comisai 1.0.44 → 1.0.46

package/node_modules/@comis/core/dist/workspace/workspace-manager.js

@@ -51,10 +51,10 @@ function sha256Hex(input) {
  * supplied, the post-rename `tracker.recordRead` call is sufficient observability
  * for the session-aware path (the tracker is consumed by `write` tools).
  *
- * 2026-05-20 lineage: prior to this helper, `ensureWorkspace` only wrote files
- * with the `wx` (exclusive-create) flag. Every existing install kept its
- * pre-fix template forever, including the false-promise venv prose in AGENTS.md
- * that triggered the 06:18-06:25 sub-agent exec cascade. The codebase's own
+ * Why refresh at all: `writeIfMissing` seeds with the `wx` (exclusive-create)
+ * flag only, so without this helper an existing install would keep a stale
+ * template copy forever -- e.g. prose promising capabilities no code
+ * provisions, which sends sub-agents into failing exec cascades. The template
  * AGENTS.md prose declares "This file is read-only" -- this helper makes that
  * contract real for the three platform-owned files.
  *
@@ -89,9 +89,8 @@ async function refreshPlatformFiles(dir, tracker) {
             throw err;
         }
         // BOOTSTRAP.md empty-guard: preserve the post-onboarding cleared state.
-        // 2026-05-20 lineage: the agent clears BOOTSTRAP.md via `write` once
-        // onboarding completes; resurrecting it would re-run onboarding on the
-        // next ensureWorkspace call.
+        // The agent clears BOOTSTRAP.md via `write` once onboarding completes;
+        // resurrecting it would re-run onboarding on the next ensureWorkspace call.
         if (name === "BOOTSTRAP.md" && onDiskContent.length === 0) {
             continue;
         }
@@ -178,8 +177,8 @@ export async function ensureWorkspace(options) {
                     tracker.recordRead(filePath, stat.mtimeMs, 0, undefined, Buffer.from(template, "utf-8"));
                 }
                 catch {
-                    // stat failure is non-fatal: skip registration, fall back to
-                    // pre-fix behavior (caller will need to read before overwriting).
+                    // stat failure is non-fatal: skip registration (the caller will
+                    // need to read the file before overwriting it).
                 }
             }
         }
@@ -189,8 +188,8 @@ export async function ensureWorkspace(options) {
         // Heal stale platform-owned files (SOUL.md, AGENTS.md, non-empty stale
         // BOOTSTRAP.md) whose on-disk sha256 differs from the canonical template.
         // No-op on first-run (writeIfMissing just seeded them at canonical hash).
-        // 2026-05-20: closes the architectural gap where wx-only seeding let stale
-        // pre-fix templates persist forever.
+        // Without this, wx-only seeding would let stale template copies persist
+        // forever.
         await refreshPlatformFiles(dir, tracker);
     }
     if (initGit) {
@@ -206,9 +205,8 @@ export async function ensureWorkspace(options) {
  * (before any session tracker exists) and seeds the agent's own workspace
  * files. Every subsequent session's first `write` to those paths would
  * otherwise hit a read-before-write gate. Call this right after the
- * per-session tracker is created (or per-turn, before the session-lifetime
- * registry existed) so the agent's first `write` to its own workspace
- * passes the gate.
+ * per-session tracker is created so the agent's first `write` to its own
+ * workspace passes the gate.
  *
  * Idempotency: when the tracker already records a matching-mtime entry
  * for a path (via the optional `getReadState` method), the helper skips

package/node_modules/@comis/core/dist/workspace/workspace-resolver.d.ts

@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ import type { AgentConfig } from "../config/schema-agent/index.js";
  * 3. Named agent: `<baseDataDir>/workspace-{agentId}`
  *
  * `baseDataDir` is the daemon's RESOLVED data dir (config.dataDir /
- * COMIS_DATA_DIR); absent/empty falls back to `~/.comis`. Before 260611 the
- * base was hardcoded to `~/.comis` — the fourth face of the dataDir
- * split-brain: isolated test daemons created `workspace-<agentId>` dirs
- * inside the production `~/.comis`, and because the path was shared across
- * daemon instances, a later run silently RESUMED an earlier run's degraded
+ * COMIS_DATA_DIR); absent/empty falls back to `~/.comis`. Threading the
+ * resolved base (never hardcoding `~/.comis`) is load-bearing: a hardcoded
+ * base would let isolated test daemons create `workspace-<agentId>` dirs
+ * inside the production `~/.comis`, and a path shared across daemon
+ * instances means a later run silently RESUMES an earlier run's degraded
  * session JSONL.
  *
  * Uses safePath() for agentId-derived paths as defense-in-depth

