nonce_len_);
+    in = in.subspan(variable_nonce_len_);
+  } else {
+    assert(variable_nonce_len_ == 8);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce + nonce_len, seqnum, variable_nonce_len_);
+  }
+  nonce_len += variable_nonce_len_;
+
+  // XOR the fixed nonce, if necessary.
+  if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
+    assert(nonce_len == fixed_nonce_len_);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < fixed_nonce_len_; i++) {
+      nonce[i] ^= fixed_nonce_[i];
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Decrypt in-place.
+  size_t len;
+  if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx_.get(), in.data(), &len, in.size(), nonce,
+                         nonce_len, in.data(), in.size(), ad, ad_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  *out = in.subspan(0, len);
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool SSLAEADContext::SealScatter(uint8_t *out_prefix, uint8_t *out,
+                                 uint8_t *out_suffix, uint8_t type,
+                                 uint16_t record_version,
+                                 const uint8_t seqnum[8], const uint8_t *in,
+                                 size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
+                                 size_t extra_in_len) {
+  const size_t prefix_len = ExplicitNonceLen();
+  size_t suffix_len;
+  if (!SuffixLen(&suffix_len, in_len, extra_in_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+    return false;
+  }
+  if ((in != out && buffers_alias(in, in_len, out, in_len)) ||
+      buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_prefix, prefix_len) ||
+      buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_suffix, suffix_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE) {
+    // Handle the initial NULL cipher.
+    OPENSSL_memmove(out, in, in_len);
+    OPENSSL_memmove(out_suffix, extra_in, extra_in_len);
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t ad[13];
+  size_t ad_len = GetAdditionalData(ad, type, record_version, seqnum, in_len);
+
+  // Assemble the nonce.
+  uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
+  size_t nonce_len = 0;
+
+  // Prepend the fixed nonce, or left-pad with zeros if XORing.
+  if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
+    nonce_len = fixed_nonce_len_ - variable_nonce_len_;
+    OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 0, nonce_len);
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, fixed_nonce_, fixed_nonce_len_);
+    nonce_len += fixed_nonce_len_;
+  }
+
+  // Select the variable nonce.
+  if (random_variable_nonce_) {
+    assert(variable_nonce_included_in_record_);
+    if (!RAND_bytes(nonce + nonce_len, variable_nonce_len_)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  } else {
+    // When sending we use the sequence number as the variable part of the
+    // nonce.
+    assert(variable_nonce_len_ == 8);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce + nonce_len, seqnum, variable_nonce_len_);
+  }
+  nonce_len += variable_nonce_len_;
+
+  // Emit the variable nonce if included in the record.
+  if (variable_nonce_included_in_record_) {
+    assert(!xor_fixed_nonce_);
+    if (buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_prefix, variable_nonce_len_)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
+      return false;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out_prefix, nonce + fixed_nonce_len_,
+                   variable_nonce_len_);
+  }
+
+  // XOR the fixed nonce, if necessary.
+  if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
+    assert(nonce_len == fixed_nonce_len_);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < fixed_nonce_len_; i++) {
+      nonce[i] ^= fixed_nonce_[i];
+    }
+  }
+
+  size_t written_suffix_len;
+  bool result = !!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal_scatter(
+      ctx_.get(), out, out_suffix, &written_suffix_len, suffix_len, nonce,
+      nonce_len, in, in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len);
+  assert(!result || written_suffix_len == suffix_len);
+  return result;
+}
+
+bool SSLAEADContext::Seal(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
+                          uint8_t type, uint16_t record_version,
+                          const uint8_t seqnum[8], const uint8_t *in,
+                          size_t in_len) {
+  const size_t prefix_len = ExplicitNonceLen();
+  size_t suffix_len;
+  if (!SuffixLen(&suffix_len, in_len, 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (in_len + prefix_len < in_len ||
+      in_len + prefix_len + suffix_len < in_len + prefix_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (in_len + prefix_len + suffix_len > max_out_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!SealScatter(out, out + prefix_len, out + prefix_len + in_len, type,
+                   record_version, seqnum, in, in_len, 0, 0)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  *out_len = prefix_len + in_len + suffix_len;
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool SSLAEADContext::GetIV(const uint8_t **out_iv, size_t *out_iv_len) const {
+  return !is_null_cipher() &&
+         EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_iv(ctx_.get(), out_iv, out_iv_len);
+}
+
+}  // namespace bssl

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/ssl_asn1.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,840 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+// Per C99, various stdint.h macros are unavailable in C++ unless some macros
+// are defined. C++11 overruled this decision, but older Android NDKs still
+// require it.
