pi-crew 0.9.50 → 0.9.52

package/src/state/locks.ts

@@ -1,562 +0,0 @@
-import { AsyncLocalStorage } from "node:async_hooks";
-import { randomUUID, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
-import * as fs from "node:fs";
-import * as path from "node:path";
-import { DEFAULT_LOCKS } from "../config/defaults.ts";
-import { logInternalError } from "../utils/internal-error.ts";
-import { sleepSync } from "../utils/sleep.ts";
-import { isSymlinkSafePath } from "./atomic-write.ts";
-import type { TeamRunManifest } from "./types.ts";
-
-export interface RunLockOptions {
-	staleMs?: number;
-}
-
-const DEFAULT_STALE_MS = DEFAULT_LOCKS.staleMs;
-
-function lockPath(manifest: TeamRunManifest): string {
-	return path.join(manifest.stateRoot, "run.lock");
-}
-
-function parseCreatedAtFromLock(raw: string): number | undefined {
-	try {
-		const payload = JSON.parse(raw) as unknown;
-		if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object" || Array.isArray(payload)) return undefined;
-		const candidate = payload as { createdAt?: unknown };
-		if (typeof candidate.createdAt !== "string") return undefined;
-		const parsed = Date.parse(candidate.createdAt);
-		return Number.isNaN(parsed) ? undefined : parsed;
-	} catch {
-		return undefined;
-	}
-}
-
-function isLockStale(filePath: string, staleMs: number): boolean {
-	try {
-		const stat = fs.statSync(filePath);
-		let createdAt = parseCreatedAtFromLock(fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf-8"));
-		if (createdAt === undefined) createdAt = stat.mtimeMs;
-		return Date.now() - createdAt > staleMs;
-	} catch {
-		return false;
-	}
-}
-
-function isLockHolderAlive(filePath: string): boolean {
-	try {
-		const raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf-8");
-		const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as { pid?: unknown };
-		const pid = typeof parsed.pid === "number" ? parsed.pid : undefined;
-		if (pid === undefined) return true; // Unknown holder — assume alive to be safe
-		try {
-			process.kill(pid, 0);
-			return true; // Signal 0 succeeded — process is alive
-		} catch (error) {
-			const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
-			// EPERM: process exists but we don't have permission to signal it.
-			// Since we cannot verify liveness, treat the holder as potentially
-			// stale so the lock can be stolen rather than blocking indefinitely.
-			// This is an acceptable trade-off: EPERM requires elevated privileges,
-			// and blocking indefinitely would be worse. The risk is low.
-			// Other errors (ESRCH — process doesn't exist) also mean holder is dead.
-			return false;
-		}
-	} catch {
-		return true; // Can't read — assume alive to be safe
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * Round 26 (BUG 1): read the lock file ONCE and evaluate staleness + holder
- * liveness from that single snapshot.
- *
- * Previously `acquireLockWithRetry` called `isLockStale()` and
- * `isLockHolderAlive()` separately, each performing its own `readFileSync`.
- * Between those two reads the lock could transition stale→fresh (old holder
- * released, new holder acquired): isLockStale saw the OLD createdAt → stale,
- * isLockHolderAlive saw the NEW pid → alive, yielding `!stale && alive` =
- * false → we forcibly rm the NEW holder's freshly-acquired lock and take it
- * ourselves → BOTH in the critical section. Reading once closes the window.
- *
- * Returns `{ canSteal: true }` if the lock is stale OR the holder is dead
- * (safe to forcibly remove); `{ canSteal: false }` if it is fresh AND held by
- * a live process (must keep waiting).
- *
- * ## EPERM Handling (Accepted Risk)
- *
- * When `process.kill(pid, 0)` returns EPERM, it means the holder process
- * EXISTS but we lack permission to signal it. We treat this as "not alive"
- * (stealable) because:
- *
- * 1. **Blocking indefinitely is worse** — on shared systems, a holder running
- *    under a different user/permission context would block us forever.
- * 2. **EPERM requires elevated privileges** — on single-user workstations
- *    (the typical pi-crew environment), EPERM is rare.
- * 3. **Defense in depth** — the lock staleness check provides a secondary
- *    safeguard; we only steal if the lock is also stale.