package/node_modules/@comis/core/dist/workspace/workspace-resolver.js

@@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ import path from "node:path";
  * 3. Named agent: `<baseDataDir>/workspace-{agentId}`
  *
  * `baseDataDir` is the daemon's RESOLVED data dir (config.dataDir /
- * COMIS_DATA_DIR); absent/empty falls back to `~/.comis`. Before 260611 the
- * base was hardcoded to `~/.comis` — the fourth face of the dataDir
- * split-brain: isolated test daemons created `workspace-<agentId>` dirs
- * inside the production `~/.comis`, and because the path was shared across
- * daemon instances, a later run silently RESUMED an earlier run's degraded
+ * COMIS_DATA_DIR); absent/empty falls back to `~/.comis`. Threading the
+ * resolved base (never hardcoding `~/.comis`) is load-bearing: a hardcoded
+ * base would let isolated test daemons create `workspace-<agentId>` dirs
+ * inside the production `~/.comis`, and a path shared across daemon
+ * instances means a later run silently RESUMES an earlier run's degraded
  * session JSONL.
  *
  * Uses safePath() for agentId-derived paths as defense-in-depth

package/node_modules/@comis/core/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "@comis/core",
   "private": true,
-  "version": "1.0.44",
+  "version": "1.0.46",
   "author": "Moshe Anconina",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "description": "Core domain types, ports, event bus, security, and config for Comis",

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/bundled-skills/claude-code/SKILL.md

@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ Type these into Claude's `❯` composer (`send_text` then Enter, like any prompt
 
 ## Gotchas
 
-- **Composer text you didn't type is ALWAYS ghost-text — never ask about it.** You are the SOLE driver of this session; the user CANNOT type into it. So any text sitting in the `❯` composer that you did not send yourself (e.g. `add more test cases`, `commit this`, a `/gsd-…` hint) is DEFINITIVELY Claude's dim autocomplete suggestion — there is no ambiguity and nothing to confirm. The plain-text screen can't show the dim styling, but you don't need it: **if you didn't type it, it's ghost-text.** Never run it, never treat it as a queued/pending instruction, and **never pause to ask the user "did this come from you?" or "should I run it?"** — just continue your own plan (your next keystroke overwrites it). And do **not** end the turn with a "want me to…?" question while the user's request still has unfinished steps — finish the requested work first.
+- **Composer text you didn't type is ALWAYS ghost-text — never ask about it.** You are the SOLE driver of this session; the user CANNOT type into it. So any text sitting in the `❯` composer that you did not send yourself (e.g. `add more test cases`, `commit this`, a slash-command hint) is DEFINITIVELY Claude's dim autocomplete suggestion — there is no ambiguity and nothing to confirm. The plain-text screen can't show the dim styling, but you don't need it: **if you didn't type it, it's ghost-text.** Never run it, never treat it as a queued/pending instruction, and **never pause to ask the user "did this come from you?" or "should I run it?"** — just continue your own plan (your next keystroke overwrites it). And do **not** end the turn with a "want me to…?" question while the user's request still has unfinished steps — finish the requested work first.
 - **One read can lie** — poll and require a stable screen before deciding "done"; match the structural cues above, not the exact spinner word (it rotates).
 - **A 401 means re-auth** — never retry-loop a failed login; tell the user.
 - **Long tasks are normal** — give generous `wait`s; don't kill a session just because it's been working a while.

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/bundled-skills/gsd-builder/SKILL.md

@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ skill + the `terminal_session_*` tools) through the **GSD workflow** in the targ
 
 You are the **orchestrator**: GSD itself (`/gsd-*`) runs inside the driven Claude Code, not in you.
 Your job is to set it up, drive it through the gates, keep the long run healthy, and verify the
-result honestly. This is a **multi-hour, durable** drive — treat it like the v2.24 long-drive regime.
+result honestly. This is a **multi-hour, durable** drive — treat it as one from the start (durable
+session, per-phase engagement, honest verification).
 
 ## 0. Prerequisites (check first; STOP and tell the operator if missing)
 

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/agent-inline-workspace.d.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /**
  * Best-effort writer for inline ROLE.md / IDENTITY.md content supplied via
- * the L2 single-call agents.create path.
+ * the single-call agents.create path.
  *
- * Collapses the previous 3-call agent-creation workflow
+ * Collapses the 3-call agent-creation workflow
  * (`agents_manage.create` -> `write(ROLE.md)` -> `write(IDENTITY.md)`)
  * into a single RPC by writing both files atomically as a side-effect of
  * the `agents.create` RPC. role/identity are write-once side-effects, NOT

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/agent-inline-workspace.js

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
  * Best-effort writer for inline ROLE.md / IDENTITY.md content supplied via
- * the L2 single-call agents.create path.
+ * the single-call agents.create path.
  *
- * Collapses the previous 3-call agent-creation workflow
+ * Collapses the 3-call agent-creation workflow
  * (`agents_manage.create` -> `write(ROLE.md)` -> `write(IDENTITY.md)`)
  * into a single RPC by writing both files atomically as a side-effect of
  * the `agents.create` RPC. role/identity are write-once side-effects, NOT

