comisai 1.0.44 → 1.0.46

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/model/operation-model-resolver.d.ts

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
  */
 import type { ModelOperationType, OperationModels } from "@comis/core";
 /**
- * Which level of the timeout resolution bound the effective timeout (LAT-01).
+ * Which level of the timeout resolution bound the effective timeout.
  * Born HERE — producers thread it; decodeExecutionOverrides merges it; hints
  * render knobs from it via executor/timeout-knob.ts. Deriving the label
  * anywhere downstream cannot work: the cron producer materializes
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ export interface OperationModelResolution {
     operationType: ModelOperationType;
     /** Resolved timeout in milliseconds. */
     timeoutMs: number;
-    /** Which resolution level bound timeoutMs (LAT-01) — mirrors `source` for
+    /** Which resolution level bound timeoutMs — mirrors `source` for
      *  the MODEL pick. Carried through ExecutionOverrides so hints can name the
      *  binding knob without re-deriving it. */
     timeoutSource: TimeoutSource;
@@ -51,18 +51,12 @@ export interface OperationModelResolution {
 /**
  * Resolve a provider name to its canonical ID for operation-tier catalog lookup.
  *
- * SA8: routes through normalizeProviderId (resolves user-facing aliases like
+ * Routes through normalizeProviderId (resolves user-facing aliases like
  * "bedrock" → "amazon-bedrock", "aws-bedrock" → "amazon-bedrock") and returns
  * the normalized ID as-is. Both "amazon-bedrock" and "google-vertex" are native
  * pi-ai KnownProvider entries in getProviders() — stripping the suffix to
- * "amazon" or "google" was never correct and caused resolveOperationDefaults
- * to return {} (Level 5 silent fallback) for Bedrock/Vertex agents.
- *
- * Side-effect on executor-context-engine-setup.ts:284 (currentApi drift):
- * Existing Bedrock and Vertex sessions will emit ONE api_change drift event
- * on first execution post-deploy (old value: "amazon"/"google", new value:
- * "amazon-bedrock"/"google-vertex"). This drops signed thinking state once,
- * then stabilizes. See T-162-05b.
+ * "amazon" or "google" would make resolveOperationDefaults return {}
+ * (Level 5 silent fallback) for Bedrock/Vertex agents.
  *
  * @param provider - Provider name (e.g., "amazon-bedrock", "google-vertex",
  *                   "bedrock", "openai")

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/model/operation-model-resolver.js

@@ -61,18 +61,12 @@ function buildResult(provider, modelId, source, operationType, timeoutMs, timeou
 /**
  * Resolve a provider name to its canonical ID for operation-tier catalog lookup.
  *
- * SA8: routes through normalizeProviderId (resolves user-facing aliases like
+ * Routes through normalizeProviderId (resolves user-facing aliases like
  * "bedrock" → "amazon-bedrock", "aws-bedrock" → "amazon-bedrock") and returns
  * the normalized ID as-is. Both "amazon-bedrock" and "google-vertex" are native
  * pi-ai KnownProvider entries in getProviders() — stripping the suffix to
- * "amazon" or "google" was never correct and caused resolveOperationDefaults
- * to return {} (Level 5 silent fallback) for Bedrock/Vertex agents.
- *
- * Side-effect on executor-context-engine-setup.ts:284 (currentApi drift):
- * Existing Bedrock and Vertex sessions will emit ONE api_change drift event
- * on first execution post-deploy (old value: "amazon"/"google", new value:
- * "amazon-bedrock"/"google-vertex"). This drops signed thinking state once,
- * then stabilizes. See T-162-05b.
+ * "amazon" or "google" would make resolveOperationDefaults return {}
+ * (Level 5 silent fallback) for Bedrock/Vertex agents.
  *
  * @param provider - Provider name (e.g., "amazon-bedrock", "google-vertex",
  *                   "bedrock", "openai")
@@ -104,9 +98,9 @@ export function resolveProviderFamily(provider) {
 export function resolveOperationModel(params) {
     const { operationType, agentProvider, agentModel, operationModels, providerFamily, invocationOverride, parentModel, agentPromptTimeoutMs, } = params;
     // -- Resolve timeout (independent of which level picks the model) --
-    // LAT-01: the binding provenance is born at these branch points — never
+    // The binding provenance is born at these branch points — never
     // re-derived downstream (value-equality inference is ambiguous when an
-    // operator sets a value equal to a default; T-177-06).
+    // operator sets a value equal to a default).
     const entry = operationModels[operationType];
     const explicitTimeout = entry?.timeout;
     const operationDefaultTimeout = OPERATION_TIMEOUT_DEFAULTS[operationType];