- *
- * **Trade-off:** On multi-user systems, this could theoretically allow two
- * processes in the critical section simultaneously if: (a) holder is alive
- * under different permissions, AND (b) our steal attempt races with holder's
- * release. The practical risk is low because:
- * - Lock holders typically complete quickly
- * - Stale timeout provides a safety window
- * - Critical sections are designed to tolerate rare races
- *
- * See also: SECURITY-ISSUES.md SEC-008 for documented acceptance.
- */
-function readLockSnapshot(filePath: string, staleMs: number, options?: { treatOwnPidAsStealable?: boolean }): { canSteal: boolean } {
-	const treatOwnPidAsStealable = options?.treatOwnPidAsStealable === true;
-	let stat: fs.Stats | undefined;
-	let raw: string | undefined;
-	try {
-		stat = fs.statSync(filePath);
-		raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf-8");
-	} catch (error) {
-		// FIX (CI flake): when the lock file vanishes between writeLockFile's
-		// EEXIST and our read here, the holder has released — return canSteal:true
-		// so the acquire loop retries the create instead of throwing a false
-		// "locked" error.
-		const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
-		if (code === "ENOENT") {
-			return { canSteal: true };
-		}
-		// Transient I/O error — be conservative (don't steal, retry the read on
-		// next attempt).
-		return { canSteal: false };
-	}
-	// Staleness from a single snapshot.
-	let createdAt = parseCreatedAtFromLock(raw);
-	if (createdAt === undefined) createdAt = stat.mtimeMs;
-	const isStale = Date.now() - createdAt > staleMs;
-	let holderPid: number | undefined;
-	let isAlive = true;
-	try {
-		const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as { pid?: unknown };
-		holderPid = typeof parsed.pid === "number" ? parsed.pid : undefined;
-	} catch {
-		/* malformed payload — keep isAlive=true */
-	}
-	if (holderPid !== undefined) {
-		try {
-			process.kill(holderPid, 0);
-			isAlive = true;
-		} catch (error) {
-			const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
-			// EPERM/ESRCH → treat as not-alive (stealable), see isLockHolderAlive.
-			isAlive = false;
-		}
-	}
-	// Steal if stale OR holder dead. Optionally steal if holder is our own pid
-	// (used by withRunLock* which is single-process — a fresh lock with our pid
-	// between acquisitions is just a leftover from a previous call that
-	// releaseOwnLock didn't get to delete yet; safe to steal).
-	const isOurOwnHolder = holderPid === process.pid;
-	return {
-		canSteal: isStale || !isAlive || (treatOwnPidAsStealable && isOurOwnHolder),
-	};
-}
-
-/**
- * Lock file kinds. Discriminator written to the lock file payload so that:
- *   - Debugging tools (e.g. a future `pi-crew locks` command) can identify
- *     what a lock is protecting.
- *   - Cross-kind ambiguity is prevented if two locks somehow resolve to the
- *     same path (defense in depth).
- *   - Forward compat: new lock types can be added without changing the
- *     on-disk format (the `kind` field is the only discriminator).
- */
-export type LockKind = "run" | "file";
-
-function writeLockFile(filePath: string, token: string, kind: LockKind = "file"): void {
-	// Reject a pre-existing symlink at the lock path before O_CREAT|O_EXCL.
-	// O_EXCL fails with EEXIST if the path exists (including as a symlink),
-	// but the failure mode is confusing — an explicit lstatSync gives a
-	// clean, distinguishable error instead.
-	try {
-		const stat = fs.lstatSync(filePath);
-		if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) {
-			throw new Error(`Refusing to create lock file over symlink: ${filePath}`);
-		}
-	} catch (error) {
-		const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
-		// ENOENT means the path doesn't exist yet — that's fine, proceed.
-		// Anything else (EACCES, EPERM, etc.) should surface immediately.
-		if (code !== "ENOENT") throw error;
-	}
-	// Ensure parent directory exists (may have been cleaned up by a concurrent process)
-	fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true });
-	const fd = fs.openSync(filePath, fs.constants.O_WRONLY | fs.constants.O_CREAT | fs.constants.O_EXCL, 0o600);
-	try {
-		fs.writeSync(
-			fd,
-			JSON.stringify({
-				kind,
-				pid: process.pid,
-				createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
-				token,
-			}),
-		);
-	} finally {
-		fs.closeSync(fd);
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * Read the token stored in a lock file. Returns undefined if the file
- * cannot be read or parsed.
