comisai 1.0.44 → 1.0.46

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/builtin/terminal-driver/terminal-spend-ceiling.d.ts

@@ -1,24 +1,23 @@
 /**
- * The pure ENDURE-01 spend-ceiling check (design §4 Phase C; CONTEXT ENDURE-01).
+ * The pure spend-ceiling check.
  *
  * `checkSpendCeiling(costUsd, maxCostUsd)` answers ONE question over a drive journal's
  * accumulated run-total cost: has the drive spent MORE than its optional per-drive spend
  * ceiling (`drive.maxCostUsd`)? On a breach it returns the typed discriminant
- * `{ breach: "spend_ceiling" }`; the CALLER (165-07 / the wake-turn driver) escalates or
- * stops with the figure. This is what makes ENDURE-01's "bounds runaway cost ...
- * escalate/stop on breach, never a silent overspend" testable: a thrashing
- * misclassification loop cannot burn cost unbounded over a 40h drive, because every woken
- * turn re-asks this question and the breach is never silent.
+ * `{ breach: "spend_ceiling" }`; the CALLER (the wake-turn driver) escalates or
+ * stops with the figure. This bounds runaway cost — escalate or stop on breach, never a
+ * silent overspend: a thrashing misclassification loop cannot burn cost unbounded over a
+ * 40h drive, because every woken turn re-asks this question and the breach is never silent.
  *
- * PREDICATE-ONLY (the resolved Open Question Q1; I6). This module reads the journal's
+ * PREDICATE-ONLY. This module reads the journal's
  * existing `costUsd` field (terminal-drive-journal.ts:153) and makes ONLY the decision —
  * it adds NO cost PRODUCER. `costUsd` is honestly hardcoded `0` at the canned-keystroke
  * woken-turn seam (no LLM spend there; the comment at terminal-wake-turn.ts:222-225
- * already names "Phase 165 spend ceiling" as the consumer of that reserved field), and it
- * stays that way — a FABRICATED cost would violate I6. The check becomes load-bearing the
- * day a real LLM-in-the-loop turn writes a non-zero `costUsd`; until then it is
- * unit-tested over seeded journal values. A real producer is explicit FUTURE work — NOT
- * this phase. SEC-11's loop guard still catches tight loops independently (I4, unchanged).
+ * already names this spend ceiling as the consumer of that reserved field), and it
+ * stays that way — a FABRICATED cost would violate the predicate-only contract. The check
+ * becomes load-bearing the day a real LLM-in-the-loop turn writes a non-zero `costUsd`;
+ * until then it is unit-tested over seeded journal values. A real producer is explicit
+ * FUTURE work. The existing loop guard still catches tight loops independently.
  *
  * The breach discriminant is LOCAL: a spend-ceiling breach is a DISTINCT escalate/stop
  * path, so it deliberately does NOT extend `terminal-caps.ts`'s `CapBreach`
@@ -28,14 +27,14 @@
  * mirrors `cap === undefined ⇒ undefined`, and the strict `>` boundary means AT the cap
  * the budget is not yet spent.
  *
- * Architecture invariants (binding — AGENTS.md / 124 house style, mirrors
+ * Architecture invariants (binding — AGENTS.md; mirrors
  * `terminal-caps.ts` / `terminal-dialog-detector.ts` / `terminal-drive-journal.ts`):
  *   - PURE: a free function, NOT a factory. NO module-global mutable state. NO clock/timer
  *     reads — the cost is the journal's accumulated run-total passed in by the caller (this
  *     module never reads a wall-clock global; there is no time in a spend check at all).
  *   - NEVER throws: a degenerate input (a NaN/negative/Infinity cost or cap) yields
  *     `undefined` — the SAFE direction. A forged/garbage cost must never cause a SPURIOUS
- *     breach that kills a healthy drive (I9), and a degenerate cap is treated as uncapped.
+ *     breach that kills a healthy drive, and a degenerate cap is treated as uncapped.
  *   - Infra-free: value-imports NOTHING (node builtins only if ever needed) — no platform
  *     runtime packages, no observability egress (the infra-runtime-scope architecture
  *     gate; this file names none of them, and worker ↛ infra/observability).
@@ -50,18 +49,18 @@
  */
 export type SpendBreach = "spend_ceiling";
 /**
- * Has the drive spent MORE than its optional spend ceiling? — ENDURE-01.
+ * Has the drive spent MORE than its optional spend ceiling?
