grpc-z 1.11.1

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery_inv.c

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+/* Copyright 2016 Brian Smith.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+
+
+static uint64_t bn_neg_inv_mod_r_u64(uint64_t n);
+
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 1 || BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2,
+                       BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS_VALUE_INVALID_2);
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(uint64_t) ==
+                       BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+                       BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS_DOES_NOT_MATCH_UINT64_T);
+
+// LG_LITTLE_R is log_2(r).
+#define LG_LITTLE_R (BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * BN_BITS2)
+
+uint64_t bn_mont_n0(const BIGNUM *n) {
+  // These conditions are checked by the caller, |BN_MONT_CTX_set|.
+  assert(!BN_is_zero(n));
+  assert(!BN_is_negative(n));
+  assert(BN_is_odd(n));
+
+  // r == 2**(BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * BN_BITS2) and LG_LITTLE_R == lg(r). This
+  // ensures that we can do integer division by |r| by simply ignoring
+  // |BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS| limbs. Similarly, we can calculate values modulo
+  // |r| by just looking at the lowest |BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS| limbs. This is
+  // what makes Montgomery multiplication efficient.
+  //
+  // As shown in Algorithm 1 of "Fast Prime Field Elliptic Curve Cryptography
+  // with 256 Bit Primes" by Shay Gueron and Vlad Krasnov, in the loop of a
+  // multi-limb Montgomery multiplication of |a * b (mod n)|, given the
+  // unreduced product |t == a * b|, we repeatedly calculate:
+  //
+  //    t1 := t % r         |t1| is |t|'s lowest limb (see previous paragraph).
+  //    t2 := t1*n0*n
+  //    t3 := t + t2
+  //    t := t3 / r         copy all limbs of |t3| except the lowest to |t|.
+  //
+  // In the last step, it would only make sense to ignore the lowest limb of
+  // |t3| if it were zero. The middle steps ensure that this is the case:
+  //
+  //                            t3 ==  0 (mod r)
+  //                        t + t2 ==  0 (mod r)
+  //                   t + t1*n0*n ==  0 (mod r)
+  //                       t1*n0*n == -t (mod r)
+  //                        t*n0*n == -t (mod r)
+  //                          n0*n == -1 (mod r)
+  //                            n0 == -1/n (mod r)
+  //
+  // Thus, in each iteration of the loop, we multiply by the constant factor
+  // |n0|, the negative inverse of n (mod r).
+
+  // n_mod_r = n % r. As explained above, this is done by taking the lowest
+  // |BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS| limbs of |n|.
+  uint64_t n_mod_r = n->d[0];
+#if BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2
+  if (n->top > 1) {
+    n_mod_r |= (uint64_t)n->d[1] << BN_BITS2;
+  }
+#endif
+
+  return bn_neg_inv_mod_r_u64(n_mod_r);
+}
+
+// bn_neg_inv_r_mod_n_u64 calculates the -1/n mod r; i.e. it calculates |v|
+// such that u*r - v*n == 1. |r| is the constant defined in |bn_mont_n0|. |n|
+// must be odd.
+//
+// This is derived from |xbinGCD| in Henry S. Warren, Jr.'s "Montgomery
+// Multiplication" (http://www.hackersdelight.org/MontgomeryMultiplication.pdf).
+// It is very similar to the MODULAR-INVERSE function in Stephen R. Dussé's and
+// Burton S. Kaliski Jr.'s "A Cryptographic Library for the Motorola DSP56000"
+// (http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-46877-3_21).
+//
+// This is inspired by Joppe W. Bos's "Constant Time Modular Inversion"
+// (http://www.joppebos.com/files/CTInversion.pdf) so that the inversion is
+// constant-time with respect to |n|. We assume uint64_t additions,
+// subtractions, shifts, and bitwise operations are all constant time, which
+// may be a large leap of faith on 32-bit targets. We avoid division and
+// multiplication, which tend to be the most problematic in terms of timing
+// leaks.
