opencode-skills-collection 4.0.68 → 4.0.70

package/bundled-skills/saas-security-posture/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: saas-security-posture
+description: Audit and harden your SaaS tool stack
+category: devops
+risk: critical
+source: https://github.com/BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills
+source_repo: BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills
+source_type: community
+date_added: '2026-09-20'
+license: MIT
+license_source: https://github.com/BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills/blob/main/LICENSE
+compatibility: Requires the relevant OS/platform tooling and privileged access where
+  noted. Docs-only; helper scripts and templates not bundled.
+metadata:
+  author: devops-skills
+  version: '1.0'
+---
+
+# SaaS Security Posture Management for Startups
+
+Secure every SaaS tool your company relies on with practical, command-driven hardening.
+
+## When to Use This Skill
+
+- **SOC 2 preparation** — auditors need evidence of MFA, access controls, and OAuth governance.
+- **Suspicious OAuth app** — an employee authorized a third-party app with broad scopes.
+- **SaaS sprawl** — teams sign up for tools with company email and nobody tracks them.
+- **Post-incident hardening** — after phishing or credential leaks, tighten every surface.
+
+## 2. SaaS Inventory Audit
+
+### Google Workspace — OAuth Grants
+
+```bash
+gam all users show tokens > oauth_tokens_audit.csv
+```
+
+### GitHub — Installed Apps
+
+```bash
+gh api /orgs/{ORG}/installations --paginate \
+  --jq '.installations[] | {app: .app_slug, permissions: .permissions, created: .created_at}'
+gh api /orgs/{ORG}/credential-authorizations --paginate \
+  --jq '.[] | {login: .login, credential_type: .credential_type}'
+```
+
+### Slack — Approved and Pending Apps
+
+```bash
+curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}" \
+  "https://slack.com/api/admin.apps.approved.list" | jq '.approved_apps[] | {name: .app.name, id: .app.id}'
+curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}" \
+  "https://slack.com/api/admin.apps.requests.list" | jq '.app_requests[]'
+```
+
+### AWS — IAM Credential Report
+
+```bash
+aws iam generate-credential-report
+aws iam get-credential-report --output text --query 'Content' | base64 -d > iam_credential_report.csv
+```
+
+### Master Inventory Template
+
+```yaml
+tools:
+  - name: Google Workspace
+    owner: it@company.com
+    sso: true
+    mfa: enforced
+  - name: GitHub Enterprise
+    owner: engineering@company.com
+    sso: true
+    mfa: enforced
+  - name: Slack Business+
+    owner: it@company.com
+    sso: true
+    app_approval: required
+  - name: AWS Organizations
+    owner: platform@company.com
+    sso: true
+    scp_enforced: true
+```
+
+---
+
+## 3. GitHub Security Hardening
+
+```bash
+# Enforce 2FA and find non-compliant members
+gh api -X PATCH /orgs/{ORG} -f two_factor_requirement_enabled=true
+gh api /orgs/{ORG}/members?filter=2fa_disabled --paginate --jq '.[].login'
+
+# Verify SAML SSO identities
+gh api /orgs/{ORG}/credential-authorizations --paginate \
+  --jq '.[] | {login: .login, saml_name_id: .saml_name_id}'
+
+# Add IP allow list entry
+gh api -X POST /orgs/{ORG}/ip-allow-list \
+  -f allow_list_value="203.0.113.0/24" -f name="Office VPN" -F is_active=true
+
+# Branch protection on main
+gh api -X PUT /repos/{ORG}/{REPO}/branches/main/protection \
+  -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" --input - <<'EOF'
+{
+  "required_status_checks": {"strict": true, "contexts": ["ci/build","ci/test"]},
+  "enforce_admins": true,
+  "required_pull_request_reviews": {
+    "required_approving_review_count": 2,