  *
  * Returns `{ breach: "spend_ceiling" }` iff `costUsd > maxCostUsd` (strict `>`: at the cap
  * the budget is not yet over), else `undefined`. Pure + total: a `null`/degenerate cap is
- * uncapped (I1, safe) and a degenerate cost never produces a spurious breach (I9); never
- * throws. PREDICATE-ONLY — it reads the journal's honest `costUsd` (I6, see @module) and
+ * uncapped (safe) and a degenerate cost never produces a spurious breach; never
+ * throws. PREDICATE-ONLY — it reads the journal's honest `costUsd` (see @module) and
  * adds no cost producer.
  *
  * @param costUsd - The drive journal's accumulated run-total spend, in USD
- *   (terminal-drive-journal.ts `costUsd` — honestly `0` at the canned-keystroke seam, I6).
+ *   (terminal-drive-journal.ts `costUsd` — honestly `0` at the canned-keystroke seam).
  * @param maxCostUsd - The operator's per-drive spend ceiling (`drive.maxCostUsd`), or
- *   `null` for uncapped (the default — preserves today's behavior, I1).
+ *   `null` for uncapped (the default).
  * @returns `{ breach: "spend_ceiling" }` on an overspend, else `undefined`.
  */
 export declare function checkSpendCeiling(costUsd: number, maxCostUsd: number | null): {

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/builtin/terminal-driver/terminal-spend-ceiling.js

@@ -1,25 +1,24 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * The pure ENDURE-01 spend-ceiling check (design §4 Phase C; CONTEXT ENDURE-01).
+ * The pure spend-ceiling check.
  *
  * `checkSpendCeiling(costUsd, maxCostUsd)` answers ONE question over a drive journal's
  * accumulated run-total cost: has the drive spent MORE than its optional per-drive spend
  * ceiling (`drive.maxCostUsd`)? On a breach it returns the typed discriminant
- * `{ breach: "spend_ceiling" }`; the CALLER (165-07 / the wake-turn driver) escalates or
- * stops with the figure. This is what makes ENDURE-01's "bounds runaway cost ...
- * escalate/stop on breach, never a silent overspend" testable: a thrashing
- * misclassification loop cannot burn cost unbounded over a 40h drive, because every woken
- * turn re-asks this question and the breach is never silent.
+ * `{ breach: "spend_ceiling" }`; the CALLER (the wake-turn driver) escalates or
+ * stops with the figure. This bounds runaway cost — escalate or stop on breach, never a
+ * silent overspend: a thrashing misclassification loop cannot burn cost unbounded over a
+ * 40h drive, because every woken turn re-asks this question and the breach is never silent.
  *
- * PREDICATE-ONLY (the resolved Open Question Q1; I6). This module reads the journal's
+ * PREDICATE-ONLY. This module reads the journal's
  * existing `costUsd` field (terminal-drive-journal.ts:153) and makes ONLY the decision —
  * it adds NO cost PRODUCER. `costUsd` is honestly hardcoded `0` at the canned-keystroke
  * woken-turn seam (no LLM spend there; the comment at terminal-wake-turn.ts:222-225
- * already names "Phase 165 spend ceiling" as the consumer of that reserved field), and it
- * stays that way — a FABRICATED cost would violate I6. The check becomes load-bearing the
- * day a real LLM-in-the-loop turn writes a non-zero `costUsd`; until then it is
- * unit-tested over seeded journal values. A real producer is explicit FUTURE work — NOT
- * this phase. SEC-11's loop guard still catches tight loops independently (I4, unchanged).
+ * already names this spend ceiling as the consumer of that reserved field), and it
+ * stays that way — a FABRICATED cost would violate the predicate-only contract. The check
+ * becomes load-bearing the day a real LLM-in-the-loop turn writes a non-zero `costUsd`;
+ * until then it is unit-tested over seeded journal values. A real producer is explicit
+ * FUTURE work. The existing loop guard still catches tight loops independently.
  *
  * The breach discriminant is LOCAL: a spend-ceiling breach is a DISTINCT escalate/stop
  * path, so it deliberately does NOT extend `terminal-caps.ts`'s `CapBreach`
@@ -29,14 +28,14 @@
  * mirrors `cap === undefined ⇒ undefined`, and the strict `>` boundary means AT the cap
  * the budget is not yet spent.