+//
+// Most GCD implementations return values such that |u*r + v*n == 1|, so the
+// caller would have to negate the resultant |v| for the purpose of Montgomery
+// multiplication. This implementation does the negation implicitly by doing
+// the computations as a difference instead of a sum.
+static uint64_t bn_neg_inv_mod_r_u64(uint64_t n) {
+  assert(n % 2 == 1);
+
+  // alpha == 2**(lg r - 1) == r / 2.
+  static const uint64_t alpha = UINT64_C(1) << (LG_LITTLE_R - 1);
+
+  const uint64_t beta = n;
+
+  uint64_t u = 1;
+  uint64_t v = 0;
+
+  // The invariant maintained from here on is:
+  // 2**(lg r - i) == u*2*alpha - v*beta.
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < LG_LITTLE_R; ++i) {
+#if BN_BITS2 == 64 && defined(BN_ULLONG)
+    assert((BN_ULLONG)(1) << (LG_LITTLE_R - i) ==
+           ((BN_ULLONG)u * 2 * alpha) - ((BN_ULLONG)v * beta));
+#endif
+
+    // Delete a common factor of 2 in u and v if |u| is even. Otherwise, set
+    // |u = (u + beta) / 2| and |v = (v / 2) + alpha|.
+
+    uint64_t u_is_odd = UINT64_C(0) - (u & 1);  // Either 0xff..ff or 0.
+
+    // The addition can overflow, so use Dietz's method for it.
+    //
+    // Dietz calculates (x+y)/2 by (x⊕y)>>1 + x&y. This is valid for all
+    // (unsigned) x and y, even when x+y overflows. Evidence for 32-bit values
+    // (embedded in 64 bits to so that overflow can be ignored):
+    //
+    // (declare-fun x () (_ BitVec 64))
+    // (declare-fun y () (_ BitVec 64))
+    // (assert (let (
+    //    (one (_ bv1 64))
+    //    (thirtyTwo (_ bv32 64)))
+    //    (and
+    //      (bvult x (bvshl one thirtyTwo))
+    //      (bvult y (bvshl one thirtyTwo))
+    //      (not (=
+    //        (bvadd (bvlshr (bvxor x y) one) (bvand x y))
+    //        (bvlshr (bvadd x y) one)))
+    // )))
+    // (check-sat)
+    uint64_t beta_if_u_is_odd = beta & u_is_odd;  // Either |beta| or 0.
+    u = ((u ^ beta_if_u_is_odd) >> 1) + (u & beta_if_u_is_odd);
+
+    uint64_t alpha_if_u_is_odd = alpha & u_is_odd;  // Either |alpha| or 0.
+    v = (v >> 1) + alpha_if_u_is_odd;
+  }
+
+  // The invariant now shows that u*r - v*n == 1 since r == 2 * alpha.
+#if BN_BITS2 == 64 && defined(BN_ULLONG)
+  assert(1 == ((BN_ULLONG)u * 2 * alpha) - ((BN_ULLONG)v * beta));
+#endif
+
+  return v;
+}
+
+// bn_mod_exp_base_2_vartime calculates r = 2**p (mod n). |p| must be larger
+// than log_2(n); i.e. 2**p must be larger than |n|. |n| must be positive and
+// odd.
+int bn_mod_exp_base_2_vartime(BIGNUM *r, unsigned p, const BIGNUM *n) {
+  assert(!BN_is_zero(n));
+  assert(!BN_is_negative(n));
+  assert(BN_is_odd(n));
+
+  BN_zero(r);
+
+  unsigned n_bits = BN_num_bits(n);
+  assert(n_bits != 0);
+  if (n_bits == 1) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // Set |r| to the smallest power of two larger than |n|.
+  assert(p > n_bits);
+  if (!BN_set_bit(r, n_bits)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Unconditionally reduce |r|.
+  assert(BN_cmp(r, n) > 0);
+  if (!BN_usub(r, r, n)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  assert(BN_cmp(r, n) < 0);
+
+  for (unsigned i = n_bits; i < p; ++i) {
+    // This is like |BN_mod_lshift1_quick| except using |BN_usub|.
+    //
+    // TODO: Replace this with the use of a constant-time variant of
+    // |BN_mod_lshift1_quick|.