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/model/served-window-comparator.d.ts

@@ -1,31 +1,30 @@
 /**
  * Served-Window Comparator: boot-time comparison of the Ollama-served context
  * window (discovered by ollama-capacity-probe.ts) against the registry-resolved
- * configured contextWindow for the same provider (KNOB-01).
+ * configured contextWindow for the same provider.
  *
- * The probe (17fdd1e5, freshly live) discovers the served window but never
- * compared it to anything — an operator whose Ollama serves 8K against a
- * configured 131072 got a silently shrunken agent. This module is the
- * boot-time half of the fix:
+ * The probe discovers the served window; without this comparison an operator
+ * whose Ollama serves 8K against a configured 131072 gets a silently shrunken
+ * agent. This module is the boot-time comparison:
  *
  * - served < configured → exactly ONE WARN per provider per boot, naming both
  *   numbers, both Ollama knobs (`OLLAMA_CONTEXT_LENGTH` / `PARAMETER num_ctx`),
  *   the probed model, and the `probeServedWindow` opt-out path.
  * - served >= configured, equal windows, or provider absent from the probe map
- *   → silent (healthy boot stays quiet, R-4).
+ *   → silent (healthy boot stays quiet).
  * - EVERY call returns the structured {@link ServedWindowComparison} — latched
  *   repeat calls return data WITHOUT re-warning, so the daemon can collect one
- *   result per agent for the KNOB-03 config-posture count (one comparison, two
+ *   result per agent for the config-posture count (one comparison, two
  *   surfaces).
  *
  * Multi-model limitation: Ollama serves num_ctx PER MODEL but the probe yields
  * one window per provider (probed on models[0] via resolveProbedModelId); the
- * WARN names the probed model — PROBE-01 (v2, REQUIREMENTS.md) tracks per-model
- * probing.
+ * WARN names the probed model; per-model probing is a possible future
+ * refinement.
  *
  * @module
  */
-/** Structured comparison result — collected by the daemon for KNOB-03. */
+/** Structured comparison result — collected by the daemon for the config-posture count. */
 export interface ServedWindowComparison {
     providerId: string;
     /** The probe-discovered served num_ctx. */
@@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ export interface ServedWindowComparisonInput {
     } | undefined;
     /** Registry resolution composed by the caller: piModelRegistry.find + providerAliases
      *  fallback — the SAME chain pi-executor.ts uses to resolve `configured`, so the two
-     *  paths cannot disagree about what "configured" is (Pitfall 5). */
+     *  paths cannot disagree about what "configured" is. */
     findModel: (provider: string, modelId: string) => {
         contextWindow?: number;
     } | undefined;
@@ -70,6 +69,6 @@ export declare function resetServedWindowWarnForTest(): void;
  * comparison, NOT a zero-served comparison). Otherwise always returns the
  * comparison result; the under-served WARN fires at most once per provider
  * per boot (the latch), so repeat calls from agents sharing the provider
- * still feed the KNOB-03 collector without log spam.
+ * still feed the config-posture collector without log spam.
  */
 export declare function compareServedWindowForProvider(input: ServedWindowComparisonInput): ServedWindowComparison | undefined;

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/model/served-window-comparator.js