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/auth-handlers.d.ts

@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@
  * packages/core/src/ports/oauth-credential-store.ts lines 46-52).
  *
  * `auth.set` (AuthSetContract, scopes:["admin"]) is the daemon-assisted
- * OAuth-login RPC, authorized by the §8.1 threat-model amendment in
- * DESIGN-credential-storage-modes.md. The CLI runs the OAuth browser/device
+ * OAuth-login RPC — an admin-gated, audited write that is the sanctioned way
+ * tokens enter the encrypted store. The CLI runs the OAuth browser/device
  * flow locally, then delegates persistence to this handler so the CLI never
  * imports @comis/memory or opens secrets.db.
  *

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/auth-handlers.js

@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@
  * packages/core/src/ports/oauth-credential-store.ts lines 46-52).
  *
  * `auth.set` (AuthSetContract, scopes:["admin"]) is the daemon-assisted
- * OAuth-login RPC, authorized by the §8.1 threat-model amendment in
- * DESIGN-credential-storage-modes.md. The CLI runs the OAuth browser/device
+ * OAuth-login RPC — an admin-gated, audited write that is the sanctioned way
+ * tokens enter the encrypted store. The CLI runs the OAuth browser/device
  * flow locally, then delegates persistence to this handler so the CLI never
  * imports @comis/memory or opens secrets.db.
  *
@@ -182,9 +182,9 @@ export function createAuthHandlers(deps) {
             }
             // Bespoke profileId guard runs BEFORE the contract parse so the
             // user-facing error message stays
-            // `"Missing required parameter: profileId"` (legacy UX). The
-            // contract's `z.string().min(1)` would otherwise raise a Zod
-            // message that is noisier and less actionable for operators.
+            // `"Missing required parameter: profileId"`. The contract's
+            // `z.string().min(1)` would otherwise raise a Zod message that is
+            // noisier and less actionable for operators.
             const profileIdRaw = rawParams.profileId;
             if (!profileIdRaw || typeof profileIdRaw !== "string") {
                 throw new Error("Missing required parameter: profileId");
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ export function createAuthHandlers(deps) {
                 },
             });
             // The identity field must NOT embed accountId when email is absent.
-            // The residency rule (§6, auth-handlers.ts header) allows only
+            // The residency rule (see this file's header) allows only
             // provider/profileId/redacted-email in log output. Using a non-
             // identifying sentinel keeps the log line informative without leaking
             // an account identifier when the OAuth provider returns no email.