- */
-function readLockToken(filePath: string): string | undefined {
-	try {
-		// Refuse to read a symlink — prevents reading a target an attacker placed
-		const stat = fs.lstatSync(filePath);
-		if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) return undefined;
-		const raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf-8");
-		const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as { token?: unknown };
-		return typeof parsed.token === "string" ? parsed.token : undefined;
-	} catch {
-		return undefined;
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * Release a lock file, but ONLY if the stored token matches. This prevents
- * the "losing contender wipes winner's lock" race that occurs when:
- *   1. Process A acquires lock with token T_A
- *   2. Process B times out waiting, steals the lock (overwriting with T_B)
- *   3. Process A finishes, tries to release — would otherwise rm Process B's lock
- *
- * With token matching, A's release is a no-op for B's lock.
- */
-function timingSafeTokenMatch(a: string, b: string): boolean {
-	// Early length check prevents timing side-channel that leaks length info.
-	// Without this, timingSafeEqual compares the full padded length, revealing
-	// that the strings have different lengths via the zero-padding.
-	if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
-	const bufA = Buffer.from(a);
-	const bufB = Buffer.from(b);
-	return timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB);
-}
-
-/**
- * Release the lock we (this process) just acquired. Unlike releaseLock, this
- * unconditionally removes the file because we know we created it in the same
- * withRunLock* call — token matching is only needed for multi-process scenarios
- * (where a different holder's token must not be deleted). Within the same process
- * the new acquire uses a fresh randomUUID token, so token matching would falsely
- * fail and leak the file across releases.
- *
- * Symlink guard is preserved: if a symlink appeared since our writeLockFile, we
- * don't rm it (defense against attacker-planted symlinks).
- */
-export function releaseOwnLock(filePath: string, _token: string): void {
-	try {
-		const stat = fs.lstatSync(filePath);
-		if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) return;
-	} catch {
-		/* ENOENT is fine */
-	}
-	try {
-		fs.rmSync(filePath, { force: true });
-	} catch (error) {
-		const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
-		if (code !== "ENOENT") {
-			logInternalError("lock-release-own", error, filePath, "warn");
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-function releaseLock(filePath: string, token: string): void {
-	// FIX: Do not delete a symlink — it may have been planted by an attacker
-	// after our lock was released. A legitimate lock file should never be a
-	// symlink since writeLockFile uses O_CREAT|O_EXCL which fails on symlinks.
-	let isSymlink = false;
-	try {
-		isSymlink = fs.lstatSync(filePath).isSymbolicLink();
-	} catch {
-		/* file doesn't exist — that's fine, we'll handle ENOENT below */
-	}
-	if (isSymlink) return;
-
-	const stored = readLockToken(filePath);
-	if (stored === undefined || timingSafeTokenMatch(stored, token)) {
-		try {
-			fs.rmSync(filePath, { force: true });
-		} catch (error) {
-			// FIX: Only ignore ENOENT (lock already gone). Other errors (EACCES,
-			// EPERM, EBUSY) indicate a real problem and should be surfaced.
-			const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
-			if (code !== "ENOENT") throw error;
-			// Lock already gone — that's fine, we wanted to release it anyway.
-		}
-	}
-	// If the stored token does not match, our lock has been stolen
-	// (probably stale and overtaken). Do not touch it — the new holder owns it.
-}
-
-function acquireLockWithRetry(filePath: string, staleMs: number, kind: LockKind = "file"): string {
-	let attempt = 0;
-	const deadline = Date.now() + staleMs * 2;
-	while (true) {
-		const token = randomUUID();
-		try {
-			writeLockFile(filePath, token, kind);
-			return token;
-		} catch (error) {
-			const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
-			if (code !== "EEXIST") throw error;
-			if (Date.now() > deadline) {
-				throw new Error(`Run '${path.basename(filePath)}' is locked by another operation.`);
-			}
-			// Round 26 (BUG 1): single-snapshot read closes the TOCTOU window between
-			// separate stale + alive reads (which could race stale→fresh).
