pi-crew 0.9.50 → 0.9.52

package/src/runtime/verification-gates.ts

@@ -1,571 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Verification Gates — ECC VERIFICATION_LOOP Pattern Implementation
- *
- * Implements RED/GREEN phase gates for task verification.
- * Sequential execution: cannot skip to Phase N+1 without Phase N passing.
- *
- * Based on: docs/distillation/ECC-10-skills.md §2 (verification-loop)
- *
- * @module verification-gates
- */
-
-import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
-import * as fs from "node:fs";
-import * as path from "node:path";
-import { writeArtifact } from "../state/artifact-store.ts";
-import type { GreenLevel, VerificationCommandResult, VerificationContract } from "../state/types.ts";
-import { WINDOWS_ESSENTIAL_ENV_VARS } from "../utils/env-allowlist.ts";
-import { sanitizeEnvSecrets } from "../utils/env-filter.ts";
-import { redactSecretString } from "../utils/redaction.ts";
-
-/**
- * Phase 1.5 #1 (RFC 13 §6 info-disclosure mitigation): sanitize the env passed
- * to verification commands so worker-induced output cannot leak model-provider
- * secrets. P1f redaction at artifact-write + judge-bound is regex-best-effort
- * against adversarial workers; this kills the leak at the source by never
- * giving the verification process the secret in the first place.
- *
- * Opt-out via `PI_CREW_VERIFICATION_SANITIZE_ENV=0` or
- * `PI_TEAMS_VERIFICATION_SANITIZE_ENV=0` to disable sanitization (e.g. for
- * tests that legitimately need API access). Escape hatch:
- * `PI_CREW_VERIFICATION_PRESERVE_ENV=KEY1,KEY2,...` lets users explicitly opt
- * specific secrets back in (audited via the allowlist validator).
- */
-const VERIFICATION_ENV_ALLOWLIST: readonly string[] = [
-	// Essential non-secret vars only — NO model-provider keys by default.
-	"PATH",
-	"HOME",
-	"USER",
-	"SHELL",
-	"TERM",
-	"LANG",
-	"LC_ALL",
-	"LC_COLLATE",
-	"LC_CTYPE",
-	"LC_MESSAGES",
-	"LC_MONETARY",
-	"LC_NUMERIC",
-	"LC_TIME",
-	"XDG_CONFIG_HOME",
-	"XDG_DATA_HOME",
-	"XDG_CACHE_HOME",
-	"XDG_RUNTIME_DIR",
-	// Windows essentials — see WINDOWS_ESSENTIAL_ENV_VARS (src/utils/env-allowlist.ts).
-	...WINDOWS_ESSENTIAL_ENV_VARS,
-	"NVM_BIN",
-	"NVM_DIR",
-	"NVM_INC",
-	"NODE_PATH",
-	"NODE_DISABLE_COLORS",
-	"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS",
-	"NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY",
-	"NPM_CONFIG_USERCONFIG",
-	"NPM_CONFIG_GLOBALCONFIG",
-];
-
-/** Whether env sanitization for verification is enabled (opt-out: enabled by default). */
-export function isVerificationEnvSanitizeEnabled(): boolean {
-	// Opt-out: explicitly disabled via env var set to '0'.
-	if (process.env.PI_CREW_VERIFICATION_SANITIZE_ENV === "0" || process.env.PI_TEAMS_VERIFICATION_SANITIZE_ENV === "0") {
-		return false;
-	}
-	return true;
-}
-
-/**
- * Build the env dict for a verification command. When sanitization is enabled,
- * strips everything except VERIFICATION_ENV_ALLOWLIST + any explicitly-preserved
- * keys (PI_CREW_VERIFICATION_PRESERVE_ENV=KEY1,KEY2). Always adds FORCE_COLOR=0
- * to keep output plain-text (matches pre-existing behavior).