@@ -2,35 +2,34 @@
 /**
  * Served-Window Comparator: boot-time comparison of the Ollama-served context
  * window (discovered by ollama-capacity-probe.ts) against the registry-resolved
- * configured contextWindow for the same provider (KNOB-01).
+ * configured contextWindow for the same provider.
  *
- * The probe (17fdd1e5, freshly live) discovers the served window but never
- * compared it to anything — an operator whose Ollama serves 8K against a
- * configured 131072 got a silently shrunken agent. This module is the
- * boot-time half of the fix:
+ * The probe discovers the served window; without this comparison an operator
+ * whose Ollama serves 8K against a configured 131072 gets a silently shrunken
+ * agent. This module is the boot-time comparison:
  *
  * - served < configured → exactly ONE WARN per provider per boot, naming both
  *   numbers, both Ollama knobs (`OLLAMA_CONTEXT_LENGTH` / `PARAMETER num_ctx`),
  *   the probed model, and the `probeServedWindow` opt-out path.
  * - served >= configured, equal windows, or provider absent from the probe map
- *   → silent (healthy boot stays quiet, R-4).
+ *   → silent (healthy boot stays quiet).
  * - EVERY call returns the structured {@link ServedWindowComparison} — latched
  *   repeat calls return data WITHOUT re-warning, so the daemon can collect one
- *   result per agent for the KNOB-03 config-posture count (one comparison, two
+ *   result per agent for the config-posture count (one comparison, two
  *   surfaces).
  *
  * Multi-model limitation: Ollama serves num_ctx PER MODEL but the probe yields
  * one window per provider (probed on models[0] via resolveProbedModelId); the
- * WARN names the probed model — PROBE-01 (v2, REQUIREMENTS.md) tracks per-model
- * probing.
+ * WARN names the probed model; per-model probing is a possible future
+ * refinement.
  *
  * @module
  */
 import { resolveProbedModelId } from "./ollama-capacity-probe.js";
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Once-per-boot-per-provider WARN latch (R-4)
+// Once-per-boot-per-provider WARN latch
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-/** Once-per-boot-per-provider WARN latch (R-4). Module-level Set — the daemon
+/** Once-per-boot-per-provider WARN latch. Module-level Set — the daemon
  *  process IS the boot (normalize.ts gbnf precedent). */
 const servedWarnLoggedForProvider = new Set();
 /** Test-only reset for the module-level latch — without it test order breaks
@@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ export function resetServedWindowWarnForTest() {
  * comparison, NOT a zero-served comparison). Otherwise always returns the
  * comparison result; the under-served WARN fires at most once per provider
  * per boot (the latch), so repeat calls from agents sharing the provider
- * still feed the KNOB-03 collector without log spam.
+ * still feed the config-posture collector without log spam.
  */
 export function compareServedWindowForProvider(input) {
     const { providerId, served } = input;
@@ -66,7 +65,7 @@ export function compareServedWindowForProvider(input) {
             probedModel: probedModelId,
             errorKind: "config",
             submodule: "served-window-comparator",
-            // Knob NAMES + config PATHS + numbers only — never env VALUES (T-176-05).
+            // Knob NAMES + config PATHS + numbers only — never env VALUES.
             hint: `Ollama serves num_ctx ${served} but model '${probedModelId}' is configured for ${configured} — the agent runs with the smaller window. ` +
                 `Fix: OLLAMA_CONTEXT_LENGTH=${configured} ollama serve, or Modelfile 'PARAMETER num_ctx ${configured}' (VRAM caveat: see the config-yaml.mdx served-window section). ` +
                 `Opt out: providers.entries.${providerId}.capabilities.probeServedWindow: false`,

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/provider/capabilities.js

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  *
  * @module
  */
-import { getProviders } from "@earendil-works/pi-ai";
+import { getProviders } from "@earendil-works/pi-ai/compat";
 /**
  * Default provider capabilities. Matches ProviderCapabilitiesSchema defaults.
  * All fields present -- serves as the base layer in the 3-layer cascade.

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/provider/model-compat.d.ts

@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
  * - **Ollama** -- gated on declared config `type: "ollama"`. The
  *   llama.cpp-family GBNF grammar compiler rejects common MCP schema shapes
  *   (`pattern`/`format`, nullable unions, type arrays, free-form objects);
- *   the "gbnf" profile conservatively rewrites them before dispatch
- *   (GBNF-01). Without auto-detection, local-model operators hit opaque
+ *   the "gbnf" profile conservatively rewrites them before dispatch.
+ *   Without auto-detection, local-model operators hit opaque
  *   grammar-compile 400s on third-party MCP toolsets.
  *
  * **Override precedence (deliberately INVERTED between the two branches):**
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
  * In both branches, user fields that auto-detection does NOT touch (e.g.,
  * `supportsTools`) are preserved via spread.
  *
- * **D-08:** `baseUrl` is part of the signature but must NEVER be consulted
+ * **Detection inputs:** `baseUrl` is part of the signature but must NEVER be consulted
  * for detection. Detection keys ONLY on provider name / declared config
  * `type` / explicit profile -- a provider cannot self-elect into a different
  * profile via its endpoint.