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/autonomy-handlers.d.ts

@@ -1,31 +1,31 @@
 /**
- * Autonomy RPC handler module (Phase 213-06, REVOKE-01/03) — the operator-facing
+ * Autonomy RPC handler module — the operator-facing
  * live-control surface of the bounded-autonomy control plane:
  *
  *   - `lease.revoke {leaseId|rootRunId}` — COOPERATIVE stop. Revoke a single
  *     capability lease by `leaseId`, OR every lease of a spawn tree by
  *     `rootRunId` (cascading each to its descendants). The LeaseManager then
- *     denies the next RPC the bearer makes (REVOKE-01 "external to + non-bypassable
- *     by the agent"). Returns the content-free revoked COUNT.
+ *     denies the next RPC the bearer makes — the revoke is external to, and
+ *     non-bypassable by, the agent. Returns the content-free revoked COUNT.
  *   - `run.kill {rootRunId}` — HARD stop. Kill every run of the spawn tree
  *     (`subAgentRunner.killByRootRun` aborts each SDK session) AND revoke every
  *     lease of the tree (`leaseManager.revokeByRootRun`) so a survivor child can
- *     never keep operating (REVOKE-03). Returns the content-free killed COUNT.
- *   - `autonomy.evict {rootRunId}` — DEMOTE (Phase 217-04, EVICT-01). Marks the
+ *     never keep operating. Returns the content-free killed COUNT.
+ *   - `autonomy.evict {rootRunId}` — DEMOTE. Marks the
  *     `rootRunId` in the daemon-wide evicted-set (`evictRegistry.mark`); the
- *     bounded-autonomy chokepoint consults it at the NEXT gate decision (EVICT-03,
- *     mid-run) to resolve the run's effective profile to `default`. UNLIKE
+ *     bounded-autonomy chokepoint consults it at the NEXT gate decision
+ *     (mid-run) to resolve the run's effective profile to `default`. UNLIKE
  *     revoke/kill, evict does NOT abort — the run CONTINUES under `default` (which
  *     still escalates outward, never auto-sends). Returns the content-free
  *     `{ evicted }` boolean. Registered ONLY when the OPTIONAL `evictRegistry`
- *     dep is wired (HIGH-1 — the Wave-2 composition root supplies it).
+ *     dep is wired (the composition root supplies it).
  *
  * DENY-BY-ORIGIN IS AUTOMATIC — there is NO manual agent-origin check here (it
  * would drift, and the single-chokepoint arch gate forbids per-handler scatter).
- * All three methods are `scopes:["admin"]` (Plan 03 / Plan 04) → they land in the
+ * All three methods are `scopes:["admin"]` → they land in the
  * DERIVED `ADMIN_METHODS` → the dispatch chokepoint's origin guard
  * (rpc-dispatch.ts) denies any agent-origin call BEFORE the handler runs (an agent
- * cannot self-un-evict — T-217-12). The autonomy-handlers test proves the deny on
+ * cannot self-un-evict). The autonomy-handlers test proves the deny on
  * the dispatch path.
  *
  * Per-method pipeline mirrors `subagent-handlers.ts`: bespoke pre-Zod guard
@@ -47,20 +47,20 @@ import type { RpcHandler } from "./types.js";
  * `logger` is required on every slice.
  */
 export interface AutonomyHandlerDeps {
-    /** The credential-broker lease authority — the revoke fan-outs (Plan 02). */
+    /** The credential-broker lease authority — the revoke fan-outs. */
     leaseManager: LeaseManager;
-    /** The sub-agent runner — `killByRootRun` aborts a whole spawn tree (Plan 01). */
+    /** The sub-agent runner — `killByRootRun` aborts a whole spawn tree. */
     subAgentRunner: {
         killByRootRun(rootRunId: string): {
             killed: number;
         };
     };
     /**
-     * Phase 216 (DUR-03): the durable-run store. OPTIONAL — when a `rootRunId` is
+     * The durable-run store. OPTIONAL — when a `rootRunId` is
      * revoked (lease.revoke by rootRunId, OR run.kill), the handler ALSO calls
      * `invalidateForRevoke(rootRunId)` so the persisted checkpoint flips to status
      * `revoked` and a subsequent boot can NEVER re-mint the pre-revoke caps (the
-     * resurrection-window close, invariant #6/#13). **Absent ⇒ inert** (the lease
+     * resurrection-window close). **Absent ⇒ inert** (the lease
      * revoke alone still stops the live bearer; the persisted record is just not
      * poisoned — only matters once durability is enabled, which is when the daemon
      * wires this). Best-effort: an invalidate error is WARN-logged, never fails the
@@ -68,33 +68,31 @@ export interface AutonomyHandlerDeps {
      */
     durableRuns?: DurableRunPort;
     /**
-     * Phase 217-04 (EVICT-01): the daemon-wide evicted-`rootRunId` set. OPTIONAL —
-     * the sole call site (rpc-dispatch.ts, `createAutonomyHandlers({ ...deps,
-     * leaseManager: deps.leaseManager })`) does NOT supply it until the Wave-2
-     * composition root (Plan 05) constructs `createEvictRegistry` and threads it
-     * onto `deps`. CRITICAL (HIGH-1): it MUST stay OPTIONAL so the Wave-1 `pnpm
-     * build` compiles with the unchanged call site; the `autonomy.evict` handler is
-     * registered ONLY when this is present (mirrors how `leaseManager`/
+     * The daemon-wide evicted-`rootRunId` set. OPTIONAL —
+     * the composition root constructs `createEvictRegistry` and threads it
+     * onto `deps`. CRITICAL: it MUST stay OPTIONAL so a partially-wired
+     * build compiles with a call site that does not supply it; the `autonomy.evict`
+     * handler is registered ONLY when this is present (mirrors how `leaseManager`/
      * `boundedAutonomy` gate whole handler families). **Absent ⇒ the autonomy.evict
      * method is simply not registered** (a stray call hits the dispatcher's
      * unknown-method path) — no build break, no half-wired handler.
      */
     evictRegistry?: EvictRegistry;
     /**
-     * FLEET-03 (Phase 220-01): the typed event bus. OPTIONAL — when wired, the
+     * The typed event bus. OPTIONAL — when wired, the
      * handlers emit a content-free `autonomy:revoked` (lease.revoke by rootRunId) /
      * `autonomy:killed` (run.kill) BESIDE the existing INFO line so `comis fleet`
-     * surfaces the revoke/kill counts. **Absent ⇒ no emit, byte-identical pre-220
-     * boot** (mirrors the `durableRuns?`/`evictRegistry?` optional-dep convention).
+     * surfaces the revoke/kill counts. **Absent ⇒ no emit**
+     * (mirrors the `durableRuns?`/`evictRegistry?` optional-dep convention).
      * The PRODUCTION construction site (rpc-dispatch.ts createAutonomyHandlers)
      * MUST supply `deps.container.eventBus` — otherwise the live daemon emits
-     * nothing and Plan 03's counts are silently zero.
+     * nothing and the fleet revoke/kill counts are silently zero.
      */
     eventBus?: {
         emit<K extends keyof EventMap>(event: K, payload: EventMap[K]): void;
     };
     /**
-     * FLEET-03: the wiring-layer clock for the emitted-event timestamp. Supplied as
+     * The wiring-layer clock for the emitted-event timestamp. Supplied as
      * `systemNowMs` by the construction site (the globals-gate-safe wiring clock the
      * execution:aborted emit uses) — NEVER `Date.now()`/`new Date()` here. Only read
      * when `eventBus` is present (the production site supplies both together).