-			// treatOwnPidAsStealable=false (this is the sync file-lock path used
-			// by withFileLockSync — never steal a fresh lock even if it has our pid).
-			const { canSteal } = readLockSnapshot(filePath, staleMs, { treatOwnPidAsStealable: false });
-			if (!canSteal) {
-				throw new Error(`Run '${path.basename(filePath)}' is locked by another operation.`);
-			}
-			// Stale or dead holder — forcibly remove the lock.
-			try {
-				fs.rmSync(filePath, { force: true });
-			} catch {
-				/* race — let loop retry */
-			}
-			sleepSync(Math.min(250, 25 * 2 ** attempt));
-			attempt++;
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-function sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {
-	return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
-}
-
-async function acquireLockWithRetryAsync(filePath: string, staleMs: number, kind: LockKind = "file"): Promise<string> {
-	let attempt = 0;
-	const deadline = Date.now() + staleMs * 2;
-	while (true) {
-		const token = randomUUID();
-		try {
-			writeLockFile(filePath, token, kind);
-			return token;
-		} catch (error) {
-			const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
-			if (code !== "EEXIST") throw error;
-			if (Date.now() > deadline) {
-				throw new Error(`Run '${path.basename(filePath)}' is locked by another operation.`);
-			}
-			// Round 26 (BUG 1): single-snapshot read (see sync variant).
-			// FIX (CI flake): treatOwnPidAsStealable=true for the run-lock async path
-			// (withRunLock). Between acquisitions in parallel-research scaffold mode,
-			// the previous releaseOwnLock leaves a microsecond window where the
-			// file still exists with our own pid. Stealing it avoids spurious 'locked'
-			// errors. The sync file-lock path (withFileLockSync) above uses false to
-			// preserve the multi-process safety guarantee.
-			const { canSteal } = readLockSnapshot(filePath, staleMs, { treatOwnPidAsStealable: true });
-			if (!canSteal) {
-				throw new Error(`Run '${path.basename(filePath)}' is locked by another operation.`);
-			}
-			// Stale or dead holder — forcibly remove the lock.
-			try {
-				fs.rmSync(filePath, { force: true });
-			} catch {
-				/* race — let loop retry */
-			}
-			const delay = Math.min(250, 25 * 2 ** attempt);
-			await sleep(delay);
-			attempt++;
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * General-purpose file lock for arbitrary file paths.
- * Uses the same O_EXCL atomic create strategy as run locks.
- */
-export function withFileLockSync<T>(filePath: string, fn: () => T, options: RunLockOptions = {}): T {
-	// FIX: Use a separate .lock sidecar so the lock file doesn't collide with
-	// the file being protected. Previously withFileLockSync used the file path
-	// itself as the lock, which meant any operation on the same file (read,
-	// append, or even the lock acquisition itself) would race with the lock.
-	const lockFile = `${filePath}.lock`;
-	const staleMs = options.staleMs ?? DEFAULT_STALE_MS;
-	// FIX (Round 29): re-entrance guard — mirrors withRunLockSync below.
-	// When the same call stack already holds the file lock (e.g.
-	// registerWorker -> cleanupOrphanWorkers -> readRegistry), the second
-	// acquisition would otherwise read its own freshly-written lock file
-	// (same pid, fresh createdAt), fail the steal check, and deadlock for
-	// the full staleMs window. Strace-confirmed in
-	// .github/issues/pre-existing-2026-06-10/04-orphan-worker-registry-tests.md:75-86.
-	const existingToken = fileLockHeldByUs.get(lockFile);
-	if (existingToken) {
-		return fn();
-	}
-	// FIX: Validate the parent directory is not a symlink BEFORE calling mkdirSync.
-	// Between mkdir and lock acquisition, an attacker could plant a symlink.
-	if (!isSymlinkSafePath(path.dirname(lockFile))) throw new Error("Refusing: parent of lock directory is a symlink");
-	fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(lockFile), { recursive: true });
-	// Round 26 (BUG 2): REMOVED the pre-acquisition target-file-existence check.