  *
- * Architecture invariants (binding — AGENTS.md / 124 house style, mirrors
+ * Architecture invariants (binding — AGENTS.md; mirrors
  * `terminal-caps.ts` / `terminal-dialog-detector.ts` / `terminal-drive-journal.ts`):
  *   - PURE: a free function, NOT a factory. NO module-global mutable state. NO clock/timer
  *     reads — the cost is the journal's accumulated run-total passed in by the caller (this
  *     module never reads a wall-clock global; there is no time in a spend check at all).
  *   - NEVER throws: a degenerate input (a NaN/negative/Infinity cost or cap) yields
  *     `undefined` — the SAFE direction. A forged/garbage cost must never cause a SPURIOUS
- *     breach that kills a healthy drive (I9), and a degenerate cap is treated as uncapped.
+ *     breach that kills a healthy drive, and a degenerate cap is treated as uncapped.
  *   - Infra-free: value-imports NOTHING (node builtins only if ever needed) — no platform
  *     runtime packages, no observability egress (the infra-runtime-scope architecture
  *     gate; this file names none of them, and worker ↛ infra/observability).
@@ -44,28 +43,28 @@
  * @module
  */
 /**
- * Has the drive spent MORE than its optional spend ceiling? — ENDURE-01.
+ * Has the drive spent MORE than its optional spend ceiling?
  *
  * Returns `{ breach: "spend_ceiling" }` iff `costUsd > maxCostUsd` (strict `>`: at the cap
  * the budget is not yet over), else `undefined`. Pure + total: a `null`/degenerate cap is
- * uncapped (I1, safe) and a degenerate cost never produces a spurious breach (I9); never
- * throws. PREDICATE-ONLY — it reads the journal's honest `costUsd` (I6, see @module) and
+ * uncapped (safe) and a degenerate cost never produces a spurious breach; never
+ * throws. PREDICATE-ONLY — it reads the journal's honest `costUsd` (see @module) and
  * adds no cost producer.
  *
  * @param costUsd - The drive journal's accumulated run-total spend, in USD
- *   (terminal-drive-journal.ts `costUsd` — honestly `0` at the canned-keystroke seam, I6).
+ *   (terminal-drive-journal.ts `costUsd` — honestly `0` at the canned-keystroke seam).
  * @param maxCostUsd - The operator's per-drive spend ceiling (`drive.maxCostUsd`), or
- *   `null` for uncapped (the default — preserves today's behavior, I1).
+ *   `null` for uncapped (the default).
  * @returns `{ breach: "spend_ceiling" }` on an overspend, else `undefined`.
  */
 export function checkSpendCeiling(costUsd, maxCostUsd) {
-    // null / degenerate cap ⇒ uncapped → no breach (I1, safe). Mirrors checkWallClock's
+    // null / degenerate cap ⇒ uncapped → no breach (safe). Mirrors checkWallClock's
     // `cap === undefined ⇒ undefined`; a NaN/negative/Infinity cap is treated as no cap
     // rather than a meaningful bound (a malformed cap must not kill a drive).
     if (maxCostUsd === null || !Number.isFinite(maxCostUsd) || maxCostUsd < 0) {
         return undefined;
     }
-    // A degenerate cost (NaN / negative / Infinity) ⇒ no SPURIOUS breach (I9) — the safe
+    // A degenerate cost (NaN / negative / Infinity) ⇒ no SPURIOUS breach — the safe
     // direction is never to kill a healthy drive on a garbage/forged figure.
     if (!Number.isFinite(costUsd) || costUsd < 0) {
         return undefined;

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/builtin/terminal-driver/terminal-status-tool.d.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 /**
- * terminal-status-tool -- the REAL `terminal_session_status` AgentTool (124-06,
- * spec §5; TR-11/OPS-04). This is the lone P0 `not_implemented` stub (Open Q1)
- * promoted to a classifier-backed, owner-scoped tool.
+ * terminal-status-tool -- the REAL `terminal_session_status` AgentTool. This was the
+ * lone `not_implemented` stub, promoted to a classifier-backed, owner-scoped tool.
  *
  * It lives in its own module (NOT in `terminal-tools.ts`, which sits at the 800-line
  * cap) and is modeled VERBATIM on `createTerminalSessionReadTool`: a read-only,
@@ -10,12 +9,12 @@
  * `jsonResult`. `terminal-tools-stubs.ts` re-exports this so the public surface +
  * the import path are unchanged.