+#if !defined(__STDC_LIMIT_MACROS)
+#define __STDC_LIMIT_MACROS
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+// An SSL_SESSION is serialized as the following ASN.1 structure:
+//
+// SSLSession ::= SEQUENCE {
+//     version                     INTEGER (1),  -- session structure version
+//     sslVersion                  INTEGER,      -- protocol version number
+//     cipher                      OCTET STRING, -- two bytes long
+//     sessionID                   OCTET STRING,
+//     masterKey                   OCTET STRING,
+//     time                    [1] INTEGER, -- seconds since UNIX epoch
+//     timeout                 [2] INTEGER, -- in seconds
+//     peer                    [3] Certificate OPTIONAL,
+//     sessionIDContext        [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+//     verifyResult            [5] INTEGER OPTIONAL,  -- one of X509_V_* codes
+//     pskIdentity             [8] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+//     ticketLifetimeHint      [9] INTEGER OPTIONAL,       -- client-only
+//     ticket                  [10] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- client-only
+//     peerSHA256              [13] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+//     originalHandshakeHash   [14] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+//     signedCertTimestampList [15] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+//                                  -- contents of SCT extension
+//     ocspResponse            [16] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+//                                  -- stapled OCSP response from the server
+//     extendedMasterSecret    [17] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
+//     groupID                 [18] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+//     certChain               [19] SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL,
+//     ticketAgeAdd            [21] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+//     isServer                [22] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
+//     peerSignatureAlgorithm  [23] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+//     ticketMaxEarlyData      [24] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+//     authTimeout             [25] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- defaults to timeout
+//     earlyALPN               [26] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+// }
+//
+// Note: historically this serialization has included other optional
+// fields. Their presence is currently treated as a parse error, except for
+// hostName, which is ignored.
+//
+//     keyArg                  [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+//     hostName                [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+//     pskIdentityHint         [7] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+//     compressionMethod       [11] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+//     srpUsername             [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+//     ticketFlags             [20] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+
+static const unsigned kVersion = 1;
+
+static const unsigned kTimeTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1;
+static const unsigned kTimeoutTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2;
+static const unsigned kPeerTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 3;
+static const unsigned kSessionIDContextTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 4;
+static const unsigned kVerifyResultTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 5;
+static const unsigned kHostNameTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 6;
+static const unsigned kPSKIdentityTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 8;
+static const unsigned kTicketLifetimeHintTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 9;
+static const unsigned kTicketTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 10;
+static const unsigned kPeerSHA256Tag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 13;
+static const unsigned kOriginalHandshakeHashTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 14;
+static const unsigned kSignedCertTimestampListTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 15;
+static const unsigned kOCSPResponseTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 16;
+static const unsigned kExtendedMasterSecretTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 17;
+static const unsigned kGroupIDTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 18;
+static const unsigned kCertChainTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 19;
+static const unsigned kTicketAgeAddTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 21;
+static const unsigned kIsServerTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 22;
+static const unsigned kPeerSignatureAlgorithmTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 23;
+static const unsigned kTicketMaxEarlyDataTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 24;
+static const unsigned kAuthTimeoutTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 25;
+static const unsigned kEarlyALPNTag =
+    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 26;
+
+static int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full(const SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data,
+                                     size_t *out_len, int for_ticket) {
+  if (in == NULL || in->cipher == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB session, child, child2;
+  if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 0) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(cbb.get(), &session, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&session, kVersion) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&session, in->ssl_version) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&child, (uint16_t)(in->cipher->id & 0xffff)) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      // The session ID is irrelevant for a session ticket.