+    "dismiss_stale_reviews": true,
+    "require_code_owner_reviews": true
+  },
+  "restrictions": null,
+  "allow_force_pushes": false,
+  "allow_deletions": false
+}
+EOF
+
+# Audit PATs and revoke stale tokens
+gh api /orgs/{ORG}/personal-access-tokens --paginate \
+  --jq '.[] | {owner: .owner.login, name: .token_name, expires: .token_expires_at}'
+gh api -X DELETE /orgs/{ORG}/personal-access-tokens/{PAT_ID}
+
+# Audit deploy keys and webhooks
+for repo in $(gh repo list {ORG} --limit 500 --json name -q '.[].name'); do
+  gh api /repos/{ORG}/${repo}/keys --jq '.[] | {title: .title, read_only: .read_only}'
+done
+gh api /orgs/{ORG}/hooks --jq '.[] | {url: .config.url, events: .events, active: .active}'
+```
+
+---
+
+## 4. Slack Security
+
+```bash
+# Require app approval
+curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  "https://slack.com/api/admin.apps.config.set" -d '{"app_approval_enabled": true}'
+
+# Set workspace to invite-only
+curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  "https://slack.com/api/admin.teams.settings.setDiscoverability" \
+  -d '{"team_id": "T0XXXXXXX", "discoverability": "invite_only"}'
+
+# Force re-authentication every 24 hours
+curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  "https://slack.com/api/admin.teams.settings.setSessionDuration" \
+  -d '{"team_id": "T0XXXXXXX", "session_duration": 86400}'
+
+# Set message retention to 1 year
+curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  "https://slack.com/api/admin.teams.settings.setRetentionPolicy" \
+  -d '{"team_id": "T0XXXXXXX", "retention_type": "all", "retention_duration": 365}'
+
+# Audit Slack Connect shared channels
+curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}" \
+  "https://slack.com/api/admin.conversations.search?search_channel_types=connect" \
+  | jq '.conversations[] | {name: .name, is_ext_shared: .is_ext_shared}'
+```
+
+---
+
+## 5. Google Workspace Hardening
+
+```bash
+# Enforce 2-Step Verification and strong passwords
+gam update org "/" settings 2sv enforced
+gam update org "/" settings password_length 14
+
+# Block all third-party OAuth apps, then whitelist specific ones
+gam update org "/" settings oauth_access block_all
+gam update org "/" settings oauth_access whitelist client_id:APP_CLIENT_ID_1
+
+# Disable external Drive sharing and file transfers
+gam update org "/" settings drive sharing_outside_domain off
+gam update org "/" settings drive transfer_to_personal off
+gam update org "/" settings groups external_members off
+
+# Verify email authentication records
+dig TXT company.com | grep "v=spf1"
+dig TXT google._domainkey.company.com
+dig TXT _dmarc.company.com
+# Expected: v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@company.com; pct=100
+
+# Mobile device management
+gam update org "/" settings mobile management advanced
+gam update org "/" settings mobile screen_lock required
+gam update org "/" settings mobile encryption required
+gam update mobile ${DEVICE_ID} action wipe   # compromised device
+```
+
+---
+
+## 6. AWS Account Security
+
+```bash
+# Root account lockdown — verify MFA, remove access keys
+aws iam get-account-summary --query 'SummaryMap.AccountMFAEnabled'
+aws iam get-account-summary --query 'SummaryMap.AccountAccessKeysPresent'
+
+# SSO permission set with least privilege
+aws sso-admin create-permission-set --instance-arn "${SSO_INSTANCE_ARN}" \
+  --name "DeveloperAccess" --session-duration "PT8H"
+aws sso-admin attach-managed-policy-to-permission-set \
+  --instance-arn "${SSO_INSTANCE_ARN}" --permission-set-arn "${PERMISSION_SET_ARN}" \
+  --managed-policy-arn "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/ReadOnlyAccess"
+```
+