- */
-function buildVerificationEnv(): Record<string, string> {
-	if (!isVerificationEnvSanitizeEnabled()) {
-		return { ...process.env, FORCE_COLOR: "0" };
-	}
-	const preserveRaw = process.env.PI_CREW_VERIFICATION_PRESERVE_ENV ?? process.env.PI_TEAMS_VERIFICATION_PRESERVE_ENV ?? "";
-	const preserve = preserveRaw
-		.split(",")
-		.map((s) => s.trim())
-		.filter((s) => s.length > 0);
-	const allowList = [...VERIFICATION_ENV_ALLOWLIST, ...preserve];
-	return {
-		...sanitizeEnvSecrets(process.env, { allowList }),
-		FORCE_COLOR: "0",
-	};
-}
-
-export interface PhaseGateResult {
-	phase: number;
-	name: string;
-	status: "passed" | "failed" | "skipped";
-	command: string;
-	exitCode?: number | null;
-	output?: string;
-	durationMs: number;
-	error?: string;
-}
-
-export interface PhaseGateBundle {
-	results: PhaseGateResult[];
-	totalDurationMs: number;
-	allPassed: boolean;
-	stoppedAt?: number; // phase number where stopped
-}
-
-/**
- * Standard phase gate definitions for npm/TypeScript projects.
- * Sequential enforcement: each phase must pass before proceeding.
- */
-export const NPM_TYPESCRIPT_GATES: Array<{
-	name: string;
-	command: string;
-	critical: boolean;
-}> = [
-	{ name: "build", command: "npm run build 2>&1", critical: true },
-	{ name: "typecheck", command: "npx tsc --noEmit 2>&1", critical: true },
-	{ name: "lint", command: "npm run lint 2>&1", critical: false },
-	{ name: "tests", command: "npm test 2>&1", critical: true },
-];
-
-/**
- * Cargo/Rust project phase gates.
- */
-export const CARGO_RUST_GATES: Array<{
-	name: string;
-	command: string;
-	critical: boolean;
-}> = [
-	{ name: "check", command: "cargo check 2>&1", critical: true },
-	{ name: "test", command: "cargo test 2>&1", critical: true },
-	{ name: "clippy", command: "cargo clippy 2>&1", critical: false },
-];
-
-/**
- * Execute a single command and capture output.
- */
-/** Characters/patterns that indicate dangerous shell metacharacters. */
-// Round 25 (VULN-3/VULN-4): also block raw newlines (sh -c treats \n as a
-// command separator -> injection) and bare $VARNAME references (can exfiltrate
-// secrets into captured gate output, e.g. `echo $ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`).
-// $+word-char is blocked; special vars like $?/$$/$! are left alone. Built-in
-// gates use only `2>&1` (no $VAR), so this does not break them.
-// M-3/M-4 fix (code-review 2026-06-23): the old pattern used `>>` (append) and
-// `<[^^&]` (a confusing char class). It allowed bare `>` (file redirect, e.g.
-// `npm test > ~/.ssh/authorized_keys`) and used char-class semantics instead of
-// a lookahead. Now `[<>](?![&\d])` blocks BOTH `<` and `>` file redirects while
-// still permitting fd-duplication forms (`2>&1`, `1>&2`, `>&2`, `<&3`) via the
-// negative lookahead (a `>`/`<` followed by `&` or a digit is allowed). A bare
-// `&` is also blocked so an allowed gate cannot background itself and start a
-// second command.
-const DANGEROUS_SHELL_PATTERNS = /(?:;|&&|\|\||\$\(|`|\$\{|\$\w|\b(eval|exec)\b|[<>](?![&\d])|(?<![<>])&|[\r\n])/;
-
-/**
- * Verification gates intentionally execute project-controlled code, but they
- * must enter through a known build/test runner. Interpreter eval modes and
- * arbitrary utilities are excluded: `node -e`, `python -c`, `curl`, etc. can
- * otherwise execute attacker-provided code without any shell metacharacters.
- *
- * Prefixes are token-bound and each side of a pipeline is checked separately,
- * preventing an allowed prefix such as `npm test | node -e ...` from bypassing
- * the restriction. Keep this list focused on common verification commands.