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&child, in->session_id,
+                     for_ticket ? 0 : in->session_id_length) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&child, in->master_key, in->master_key_length) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeTag) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->time) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeoutTag) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->timeout)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // The peer certificate is only serialized if the SHA-256 isn't
+  // serialized instead.
+  if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(in->certs) > 0 && !in->peer_sha256_valid) {
+    const CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(in->certs, 0);
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerTag) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer),
+                       CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer))) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Although it is OPTIONAL and usually empty, OpenSSL has
+  // historically always encoded the sid_ctx.
+  if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kSessionIDContextTag) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->sid_ctx, in->sid_ctx_length)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kVerifyResultTag) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->verify_result)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in->psk_identity) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPSKIdentityTag) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, (const uint8_t *)in->psk_identity,
+                       strlen(in->psk_identity))) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketLifetimeHintTag) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in->tlsext_tick && !for_ticket) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketTag) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->tlsext_tick, in->tlsext_ticklen)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in->peer_sha256_valid) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerSHA256Tag) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->peer_sha256, sizeof(in->peer_sha256))) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in->original_handshake_hash_len > 0) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kOriginalHandshakeHashTag) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->original_handshake_hash,
+                       in->original_handshake_hash_len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in->signed_cert_timestamp_list != nullptr) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kSignedCertTimestampListTag) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child2,
+                       CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(in->signed_cert_timestamp_list),
+                       CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(in->signed_cert_timestamp_list))) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in->ocsp_response != nullptr) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kOCSPResponseTag) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(in->ocsp_response),
+                       CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(in->ocsp_response))) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in->extended_master_secret) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kExtendedMasterSecretTag) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) ||
+        !CBB_add_u8(&child2, 0xff)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in->group_id > 0 &&
+      (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kGroupIDTag) ||
+       !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->group_id))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // The certificate chain is only serialized if the leaf's SHA-256 isn't
+  // serialized instead.
+  if (in->certs != NULL &&
+      !in->peer_sha256_valid &&
+      sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(in->certs) >= 2) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kCertChainTag)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(in->certs); i++) {
+      const CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(in->certs, i);
+      if (!CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer),
+                         CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer))) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in->ticket_age_add_valid) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketAgeAddTag) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        !CBB_add_u32(&child2, in->ticket_age_add)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!in->is_server) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kIsServerTag) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) ||
+        !CBB_add_u8(&child2, 0x00)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in->peer_signature_algorithm != 0 &&
+      (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerSignatureAlgorithmTag) ||
+       !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->peer_signature_algorithm))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in->ticket_max_early_data != 0 &&
+      (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketMaxEarlyDataTag) ||
+       !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->ticket_max_early_data))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in->timeout != in->auth_timeout &&
+      (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kAuthTimeoutTag) ||
+       !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->auth_timeout))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in->early_alpn) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kEarlyALPNTag) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, (const uint8_t *)in->early_alpn,
+                       in->early_alpn_len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_finish(cbb.get(), out_data, out_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// SSL_SESSION_parse_string gets an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
+// explicitly tagged with |tag| from |cbs| and saves it in |*out|. On
+// entry, if |*out| is not NULL, it frees the existing contents. If
+// the element was not found, it sets |*out| to NULL. It returns one
+// on success, whether or not the element was found, and zero on
+// decode error.
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_string(CBS *cbs, char **out, unsigned tag) {
+  CBS value;
+  int present;
+  if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, &present, tag)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (present) {
+    if (CBS_contains_zero_byte(&value)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    if (!CBS_strdup(&value, out)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_free(*out);
+    *out = NULL;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// SSL_SESSION_parse_string gets an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
+// explicitly tagged with |tag| from |cbs| and stows it in |*out_ptr|
+// and |*out_len|. If |*out_ptr| is not NULL, it frees the existing
+// contents. On entry, if the element was not found, it sets
+// |*out_ptr| to NULL. It returns one on success, whether or not the
+// element was found, and zero on decode error.