+    if (!BN_lshift1(r, r)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    if (BN_cmp(r, n) >= 0) {
+      if (!BN_usub(r, r, n)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/mul.c

@@ -0,0 +1,902 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+
+
+#define BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL 16
+#define BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL
+
+
+static void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t na,
+                          const BN_ULONG *b, size_t nb) {
+  if (na < nb) {
+    size_t itmp = na;
+    na = nb;
+    nb = itmp;
+    const BN_ULONG *ltmp = a;
+    a = b;
+    b = ltmp;
+  }
+  BN_ULONG *rr = &(r[na]);
+  if (nb == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_memset(r, 0, na * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+    return;
+  }
+  rr[0] = bn_mul_words(r, a, na, b[0]);
+
+  for (;;) {
+    if (--nb == 0) {
+      return;
+    }
+    rr[1] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[1]), a, na, b[1]);
+    if (--nb == 0) {
+      return;
+    }
+    rr[2] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[2]), a, na, b[2]);
+    if (--nb == 0) {
+      return;
+    }
+    rr[3] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[3]), a, na, b[3]);
+    if (--nb == 0) {
+      return;
+    }
+    rr[4] = bn_mul_add_words(&(r[4]), a, na, b[4]);
+    rr += 4;
+    r += 4;
+    b += 4;
+  }
+}
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
+// Here follows specialised variants of bn_add_words() and bn_sub_words(). They
+// have the property performing operations on arrays of different sizes. The
+// sizes of those arrays is expressed through cl, which is the common length (
+// basicall, min(len(a),len(b)) ), and dl, which is the delta between the two
+// lengths, calculated as len(a)-len(b). All lengths are the number of
+// BN_ULONGs...  For the operations that require a result array as parameter,
+// it must have the length cl+abs(dl). These functions should probably end up
+// in bn_asm.c as soon as there are assembler counterparts for the systems that
+// use assembler files.
+
+static BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                                  const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl) {
+  BN_ULONG c, t;
+
+  assert(cl >= 0);
+  c = bn_sub_words(r, a, b, cl);
+
+  if (dl == 0) {
+    return c;
+  }
+
+  r += cl;
+  a += cl;
+  b += cl;
+
+  if (dl < 0) {
+    for (;;) {
+      t = b[0];
+      r[0] = 0 - t - c;
+      if (t != 0) {
+        c = 1;
+      }
+      if (++dl >= 0) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      t = b[1];
+      r[1] = 0 - t - c;
+      if (t != 0) {
+        c = 1;
+      }
+      if (++dl >= 0) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      t = b[2];
+      r[2] = 0 - t - c;
+      if (t != 0) {
+        c = 1;
+      }
+      if (++dl >= 0) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      t = b[3];
+      r[3] = 0 - t - c;
+      if (t != 0) {
+        c = 1;
+      }
+      if (++dl >= 0) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      b += 4;
+      r += 4;
+    }
+  } else {
+    int save_dl = dl;
+    while (c) {
+      t = a[0];
+      r[0] = t - c;
+      if (t != 0) {
+        c = 0;
+      }
+      if (--dl <= 0) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      t = a[1];
+      r[1] = t - c;
+      if (t != 0) {
+        c = 0;
+      }
+      if (--dl <= 0) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      t = a[2];
+      r[2] = t - c;
+      if (t != 0) {
+        c = 0;
+      }
+      if (--dl <= 0) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      t = a[3];
+      r[3] = t - c;
+      if (t != 0) {
+        c = 0;
+      }
+      if (--dl <= 0) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      save_dl = dl;
+      a += 4;
+      r += 4;
+    }
+    if (dl > 0) {
+      if (save_dl > dl) {
+        switch (save_dl - dl) {
+          case 1:
+            r[1] = a[1];
+            if (--dl <= 0) {
+              break;
+            }
+            OPENSSL_FALLTHROUGH;
+          case 2:
+            r[2] = a[2];
+            if (--dl <= 0) {
+              break;
+            }
+            OPENSSL_FALLTHROUGH;
+          case 3:
+            r[3] = a[3];
+            if (--dl <= 0) {
+              break;
+            }
+        }
+        a += 4;
+        r += 4;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (dl > 0) {
+      for (;;) {
+        r[0] = a[0];
+        if (--dl <= 0) {
+          break;
+        }
+        r[1] = a[1];
+        if (--dl <= 0) {
+          break;
+        }
+        r[2] = a[2];
+        if (--dl <= 0) {
+          break;
+        }
+        r[3] = a[3];
+        if (--dl <= 0) {
+          break;
+        }
+
+        a += 4;
+        r += 4;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return c;
+}
+#else
+// On other platforms the function is defined in asm.
