gnache-cli 0.0.1-security → 6.12.2

package/node_modules/secp256k1/src/secp256k1/src/ecmult_const_impl.h

@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+/**********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra                  *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying   *
+ * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H
+#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H
+
+#include "scalar.h"
+#include "group.h"
+#include "ecmult_const.h"
+#include "ecmult_impl.h"
+
+/* This is like `ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE` but is constant time */
+#define ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(r,pre,n,w) do { \
+    int m; \
+    int abs_n = (n) * (((n) > 0) * 2 - 1); \
+    int idx_n = abs_n / 2; \
+    secp256k1_fe neg_y; \
+    VERIFY_CHECK(((n) & 1) == 1); \
+    VERIFY_CHECK((n) >= -((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \
+    VERIFY_CHECK((n) <=  ((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \
+    VERIFY_SETUP(secp256k1_fe_clear(&(r)->x)); \
+    VERIFY_SETUP(secp256k1_fe_clear(&(r)->y)); \
+    for (m = 0; m < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(w); m++) { \
+        /* This loop is used to avoid secret data in array indices. See
+         * the comment in ecmult_gen_impl.h for rationale. */ \
+        secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->x, &(pre)[m].x, m == idx_n); \
+        secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->y, &(pre)[m].y, m == idx_n); \
+    } \
+    (r)->infinity = 0; \
+    secp256k1_fe_negate(&neg_y, &(r)->y, 1); \
+    secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->y, &neg_y, (n) != abs_n); \
+} while(0)
+
+
+/** Convert a number to WNAF notation.
+ *  The number becomes represented by sum(2^{wi} * wnaf[i], i=0..WNAF_SIZE(w)+1) - return_val.
+ *  It has the following guarantees:
+ *  - each wnaf[i] an odd integer between -(1 << w) and (1 << w)
+ *  - each wnaf[i] is nonzero
+ *  - the number of words set is always WNAF_SIZE(w) + 1
+ *
+ *  Adapted from `The Width-w NAF Method Provides Small Memory and Fast Elliptic Scalar
+ *  Multiplications Secure against Side Channel Attacks`, Okeya and Tagaki. M. Joye (Ed.)
+ *  CT-RSA 2003, LNCS 2612, pp. 328-443, 2003. Springer-Verlagy Berlin Heidelberg 2003
+ *
+ *  Numbers reference steps of `Algorithm SPA-resistant Width-w NAF with Odd Scalar` on pp. 335
+ */
+static int secp256k1_wnaf_const(int *wnaf, const secp256k1_scalar *scalar, int w, int size) {
+    int global_sign;
+    int skew = 0;
+    int word = 0;
+
+    /* 1 2 3 */
+    int u_last;
+    int u;
+
+    int flip;
+    int bit;
+    secp256k1_scalar s;
+    int not_neg_one;
+
+    VERIFY_CHECK(w > 0);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(size > 0);
+
+    /* Note that we cannot handle even numbers by negating them to be odd, as is
+     * done in other implementations, since if our scalars were specified to have
+     * width < 256 for performance reasons, their negations would have width 256
+     * and we'd lose any performance benefit. Instead, we use a technique from
+     * Section 4.2 of the Okeya/Tagaki paper, which is to add either 1 (for even)
+     * or 2 (for odd) to the number we are encoding, returning a skew value indicating
+     * this, and having the caller compensate after doing the multiplication.