  *
- * Owner-scoping (T-124-15) is INHERITED from `registry.status`'s contract: a
+ * Owner-scoping is INHERITED from `registry.status`'s contract: a
  * cross-owner / killed session returns the not-found minimal view (`exited`, not
  * parked) — never another owner's classifier state. The classifier stays
  * single-homed in the worker (the registry round-trips a `status` frame).
  *
- * never-export (T-124-16, SEC-08): `terminal_session_status` is registered
+ * never-export: `terminal_session_status` is registered
  * `mcpExportPolicy:"never-export"` in `tool-metadata-registry.ts` — inherited from
  * that registration; this factory adds NO export annotation of its own.
  *
@@ -28,16 +27,16 @@
 import type { AgentTool } from "@earendil-works/pi-agent-core";
 import { Type } from "typebox";
 import { type TerminalToolDeps } from "./terminal-tools.js";
-/** The spec §5 `status` parameter schema (the surface 119-01 registered; the body is now real). */
+/** The `status` parameter schema. */
 export declare const StatusParams: Type.TObject<{
     sessionId: Type.TString;
 }>;
 /**
- * `terminal_session_status` — return the classifier-derived spec §5 status view
+ * `terminal_session_status` — return the classifier-derived status view
  * `{state, lastActivity, interactions, cursorParked, screenDiffEmpty, exitCode?}` for
- * an OWNED session. Owner-scoped (T-124-15, inherited from `registry.status`): a
+ * an OWNED session. Owner-scoped (inherited from `registry.status`): a
  * cross-owner / killed session returns the not-found minimal view, never a leak.
  * Read-only — it never mutates the session. The status view is structural (no screen
- * text), so unlike `read` it needs no redaction/wrap (T-124-17).
+ * text), so unlike `read` it needs no redaction/wrap.
  */
 export declare function createTerminalSessionStatusTool(deps: TerminalToolDeps): AgentTool<typeof StatusParams>;

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/builtin/terminal-driver/terminal-status-tool.js

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * terminal-status-tool -- the REAL `terminal_session_status` AgentTool (124-06,
- * spec §5; TR-11/OPS-04). This is the lone P0 `not_implemented` stub (Open Q1)
- * promoted to a classifier-backed, owner-scoped tool.
+ * terminal-status-tool -- the REAL `terminal_session_status` AgentTool. This was the
+ * lone `not_implemented` stub, promoted to a classifier-backed, owner-scoped tool.
  *
  * It lives in its own module (NOT in `terminal-tools.ts`, which sits at the 800-line
  * cap) and is modeled VERBATIM on `createTerminalSessionReadTool`: a read-only,
@@ -11,12 +10,12 @@
  * `jsonResult`. `terminal-tools-stubs.ts` re-exports this so the public surface +
  * the import path are unchanged.
  *
- * Owner-scoping (T-124-15) is INHERITED from `registry.status`'s contract: a
+ * Owner-scoping is INHERITED from `registry.status`'s contract: a
  * cross-owner / killed session returns the not-found minimal view (`exited`, not
  * parked) — never another owner's classifier state. The classifier stays
  * single-homed in the worker (the registry round-trips a `status` frame).
  *
- * never-export (T-124-16, SEC-08): `terminal_session_status` is registered
+ * never-export: `terminal_session_status` is registered
  * `mcpExportPolicy:"never-export"` in `tool-metadata-registry.ts` — inherited from
  * that registration; this factory adds NO export annotation of its own.
  *
@@ -29,7 +28,7 @@
 import { Type } from "typebox";
 import { jsonResult } from "../../../platform-tools/tool-helpers.js";
 import { resolveOwner } from "./terminal-tools.js";
-/** The spec §5 `status` parameter schema (the surface 119-01 registered; the body is now real). */
+/** The `status` parameter schema. */
 export const StatusParams = Type.Object({
     sessionId: Type.String({ description: "Session to inspect" }),
 });
@@ -39,12 +38,12 @@ function readSessionId(params) {
     return typeof v === "string" ? v : "";
 }
 /**
- * `terminal_session_status` — return the classifier-derived spec §5 status view
+ * `terminal_session_status` — return the classifier-derived status view
  * `{state, lastActivity, interactions, cursorParked, screenDiffEmpty, exitCode?}` for
- * an OWNED session. Owner-scoped (T-124-15, inherited from `registry.status`): a
+ * an OWNED session. Owner-scoped (inherited from `registry.status`): a
  * cross-owner / killed session returns the not-found minimal view, never a leak.