- */
-const ALLOWED_GATE_COMMAND_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [
-	/^npm\s+(?:test(?:\s|$)|run(?:-script)?\s+[A-Za-z0-9_.:-]+(?:\s|$))/,
-	/^pnpm\s+(?:test(?:\s|$)|run\s+[A-Za-z0-9_.:-]+(?:\s|$))/,
-	/^yarn\s+(?:test(?:\s|$)|run\s+[A-Za-z0-9_.:-]+(?:\s|$))/,
-	/^npx\s+(?:--no-install\s+)?(?:biome|eslint|tsc)(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^(?:biome|eslint|tsc)(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^node\s+(?:(?:--experimental-strip-types|--no-warnings)\s+)*--test(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^python(?:3(?:\.\d+)*)?\s+-m\s+(?:pytest|unittest)(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^pytest(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^cargo\s+(?:build|check|clippy|fmt|test)(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^go\s+(?:build|test|vet)(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^bun\s+test(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^deno\s+(?:check|lint|test)(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^dotnet\s+(?:build|test)(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^(?:gradle|\.\/gradlew)\s+(?:build|check|test)(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^(?:mvn|\.\/mvnw)\s+(?:package|test|verify)(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^make\s+(?:build|check|lint|test)(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^(?:echo|false|printenv|printf|true)(?:\s|$)/,
-	/^(?:grep|head|rg|tail)(?:\s|$)/,
-];
-
-const NODE_EVAL_MODE_PATTERN = /(?:^|\s)["']?(?:(?:-e|-p)(?!-)|--(?:eval|print)(?:=|\s|["']|$))/;
-
-function validateAllowedGateCommands(normalized: string, original: string): void {
-	const pipelineCommands = normalized.split("|").map((part) => part.trim());
-	for (const pipelineCommand of pipelineCommands) {
-		if (/^node(?:\s|$)/.test(pipelineCommand) && NODE_EVAL_MODE_PATTERN.test(pipelineCommand)) {
-			throw new Error(`Security: verification gate command rejected (Node eval/print mode is not allowed): ${original}`);
-		}
-		if (!pipelineCommand || !ALLOWED_GATE_COMMAND_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(pipelineCommand))) {
-			throw new Error(`Security: verification gate command rejected (command is not allowlisted): ${original}`);
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate a verification gate command is safe to execute.
- * Rejects commands with shell metacharacters that could enable injection and
- * commands outside the verification-runner allowlist. Allows safe pipelines
- * and stderr fd duplication (`2>&1`).
- */
-/** @internal — exported for injection-guard unit testing (Round 25). */
-export function __test__validateGateCommand(command: string): void {
-	validateGateCommand(command);
-}
-
-function validateGateCommand(command: string): void {
-	// Round 25 (VULN-3): check the ORIGINAL command for raw newlines BEFORE
-	// normalization. The regex below runs on the NORMALIZED command (which
-	// collapses \s+ incl. newlines to a single space), so a newline would be
-	// hidden from it - but `sh -c` treats a raw newline as a command
-	// separator, enabling injection (e.g. `npm test\nrm -rf x`).
-	if (/[\r\n]/.test(command)) {
-		throw new Error(
-			`Security: verification gate command rejected (raw newline - potential command injection): ${JSON.stringify(command)}`,
-		);
-	}
-	const normalized = command
-		.replace(/\x1b\[[0-9;]*[a-zA-Z]/g, "") // ANSI escape sequences
-		.replace(/[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f]/g, "") // control chars
-		.replace(/\\\n/g, " ") // escaped newlines
-		.replace(/\s+/g, " ") // collapse whitespace
-		.trim();
-	if (DANGEROUS_SHELL_PATTERNS.test(normalized)) {
-		throw new Error(`Security: verification gate command rejected (dangerous shell pattern): ${command}`);
-	}
-	validateAllowedGateCommands(normalized, command);
-}
-
-async function executeCommand(
-	command: string,
-	cwd: string,
-	timeoutMs: number = 120000,
-): Promise<{ exitCode: number | null; output: string; durationMs: number }> {
-	// SECURITY: Validate command before shell execution to prevent injection.