+### Service Control Policies
+
+```json
+{
+  "Version": "2012-10-17",
+  "Statement": [
+    {"Sid": "DenyRootActions", "Effect": "Deny", "Action": "*", "Resource": "*",
+     "Condition": {"StringLike": {"aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:root"}}},
+    {"Sid": "DenyLeaveOrg", "Effect": "Deny",
+     "Action": "organizations:LeaveOrganization", "Resource": "*"}
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+```bash
+aws organizations create-policy --name "DenyRootActions" \
+  --type SERVICE_CONTROL_POLICY --content file://deny-root-actions.json
+aws organizations attach-policy --policy-id "${POLICY_ID}" --target-id "${ORG_ROOT_ID}"
+
+# Organization-wide CloudTrail
+aws cloudtrail create-trail --name org-security-trail \
+  --s3-bucket-name company-cloudtrail-logs \
+  --is-multi-region-trail --is-organization-trail --enable-log-file-validation
+aws cloudtrail start-logging --name org-security-trail
+```
+
+---
+
+## 7. OAuth App Review
+
+### Identify High-Risk Grants
+
+```bash
+# Google — find apps with dangerous scopes
+gam all users show tokens | grep -E "(drive|gmail|admin)" > high_risk_oauth.txt
+
+# GitHub — find apps with write access
+gh api /orgs/{ORG}/installations --paginate \
+  --jq '.installations[] | select(.permissions.contents == "write") | {app: .app_slug}'
+```
+
+### Revoke Dangerous Grants
+
+```bash
+gam user compromised@company.com delete token clientid APP_CLIENT_ID  # single app
+gam user compromised@company.com delete tokens                        # all apps
+gh api -X DELETE /orgs/{ORG}/installations/{INSTALLATION_ID}           # GitHub app
+curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  "https://slack.com/api/admin.apps.uninstall" -d '{"app_id": "A0XXXXXXX"}'
+```
+
+### Scope Risk Classification
+
+```
+CRITICAL — revoke unless justified:
+  Google: mail.google.com, admin.directory.user | GitHub: admin:org, repo | Slack: admin
+HIGH — review carefully:
+  Google: googleapis.com/auth/drive | GitHub: contents:write | Slack: channels:read
+LOW — generally safe:
+  Google: userinfo.email | GitHub: read:org | Slack: identity.basic
+```
+
+---
+
+## 8. Admin Account Protection
+
+```bash
+# Dedicated admin account in Google Workspace
+gam create user admin-jdoe@company.com firstname "John (Admin)" lastname "Doe" \
+  password "$(openssl rand -base64 32)" org "/Admins"
+gam update user admin-jdoe@company.com admin on
+
+# Require hardware security keys for the Admins OU
+gam update org "/Admins" settings 2sv security_key_only
+
+# AWS MFA enforcement policy
+cat <<'EOF' > enforce-mfa-policy.json
+{
+  "Version": "2012-10-17",
+  "Statement": [{
+    "Sid": "DenyUnlessMFA", "Effect": "Deny",
+    "NotAction": ["iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice","iam:EnableMFADevice",
+                  "iam:GetUser","iam:ListMFADevices","sts:GetSessionToken"],
+    "Resource": "*",
+    "Condition": {"BoolIfExists": {"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent": "false"}}
+  }]
+}
+EOF
+aws iam create-policy --policy-name EnforceMFA --policy-document file://enforce-mfa-policy.json
+
+# Break-glass account for SSO outages
+BREAK_GLASS_PW=$(openssl rand -base64 48)
+gam create user breakglass@company.com firstname "Break" lastname "Glass" \
+  password "${BREAK_GLASS_PW}" org "/Admins" admin on
+# Store password in a sealed envelope in a physical safe
+# After every use: rotate password, re-seal, log the incident
+```
+
+---
+
+## 9. Data Loss Prevention
+
+```bash
+# Google Drive — block external sharing and restrict viewers
+gam update org "/" settings drive sharing_outside_domain off
+gam update org "/" settings drive disable_download_print_copy_for_viewers on