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(CBS *cbs, uint8_t **out_ptr,
+                                          size_t *out_len, unsigned tag) {
+  CBS value;
+  if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, NULL, tag)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!CBS_stow(&value, out_ptr, out_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_crypto_buffer(CBS *cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER **out,
+                                           unsigned tag,
+                                           CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
+  if (!CBS_peek_asn1_tag(cbs, tag)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CBS child, value;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &child, tag) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1(&child, &value, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(*out);
+  *out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&value, pool);
+  if (*out == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string parses an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING
+// explicitly tagged with |tag| of size at most |max_out|.
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string(
+    CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_len, uint8_t max_out, unsigned tag) {
+  CBS value;
+  if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, NULL, tag) ||
+      CBS_len(&value) > max_out) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out, CBS_data(&value), CBS_len(&value));
+  *out_len = (uint8_t)CBS_len(&value);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_long(CBS *cbs, long *out, unsigned tag,
+                                  long default_value) {
+  uint64_t value;
+  if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(cbs, &value, tag,
+                                    (uint64_t)default_value) ||
+      value > LONG_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *out = (long)value;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out, unsigned tag,
+                                 uint32_t default_value) {
+  uint64_t value;
+  if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(cbs, &value, tag,
+                                    (uint64_t)default_value) ||
+      value > 0xffffffff) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *out = (uint32_t)value;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int SSL_SESSION_parse_u16(CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out, unsigned tag,
+                                 uint16_t default_value) {
+  uint64_t value;
+  if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(cbs, &value, tag,
+                                    (uint64_t)default_value) ||
+      value > 0xffff) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *out = (uint16_t)value;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> SSL_SESSION_parse(CBS *cbs,
+                                         const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method,
+                                         CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> ret = ssl_session_new(x509_method);
+  if (!ret) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  CBS session;
+  uint64_t version, ssl_version;
+  uint16_t unused;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &session, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&session, &version) ||
+      version != kVersion ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&session, &ssl_version) ||
+      // Require sessions have versions valid in either TLS or DTLS. The session
+      // will not be used by the handshake if not applicable, but, for
+      // simplicity, never parse a session that does not pass
+      // |ssl_protocol_version_from_wire|.
+      ssl_version > UINT16_MAX ||
+      !ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&unused, ssl_version)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  ret->ssl_version = ssl_version;
+
+  CBS cipher;
+  uint16_t cipher_value;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &cipher, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&cipher, &cipher_value) ||
+      CBS_len(&cipher) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  ret->cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_value);
+  if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  CBS session_id, master_key;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &session_id, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1(&session, &master_key, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      CBS_len(&master_key) > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), CBS_len(&session_id));
+  ret->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->master_key, CBS_data(&master_key), CBS_len(&master_key));
+  ret->master_key_length = CBS_len(&master_key);
+
+  CBS child;
+  uint64_t timeout;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeTag) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&child, &ret->time) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeoutTag) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&child, &timeout) ||
+      timeout > UINT32_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  ret->timeout = (uint32_t)timeout;
+
+  CBS peer;
+  int has_peer;
+  if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1(&session, &peer, &has_peer, kPeerTag) ||
+      (has_peer && CBS_len(&peer) == 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  // |peer| is processed with the certificate chain.
+
+  if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string(
+          &session, ret->sid_ctx, &ret->sid_ctx_length, sizeof(ret->sid_ctx),
+          kSessionIDContextTag) ||
+      !SSL_SESSION_parse_long(&session, &ret->verify_result, kVerifyResultTag,
+                              X509_V_OK)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Skip the historical hostName field.