-	validateGateCommand(command);
-
-	const start = Date.now();
-	let output = "";
-	let exitCode: number | null = null;
-
-	return new Promise((resolve) => {
-		const shell = spawn("sh", ["-c", command], {
-			cwd,
-			timeout: timeoutMs,
-			env: buildVerificationEnv(),
-		});
-
-		shell.stdout?.on("data", (data) => {
-			output += data.toString();
-		});
-
-		shell.stderr?.on("data", (data) => {
-			output += data.toString();
-		});
-
-		// M-9 fix (code-review 2026-06-23): store the timeout handle so it can be
-		// cleared when the process exits normally, and unref it so it does not
-		// keep the Node.js event loop alive for the full timeoutMs after all work
-		// is done (previously it fired shell.kill() on an already-dead process).
-		const timer = setTimeout(() => {
-			shell.kill("SIGKILL");
-			resolve({
-				exitCode: -1,
-				output: output + "\n[TIMEOUT: Command exceeded limit]",
-				durationMs: Date.now() - start,
-			});
-		}, timeoutMs);
-		timer.unref();
-		const clearTimer = (): void => clearTimeout(timer);
-
-		shell.on("close", (code) => {
-			clearTimer();
-			exitCode = code;
-			resolve({
-				exitCode,
-				output: output.slice(-100000), // Cap at 100KB
-				durationMs: Date.now() - start,
-			});
-		});
-
-		shell.on("error", (err) => {
-			clearTimer();
-			resolve({
-				exitCode: -1,
-				output: `Execution error: ${err.message}`,
-				durationMs: Date.now() - start,
-			});
-		});
-	});
-}
-
-/**
- * Run phase gates sequentially, stopping on first critical failure.
- *
- * @param gates - Array of phase gate definitions
- * @param cwd - Working directory to execute commands in
- * @param signal - Optional abort signal
- * @param onPhase - Optional callback for each phase completion
- * @returns Phase gate bundle with all results
- */
-export async function runPhaseGates(
-	gates: Array<{ name: string; command: string; critical: boolean }>,
-	cwd: string,
-	signal?: AbortSignal,
-	onPhase?: (result: PhaseGateResult) => void,
-): Promise<PhaseGateBundle> {
-	const results: PhaseGateResult[] = [];
-	const startTime = Date.now();
-	let stoppedAt: number | undefined;
-
-	for (let i = 0; i < gates.length; i++) {
-		// Check abort signal
-		if (signal?.aborted) {
-			results.push({
-				phase: i + 1,
-				name: gates[i].name,
-				status: "skipped",
-				command: gates[i].command,
-				durationMs: 0,
-				error: "Aborted",
-			});
-			stoppedAt = i + 1;
-			break;
-		}
-
-		const gate = gates[i];
-		const phaseStart = Date.now();
-
-		// Execute the gate command
-		const { exitCode, output, durationMs } = await executeCommand(
-			gate.command,
-			cwd,
-			120000, // 2 minute timeout
-		);
-
-		const passed = exitCode === 0;
-		const result: PhaseGateResult = {
-			phase: i + 1,
-			name: gate.name,
-			status: passed ? "passed" : "failed",
-			command: gate.command,
-			exitCode,
-			output,
-			durationMs,
-			error: passed ? undefined : `Exit code: ${exitCode}`,
-		};
-
-		results.push(result);
-		onPhase?.(result);
-
-		// Stop on critical failure
-		if (!passed && gate.critical) {
-			stoppedAt = i + 1;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-
-	return {
-		results,
-		totalDurationMs: Date.now() - startTime,
-		allPassed: results.every((r) => r.status === "passed"),
-		stoppedAt,
-	};
-}
-
-/**
- * Execute verification commands from a task's verification contract.