+     *
+     * In fact, we _do_ want to negate numbers to minimize their bit-lengths (and in
+     * particular, to ensure that the outputs from the endomorphism-split fit into
+     * 128 bits). If we negate, the parity of our number flips, inverting which of
+     * {1, 2} we want to add to the scalar when ensuring that it's odd. Further
+     * complicating things, -1 interacts badly with `secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit` and
+     * we need to special-case it in this logic. */
+    flip = secp256k1_scalar_is_high(scalar);
+    /* We add 1 to even numbers, 2 to odd ones, noting that negation flips parity */
+    bit = flip ^ !secp256k1_scalar_is_even(scalar);
+    /* We check for negative one, since adding 2 to it will cause an overflow */
+    secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, scalar);
+    not_neg_one = !secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&s);
+    s = *scalar;
+    secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&s, bit, not_neg_one);
+    /* If we had negative one, flip == 1, s.d[0] == 0, bit == 1, so caller expects
+     * that we added two to it and flipped it. In fact for -1 these operations are
+     * identical. We only flipped, but since skewing is required (in the sense that
+     * the skew must be 1 or 2, never zero) and flipping is not, we need to change
+     * our flags to claim that we only skewed. */
+    global_sign = secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&s, flip);
+    global_sign *= not_neg_one * 2 - 1;
+    skew = 1 << bit;
+
+    /* 4 */
+    u_last = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s, w);
+    do {
+        int sign;
+        int even;
+
+        /* 4.1 4.4 */
+        u = secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s, w);
+        /* 4.2 */
+        even = ((u & 1) == 0);
+        sign = 2 * (u_last > 0) - 1;
+        u += sign * even;
+        u_last -= sign * even * (1 << w);
+
+        /* 4.3, adapted for global sign change */
+        wnaf[word++] = u_last * global_sign;
+
+        u_last = u;
+    } while (word * w < size);
+    wnaf[word] = u * global_sign;
+
+    VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s));
+    VERIFY_CHECK(word == WNAF_SIZE_BITS(size, w));
+    return skew;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_scalar *scalar, int size) {
+    secp256k1_ge pre_a[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)];
+    secp256k1_ge tmpa;
+    secp256k1_fe Z;
+
+    int skew_1;
+#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
+    secp256k1_ge pre_a_lam[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A)];
+    int wnaf_lam[1 + WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A - 1)];
+    int skew_lam;
+    secp256k1_scalar q_1, q_lam;
+#endif
+    int wnaf_1[1 + WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A - 1)];
+
+    int i;
+
+    /* build wnaf representation for q. */
+    int rsize = size;
+#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
+    if (size > 128) {
+        rsize = 128;
+        /* split q into q_1 and q_lam (where q = q_1 + q_lam*lambda, and q_1 and q_lam are ~128 bit) */
+        secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&q_1, &q_lam, scalar);
+        skew_1   = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_1,   &q_1,   WINDOW_A - 1, 128);
+        skew_lam = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_lam, &q_lam, WINDOW_A - 1, 128);
+    } else
+#endif
+    {
+        skew_1   = secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_1, scalar, WINDOW_A - 1, size);
+#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
+        skew_lam = 0;
+#endif
+    }
+
+    /* Calculate odd multiples of a.
+     * All multiples are brought to the same Z 'denominator', which is stored
+     * in Z. Due to secp256k1' isomorphism we can do all operations pretending
+     * that the Z coordinate was 1, use affine addition formulae, and correct
+     * the Z coordinate of the result once at the end.
+     */
+    secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r, a);
+    secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_globalz_windowa(pre_a, &Z, r);
+    for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); i++) {
+        secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&pre_a[i].y);
+    }
+#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
+    if (size > 128) {
+        for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A); i++) {
+            secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&pre_a_lam[i], &pre_a[i]);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* first loop iteration (separated out so we can directly set r, rather
+     * than having it start at infinity, get doubled several times, then have
+     * its new value added to it) */
+    i = wnaf_1[WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1)];
+    VERIFY_CHECK(i != 0);
+    ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a, i, WINDOW_A);
+    secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r, &tmpa);