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/provider/model-compat.js

@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
  * - **Ollama** -- gated on declared config `type: "ollama"`. The
  *   llama.cpp-family GBNF grammar compiler rejects common MCP schema shapes
  *   (`pattern`/`format`, nullable unions, type arrays, free-form objects);
- *   the "gbnf" profile conservatively rewrites them before dispatch
- *   (GBNF-01). Without auto-detection, local-model operators hit opaque
+ *   the "gbnf" profile conservatively rewrites them before dispatch.
+ *   Without auto-detection, local-model operators hit opaque
  *   grammar-compile 400s on third-party MCP toolsets.
  *
  * **Override precedence (deliberately INVERTED between the two branches):**
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
  * In both branches, user fields that auto-detection does NOT touch (e.g.,
  * `supportsTools`) are preserved via spread.
  *
- * **D-08:** `baseUrl` is part of the signature but must NEVER be consulted
+ * **Detection inputs:** `baseUrl` is part of the signature but must NEVER be consulted
  * for detection. Detection keys ONLY on provider name / declared config
  * `type` / explicit profile -- a provider cannot self-elect into a different
  * profile via its endpoint.

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/provider/model-id-normalize.js

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
  *
  * @module
  */
-import { getModels } from "@earendil-works/pi-ai";
+import { getModels } from "@earendil-works/pi-ai/compat";
 /**
  * Static alias map: user-friendly shortcut -> model ID prefix.
  *

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/provider/response/sanitize-pipeline.d.ts

@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@
  *   2. stripModelSpecialTokens -- remove <|...|> tokens (GLM, DeepSeek)
  *   3. stripDowngradedToolCallText -- remove [Tool Call: ...] (Gemini replay)
  *   4. extractFinalTagContent (coaching path only, when enforceFinalTag=true)
- *   4. stripReasoningTagsFromText -- SA3 defense-in-depth backstop, runs UNCONDITIONALLY
- *      on ALL paths. SA1+SA2 mean thinking never reaches accumulated for native-reasoning
+ *   4. stripReasoningTagsFromText -- defense-in-depth backstop, runs UNCONDITIONALLY
+ *      on ALL paths. The upstream typed-delta guards (the onDelta kind gate) mean
+ *      thinking never reaches accumulated for native-reasoning
  *      models (SDK-typed path), so this is a no-op for them. Kept as the last-line
  *      confidentiality net for any provider that embeds <think> in a text_delta.
  *
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ export interface SanitizeOptions {
     /** When true, only return text inside `<final>` blocks; suppress everything else.
      *  This covers the non-streaming fallback path (coaching path).
      *  When true, `extractFinalTagContent` is applied first. Native-reasoning models
-     *  set this false; their thinking is excluded by the SA2 onDelta kind gate upstream.
+     *  set this false; their thinking is excluded by the onDelta kind gate upstream.
      *  `stripReasoningTagsFromText` runs unconditionally after this branch as defense-in-depth.
      *  Default: false. */
     enforceFinalTag?: boolean;

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/provider/response/sanitize-pipeline.js