- * Maps the contract commands to phase gates and runs them sequentially.
- *
- * @param contract - Verification contract with commands to execute
- * @param cwd - Working directory
- * @param runId - Run ID for artifact naming
- * @param taskId - Task ID for artifact naming
- * @param artifactsRoot - Artifacts root directory
- * @param signal - Optional abort signal
- * @returns Array of verification command results
- */
-export async function executeVerificationCommands(
-	contract: VerificationContract,
-	cwd: string,
-	runId: string,
-	taskId: string,
-	artifactsRoot: string,
-	signal?: AbortSignal,
-	/** Phase 1.5 #2 (RFC 16): when provided, run verification commands in this
-	 *  pristine git-worktree path instead of `cwd`. The caller is responsible
-	 *  for preparing + cleaning up the worktree (see verification-worktree.ts).
-	 *  When undefined, behavior is unchanged (run in `cwd`). */
-	worktreeCwd?: string,
-): Promise<VerificationCommandResult[]> {
-	if (!contract.commands || contract.commands.length === 0) {
-		return [];
-	}
-
-	const results: VerificationCommandResult[] = [];
-
-	// Map commands to phase gates
-	const gates = contract.commands.map((cmd, index) => ({
-		name: `verification-${index + 1}`,
-		command: cmd,
-		critical: true, // All verification commands are critical by default
-	}));
-
-	// Create artifacts directory
-	const gatesDir = path.join(artifactsRoot, "verification-gates");
-	if (!fs.existsSync(gatesDir)) {
-		fs.mkdirSync(gatesDir, { recursive: true });
-	}
-
-	// Phase 1.5 #2: run phase gates inside the worktree when provided.
-	const execCwd = worktreeCwd ?? cwd;
-
-	// Run phase gates
-	const bundle = await runPhaseGates(gates, execCwd, signal, (phaseResult) => {
-		// P1f: redact secrets from verification output BEFORE persisting to the
-		// world-readable artifact file. redactSecretString is best-effort vs
-		// adversarial workers (RFC §6 — Med-High residual). writeArtifact ALSO
-		// redacts (defense-in-depth); this explicit pass sanitizes the raw output
-		// at the source so the in-memory bundle and the summary below are clean.
-		const safeOutput = redactSecretString(phaseResult.output || "");
-		// Write phase artifact immediately for observability
-		const phaseArtifact = writeArtifact(artifactsRoot, {
-			kind: "log",
-			relativePath: `verification-gates/${taskId}-phase-${phaseResult.phase}-${phaseResult.name}.log`,
-			content: [
-				`# Phase ${phaseResult.phase}: ${phaseResult.name}`,
-				`Status: ${phaseResult.status.toUpperCase()}`,
-				`Command: ${phaseResult.command}`,
-				`Duration: ${phaseResult.durationMs}ms`,
-				phaseResult.exitCode != null ? `Exit Code: ${phaseResult.exitCode}` : "",
-				phaseResult.error ? `Error: ${phaseResult.error}` : "",
-				"",
-				"## Output",
-				safeOutput || "(no output)",
-			].join("\n"),
-			producer: taskId,
-		});
-
-		results.push({
-			cmd: phaseResult.command,
-			status: phaseResult.status === "passed" ? "passed" : "failed",
-			exitCode: phaseResult.exitCode,
-			outputArtifact: phaseArtifact,
-		});
-	});
-
-	// Write summary artifact. Redact the whole bundle JSON (it embeds the raw
-	// per-phase output strings) BEFORE writeArtifact persists it.
-	const summaryArtifact = writeArtifact(artifactsRoot, {
-		kind: "metadata",
-		relativePath: `verification-gates/${taskId}-summary.json`,
-		content: redactSecretString(JSON.stringify(bundle, null, 2)),
-		producer: taskId,
-	});
-
-	// Fill in any remaining results (in case of early exit)
-	for (let i = results.length; i < gates.length; i++) {
-		results.push({
-			cmd: gates[i].command,
-			status: "not_run",
-		});
-	}
-
-	return results;
-}
-
-/**
- * Compute observed green level from verification results.