+BN_ULONG bn_sub_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                           int cl, int dl);
+#endif
+
+// Karatsuba recursive multiplication algorithm
+// (cf. Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming, Vol. 2)
+
+// r is 2*n2 words in size,
+// a and b are both n2 words in size.
+// n2 must be a power of 2.
+// We multiply and return the result.
+// t must be 2*n2 words in size
+// We calculate
+// a[0]*b[0]
+// a[0]*b[0]+a[1]*b[1]+(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])
+// a[1]*b[1]
+// dnX may not be positive, but n2/2+dnX has to be
+static void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                             int n2, int dna, int dnb, BN_ULONG *t) {
+  int n = n2 / 2, c1, c2;
+  int tna = n + dna, tnb = n + dnb;
+  unsigned int neg, zero;
+  BN_ULONG ln, lo, *p;
+
+  // Only call bn_mul_comba 8 if n2 == 8 and the
+  // two arrays are complete [steve]
+  if (n2 == 8 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) {
+    bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Else do normal multiply
+  if (n2 < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
+    bn_mul_normal(r, a, n2 + dna, b, n2 + dnb);
+    if ((dna + dnb) < 0) {
+      OPENSSL_memset(&r[2 * n2 + dna + dnb], 0,
+                     sizeof(BN_ULONG) * -(dna + dnb));
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // r=(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])
+  c1 = bn_cmp_part_words(a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna);
+  c2 = bn_cmp_part_words(&(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n);
+  zero = neg = 0;
+  switch (c1 * 3 + c2) {
+    case -4:
+      bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n);        // -
+      bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb);  // -
+      break;
+    case -3:
+      zero = 1;
+      break;
+    case -2:
+      bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n);        // -
+      bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n);  // +
+      neg = 1;
+      break;
+    case -1:
+    case 0:
+    case 1:
+      zero = 1;
+      break;
+    case 2:
+      bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna);        // +
+      bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb);  // -
+      neg = 1;
+      break;
+    case 3:
+      zero = 1;
+      break;
+    case 4:
+      bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna);
+      bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n);
+      break;
+  }
+
+  if (n == 4 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) {
+    // XXX: bn_mul_comba4 could take extra args to do this well
+    if (!zero) {
+      bn_mul_comba4(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]));
+    } else {
+      OPENSSL_memset(&(t[n2]), 0, 8 * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+    }
+
+    bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b);
+    bn_mul_comba4(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]));
+  } else if (n == 8 && dna == 0 && dnb == 0) {
+    // XXX: bn_mul_comba8 could take extra args to do this well
+    if (!zero) {
+      bn_mul_comba8(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]));
+    } else {
+      OPENSSL_memset(&(t[n2]), 0, 16 * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+    }
+
+    bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b);
+    bn_mul_comba8(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]));
+  } else {
+    p = &(t[n2 * 2]);
+    if (!zero) {
+      bn_mul_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]), n, 0, 0, p);
+    } else {
+      OPENSSL_memset(&(t[n2]), 0, n2 * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+    }
+    bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, p);
+    bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, dna, dnb, p);
+  }
+
+  // t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign
+  // r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+  // r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+
+  c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
+
+  if (neg) {
+    // if t[32] is negative
+    c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2));
+  } else {
+    // Might have a carry
+    c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2));
+  }
+
+  // t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1])
+  // r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+  // r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+  // c1 holds the carry bits
+  c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