-	// It was racy — between statSync(target) and acquire, a concurrent process
-	// could acquire the lock to CREATE the target, and we'd delete its active
-	// lock. It was also actively wrong for callers that pass a path already
-	// ending in `.lock` (config.ts: the checked "target" never exists, so the
-	// cleanup ALWAYS fired, deleting a fresh concurrent holder's lock). Genuine
-	// orphan locks (crashed holder) are reclaimed by acquireLockWithRetry's
-	// staleMs-based steal logic after at most `staleMs`.
-	// FIX (TOCTOU): Re-validate symlink safety before each lock acquisition
-	// attempt. Between our initial check and the acquisition (and between
-	// acquireLockWithRetry's internal retries), an attacker could plant a
-	// symlink. We must re-check on each iteration to catch TOCTOU races.
-	let token = "";
-	let attempt = 0;
-	const deadline = Date.now() + staleMs * 2;
-	while (Date.now() <= deadline) {
-		if (!isSymlinkSafePath(path.dirname(lockFile))) throw new Error("Refusing: parent of lock directory is a symlink");
-		try {
-			token = acquireLockWithRetry(lockFile, staleMs, "file");
-			break;
-		} catch {
-			sleepSync(Math.min(250, 25 * 2 ** attempt));
-			attempt++;
-		}
-	}
-	if (token === "") throw new Error(`Run '${path.basename(lockFile)}' is locked by another operation.`);
-	fileLockHeldByUs.set(lockFile, token);
-	try {
-		return fn();
-	} finally {
-		// Token-guarded release: don't rm the lock if it has been stolen.
-		fileLockHeldByUs.delete(lockFile);
-		releaseLock(lockFile, token);
-	}
-}
-
-// H-1: track re-entrant run-lock acquisitions PER ASYNC CONTEXT (not process-global).
-// Previously a module-global Map caused a bug: when withRunLock (async) yielded at
-// `await fn()`, a concurrent withRunLockSync for the same run — fired from a
-// different async context (e.g. a child stdout event handler) — saw the holder's
-// token and bypassed the file lock entirely, allowing two writers in the critical
-// section simultaneously. AsyncLocalStorage scopes the "held" set to the current
-// async context, so a call from a different async context no longer bypasses and
-// properly serializes against the on-disk lock. True nested calls in the SAME
-// async context (e.g. handleResume -> executeTeamRun -> executeTeamRunCore) still
-// bypass via lockCtx.getStore(), avoiding the deadlock the bypass was designed for.
-const lockCtx = new AsyncLocalStorage<Set<string>>();
-// Round 29: parallel map for withFileLockSync re-entrance. See the comment
-// at the top of withFileLockSync for the full deadlock mechanism.
-const fileLockHeldByUs = new Map<string, string>(); // lockFile -> token
-
-// --- Async file lock (non-blocking alternative to withFileLockSync) ---
-// Uses a promise-chain pattern to serialize per-path access without blocking
-// the Node.js event loop. Unlike withFileLockSync (which uses O_EXCL +
-// sleepSync for cross-process safety), this is **in-process only** —
-// sufficient for single-process mailbox writes (team-runner is single-process).
-// Mirrors the structure of withEventLogLockAsync in event-log.ts.
-const fileAsyncLocks = new Map<string, Promise<unknown>>();
-
-// FIND-02 follow-up (P3): re-entrance guard for the async file lock, mirroring
-// the lockCtx pattern used by withRunLock. A future caller doing same-path
-// nested withFileLockAsync(path, ...) inside another withFileLockAsync(path,
-// ...) in the SAME async context would otherwise deadlock (the nested call
-// chains after the outer's still-pending promise). AsyncLocalStorage scopes
-// the held set to the current async context so cross-context callers still
-// serialize via the promise chain (Phase 1 mailbox path is unaffected).
-const fileAsyncLockCtx = new AsyncLocalStorage<Set<string>>();
-
-export async function withFileLockAsync<T>(filePath: string, fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
-	// Re-entrant within the same async context — run fn() directly (no chaining).
-	// Same semantics as the sync guard in withFileLockSync (fileLockHeldByUs)
-	// and the async guard in withRunLock (lockCtx).
-	if (fileAsyncLockCtx.getStore()?.has(filePath)) {
-		return await fn();
-	}
-	// Merge with the parent context's held set so nested DIFFERENT-path locks
-	// also bypass correctly (prevents cross-path deadlock, matching withRunLock).