- * Maps verification outcomes to green levels per ECC pattern.
- *
- * @param commands - Array of verification command results
- * @param requiredLevel - Required green level from contract
- * @returns Observed green level
- */
-export function computeGreenLevelFromResults(commands: VerificationCommandResult[], requiredLevel: GreenLevel): GreenLevel {
-	if (commands.length === 0) {
-		return "none";
-	}
-
-	const passed = commands.filter((c) => c.status === "passed").length;
-	const failed = commands.filter((c) => c.status === "failed").length;
-	const notRun = commands.filter((c) => c.status === "not_run").length;
-
-	// If any critical verification failed, return none
-	if (failed > 0) {
-		return "none";
-	}
-
-	// If all passed, return the required level (capped at merge_ready)
-	if (passed === commands.length) {
-		return requiredLevel === "none" ? "targeted" : requiredLevel;
-	}
-
-	// Partial pass - return targeted
-	if (passed > 0) {
-		return "targeted";
-	}
-
-	// Nothing run
-	return "none";
-}
-
-/**
- * Create a verification gate report artifact.
- * Formatted for human review per ECC verification-loop pattern.
- */
-/** @internal */
-function createVerificationGateReport(
-	taskId: string,
-	contract: VerificationContract,
-	results: VerificationCommandResult[],
-	bundle: PhaseGateBundle,
-): string {
-	const lines = [
-		`# Verification Gate Report: ${taskId}`,
-		"",
-		`## Contract`,
-		`- Required Green Level: ${contract.requiredGreenLevel}`,
-		`- Allow Manual Evidence: ${contract.allowManualEvidence}`,
-		`- Commands: ${contract.commands.length}`,
-		"",
-		`## Results`,
-		"",
-		`| Phase | Command | Status | Exit Code | Duration |`,
-		`|-------|---------|--------|-----------|----------|`,
-	];
-
-	for (const result of results) {
-		const phaseIndex = results.indexOf(result) + 1;
-		const statusIcon = result.status === "passed" ? "✅" : result.status === "failed" ? "❌" : "⏭️";
-		lines.push(
-			`| ${phaseIndex} | \`${truncate(result.cmd, 40)}\` | ${statusIcon} ${result.status} | ${result.exitCode ?? "-"} | ${result.durationMs ?? 0}ms |`,
-		);
-	}
-
-	lines.push("");
-	lines.push(`## Summary`);
-	lines.push(`- Total Phases: ${bundle.results.length}`);
-	lines.push(`- Passed: ${bundle.results.filter((r) => r.status === "passed").length}`);
-	lines.push(`- Failed: ${bundle.results.filter((r) => r.status === "failed").length}`);
-	lines.push(`- Skipped: ${bundle.results.filter((r) => r.status === "skipped").length}`);
-	lines.push(`- Total Duration: ${bundle.totalDurationMs}ms`);
-	lines.push(`- All Passed: ${bundle.allPassed ? "YES ✅" : "NO ❌"}`);
-
-	if (bundle.stoppedAt) {
-		lines.push(`- Stopped At: Phase ${bundle.stoppedAt}`);
-	}
-
-	lines.push("");
-	lines.push("## VERIFICATION");
-	lines.push(bundle.allPassed ? "**PASSED** - All gates green ✅" : "**FAILED** - One or more gates red ❌");
-
-	return lines.join("\n");
-}
-
-function truncate(str: string, maxLen: number): string {
-	if (str.length <= maxLen) return str;
-	return str.slice(0, maxLen - 3) + "...";
-}

package/src/runtime/verification-integrity.ts

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Verification Integrity — manifest bookend snapshot helper (RFC §P1a).