+
+# GitHub — enable secret scanning and push protection org-wide
+gh api -X PATCH /orgs/{ORG} -f security_product=secret_scanning -f enablement=enable_all
+gh api -X PATCH /orgs/{ORG} -f security_product=secret_scanning_push_protection -f enablement=enable_all
+gh api /orgs/{ORG}/secret-scanning/alerts --paginate \
+  --jq '.[] | {repo: .repository.name, secret_type: .secret_type, state: .state}'
+
+# Slack — restrict data export to org admins
+curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}" \
+  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  "https://slack.com/api/admin.teams.settings.setExportRestrictions" \
+  -d '{"team_id": "T0XXXXXXX", "export_type": "org_admins_only"}'
+
+# AWS — block all public S3 access at account level
+aws s3control put-public-access-block --account-id "${AWS_ACCOUNT_ID}" \
+  --public-access-block-configuration \
+  "BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true"
+```
+
+---
+
+## 10. Shadow IT Detection
+
+### DNS-Based Discovery
+
+```bash
+SHADOW_IT_DOMAINS=("airtable.com" "notion.so" "trello.com" "asana.com"
+  "monday.com" "clickup.com" "figma.com" "canva.com" "miro.com"
+  "zapier.com" "dropbox.com" "box.com" "wetransfer.com")
+for domain in "${SHADOW_IT_DOMAINS[@]}"; do
+  count=$(grep -c "${domain}" /var/log/dns/query.log 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
+  [ "${count}" -gt 0 ] && echo "DETECTED: ${domain} — ${count} queries"
+done
+```
+
+### Google Workspace Login Audit
+
+```bash
+gam report login parameters app_name \
+  start_time "2026-03-01T00:00:00Z" end_time "2026-03-24T23:59:59Z" > login_audit.csv
+gam report token > token_usage_report.csv
+```
+
+### Proxy Log Analysis
+
+```bash
+awk '{print $7}' /var/log/squid/access.log | sed 's|https\?://||;s|/.*||' \
+  | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -50 > top_domains.txt
+comm -23 <(awk '{print $2}' top_domains.txt | sort) \
+  <(yq '.tools[].domains[]' saas-inventory.yaml | sort) > unapproved.txt
+```
+
+### Automated Alerting
+
+```bash
+cat <<'SCRIPT' > /usr/local/bin/shadow-it-check.sh
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+APPROVED="/etc/security/approved-saas-domains.txt"
+YESTERDAY=$(date -d "yesterday" +%d-%b-%Y)
+grep "${YESTERDAY}" /var/log/dns/query.log | awk '{print $4}' | sort -u > /tmp/today.txt
+NEW=$(comm -23 /tmp/today.txt <(sort "${APPROVED}"))
+[ -n "${NEW}" ] && mail -s "[ALERT] Shadow IT" security@company.com <<< "${NEW}"
+SCRIPT
+chmod +x /usr/local/bin/shadow-it-check.sh
+echo "0 8 * * * root /usr/local/bin/shadow-it-check.sh" >> /etc/cron.d/shadow-it-check
+```
+
+---
+
+## Quick Reference — Top 10 Priority Actions
+
+| # | Action | Scope |
+|---|--------|-------|
+| 1 | Enforce MFA/2FA everywhere | Google, GitHub, AWS, Slack |
+| 2 | Enable SSO with your IdP | All tools |
+| 3 | Audit and revoke OAuth grants | Google, GitHub |
+| 4 | Require Slack app approval | Slack |
+| 5 | Branch protection on main | GitHub |
+| 6 | Secret scanning + push protection | GitHub |
+| 7 | Block public S3 buckets | AWS |
+| 8 | Enable org-wide CloudTrail | AWS |
+| 9 | Disable external Drive sharing | Google |
+| 10 | Create break-glass admin accounts | Google, AWS |
+
+## Maintenance Cadence
+
+**Weekly:** Review OAuth grants, secret scanning alerts, Slack app queue.
+**Monthly:** AWS IAM report, rotate service keys, admin account review, shadow IT scan.
+**Quarterly:** Full SaaS inventory refresh, OAuth pruning, break-glass test, SCP updates.
+
+## Limitations
+
+- Infrastructure commands can disrupt services: confirm target host/scope and have backups/snapshots before mutating state.
+- Docs-only import: upstream scripts and templates not bundled.
+