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/autonomy-handlers.js

@@ -1,33 +1,33 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 // @allow-throw: RPC handler module — all throws are caught and converted to JSON-RPC error responses by rpc-dispatch.ts:306-321.
 /**
- * Autonomy RPC handler module (Phase 213-06, REVOKE-01/03) — the operator-facing
+ * Autonomy RPC handler module — the operator-facing
  * live-control surface of the bounded-autonomy control plane:
  *
  *   - `lease.revoke {leaseId|rootRunId}` — COOPERATIVE stop. Revoke a single
  *     capability lease by `leaseId`, OR every lease of a spawn tree by
  *     `rootRunId` (cascading each to its descendants). The LeaseManager then
- *     denies the next RPC the bearer makes (REVOKE-01 "external to + non-bypassable
- *     by the agent"). Returns the content-free revoked COUNT.
+ *     denies the next RPC the bearer makes — the revoke is external to, and
+ *     non-bypassable by, the agent. Returns the content-free revoked COUNT.
  *   - `run.kill {rootRunId}` — HARD stop. Kill every run of the spawn tree
  *     (`subAgentRunner.killByRootRun` aborts each SDK session) AND revoke every
  *     lease of the tree (`leaseManager.revokeByRootRun`) so a survivor child can
- *     never keep operating (REVOKE-03). Returns the content-free killed COUNT.
- *   - `autonomy.evict {rootRunId}` — DEMOTE (Phase 217-04, EVICT-01). Marks the
+ *     never keep operating. Returns the content-free killed COUNT.
+ *   - `autonomy.evict {rootRunId}` — DEMOTE. Marks the
  *     `rootRunId` in the daemon-wide evicted-set (`evictRegistry.mark`); the
- *     bounded-autonomy chokepoint consults it at the NEXT gate decision (EVICT-03,
- *     mid-run) to resolve the run's effective profile to `default`. UNLIKE
+ *     bounded-autonomy chokepoint consults it at the NEXT gate decision
+ *     (mid-run) to resolve the run's effective profile to `default`. UNLIKE
  *     revoke/kill, evict does NOT abort — the run CONTINUES under `default` (which
  *     still escalates outward, never auto-sends). Returns the content-free
  *     `{ evicted }` boolean. Registered ONLY when the OPTIONAL `evictRegistry`
- *     dep is wired (HIGH-1 — the Wave-2 composition root supplies it).
+ *     dep is wired (the composition root supplies it).
  *
  * DENY-BY-ORIGIN IS AUTOMATIC — there is NO manual agent-origin check here (it
  * would drift, and the single-chokepoint arch gate forbids per-handler scatter).
- * All three methods are `scopes:["admin"]` (Plan 03 / Plan 04) → they land in the
+ * All three methods are `scopes:["admin"]` → they land in the
  * DERIVED `ADMIN_METHODS` → the dispatch chokepoint's origin guard
  * (rpc-dispatch.ts) denies any agent-origin call BEFORE the handler runs (an agent
- * cannot self-un-evict — T-217-12). The autonomy-handlers test proves the deny on
+ * cannot self-un-evict). The autonomy-handlers test proves the deny on
  * the dispatch path.
  *
  * Per-method pipeline mirrors `subagent-handlers.ts`: bespoke pre-Zod guard
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ const IS_DEV = systemGetEnv("NODE_ENV") !== "production";
  */
 export function createAutonomyHandlers(deps) {
     /**
-     * DUR-03: poison the persisted run record on revoke so a subsequent boot finds
+     * Poison the persisted run record on revoke so a subsequent boot finds
      * status='revoked' and ORPHANS the run rather than re-minting the pre-revoke
      * caps. Best-effort — a write error is WARN-logged but never fails the revoke
      * RPC (the in-memory lease is already revoked, so the live bearer is dead
@@ -71,10 +71,10 @@ export function createAutonomyHandlers(deps) {
             deps.logger.warn({ method, err: r.error, hint: "could not flip the durable run record to 'revoked'; a restart could resume it — verify the run is dead", errorKind: "dependency" }, "Durable record invalidate-on-revoke failed (lease still revoked)");
         }
     }
-    // HIGH-1: capture the OPTIONAL evictRegistry once so the conditional spread
+    // Capture the OPTIONAL evictRegistry once so the conditional spread
     // narrows it to non-undefined inside the evict handler closure (no `!`
     // non-null assertion needed). Absent ⇒ the autonomy.evict key is omitted from
-    // the returned record entirely (the Wave-1 partial-boot state).
+    // the returned record entirely.
     const evictRegistry = deps.evictRegistry;
     return {
         [LeaseRevokeContract.method]: async (rawParams) => {
@@ -88,25 +88,25 @@ export function createAutonomyHandlers(deps) {
             LeaseRevokeContract.request.parse(userParams);
             let revoked = 0;
             if (rootRunId) {
-                // Revoke every lease of the spawn tree (cascading each — Plan 02).
+                // Revoke every lease of the spawn tree (cascading each to its descendants).
                 revoked = deps.leaseManager.revokeByRootRun(rootRunId).revoked;