- *
- * Hashes a FIXED set of project-manifest files so the goal loop can detect
- * drift between T_snap (before verification runs) and T_verify_done (after the
- * command exits). This closes the PERSISTENT-edit subcase of workspace
- * tampering (a worker that rewrites package.json / lockfile and leaves it
- * changed). See RFC §P1a / §6 STRIDE for the full threat model.
- *
- * RESIDUALS (documented; closed by Phase 1.5 git-worktree sandbox, NOT here):
- *  - Round-trip tamper: a worker can edit a manifest, run the test, then REVERT
- *    before T_verify_done so the hash matches T_snap. Content-addressed
- *    execution (git-worktree) is required to close this. Not fixable by hashing.
- *  - Invoked-script tampering: only the manifest files in MANIFEST_FILES are
- *    hashed. A worker that overwrites a script the verification command invokes
- *    is NOT caught. Phase 1.5 git-worktree closes this.
- *  - node_modules/ and transitive deps are deliberately NOT hashed (size +
- *    churn); package-lock.json IS hashed, which transitively pins resolved
- *    dependency versions.
- *
- * Pure leaf module: depends only on node: built-ins. Does NOT import
- * goal-loop-runner or goal-evaluator (keeps the P1a helper unit-testable in
- * isolation and avoids pulling the conflict-zone modules into this file).
- *
- * @module verification-integrity
- */
-
-import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
-import * as fs from "node:fs";
-import * as path from "node:path";
-
-/**
- * Fixed set of project-manifest files considered by {@link snapshotManifests}.
- * Only files from this set that EXIST in the target directory are hashed.
- * (RFC §P1a: package.json, package-lock.json, pyproject.toml, setup.py,
- * Cargo.toml, Cargo.lock, go.mod, tsconfig.json.)
- */
-export const MANIFEST_FILES = [
-	"package.json",
-	"package-lock.json",
-	"pyproject.toml",
-	"setup.py",
-	"Cargo.toml",
-	"Cargo.lock",
-	"go.mod",
-	"tsconfig.json",
-] as const;
-
-/**
- * sha256-hash the manifest files from the fixed set that EXIST in `cwd`.
- *
- * - Missing files are SKIPPED silently (not errors): a Python project has no
- *   package.json, a JS project has no Cargo.toml, etc.
- * - Non-regular files (directories, etc.) are skipped.
- * - node_modules is NEVER hashed.
- *
- * @returns A map of relative manifest path -> sha256 hex digest for each
- * present file. Stable key order = MANIFEST_FILES order (insertion order).
- */
-export function snapshotManifests(cwd: string): Record<string, string> {
-	const snapshot: Record<string, string> = {};
-	for (const rel of MANIFEST_FILES) {
-		const abs = path.join(cwd, rel);
-		let stat: fs.Stats;
-		try {
-			stat = fs.statSync(abs);
-		} catch {
-			continue; // missing file — skip gracefully
-		}
-		if (!stat.isFile()) continue; // directory / special — skip
-		try {
-			const content = fs.readFileSync(abs);
-			snapshot[rel] = createHash("sha256").update(content).digest("hex");
-		} catch {}
-	}
-	return snapshot;
-}
-
-/**
- * Compare two snapshots and return the list of DRIFTED file paths.
- *
- * A file is considered drifted if:
- *  - its hash differs between `a` and `b`, OR
- *  - it is present in only one of the two snapshots (added or removed).
- *
- * @returns Sorted array of relative manifest paths that drifted. Identical
- * snapshots yield `[]`.
- */
-export function compareSnapshot(a: Record<string, string>, b: Record<string, string>): string[] {
-	const drifted = new Set<string>();
-	for (const [key, hash] of Object.entries(a)) {
-		const other = b[key];
-		if (other === undefined) {
-			drifted.add(key); // removed between a -> b
-		} else if (other !== hash) {
-			drifted.add(key); // content changed
-		}
-	}
-	for (const key of Object.keys(b)) {
-		if (a[key] === undefined) {
-			drifted.add(key); // added between a -> b
-		}
-	}
-	return [...drifted].sort();
-}