  * Read-only — it never mutates the session. The status view is structural (no screen
- * text), so unlike `read` it needs no redaction/wrap (T-124-17).
+ * text), so unlike `read` it needs no redaction/wrap.
  */
 export function createTerminalSessionStatusTool(deps) {
     return {
@@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ export function createTerminalSessionStatusTool(deps) {
         label: "Terminal: status",
         description: "Report the current state of a terminal session (working / awaiting-input / stuck / exited) + a perception summary.",
         parameters: StatusParams,
-        // 4-arg execute (TR-10): status is read-only — it never kills; the turn signal is
+        // 4-arg execute: status is read-only — it never kills; the turn signal is
         // observed but a status query has no long-running work to abort.
         async execute(_id, params, _signal, _onUpdate) {
             const start = deps.nowMs();

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/builtin/terminal-driver/terminal-status-view.d.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 /**
- * terminal-status-view -- the pure composition for `registry.status` (124-06, spec
- * §5), extracted from `terminal-session-registry.ts` so that file keeps headroom
+ * terminal-status-view -- the pure composition for `registry.status`,
+ * extracted from `terminal-session-registry.ts` so that file keeps headroom
  * under the 800-line architecture cap.
  *
  * The registry owns the owner-check + the `status`-frame round-trip; THIS module owns
  * the two pure shape transforms:
  *   - {@link notFoundStatus}: the owner-scoped degrade (absent / cross-owner / killed
- *     → `exited`, not parked) — never another owner's classifier state (T-124-15).
+ *     → `exited`, not parked) — never another owner's classifier state.
  *   - {@link composeStatusView}: fold the worker's structural perception together with
  *     the daemon-side `handle.lastActivity` into the full {@link TerminalStatusView}.
  *
@@ -14,19 +14,19 @@
  * so the registry suite pins the owner-scoped contract deterministically. Carries NO
  * raw screen text — structural signals only: the surfaced `confidence` is a 2-value
  * enum and `reason` is a fixed machine tag (`dialog_detected`/`settled_cursor_parked`/
- * `no_progress`/`exited`), NEVER screen bytes (I3, T-163-07). Never throws.
+ * `no_progress`/`exited`), NEVER screen bytes. Never throws.
  *
  * @module
  */
 import type { ClassifierState } from "./terminal-classifier.js";
 /**
- * The session status view returned by `registry.status` (124-06, spec §5). Composes
+ * The session status view returned by `registry.status`. Composes
  * the worker's classifier-derived perception ({@link ClassifierState} +
  * `cursorParked`/`screenDiffEmpty`/`interactions`/`exitCode?`, single-homed in the
  * worker) with the daemon-side `handle.lastActivity`. Owner-scoped: a cross-owner /
  * killed session yields the not-found minimal view (`exited`, not parked), NEVER
- * another owner's real state (T-124-15). Carries NO raw screen text — structural only
- * (the `confidence` enum + the `reason` machine tag are NOT screen-derived; T-163-07).
+ * another owner's real state. Carries NO raw screen text — structural only
+ * (the `confidence` enum + the `reason` machine tag are NOT screen-derived).