-	const prevHeld = fileAsyncLockCtx.getStore() ?? new Set<string>();
-	const held = new Set(prevHeld);
-	held.add(filePath);
-	const prev = fileAsyncLocks.get(filePath) ?? Promise.resolve();
-	// Chain fn after the previous holder. `next` may reject (propagating to the
-	// caller), but `stored` never rejects so subsequent waiters aren't blocked.
-	// fn() is wrapped in fileAsyncLockCtx.run so nested same-context calls see
-	// `held` and bypass the promise chain (re-entrant), while cross-context
-	// callers chain normally via `prev`.
-	const next = prev.then(() => fileAsyncLockCtx.run(held, () => fn()));
-	const stored = next.then(
-		() => undefined,
-		() => undefined,
-	);
-	fileAsyncLocks.set(filePath, stored);
-	try {
-		return await next;
-	} finally {
-		// Compare-and-delete: only remove our entry if it still points at `stored`.
-		// With 3+ overlapping callers, an earlier caller's finally would otherwise
-		// delete a later caller's promise, breaking mutual exclusion.
-		if (fileAsyncLocks.get(filePath) === stored) {
-			fileAsyncLocks.delete(filePath);
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-export function withRunLockSync<T>(manifest: TeamRunManifest, fn: () => T, options: RunLockOptions = {}): T {
-	const filePath = lockPath(manifest);
-	const staleMs = options.staleMs ?? DEFAULT_STALE_MS;
-	// H-1: re-entrance check is scoped to the current async context, not process-global.
-	// A call from a DIFFERENT async context (e.g. a child-stdout event handler that
-	// runs while an async holder is awaiting) sees no held set and properly serializes.
-	if (lockCtx.getStore()?.has(filePath)) {
-		// Re-entrant within the same async context — already hold this lock.
-		return fn();
-	}
-	fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true });
-	const token = acquireLockWithRetry(filePath, staleMs, "run");
-	const prevHeld = lockCtx.getStore() ?? new Set<string>();
-	const newHeld = new Set(prevHeld);
-	newHeld.add(filePath);
-	// Enter a new async context (or extend the current one) carrying the held set.
-	// On exit (sync return OR async resume after an awaited child), the context is
-	// restored — so the held set only contains locks acquired within fn()'s subtree.
-	return lockCtx.run(newHeld, () => {
-		try {
-			return fn();
-		} finally {
-			// FIX (CI flake): releaseLock uses token matching to prevent the
-			// "losing contender wipes winner's lock" race in multi-process scenarios.
-			// But within withRunLockSync/withRunLock (same process), the new acquire
-			// uses a FRESH random token — the previous stored token doesn't match the
-			// current token — and the lock file is never removed. Repeat acquisitions
-			// then keep failing with EEXIST because the file lingers.
-			// Since withRunLock* is always single-process, unconditionally delete
-			// (symlink guard is still applied for safety).
-			releaseOwnLock(filePath, token);
-		}
-	});
-}
-
-export async function withRunLock<T>(manifest: TeamRunManifest, fn: () => Promise<T>, options: RunLockOptions = {}): Promise<T> {
-	const filePath = lockPath(manifest);
-	const staleMs = options.staleMs ?? DEFAULT_STALE_MS;
-	if (lockCtx.getStore()?.has(filePath)) {
-		// Re-entrant within the same async context.
-		return await fn();
-	}
-	fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true });
-	const token = await acquireLockWithRetryAsync(filePath, staleMs, "run");
-	const prevHeld = lockCtx.getStore() ?? new Set<string>();
-	const newHeld = new Set(prevHeld);
-	newHeld.add(filePath);
-	// AsyncLocalStorage propagates across await boundaries, so any code that
-	// resumes after an await inside fn() (including microtasks, timers, and
-	// awaited child Pi results) still sees newHeld.
-	return await lockCtx.run(newHeld, async () => {
-		try {
-			return await fn();
-		} finally {
-			// FIX (CI flake): see withRunLockSync above — use releaseOwnLock for
-			// unconditional deletion of the lock file we created (same process).
-			releaseOwnLock(filePath, token);
-		}
-	});
-}