+#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
+    if (size > 128) {
+        i = wnaf_lam[WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1)];
+        VERIFY_CHECK(i != 0);
+        ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a_lam, i, WINDOW_A);
+        secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa);
+    }
+#endif
+    /* remaining loop iterations */
+    for (i = WNAF_SIZE_BITS(rsize, WINDOW_A - 1) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        int n;
+        int j;
+        for (j = 0; j < WINDOW_A - 1; ++j) {
+            secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(r, r, NULL);
+        }
+
+        n = wnaf_1[i];
+        ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a, n, WINDOW_A);
+        VERIFY_CHECK(n != 0);
+        secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa);
+#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
+        if (size > 128) {
+            n = wnaf_lam[i];
+            ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa, pre_a_lam, n, WINDOW_A);
+            VERIFY_CHECK(n != 0);
+            secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &tmpa);
+        }
+#endif
+    }
+
+    secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &r->z, &Z);
+
+    {
+        /* Correct for wNAF skew */
+        secp256k1_ge correction = *a;
+        secp256k1_ge_storage correction_1_stor;
+#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
+        secp256k1_ge_storage correction_lam_stor;
+#endif
+        secp256k1_ge_storage a2_stor;
+        secp256k1_gej tmpj;
+        secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&tmpj, &correction);
+        secp256k1_gej_double_var(&tmpj, &tmpj, NULL);
+        secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&correction, &tmpj);
+        secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&correction_1_stor, a);
+#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
+        if (size > 128) {
+            secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&correction_lam_stor, a);
+        }
+#endif
+        secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&a2_stor, &correction);
+
+        /* For odd numbers this is 2a (so replace it), for even ones a (so no-op) */
+        secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&correction_1_stor, &a2_stor, skew_1 == 2);
+#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
+        if (size > 128) {
+            secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&correction_lam_stor, &a2_stor, skew_lam == 2);
+        }
+#endif
+
+        /* Apply the correction */
+        secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&correction, &correction_1_stor);
+        secp256k1_ge_neg(&correction, &correction);
+        secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &correction);
+
+#ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
+        if (size > 128) {
+            secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&correction, &correction_lam_stor);
+            secp256k1_ge_neg(&correction, &correction);
+            secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&correction, &correction);
+            secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &correction);
+        }
+#endif
+    }
+}
+
+#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H */

package/node_modules/secp256k1/src/secp256k1/src/ecmult_gen.h

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/**********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille                             *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying   *
+ * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_H
+#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_H
+
+#include "scalar.h"
+#include "group.h"
+
+#if ECMULT_GEN_PREC_BITS != 2 && ECMULT_GEN_PREC_BITS != 4 && ECMULT_GEN_PREC_BITS != 8
+#  error "Set ECMULT_GEN_PREC_BITS to 2, 4 or 8."
+#endif
+#define ECMULT_GEN_PREC_B ECMULT_GEN_PREC_BITS
+#define ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G (1 << ECMULT_GEN_PREC_B)
+#define ECMULT_GEN_PREC_N (256 / ECMULT_GEN_PREC_B)
+
+typedef struct {
+    /* For accelerating the computation of a*G:
+     * To harden against timing attacks, use the following mechanism:
+     * * Break up the multiplicand into groups of PREC_B bits, called n_0, n_1, n_2, ..., n_(PREC_N-1).
+     * * Compute sum(n_i * (PREC_G)^i * G + U_i, i=0 ... PREC_N-1), where:
+     *   * U_i = U * 2^i, for i=0 ... PREC_N-2
+     *   * U_i = U * (1-2^(PREC_N-1)), for i=PREC_N-1
+     *   where U is a point with no known corresponding scalar. Note that sum(U_i, i=0 ... PREC_N-1) = 0.
+     * For each i, and each of the PREC_G possible values of n_i, (n_i * (PREC_G)^i * G + U_i) is
+     * precomputed (call it prec(i, n_i)). The formula now becomes sum(prec(i, n_i), i=0 ... PREC_N-1).
+     * None of the resulting prec group elements have a known scalar, and neither do any of
+     * the intermediate sums while computing a*G.