-                // DUR-03: ALSO poison the persisted checkpoint so a restart cannot
+                // ALSO poison the persisted checkpoint so a restart cannot
                 // resurrect the pre-revoke caps (the resurrection-window close).
                 await invalidatePersistedRecord(rootRunId, LeaseRevokeContract.method);
             }
             else if (leaseId) {
                 // Single-lease cooperative stop — report the HONEST count: 1 if the lease
                 // existed (now revoked), 0 for an unknown id (never a phantom revoke:1 —
-                // the live VPS finding where a nonexistent leaseId reported revoked:1
-                // while the rootRunId path honestly reported 0).
+                // both selector paths must agree that a nonexistent id revokes nothing,
+                // matching the rootRunId path's honest 0).
                 revoked = deps.leaseManager.revoke(leaseId).revoked;
             }
             // §2.7: content-free completion line — the COUNT + method only, never the
             // bearer or the selector bodies.
             deps.logger.info({ method: LeaseRevokeContract.method, revoked, by: rootRunId ? "rootRunId" : "leaseId" }, "Capability lease(s) revoked");
-            // FLEET-03: a typed content-free event BESIDE the INFO line — only on a
+            // A typed content-free event BESIDE the INFO line — only on a
             // rootRunId revoke (a by-leaseId revoke has no rootRunId). Carries the COUNT
-            // + the id + timestamp ONLY (T-220-02). Absent eventBus ⇒ no emit.
+            // + the id + timestamp ONLY. Absent eventBus ⇒ no emit.
             if (rootRunId) {
                 deps.eventBus?.emit("autonomy:revoked", {
                     rootRunId,
@@ -131,15 +131,15 @@ export function createAutonomyHandlers(deps) {
             // every lease of the tree so a survivor child cannot keep operating.
             const { killed } = deps.subAgentRunner.killByRootRun(rootRunId);
             deps.leaseManager.revokeByRootRun(rootRunId);
-            // DUR-03: ALSO poison the persisted checkpoint so a restart cannot resume
-            // the killed tree under re-minted pre-revoke caps (REVOKE-03 across restart).
+            // ALSO poison the persisted checkpoint so a restart cannot resume
+            // the killed tree under re-minted pre-revoke caps (the hard stop holds across restart).
             await invalidatePersistedRecord(rootRunId, RunKillContract.method);
             // §2.7: content-free completion line — the killed COUNT + method only.
             deps.logger.info({ method: RunKillContract.method, killed }, "Spawn tree killed (hard stop) and its leases revoked");
-            // FLEET-03: a DISTINCT autonomy:killed event (separate from revoke — kill
+            // A DISTINCT autonomy:killed event (separate from revoke — kill
             // flips durable status to 'revoked' INDISTINGUISHABLY from a cooperative
             // revoke, so the event is the only separator for the killed count). COUNT +
-            // id + timestamp ONLY (T-220-02). Absent eventBus ⇒ no emit.
+            // id + timestamp ONLY. Absent eventBus ⇒ no emit.
             deps.eventBus?.emit("autonomy:killed", {
                 rootRunId,
                 killed,
@@ -150,10 +150,10 @@ export function createAutonomyHandlers(deps) {
                 RunKillContract.response.parse(result);
             return result;
         },
-        // HIGH-1: gate the autonomy.evict handler on the OPTIONAL evictRegistry
+        // Gate the autonomy.evict handler on the OPTIONAL evictRegistry
         // (mirrors the dispatch-wiring convention of gating whole handler families on
-        // leaseManager/boundedAutonomy). Absent ⇒ the method key is omitted (Wave-1
-        // partial boot); present ⇒ the closure reads the narrowed non-undefined
+        // leaseManager/boundedAutonomy). Absent ⇒ the method key is omitted;
+        // present ⇒ the closure reads the narrowed non-undefined
         // registry. The contract↔handler parity gate accepts this conditional
         // registration (the capabilities.introspect precedent, rpc-dispatch.ts).
         ...(evictRegistry
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ export function createAutonomyHandlers(deps) {
                     const userParams = stripInternalFields(rawParams);
                     AutonomyEvictContract.request.parse(userParams);
                     // DEMOTE (NOT kill): mark the rootRunId so the chokepoint resolves the
-                    // run's mode to `default` from the NEXT gate decision (EVICT-03). The
+                    // run's mode to `default` from the NEXT gate decision. The
                     // run KEEPS GOING under default — evict does not abort. `newlyEvicted`
                     // reports whether THIS call changed state (the run is demoted either
                     // way, so the response is { evicted: true } regardless).