+  if (c1) {
+    p = &(r[n + n2]);
+    lo = *p;
+    ln = lo + c1;
+    *p = ln;
+
+    // The overflow will stop before we over write
+    // words we should not overwrite
+    if (ln < (BN_ULONG)c1) {
+      do {
+        p++;
+        lo = *p;
+        ln = lo + 1;
+        *p = ln;
+      } while (ln == 0);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// n+tn is the word length
+// t needs to be n*4 is size, as does r
+// tnX may not be negative but less than n
+static void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
+                                  const BN_ULONG *b, int n, int tna, int tnb,
+                                  BN_ULONG *t) {
+  int i, j, n2 = n * 2;
+  int c1, c2, neg;
+  BN_ULONG ln, lo, *p;
+
+  if (n < 8) {
+    bn_mul_normal(r, a, n + tna, b, n + tnb);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // r=(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])
+  c1 = bn_cmp_part_words(a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna);
+  c2 = bn_cmp_part_words(&(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n);
+  neg = 0;
+  switch (c1 * 3 + c2) {
+    case -4:
+      bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n);        // -
+      bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb);  // -
+      break;
+    case -3:
+      // break;
+    case -2:
+      bn_sub_part_words(t, &(a[n]), a, tna, tna - n);        // -
+      bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n);  // +
+      neg = 1;
+      break;
+    case -1:
+    case 0:
+    case 1:
+      // break;
+    case 2:
+      bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna);        // +
+      bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), b, &(b[n]), tnb, n - tnb);  // -
+      neg = 1;
+      break;
+    case 3:
+      // break;
+    case 4:
+      bn_sub_part_words(t, a, &(a[n]), tna, n - tna);
+      bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]), &(b[n]), b, tnb, tnb - n);
+      break;
+  }
+
+  if (n == 8) {
+    bn_mul_comba8(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]));
+    bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b);
+    bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tna, &(b[n]), tnb);
+    OPENSSL_memset(&(r[n2 + tna + tnb]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tna - tnb));
+  } else {
+    p = &(t[n2 * 2]);
+    bn_mul_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n]), n, 0, 0, p);
+    bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n, 0, 0, p);
+    i = n / 2;
+    // If there is only a bottom half to the number,
+    // just do it
+    if (tna > tnb) {
+      j = tna - i;
+    } else {
+      j = tnb - i;
+    }
+
+    if (j == 0) {
+      bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i, tnb - i, p);
+      OPENSSL_memset(&(r[n2 + i * 2]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - i * 2));
+    } else if (j > 0) {
+      // eg, n == 16, i == 8 and tn == 11
+      bn_mul_part_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i, tnb - i, p);
+      OPENSSL_memset(&(r[n2 + tna + tnb]), 0,
+                     sizeof(BN_ULONG) * (n2 - tna - tnb));
+    } else {
+      // (j < 0) eg, n == 16, i == 8 and tn == 5
+      OPENSSL_memset(&(r[n2]), 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * n2);
+      if (tna < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL &&
+          tnb < BN_MUL_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
+        bn_mul_normal(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), tna, &(b[n]), tnb);
+      } else {
+        for (;;) {
+          i /= 2;
+          // these simplified conditions work
+          // exclusively because difference
+          // between tna and tnb is 1 or 0
+          if (i < tna || i < tnb) {
+            bn_mul_part_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i,
+                                  tnb - i, p);
+            break;
+          } else if (i == tna || i == tnb) {
+            bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), i, tna - i, tnb - i,
+                             p);
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign
+  // r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+  // r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+
+  c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
+
+  if (neg) {
+    // if t[32] is negative
+    c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2));
+  } else {
+    // Might have a carry
+    c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2));
+  }
+