@@ -7,8 +7,9 @@
  *   2. stripModelSpecialTokens -- remove <|...|> tokens (GLM, DeepSeek)
  *   3. stripDowngradedToolCallText -- remove [Tool Call: ...] (Gemini replay)
  *   4. extractFinalTagContent (coaching path only, when enforceFinalTag=true)
- *   4. stripReasoningTagsFromText -- SA3 defense-in-depth backstop, runs UNCONDITIONALLY
- *      on ALL paths. SA1+SA2 mean thinking never reaches accumulated for native-reasoning
+ *   4. stripReasoningTagsFromText -- defense-in-depth backstop, runs UNCONDITIONALLY
+ *      on ALL paths. The upstream typed-delta guards (the onDelta kind gate) mean
+ *      thinking never reaches accumulated for native-reasoning
  *      models (SDK-typed path), so this is a no-op for them. Kept as the last-line
  *      confidentiality net for any provider that embeds <think> in a text_delta.
  *
@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@
 import { stripReasoningTagsFromText } from "../../response-filter/reasoning-tags.js";
 import { findCodeRegions, isInsideCode } from "../../response-filter/code-regions.js";
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Inlined strip functions (previously in separate files)
+// Strip functions applied by the pipeline
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 /**
  * Strip Minimax's malformed tool call XML from LLM responses.
@@ -115,8 +116,8 @@ export function sanitizeAssistantResponse(text, options) {
             // Non-streaming equivalent of ThinkingTagFilter "suppressed" initial state.
             cleaned = extractFinalTagContent(cleaned);
         }
-        // SA3 defense-in-depth backstop: stripReasoningTagsFromText runs unconditionally on
-        // ALL paths. SA1+SA2 mean thinking never reaches `accumulated` for native-reasoning
+        // Defense-in-depth backstop: stripReasoningTagsFromText runs unconditionally on
+        // ALL paths. The upstream guards mean thinking never reaches `accumulated` for native-reasoning
         // models (SDK-typed onDelta kind gate), so this is a no-op for them in practice.
         // For coaching models, it runs AFTER extractFinalTagContent — idempotent on clean text.
         // Kept as the last-line confidentiality net for any provider that embeds <think> in

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/provider/tool-schema/clean-for-gbnf.d.ts

@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@
  * - T3 free-form-object properties injection — template-rendering / Go-side
  *   robustness for `{"type":"object"}` nodes with no shape at all.
  *
- * I6 invariant (security posture untouched) — the real guarantee
- * (175-REVIEW WR-04): no transform ever WIDENS the set of values the schema
+ * Security invariant (posture untouched) — the real guarantee:
+ * no transform ever WIDENS the set of values the schema
  * admits. Transformed schemas accept a SUBSET of the original's values
  * (T1/T2 drop the null branch; T4 injects an inferred `type` that narrows a
  * previously-unconstrained node) or the IDENTICAL set (T3 —
@@ -36,16 +36,16 @@
  * twice produces byte-identical output to running it once.
  *
  * `pattern` and `format` are deliberately NOT stripped here: llama.cpp largely
- * supports them, and stripping them is GBNF-02's REACTIVE remedy (classify a
+ * supports them, and stripping them is the REACTIVE remedy (classify a
  * grammar-400, strip, retry once) — never part of this proactive profile.
  *
- * DoS posture (T-175-01): the walk recurses only into schema-bearing keys
+ * DoS posture: the walk recurses only into schema-bearing keys
  * (`properties`/`items`/`prefixItems`/`allOf`/`anyOf`/`oneOf`/
- * `additionalProperties`/`$defs`/`definitions`/`patternProperties` — WR-06);
+ * `additionalProperties`/`$defs`/`definitions`/`patternProperties`);
  * no `$ref` resolution or expansion (refs pass through untouched; their
  * TARGET definitions are walked once where they live under `$defs`), so a
  * maliciously deep third-party MCP schema costs O(nodes), never exponential.
- * STACK DEPTH is bounded too (175-REVIEW WR-03): recursion stops at
+ * STACK DEPTH is bounded too: recursion stops at
  * {@link MAX_GBNF_WALK_DEPTH} — subtrees beyond the cap pass through
  * un-walked (every transform is skip-tolerant, so pass-through is always
  * safe) and `depthLimited` reports the cut so the caller can WARN. Without
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
 /** Transform-token vocabulary (content-free identifiers, never schema bodies). */
 export type GbnfTransformKeyword = "nullable_union" | "type_array" | "free_form_object" | "missing_type";
 /**
- * Stack-depth cap for the recursive walk (175-REVIEW WR-03). Third-party MCP
+ * Stack-depth cap for the recursive walk. Third-party MCP
  * schemas are attacker-controlled: a chain deep enough to overflow the
  * un-capped walk still parses cleanly through JSON.parse at the transport
  * boundary. Nodes deeper than the cap pass through UN-WALKED — fail-safe by
@@ -76,10 +76,10 @@ export declare const MAX_GBNF_WALK_DEPTH = 64;
  *
  * `transformedKeywords` is the content-free report of which transform classes
  * fired anywhere in the tree (deduplicated, stable order) — safe for logging
- * under I7 (keyword names only, never schema bodies).
+ * (keyword names only, never schema bodies).
  *
  * `depthLimited` is true when any subtree exceeded {@link MAX_GBNF_WALK_DEPTH}
- * and passed through un-walked (WR-03 fail-safe) — callers WARN on it.
+ * and passed through un-walked (the depth-cap fail-safe) — callers WARN on it.
  */
 export declare function cleanSchemaForGbnf(schema: unknown): {
     schema: unknown;