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/capabilities-handlers.d.ts

@@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
 /**
- * Capabilities RPC handler module (Phase 215-04, INTRO-01/INTRO-02) — the
- * read-only, agent-reachable surface behind `comis whoami`:
+ * Capabilities RPC handler module — the read-only, agent-reachable surface
+ * behind `comis whoami`:
  *
  *   - `capabilities.introspect {}` — return the CALLER's resolved orchestration
  *     capabilities + the remaining per-root budget/quota for its live run. The
  *     read is SELF-SCOPED: it reports caps/budget for the caller's `_agentId`
- *     ONLY — never an arbitrary `agentId` request param (T-215-11, the
- *     session-read.ts:43 self-scope precedent). The request is `{}`.
+ *     ONLY — never an arbitrary `agentId` request param (the session-read.ts:43
+ *     self-scope precedent). The request is `{}`.
  *
- * NO `requireCapability` (INTRO-02). The method is `scopes:["rpc"]`, classified
+ * NO `requireCapability`. The method is `scopes:["rpc"]`, classified
  * `"ungated"` in `HANDLER_CAPABILITY_MAP` — an agent reading its OWN posture
  * needs no capability. It is NOT in `ADMIN_METHODS`, so deny-by-origin does NOT
- * fire and the agent CAN reach it (correct). The Plan-01 per-cap audit does NOT
+ * fire and the agent CAN reach it (correct). The per-cap audit does NOT
  * fire for it either (the audit's filter is real-`AgentCapability`-only, and
  * `"ungated"` is excluded).
  *
  * Self-scope mechanics: read `_agentId` AND `_capabilities` BEFORE
  * `stripInternalFields` (both are dispatcher-injected, unforgeable agent-origin
- * signals — inbound copies are stripped from external callers at the gateway,
- * ORIGIN-02; forged ones are dropped before reaching here). Report the injected
+ * signals — inbound copies are stripped from external callers at the gateway;
+ * forged ones are dropped before reaching here). Report the injected
  * `_capabilities` — the EXACT `heldCapabilities` set `createAgentRpcCall`
  * resolves once at setup-tools-capabilities.ts:51-53 and `requireCapability`
- * enforces this run — so the read can NEVER diverge from enforcement (WR-04). An
+ * enforces this run — so the read can NEVER diverge from enforcement. An
  * empty `[]` is authoritative (a genuine zero-cap run), not a fallback trigger.
  * The operator/CLI origin (no in-process gate, no injected `_capabilities`) falls
  * back to re-resolving the caller's OWN `PerAgentConfig.autonomy` — with NO
@@ -48,10 +48,10 @@ import type { RpcHandler } from "./types.js";
  */
 export interface CapabilitiesHandlerDeps {
     /**
-     * The bounded-autonomy composite — `snapshot` is the pure remaining-budget read (Plan 02).
-     * OPTIONAL (finding E, 30uc-20260624): when NO agent resolves to an autonomy-bearing profile
+     * The bounded-autonomy composite — `snapshot` is the pure remaining-budget read.
+     * OPTIONAL: when NO agent resolves to an autonomy-bearing profile
      * (e.g. all `autonomy.profile: assistant`), bounded-autonomy is not wired — but the handler is
-     * STILL registered (no more "Unknown RPC method") and returns the disabled-state ({enabled:false,
+     * STILL registered (never "Unknown RPC method") and returns the disabled-state ({enabled:false,
      * caps:[]}); the budget snapshot is simply omitted (no live root to report).
      */
     boundedAutonomy?: BoundedAutonomy;
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ export interface CapabilitiesHandlerDeps {
     agents: Record<string, PerAgentConfig>;
     /** The default agent the self-scope falls back to (operator/CLI origin, or an unknown agent). */
     defaultAgentId: string;
-    /** Tree-stable synthetic-root resolver (Phase 213 CR-01). Absent ⇒ no live root ⇒ budget omitted. */
+    /** Tree-stable synthetic-root resolver. Absent ⇒ no live root ⇒ budget omitted. */
     resolveRootRunId?: (sessionKey: SessionKey) => string;
     /** Structured logger for the content-free §2.7 instrumentation. */
     logger: ComisLogger;