+  CBS unused_hostname;
+  if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1(&session, &unused_hostname, nullptr,
+                             kHostNameTag)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_string(&session, &ret->psk_identity,
+                                kPSKIdentityTag) ||
+      !SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint,
+                             kTicketLifetimeHintTag, 0) ||
+      !SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(&session, &ret->tlsext_tick,
+                                      &ret->tlsext_ticklen, kTicketTag)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&session, kPeerSHA256Tag)) {
+    CBS peer_sha256;
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerSHA256Tag) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&child, &peer_sha256, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        CBS_len(&peer_sha256) != sizeof(ret->peer_sha256) ||
+        CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->peer_sha256, CBS_data(&peer_sha256),
+                   sizeof(ret->peer_sha256));
+    ret->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
+  } else {
+    ret->peer_sha256_valid = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string(
+          &session, ret->original_handshake_hash,
+          &ret->original_handshake_hash_len,
+          sizeof(ret->original_handshake_hash), kOriginalHandshakeHashTag) ||
+      !SSL_SESSION_parse_crypto_buffer(&session,
+                                       &ret->signed_cert_timestamp_list,
+                                       kSignedCertTimestampListTag, pool) ||
+      !SSL_SESSION_parse_crypto_buffer(&session, &ret->ocsp_response,
+                                       kOCSPResponseTag, pool)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  int extended_master_secret;
+  if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_bool(&session, &extended_master_secret,
+                                  kExtendedMasterSecretTag,
+                                  0 /* default to false */)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  ret->extended_master_secret = !!extended_master_secret;
+
+  if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_u16(&session, &ret->group_id, kGroupIDTag, 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  CBS cert_chain;
+  CBS_init(&cert_chain, NULL, 0);
+  int has_cert_chain;
+  if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1(&session, &cert_chain, &has_cert_chain,
+                             kCertChainTag) ||
+      (has_cert_chain && CBS_len(&cert_chain) == 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  if (has_cert_chain && !has_peer) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  if (has_peer || has_cert_chain) {
+    ret->certs = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+    if (ret->certs == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    if (has_peer) {
+      UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&peer, pool));
+      if (!buffer ||
+          !PushToStack(ret->certs, std::move(buffer))) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return nullptr;
+      }
+    }
+
+    while (CBS_len(&cert_chain) > 0) {
+      CBS cert;
+      if (!CBS_get_any_asn1_element(&cert_chain, &cert, NULL, NULL) ||
+          CBS_len(&cert) == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+        return nullptr;
+      }
+
+      CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&cert, pool);
+      if (buffer == NULL ||
+          !sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(ret->certs, buffer)) {
+        CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return nullptr;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!x509_method->session_cache_objects(ret.get())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  CBS age_add;
+  int age_add_present;
+  if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(&session, &age_add, &age_add_present,
+                                          kTicketAgeAddTag) ||
+      (age_add_present &&
+       !CBS_get_u32(&age_add, &ret->ticket_age_add)) ||
+      CBS_len(&age_add) != 0) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  ret->ticket_age_add_valid = age_add_present;
+
+  int is_server;
+  if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_bool(&session, &is_server, kIsServerTag,
+                                  1 /* default to true */)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  /* TODO: in time we can include |is_server| for servers too, then we can
+     enforce that client and server sessions are never mixed up. */
+
+  ret->is_server = is_server;
+
+  if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_u16(&session, &ret->peer_signature_algorithm,
+                             kPeerSignatureAlgorithmTag, 0) ||
+      !SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &ret->ticket_max_early_data,
+                             kTicketMaxEarlyDataTag, 0) ||
+      !SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &ret->auth_timeout, kAuthTimeoutTag,
+                             ret->timeout) ||
+      !SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(&session, &ret->early_alpn,
+                                      &ret->early_alpn_len, kEarlyALPNTag) ||
+      CBS_len(&session) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+}  // namespace bssl
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes(const SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data,
+                         size_t *out_len) {
+  if (in->not_resumable) {
+    // If the caller has an unresumable session, e.g. if |SSL_get_session| were
+    // called on a TLS 1.3 or False Started connection, serialize with a
+    // placeholder value so it is not accidentally deserialized into a resumable
+    // one.
+    static const char kNotResumableSession[] = "NOT RESUMABLE";
+
+    *out_len = strlen(kNotResumableSession);
+    *out_data = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(kNotResumableSession, *out_len);
+    if (*out_data == NULL) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  return SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full(in, out_data, out_len, 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data,
+                                    size_t *out_len) {
+  return SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full(in, out_data, out_len, 1);
+}
+
+int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **pp) {
+  uint8_t *out;
+  size_t len;
+
+  if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes(in, &out, &len)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (len > INT_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_free(out);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (pp) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(*pp, out, len);
+    *pp += len;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(out);
+
+  return len;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                                    const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> ret =
+      SSL_SESSION_parse(&cbs, ctx->x509_method, ctx->pool);
+  if (!ret) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return ret.release();
+}