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/provider/tool-schema/clean-for-gbnf.js

@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@
  * - T3 free-form-object properties injection — template-rendering / Go-side
  *   robustness for `{"type":"object"}` nodes with no shape at all.
  *
- * I6 invariant (security posture untouched) — the real guarantee
- * (175-REVIEW WR-04): no transform ever WIDENS the set of values the schema
+ * Security invariant (posture untouched) — the real guarantee:
+ * no transform ever WIDENS the set of values the schema
  * admits. Transformed schemas accept a SUBSET of the original's values
  * (T1/T2 drop the null branch; T4 injects an inferred `type` that narrows a
  * previously-unconstrained node) or the IDENTICAL set (T3 —
@@ -37,16 +37,16 @@
  * twice produces byte-identical output to running it once.
  *
  * `pattern` and `format` are deliberately NOT stripped here: llama.cpp largely
- * supports them, and stripping them is GBNF-02's REACTIVE remedy (classify a
+ * supports them, and stripping them is the REACTIVE remedy (classify a
  * grammar-400, strip, retry once) — never part of this proactive profile.
  *
- * DoS posture (T-175-01): the walk recurses only into schema-bearing keys
+ * DoS posture: the walk recurses only into schema-bearing keys
  * (`properties`/`items`/`prefixItems`/`allOf`/`anyOf`/`oneOf`/
- * `additionalProperties`/`$defs`/`definitions`/`patternProperties` — WR-06);
+ * `additionalProperties`/`$defs`/`definitions`/`patternProperties`);
  * no `$ref` resolution or expansion (refs pass through untouched; their
  * TARGET definitions are walked once where they live under `$defs`), so a
  * maliciously deep third-party MCP schema costs O(nodes), never exponential.
- * STACK DEPTH is bounded too (175-REVIEW WR-03): recursion stops at
+ * STACK DEPTH is bounded too: recursion stops at
  * {@link MAX_GBNF_WALK_DEPTH} — subtrees beyond the cap pass through
  * un-walked (every transform is skip-tolerant, so pass-through is always
  * safe) and `depthLimited` reports the cut so the caller can WARN. Without
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ const KEYWORD_ORDER = [
 ];
 const NULLABLE_HINT = " (nullable)";
 /**
- * Stack-depth cap for the recursive walk (175-REVIEW WR-03). Third-party MCP
+ * Stack-depth cap for the recursive walk. Third-party MCP
  * schemas are attacker-controlled: a chain deep enough to overflow the
  * un-capped walk still parses cleanly through JSON.parse at the transport
  * boundary. Nodes deeper than the cap pass through UN-WALKED — fail-safe by
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ function collapseTypeArray(node, applied) {
     applied.add("type_array");
     return out;
 }
-/** WR-04: typeless nodes carrying any of these keys infer `type: "number"`. */
+/** Typeless nodes carrying any of these keys infer `type: "number"`. */
 const NUMERIC_CONSTRAINT_KEYS = [
     "minimum",
     "maximum",
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ const NUMERIC_CONSTRAINT_KEYS = [
     "exclusiveMaximum",
     "multipleOf",
 ];
-/** WR-04: typeless nodes carrying any of these keys infer `type: "array"`. */
+/** Typeless nodes carrying any of these keys infer `type: "array"`. */
 const ARRAY_CONSTRAINT_KEYS = ["minItems", "maxItems", "uniqueItems", "contains"];
 /** Typeless nodes carrying any of these keys infer `type: "string"` honestly. */
 const STRING_CONSTRAINT_KEYS = ["minLength", "maxLength", "pattern", "format"];
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ function hasAnyKey(node, keys) {
 /**
  * T4: inject an inferred `type` on a node carrying NONE of the type-bearing
  * keys (the llama.cpp "Unrecognized schema" class). Inference reads the
- * constraint family (175-REVIEW WR-04 — a constraint-only `{minimum: 0}`
+ * constraint family (a constraint-only `{minimum: 0}`
  * must become "number", not the string default that would force the model
  * to emit a string where the tool expects a number):
  * properties/required/additionalProperties → "object";
@@ -214,9 +214,9 @@ function hasAnyKey(node, keys) {
  * "patternProperties":{"^.*$":{}}}`) got `type:"string"` stamped on its
  * value schema, so the wire schema contradicted the daemon driver
  * (`agents: array`, `rounds: number`) and the model oscillated between the
- * two validators' errors forever (small-model e2e 2026-06-12, UC-1/UC-6).
+ * two validators' errors forever (observed live in a small-model e2e run).