  */
 export interface TerminalStatusView {
     /** The classifier verdict (`working | awaiting-input | exited | stuck`). */
@@ -35,42 +35,42 @@ export interface TerminalStatusView {
     lastActivity: number;
     /** The session's interaction count (the worker's per-session counter). */
     interactions: number;
-    /** Whether the cursor is parked at a plausible input position (the §4.3 gate). */
+    /** Whether the cursor is parked at a plausible input position (the cursor-park gate). */
     cursorParked: boolean;
     /** Whether the current screen-diff vs the previously-classified frame is empty. */
     screenDiffEmpty: boolean;
     /** The PTY exit code, when known (present for an exited session that reported one). */
     exitCode?: number;
-    /** The classifier's confidence in {@link state} (`high` for the structural certainties, `medium` for the heuristics). A 2-value enum — NEVER screen text (I3). */
+    /** The classifier's confidence in {@link state} (`high` for the structural certainties, `medium` for the heuristics). A 2-value enum — NEVER screen text. */
     confidence: "high" | "medium";
-    /** The classifier's stable machine-readable reason tag (e.g. `dialog_detected`/`settled_cursor_parked`/`no_progress`/`exited`) — a structural tag for logs/the autonomous policy, NEVER screen text (I3, T-163-07). */
+    /** The classifier's stable machine-readable reason tag (e.g. `dialog_detected`/`settled_cursor_parked`/`no_progress`/`exited`) — a structural tag for logs/the autonomous policy, NEVER screen text. */
     reason: string;
-    /** The session's operator-declared allowId (v2.26 DIALOG-01) — the daemon woken turn resolves the
+    /** The session's operator-declared allowId — the daemon woken turn resolves the
      *  platform profile from it to feed `decideAutoAnswer` the profile's dialogs. Absent for a
      *  not-found / cross-owner session (⇒ no profile ⇒ the safe escalate-only default). */
     allowId?: string;
 }
-/** The structural perception the worker replies to a `status` frame (124-06) — the §5 subset minus `lastActivity` (the worker is owner-agnostic; the registry adds it). */
+/** The structural perception the worker replies to a `status` frame — the subset minus `lastActivity` (the worker is owner-agnostic; the registry adds it). */
 export interface WorkerStatusPerception {
     state: ClassifierState;
     cursorParked: boolean;
     screenDiffEmpty: boolean;
     interactions: number;
     exitCode?: number;
-    /** The classifier's confidence in {@link state} (from `Classification.confidence`). A 2-value enum — NEVER screen text (I3). */
+    /** The classifier's confidence in {@link state} (from `Classification.confidence`). A 2-value enum — NEVER screen text. */
     confidence: "high" | "medium";
-    /** The classifier's machine-readable reason tag (from `Classification.reason`) — a structural tag, NEVER screen text (I3, T-163-07). */
+    /** The classifier's machine-readable reason tag (from `Classification.reason`) — a structural tag, NEVER screen text. */
     reason: string;
 }
 /** The minimal `lastActivity`/`exitCode`/`allowId` carrier the composition reads off a daemon-side handle (a structural subset of `SessionHandle`). */
 export interface StatusHandleFields {
     lastActivity: number;
     exitCode?: number;
-    /** The session's operator-declared allowId (for the DIALOG-01 profile resolution in the woken turn). */
+    /** The session's operator-declared allowId (for the platform-profile resolution in the woken turn). */
     allowId?: string;
 }
 /**
- * The owner-scoped not-found status view (124-06, T-124-15): an absent / cross-owner /
+ * The owner-scoped not-found status view: an absent / cross-owner /
  * killed session degrades to `exited`, not parked, carrying the handle's `lastActivity`
  * + `exitCode` when a (same-owner) handle exists — NEVER another owner's classifier
  * state. Mirrors `read`'s owner-scoped degrade (the caller does not round-trip a frame
@@ -85,13 +85,13 @@ export declare function notFoundStatus(handle: StatusHandleFields | undefined):
  * stays single-homed in the worker; the registry only adds the activity timestamp it
  * owns.
  *
- * DEFENSIVE against a malformed reply (LR-03): the registry casts the cross-process IPC
+ * DEFENSIVE against a malformed reply: the registry casts the cross-process IPC
  * `reply.result` with `as WorkerStatusPerception` (an unchecked cast of untrusted bytes),
  * so a version-skewed / corrupt worker could deliver an out-of-enum `confidence` or a
  * missing / non-string `reason`. This fold NARROWS both before they reach the status
  * surface the autonomous policy reads — coalescing `confidence` to `"medium"` and
  * `reason` to {@link UNKNOWN_REASON} when not the expected enum/string — mirroring the
- * `setup-terminal-tools` fd3 republish reader (T-163-11) and {@link notFoundStatus}'s
+ * `setup-terminal-tools` fd3 republish reader and {@link notFoundStatus}'s
  * safe-default stance, so the view stays TOTAL (never an `undefined`/type-breaking
  * field). The well-formed happy path folds through verbatim.
  *

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/builtin/terminal-driver/terminal-status-view.js

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * terminal-status-view -- the pure composition for `registry.status` (124-06, spec
- * §5), extracted from `terminal-session-registry.ts` so that file keeps headroom
+ * terminal-status-view -- the pure composition for `registry.status`,
+ * extracted from `terminal-session-registry.ts` so that file keeps headroom
  * under the 800-line architecture cap.
  *
  * The registry owns the owner-check + the `status`-frame round-trip; THIS module owns
  * the two pure shape transforms:
  *   - {@link notFoundStatus}: the owner-scoped degrade (absent / cross-owner / killed
- *     → `exited`, not parked) — never another owner's classifier state (T-124-15).