+  // t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1])
+  // r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+  // r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+  // c1 holds the carry bits
+  c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
+  if (c1) {
+    p = &(r[n + n2]);
+    lo = *p;
+    ln = lo + c1;
+    *p = ln;
+
+    // The overflow will stop before we over write
+    // words we should not overwrite
+    if (ln < (BN_ULONG)c1) {
+      do {
+        p++;
+        lo = *p;
+        ln = lo + 1;
+        *p = ln;
+      } while (ln == 0);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  int ret = 0;
+  int top, al, bl;
+  BIGNUM *rr;
+  int i;
+  BIGNUM *t = NULL;
+  int j = 0, k;
+
+  al = a->top;
+  bl = b->top;
+
+  if ((al == 0) || (bl == 0)) {
+    BN_zero(r);
+    return 1;
+  }
+  top = al + bl;
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  if ((r == a) || (r == b)) {
+    if ((rr = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else {
+    rr = r;
+  }
+  rr->neg = a->neg ^ b->neg;
+
+  i = al - bl;
+  if (i == 0) {
+    if (al == 8) {
+      if (!bn_wexpand(rr, 16)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      rr->top = 16;
+      bn_mul_comba8(rr->d, a->d, b->d);
+      goto end;
+    }
+  }
+
+  static const int kMulNormalSize = 16;
+  if (al >= kMulNormalSize && bl >= kMulNormalSize) {
+    if (i >= -1 && i <= 1) {
+      /* Find out the power of two lower or equal
+         to the longest of the two numbers */
+      if (i >= 0) {
+        j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al);
+      }
+      if (i == -1) {
+        j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)bl);
+      }
+      j = 1 << (j - 1);
+      assert(j <= al || j <= bl);
+      k = j + j;
+      t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+      if (t == NULL) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (al > j || bl > j) {
+        if (!bn_wexpand(t, k * 4)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+        if (!bn_wexpand(rr, k * 4)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+        bn_mul_part_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, j, al - j, bl - j, t->d);
+      } else {
+        // al <= j || bl <= j
+        if (!bn_wexpand(t, k * 2)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+        if (!bn_wexpand(rr, k * 2)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+        bn_mul_recursive(rr->d, a->d, b->d, j, al - j, bl - j, t->d);
+      }
+      rr->top = top;
+      goto end;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!bn_wexpand(rr, top)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  rr->top = top;
+  bn_mul_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, b->d, bl);
+
+end:
+  bn_correct_top(rr);
+  if (r != rr && !BN_copy(r, rr)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int bn_mul_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num_a,
+                 const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num_b) {
+  if (num_r != num_a + num_b) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // TODO(davidben): Should this call |bn_mul_comba4| too? |BN_mul| does not
+  // hit that code.
+  if (num_a == 8 && num_b == 8) {
+    bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b);
+  } else {
+    bn_mul_normal(r, a, num_a, b, num_b);
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// tmp must have 2*n words
+static void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t n,
+                          BN_ULONG *tmp) {
+  if (n == 0) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  size_t max = n * 2;
+  const BN_ULONG *ap = a;
+  BN_ULONG *rp = r;
+  rp[0] = rp[max - 1] = 0;
+  rp++;
+
+  // Compute the contribution of a[i] * a[j] for all i < j.
+  if (n > 1) {
+    ap++;
+    rp[n - 1] = bn_mul_words(rp, ap, n - 1, ap[-1]);
+    rp += 2;
+  }
+  if (n > 2) {
+    for (size_t i = n - 2; i > 0; i--) {
+      ap++;
+      rp[i] = bn_mul_add_words(rp, ap, i, ap[-1]);
+      rp += 2;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // The final result fits in |max| words, so none of the following operations
+  // will overflow.
+
+  // Double |r|, giving the contribution of a[i] * a[j] for all i != j.
+  bn_add_words(r, r, r, max);
+
+  // Add in the contribution of a[i] * a[i] for all i.
+  bn_sqr_words(tmp, a, n);
+  bn_add_words(r, r, tmp, max);
+}
+
+// r is 2*n words in size,
+// a and b are both n words in size.    (There's not actually a 'b' here ...)
+// n must be a power of 2.
+// We multiply and return the result.