  * The union keeps the node grammar-valid (llama.cpp still rejects truly
- * typeless nodes) while admitting the identical value set — an I6
+ * typeless nodes) while admitting the identical value set — an
  * identical-set transform like T3, not a narrowing.
  */
 function injectMissingType(node, applied, openRecordValue) {
@@ -238,8 +238,8 @@ function injectMissingType(node, applied, openRecordValue) {
 }
 /**
  * T3: give a free-form object (`type: "object"`, no `properties`, no
- * `additionalProperties`) an explicit empty `properties: {}`. Non-tightening
- * (I6): without `additionalProperties: false` the node still admits anything.
+ * `additionalProperties`) an explicit empty `properties: {}`. Non-tightening:
+ * without `additionalProperties: false` the node still admits anything.
  */
 function injectEmptyProperties(node, applied) {
     if (node.type !== "object")
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ function injectEmptyProperties(node, applied) {
  * single pass — keeping twice-equals-once true by construction. Each collapse
  * strictly shrinks the subtree, so the loop terminates in O(nodes).
  *
- * Depth-capped (WR-03): an object node at `depth >= MAX_GBNF_WALK_DEPTH` is
+ * Depth-capped: an object node at `depth >= MAX_GBNF_WALK_DEPTH` is
  * returned UN-WALKED and `limited.hit` is set — pass-through, never a throw.
  *
  * Always builds NEW objects; never mutates the input.
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ function walk(schema, applied, depth, limited, openRecordValue = false) {
         return schema;
     if (typeof schema !== "object" || Array.isArray(schema))
         return schema;
-    // WR-03: cap BEFORE any per-node transform so the entire subtree passes
+    // Cap BEFORE any per-node transform so the entire subtree passes
     // through byte-identical (a half-transformed cut node would be confusing).
     if (depth >= MAX_GBNF_WALK_DEPTH) {
         limited.hit = true;
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ function walk(schema, applied, depth, limited, openRecordValue = false) {
     const out = {};
     for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(node)) {
         // Recurse into schema MAPS: properties / $defs / definitions /
-        // patternProperties (WR-06). Map KEYS are names (property names,
+        // patternProperties. Map KEYS are names (property names,
         // definition names, key regexes) — never treated as schema nodes; each
         // VALUE is a schema. $defs/definitions matter because llama.cpp RESOLVES
         // $ref at grammar-compile — hostility inside a definition 400s exactly
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ function walk(schema, applied, depth, limited, openRecordValue = false) {
             continue;
         }
         // Recurse into items (single schema or array of schemas) and prefixItems
-        // (the draft-2020 tuple form — an array of schemas, WR-06).
+        // (the draft-2020 tuple form — an array of schemas).
         if (key === "items" || key === "prefixItems") {
             out[key] = Array.isArray(value)
                 ? value.map((item) => walk(item, applied, depth + 1, limited))
@@ -320,8 +320,8 @@ function walk(schema, applied, depth, limited, openRecordValue = false) {
             continue;
         }
         // Recurse into additionalProperties when it is an object schema — the
-        // free-form transform needs this branch (deviation from the sibling
-        // cleaners' walk, documented in the phase pattern map). Open-record
+        // free-form transform needs this branch (a deliberate deviation from the
+        // sibling cleaners' walk, which does not descend here). Open-record
         // VALUE position, like patternProperties values above.
         if (key === "additionalProperties" &&
             value !== null &&
@@ -344,10 +344,10 @@ function walk(schema, applied, depth, limited, openRecordValue = false) {
  *
  * `transformedKeywords` is the content-free report of which transform classes
  * fired anywhere in the tree (deduplicated, stable order) — safe for logging
- * under I7 (keyword names only, never schema bodies).
+ * (keyword names only, never schema bodies).
  *
  * `depthLimited` is true when any subtree exceeded {@link MAX_GBNF_WALK_DEPTH}
- * and passed through un-walked (WR-03 fail-safe) — callers WARN on it.
+ * and passed through un-walked (the depth-cap fail-safe) — callers WARN on it.
  */
 export function cleanSchemaForGbnf(schema) {
     const applied = new Set();