+     */
+    secp256k1_ge_storage (*prec)[ECMULT_GEN_PREC_N][ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G]; /* prec[j][i] = (PREC_G)^j * i * G + U_i */
+    secp256k1_scalar blind;
+    secp256k1_gej initial;
+} secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context;
+
+static const size_t SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_CONTEXT_PREALLOCATED_SIZE;
+static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_init(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx);
+static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, void **prealloc);
+static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_finalize_memcpy(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *dst, const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* src);
+static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clear(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx);
+static int secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx);
+
+/** Multiply with the generator: R = a*G */
+static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *a);
+
+static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const unsigned char *seed32);
+
+#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_H */

package/node_modules/secp256k1/src/secp256k1/src/ecmult_gen_impl.h

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/**********************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, 2014, 2015 Pieter Wuille, Gregory Maxwell      *
+ * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying   *
+ * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+#ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_IMPL_H
+#define SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_IMPL_H
+
+#include "util.h"
+#include "scalar.h"
+#include "group.h"
+#include "ecmult_gen.h"
+#include "hash_impl.h"
+#ifdef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION
+#include "ecmult_static_context.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION
+    static const size_t SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_CONTEXT_PREALLOCATED_SIZE = ROUND_TO_ALIGN(sizeof(*((secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context*) NULL)->prec));
+#else
+    static const size_t SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_CONTEXT_PREALLOCATED_SIZE = 0;
+#endif
+
+static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_init(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx) {
+    ctx->prec = NULL;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_build(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, void **prealloc) {
+#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION
+    secp256k1_ge prec[ECMULT_GEN_PREC_N * ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G];
+    secp256k1_gej gj;
+    secp256k1_gej nums_gej;
+    int i, j;
+    size_t const prealloc_size = SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_CONTEXT_PREALLOCATED_SIZE;
+    void* const base = *prealloc;
+#endif
+
+    if (ctx->prec != NULL) {
+        return;
+    }
+#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION
+    ctx->prec = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[ECMULT_GEN_PREC_N][ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G])manual_alloc(prealloc, prealloc_size, base, prealloc_size);
+
+    /* get the generator */
+    secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&gj, &secp256k1_ge_const_g);
+
+    /* Construct a group element with no known corresponding scalar (nothing up my sleeve). */
+    {
+        static const unsigned char nums_b32[33] = "The scalar for this x is unknown";
+        secp256k1_fe nums_x;
+        secp256k1_ge nums_ge;
+        int r;
+        r = secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&nums_x, nums_b32);
+        (void)r;
+        VERIFY_CHECK(r);
+        r = secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&nums_ge, &nums_x, 0);
+        (void)r;
+        VERIFY_CHECK(r);
+        secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&nums_gej, &nums_ge);
+        /* Add G to make the bits in x uniformly distributed. */
+        secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&nums_gej, &nums_gej, &secp256k1_ge_const_g, NULL);
+    }
+
+    /* compute prec. */
+    {
+        secp256k1_gej precj[ECMULT_GEN_PREC_N * ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G]; /* Jacobian versions of prec. */
+        secp256k1_gej gbase;
+        secp256k1_gej numsbase;
+        gbase = gj; /* PREC_G^j * G */
+        numsbase = nums_gej; /* 2^j * nums. */
+        for (j = 0; j < ECMULT_GEN_PREC_N; j++) {
+            /* Set precj[j*PREC_G .. j*PREC_G+(PREC_G-1)] to (numsbase, numsbase + gbase, ..., numsbase + (PREC_G-1)*gbase). */
+            precj[j*ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G] = numsbase;
+            for (i = 1; i < ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G; i++) {
+                secp256k1_gej_add_var(&precj[j*ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G + i], &precj[j*ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G + i - 1], &gbase, NULL);
+            }
+            /* Multiply gbase by PREC_G. */
+            for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_GEN_PREC_B; i++) {
+                secp256k1_gej_double_var(&gbase, &gbase, NULL);
+            }
+            /* Multiply numbase by 2. */
+            secp256k1_gej_double_var(&numsbase, &numsbase, NULL);
+            if (j == ECMULT_GEN_PREC_N - 2) {
+                /* In the last iteration, numsbase is (1 - 2^j) * nums instead. */
+                secp256k1_gej_neg(&numsbase, &numsbase);
+                secp256k1_gej_add_var(&numsbase, &numsbase, &nums_gej, NULL);
+            }
+        }
+        secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(prec, precj, ECMULT_GEN_PREC_N * ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G);
+    }
+    for (j = 0; j < ECMULT_GEN_PREC_N; j++) {
+        for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G; i++) {
+            secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&(*ctx->prec)[j][i], &prec[j*ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G + i]);
+        }
+    }
+#else
+    (void)prealloc;
+    ctx->prec = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[ECMULT_GEN_PREC_N][ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G])secp256k1_ecmult_static_context;
+#endif
+    secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(ctx, NULL);
+}
+
+static int secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx) {
+    return ctx->prec != NULL;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_finalize_memcpy(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *dst, const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *src) {
+#ifndef USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION
+    if (src->prec != NULL) {
+        /* We cast to void* first to suppress a -Wcast-align warning. */
+        dst->prec = (secp256k1_ge_storage (*)[ECMULT_GEN_PREC_N][ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G])(void*)((unsigned char*)dst + ((unsigned char*)src->prec - (unsigned char*)src));
+    }
+#else
+    (void)dst, (void)src;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_clear(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx) {
+    secp256k1_scalar_clear(&ctx->blind);
+    secp256k1_gej_clear(&ctx->initial);
+    ctx->prec = NULL;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_scalar *gn) {
+    secp256k1_ge add;
+    secp256k1_ge_storage adds;
+    secp256k1_scalar gnb;
+    int bits;
+    int i, j;
+    memset(&adds, 0, sizeof(adds));
+    *r = ctx->initial;
+    /* Blind scalar/point multiplication by computing (n-b)G + bG instead of nG. */
+    secp256k1_scalar_add(&gnb, gn, &ctx->blind);
+    add.infinity = 0;
+    for (j = 0; j < ECMULT_GEN_PREC_N; j++) {
+        bits = secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&gnb, j * ECMULT_GEN_PREC_B, ECMULT_GEN_PREC_B);
+        for (i = 0; i < ECMULT_GEN_PREC_G; i++) {
+            /** This uses a conditional move to avoid any secret data in array indexes.