+// t must be 2*n words in size
+// We calculate
+// a[0]*b[0]
+// a[0]*b[0]+a[1]*b[1]+(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])
+// a[1]*b[1]
+static void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2,
+                             BN_ULONG *t) {
+  int n = n2 / 2;
+  int zero, c1;
+  BN_ULONG ln, lo, *p;
+
+  if (n2 == 4) {
+    bn_sqr_comba4(r, a);
+    return;
+  } else if (n2 == 8) {
+    bn_sqr_comba8(r, a);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (n2 < BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
+    bn_sqr_normal(r, a, n2, t);
+    return;
+  }
+  // r=(a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0])
+  c1 = bn_cmp_words(a, &(a[n]), n);
+  zero = 0;
+  if (c1 > 0) {
+    bn_sub_words(t, a, &(a[n]), n);
+  } else if (c1 < 0) {
+    bn_sub_words(t, &(a[n]), a, n);
+  } else {
+    zero = 1;
+  }
+
+  // The result will always be negative unless it is zero
+  p = &(t[n2 * 2]);
+
+  if (!zero) {
+    bn_sqr_recursive(&(t[n2]), t, n, p);
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_memset(&(t[n2]), 0, n2 * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  }
+  bn_sqr_recursive(r, a, n, p);
+  bn_sqr_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), n, p);
+
+  // t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]), it is negative or zero
+  // r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+  // r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+
+  c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
+
+  // t[32] is negative
+  c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2));
+
+  // t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0])+(a[0]*a[0])+(a[1]*a[1])
+  // r[10] holds (a[0]*a[0])
+  // r[32] holds (a[1]*a[1])
+  // c1 holds the carry bits
+  c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
+  if (c1) {
+    p = &(r[n + n2]);
+    lo = *p;
+    ln = lo + c1;
+    *p = ln;
+
+    // The overflow will stop before we over write
+    // words we should not overwrite
+    if (ln < (BN_ULONG)c1) {
+      do {
+        p++;
+        lo = *p;
+        ln = lo + 1;
+        *p = ln;
+      } while (ln == 0);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *bn, BN_ULONG w) {
+  if (!bn->top) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (w == 0) {
+    BN_zero(bn);
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  BN_ULONG ll = bn_mul_words(bn->d, bn->d, bn->top, w);
+  if (ll) {
+    if (!bn_wexpand(bn, bn->top + 1)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    bn->d[bn->top++] = ll;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  int max, al;
+  int ret = 0;
+  BIGNUM *tmp, *rr;
+
+  al = a->top;
+  if (al <= 0) {
+    r->top = 0;
+    r->neg = 0;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  rr = (a != r) ? r : BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (!rr || !tmp) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  max = 2 * al;  // Non-zero (from above)
+  if (!bn_wexpand(rr, max)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (al == 4) {
+    bn_sqr_comba4(rr->d, a->d);
+  } else if (al == 8) {
+    bn_sqr_comba8(rr->d, a->d);
+  } else {
+    if (al < BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL) {
+      BN_ULONG t[BN_SQR_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL * 2];
+      bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, t);
+    } else {
+      int j, k;
+
+      j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)al);
+      j = 1 << (j - 1);
+      k = j + j;
+      if (al == j) {
+        if (!bn_wexpand(tmp, k * 2)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+        bn_sqr_recursive(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d);
+      } else {
+        if (!bn_wexpand(tmp, max)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+        bn_sqr_normal(rr->d, a->d, al, tmp->d);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  rr->neg = 0;
+  // If the most-significant half of the top word of 'a' is zero, then
+  // the square of 'a' will max-1 words.
+  if (a->d[al - 1] == (a->d[al - 1] & BN_MASK2l)) {
+    rr->top = max - 1;
+  } else {
+    rr->top = max;
+  }
+
+  if (rr != r && !BN_copy(r, rr)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int bn_sqr_small(BN_ULONG *r, size_t num_r, const BN_ULONG *a, size_t num_a) {
+  if (num_r != 2 * num_a || num_a > BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (num_a == 4) {
+    bn_sqr_comba4(r, a);
+  } else if (num_a == 8) {
+    bn_sqr_comba8(r, a);
+  } else {
+    BN_ULONG tmp[2 * BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS];
+    bn_sqr_normal(r, a, num_a, tmp);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, 2 * num_a * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  }
+  return 1;
+}