+ *     → `exited`, not parked) — never another owner's classifier state.
  *   - {@link composeStatusView}: fold the worker's structural perception together with
  *     the daemon-side `handle.lastActivity` into the full {@link TerminalStatusView}.
  *
@@ -15,12 +15,12 @@
  * so the registry suite pins the owner-scoped contract deterministically. Carries NO
  * raw screen text — structural signals only: the surfaced `confidence` is a 2-value
  * enum and `reason` is a fixed machine tag (`dialog_detected`/`settled_cursor_parked`/
- * `no_progress`/`exited`), NEVER screen bytes (I3, T-163-07). Never throws.
+ * `no_progress`/`exited`), NEVER screen bytes. Never throws.
  *
  * @module
  */
 /**
- * The owner-scoped not-found status view (124-06, T-124-15): an absent / cross-owner /
+ * The owner-scoped not-found status view: an absent / cross-owner /
  * killed session degrades to `exited`, not parked, carrying the handle's `lastActivity`
  * + `exitCode` when a (same-owner) handle exists — NEVER another owner's classifier
  * state. Mirrors `read`'s owner-scoped degrade (the caller does not round-trip a frame
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ export function notFoundStatus(handle) {
         interactions: 0,
         cursorParked: false,
         screenDiffEmpty: true,
-        // The not-found / cross-owner degrade is itself `exited`: a fixed SAFE default
-        // (T-124-15 / T-163-08), NEVER a real classifier verdict — keeps the widened view
+        // The not-found / cross-owner degrade is itself `exited`: a fixed SAFE default,
+        // NEVER a real classifier verdict — keeps the widened view
         // total (no undefined field) without reading another owner's state.
         confidence: "high",
         reason: "exited",
@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ export function notFoundStatus(handle) {
 }
 /**
  * The safe default `reason` tag for a malformed/version-skewed worker perception — a
- * structural machine tag (content-free, I3), NEVER screen bytes. Used when the worker
- * reply omits / mis-types `reason` (LR-03).
+ * structural machine tag (content-free), NEVER screen bytes. Used when the worker
+ * reply omits / mis-types `reason`.
  */
 const UNKNOWN_REASON = "unknown";
 /**
@@ -55,13 +55,13 @@ const UNKNOWN_REASON = "unknown";
  * stays single-homed in the worker; the registry only adds the activity timestamp it
  * owns.
  *
- * DEFENSIVE against a malformed reply (LR-03): the registry casts the cross-process IPC
+ * DEFENSIVE against a malformed reply: the registry casts the cross-process IPC
  * `reply.result` with `as WorkerStatusPerception` (an unchecked cast of untrusted bytes),
  * so a version-skewed / corrupt worker could deliver an out-of-enum `confidence` or a
  * missing / non-string `reason`. This fold NARROWS both before they reach the status
  * surface the autonomous policy reads — coalescing `confidence` to `"medium"` and
  * `reason` to {@link UNKNOWN_REASON} when not the expected enum/string — mirroring the
- * `setup-terminal-tools` fd3 republish reader (T-163-11) and {@link notFoundStatus}'s
+ * `setup-terminal-tools` fd3 republish reader and {@link notFoundStatus}'s
  * safe-default stance, so the view stays TOTAL (never an `undefined`/type-breaking
  * field). The well-formed happy path folds through verbatim.
  *
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ const UNKNOWN_REASON = "unknown";
  */
 export function composeStatusView(perception, handle) {
     const exitCode = perception.exitCode ?? handle.exitCode;
-    // Narrow the two CLASS-02 fields against a malformed reply (LR-03): only the 2-value
+    // Narrow the two classifier fields against a malformed reply: only the 2-value
     // enum passes for confidence, only a string for reason — anything else degrades to the
     // safe default rather than propagating a raw/undefined value onto the status surface.
     const confidence = perception.confidence === "high" || perception.confidence === "medium"
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ export function composeStatusView(perception, handle) {
         // The classifier's confidence + reason ride from the worker's perception onto the
         // view (the worker stays single-homed for the verdict; the registry only adds
         // `lastActivity`) — defensively narrowed above so a malformed reply can never surface
-        // an undefined / out-of-enum value (LR-03).
+        // an undefined / out-of-enum value.
         confidence,
         reason,
         ...(exitCode !== undefined ? { exitCode } : {}),

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/builtin/terminal-driver/terminal-tmux-backend.d.ts

@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
 /**
  * terminal-tmux-backend -- the THIRD worker backend (node-pty | pipe | tmux),
- * required for milestone-length runs (OPS-05, spec §4.6 "Recovery").