+             *   _Any_ use of secret indexes has been demonstrated to result in timing
+             *   sidechannels, even when the cache-line access patterns are uniform.
+             *  See also:
+             *   "A word of warning", CHES 2013 Rump Session, by Daniel J. Bernstein and Peter Schwabe
+             *    (https://cryptojedi.org/peter/data/chesrump-20130822.pdf) and
+             *   "Cache Attacks and Countermeasures: the Case of AES", RSA 2006,
+             *    by Dag Arne Osvik, Adi Shamir, and Eran Tromer
+             *    (http://www.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/cache.pdf)
+             */
+            secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&adds, &(*ctx->prec)[j][i], i == bits);
+        }
+        secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&add, &adds);
+        secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r, r, &add);
+    }
+    bits = 0;
+    secp256k1_ge_clear(&add);
+    secp256k1_scalar_clear(&gnb);
+}
+
+/* Setup blinding values for secp256k1_ecmult_gen. */
+static void secp256k1_ecmult_gen_blind(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, const unsigned char *seed32) {
+    secp256k1_scalar b;
+    secp256k1_gej gb;
+    secp256k1_fe s;
+    unsigned char nonce32[32];
+    secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 rng;
+    int retry;
+    unsigned char keydata[64] = {0};
+    if (seed32 == NULL) {
+        /* When seed is NULL, reset the initial point and blinding value. */
+        secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&ctx->initial, &secp256k1_ge_const_g);
+        secp256k1_gej_neg(&ctx->initial, &ctx->initial);
+        secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&ctx->blind, 1);
+    }
+    /* The prior blinding value (if not reset) is chained forward by including it in the hash. */
+    secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(nonce32, &ctx->blind);
+    /** Using a CSPRNG allows a failure free interface, avoids needing large amounts of random data,
+     *   and guards against weak or adversarial seeds.  This is a simpler and safer interface than
+     *   asking the caller for blinding values directly and expecting them to retry on failure.
+     */
+    memcpy(keydata, nonce32, 32);
+    if (seed32 != NULL) {
+        memcpy(keydata + 32, seed32, 32);
+    }
+    secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(&rng, keydata, seed32 ? 64 : 32);
+    memset(keydata, 0, sizeof(keydata));
+    /* Retry for out of range results to achieve uniformity. */
+    do {
+        secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32);
+        retry = !secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&s, nonce32);
+        retry = retry || secp256k1_fe_is_zero(&s);
+    } while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > Fp. */
+    /* Randomize the projection to defend against multiplier sidechannels. */
+    secp256k1_gej_rescale(&ctx->initial, &s);
+    secp256k1_fe_clear(&s);
+    do {
+        secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(&rng, nonce32, 32);
+        secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&b, nonce32, &retry);
+        /* A blinding value of 0 works, but would undermine the projection hardening. */
+        retry = retry || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&b);
+    } while (retry); /* This branch true is cryptographically unreachable. Requires sha256_hmac output > order. */
+    secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(&rng);
+    memset(nonce32, 0, 32);
+    secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ctx, &gb, &b);
+    secp256k1_scalar_negate(&b, &b);
+    ctx->blind = b;
+    ctx->initial = gb;
+    secp256k1_scalar_clear(&b);
+    secp256k1_gej_clear(&gb);
+}
+
+#endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_GEN_IMPL_H */