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/capabilities-handlers.js

@@ -1,29 +1,29 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 // @allow-throw: RPC handler module — all throws are caught and converted to JSON-RPC error responses by rpc-dispatch.ts:306-321.
 /**
- * Capabilities RPC handler module (Phase 215-04, INTRO-01/INTRO-02) — the
- * read-only, agent-reachable surface behind `comis whoami`:
+ * Capabilities RPC handler module — the read-only, agent-reachable surface
+ * behind `comis whoami`:
  *
  *   - `capabilities.introspect {}` — return the CALLER's resolved orchestration
  *     capabilities + the remaining per-root budget/quota for its live run. The
  *     read is SELF-SCOPED: it reports caps/budget for the caller's `_agentId`
- *     ONLY — never an arbitrary `agentId` request param (T-215-11, the
- *     session-read.ts:43 self-scope precedent). The request is `{}`.
+ *     ONLY — never an arbitrary `agentId` request param (the session-read.ts:43
+ *     self-scope precedent). The request is `{}`.
  *
- * NO `requireCapability` (INTRO-02). The method is `scopes:["rpc"]`, classified
+ * NO `requireCapability`. The method is `scopes:["rpc"]`, classified
  * `"ungated"` in `HANDLER_CAPABILITY_MAP` — an agent reading its OWN posture
  * needs no capability. It is NOT in `ADMIN_METHODS`, so deny-by-origin does NOT
- * fire and the agent CAN reach it (correct). The Plan-01 per-cap audit does NOT
+ * fire and the agent CAN reach it (correct). The per-cap audit does NOT
  * fire for it either (the audit's filter is real-`AgentCapability`-only, and
  * `"ungated"` is excluded).
  *
  * Self-scope mechanics: read `_agentId` AND `_capabilities` BEFORE
  * `stripInternalFields` (both are dispatcher-injected, unforgeable agent-origin
- * signals — inbound copies are stripped from external callers at the gateway,
- * ORIGIN-02; forged ones are dropped before reaching here). Report the injected
+ * signals — inbound copies are stripped from external callers at the gateway;
+ * forged ones are dropped before reaching here). Report the injected
  * `_capabilities` — the EXACT `heldCapabilities` set `createAgentRpcCall`
  * resolves once at setup-tools-capabilities.ts:51-53 and `requireCapability`
- * enforces this run — so the read can NEVER diverge from enforcement (WR-04). An
+ * enforces this run — so the read can NEVER diverge from enforcement. An
  * empty `[]` is authoritative (a genuine zero-cap run), not a fallback trigger.
  * The operator/CLI origin (no in-process gate, no injected `_capabilities`) falls
  * back to re-resolving the caller's OWN `PerAgentConfig.autonomy` — with NO
@@ -76,20 +76,20 @@ export function createCapabilitiesHandlers(deps) {
                 : undefined;
             const userParams = stripInternalFields(rawParams);
             CapabilitiesIntrospectContract.request.parse(userParams);
-            // WR-04: report the injected enforced caps when present; otherwise (an
+            // Report the injected enforced caps when present; otherwise (an
             // operator/CLI origin with no in-process gate) re-resolve the caller's OWN
             // per-agent `AutonomyConfig` — NO cross-agent `defaultAgentId` fallback, so
             // the echoed `agentId` and the reported caps always describe the SAME scope
-            // (an unknown `_agentId` no longer borrows the default agent's caps — the
+            // (an unknown `_agentId` never borrows the default agent's caps — the
             // chimeric-posture class). `agentId` already resolves to `defaultAgentId`
             // for a no-`_agentId` operator origin (line above), so that path is intact.
             const resolvedAutonomy = resolveAutonomy(deps.agents[agentId]?.autonomy);
             const caps = injectedCaps ?? [...resolvedAutonomy.capabilities];
-            // Finding E: report the caller's resolved autonomy.enabled so a disabled/assistant-profile
+            // Report the caller's resolved autonomy.enabled so a disabled/assistant-profile
             // agent gets a clean {enabled:false, caps:[]} instead of an "Unknown RPC method" error.
             const enabled = resolvedAutonomy.enabled;
             // Budget/outwardQuota ONLY when a live rootRunId resolves (in-flight run) AND bounded-autonomy
-            // is wired (finding E: it may be absent when no autonomy agent exists). In-process pre-spawn
+            // is wired (it may be absent when no autonomy agent exists). In-process pre-spawn
             // (no caller key) or no-autonomy ⇒ both ABSENT — honest, never a fabricated zero snapshot.
             let budget;
             let outwardQuota;

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/channel-handlers.js

@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ export function createChannelHandlers(deps) {
                 connectionMode: entry.connectionMode,
                 lastCheckedAt: entry.lastCheckedAt,
                 lastMessageAt: entry.lastMessageAt,
+                lastInboundAt: entry.lastInboundAt,
                 error: entry.error,
                 stateChangedAt: entry.stateChangedAt,
                 consecutiveFailures: entry.consecutiveFailures,

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/classify-grok-video-error.d.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
- * Pure classifier for xAI Grok Imagine video-generation failures (GROK-02).
+ * Pure classifier for xAI Grok Imagine video-generation failures.
  *
- * Grok signals failure THREE ways (190-RESEARCH §Pattern 2 + Pitfall 3) — a
+ * Grok signals failure FOUR ways — a
  * RICHER union than FAL (which has NO terminal failed status — a failure is a
  * THROW) and slightly richer than Veo (which has only `operation.error`):
  *   1. a thrown SDK/HTTP error from the REST `fetch` (a non-2xx submit/poll), or

package/node_modules/@comis/daemon/dist/api/classify-grok-video-error.js

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ export function classifyGrokVideoError(error, opts) {
             hint: "xAI reported a quota/rate/credits limit. Reduce frequency or check billing, then retry.",
         };
     }
-    // GROK-02 expired branch — a terminal `status:"expired"` with no auth/quota/
+    // Expired branch — a terminal `status:"expired"` with no auth/quota/
     // content substring match: the render expired before it could be downloaded.
     // (An expired-with-an-auth/quota/content error classifies above and never
     // reaches here; this is the bare-expired default.)