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/provider/tool-schema/gbnf-hostile-fixtures.d.ts

@@ -20,12 +20,12 @@ export interface HostileMcpTool {
     readonly parameters: Record<string, unknown>;
 }
 /**
- * One tool covering all four GBNF-01 transform classes plus GBNF-02's
+ * One tool covering all four proactive gbnf transform classes plus the
  * reactive strip targets (`pattern`/`format` — which the PROACTIVE gbnf
  * profile must NOT touch):
  *
  * - `due`      — unanchored `pattern` with PCRE `\d` shorthand + `format`
- *                (llama.cpp #22314 grammar-parse class; survives GBNF-01)
+ *                (llama.cpp #22314 grammar-parse class; survives the proactive profile)
  * - `assignee` — nullable `anyOf` + node-level description (Ollama Go-side
  *                strictness; collapse target)
  * - `retries`  — `["integer", "null"]` type array (ollama#10164 family)

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/provider/tool-schema/gbnf-hostile-fixtures.js

@@ -11,12 +11,12 @@
  * @module
  */
 /**
- * One tool covering all four GBNF-01 transform classes plus GBNF-02's
+ * One tool covering all four proactive gbnf transform classes plus the
  * reactive strip targets (`pattern`/`format` — which the PROACTIVE gbnf
  * profile must NOT touch):
  *
  * - `due`      — unanchored `pattern` with PCRE `\d` shorthand + `format`
- *                (llama.cpp #22314 grammar-parse class; survives GBNF-01)
+ *                (llama.cpp #22314 grammar-parse class; survives the proactive profile)
  * - `assignee` — nullable `anyOf` + node-level description (Ollama Go-side
  *                strictness; collapse target)
  * - `retries`  — `["integer", "null"]` type array (ollama#10164 family)

package/node_modules/@comis/agent/dist/provider/tool-schema/normalize.d.ts

@@ -36,14 +36,14 @@ export interface ToolNormalizationContext {
     modelId: string;
     compat?: ModelCompatConfig;
     /**
-     * AUTHOR-03 (best-effort, Phase 174-05): when true, the raw pipeline tool
+     * Best-effort authoring gate: when true, the raw pipeline tool
      * schema receives the GBNF Layer 3.5 structural transform to harden the raw
      * escape hatch on GBNF-eligible (local/default-family) providers EVEN WHEN
      * they are not pinned to the explicit `compat.toolSchemaProfile === "gbnf"`
      * profile. Default/absent = false = unchanged behavior (the transform is
      * driven solely by the gbnf profile). Removal/relaxation only — never widens
      * field VALUE validation (the daemon driver Zod is the single source of
-     * truth). Gated D-08-strict: it never engages GBNF on a cloud-family provider
+     * truth). Strictly gated: it never engages GBNF on a cloud-family provider
      * (anthropic/google/xai) by name. Threaded from
      * `config.orchestration.authoring.gbnfConstrain` at the call site.
      */