+ * required for milestone-length runs (recovery across a worker/daemon restart).
  *
  * A worker crash loses an in-process (node-pty / pipe) PTY. The tmux backend owns the
  * driven child inside a DETERMINISTICALLY-named tmux session (`comis-<sessionId>`) so the
  * tmux SERVER outlives the worker/daemon: a restart RE-ATTACHES (`tmux has-session` →
  * `tmux attach`) rather than re-creating, and a human can `tmux attach -t comis-<id>` to
  * take over. The deterministic name + has-session-then-attach is the load-bearing survival
- * mechanism (RESEARCH Pitfall 6 — a random/UUID name is un-recoverable and leaks an
- * un-reapable session; T-124-23).
+ * mechanism (a random/UUID name is un-recoverable and leaks an un-reapable session).
  *
  * DRIVABILITY (the read/drive model — corrected 2026-06-16). The backend drives the
  * session by ATTACHING a real **node-pty** running `tmux attach -t comis-<id>`. That pty IS
@@ -23,7 +22,7 @@
  * path. The session is configured `status off` (no chrome in reads) + `prefix None` (no
  * Ctrl-b interception of driven keystrokes) so the attach behaves as a transparent pipe.
  *
- * JAIL NESTING (T-124-24 — no unjailed path). The driven child STILL runs inside the bwrap
+ * JAIL NESTING (no unjailed path). The driven child STILL runs inside the bwrap
  * jail: `attachBackend` hands this backend the already-composed plan command (`{bin,argv}` =
  * `bwrap [scope] -- <child> …`), and the backend runs `tmux new-session -d -s comis-<id> --
  * bwrap [scope] -- <child>`. tmux is the OUTERMOST process by DESIGN (not bwrap): the
@@ -31,7 +30,7 @@
  * wrapper. The attach pty is just a viewing/driving client — the driven child stays jailed
  * inside the tmux session.
  *
- * Architecture invariants (binding — AGENTS.md / 124 house style):
+ * Architecture invariants (binding — AGENTS.md):
  *   - NO module-global mutable state: the per-session attach pty + closure state live inside
  *     the factory — two `createTmuxBackend` instances never share state.
  *   - PURE command builders: `tmuxSessionName` + the `buildTmux*Argv` set are free functions
@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@
  *   - Infra-free + DEPENDENCY-free: value-imports NOTHING (only types). The one-shot tmux
  *     runner AND the attach-pty spawner are INJECTED ({@link TmuxBackendDeps}) so the logic
  *     is provable on macOS without a live tmux server — never `@comis/infra` /
- *     `@comis/observability` (SEC-07; the infra-runtime-scope architecture gate NAMES this file).
+ *     `@comis/observability` (the infra-runtime-scope architecture gate NAMES this file).
  *
  * @module
  */
@@ -49,7 +48,7 @@ import type { FakePtyLike } from "./terminal-worker-types.js";
  * Derive the DETERMINISTIC tmux session name from a worker sessionId. Stable +
  * recoverable: the same sessionId always maps to `comis-<sessionId>`, so a
  * worker/daemon restart re-attaches by name rather than re-creating under a fresh
- * (un-recoverable) name. This is the OPS-05 survival key (RESEARCH Pitfall 6).
+ * (un-recoverable) name. This is the survival key.
  */
 export declare function tmuxSessionName(sessionId: string): string;
 /**
@@ -122,7 +121,7 @@ export interface TmuxBackendDeps {
     tmuxPath: string;
     /**
      * The explicit `-S` socket path — a STABLE file under the data dir (e.g.
-     * `<dataDir>/terminal-worker/tmux.sock`), NOT tmux's default /tmp socket. DUR-01 survival
+     * `<dataDir>/terminal-worker/tmux.sock`), NOT tmux's default /tmp socket. Survival
      * key: systemd `PrivateTmp=yes` privatizes /tmp per daemon start, so the default socket is
      * unreachable after a restart; the data-dir socket is reachable by both daemon generations
      * so the restarted daemon re-attaches. See {@link tmuxSocketHead}.
@@ -148,16 +147,16 @@ export interface TmuxBackendDeps {
      */
     spawnAttachPty: (name: string) => FakePtyLike;
     /**
-     * BL-01 (165-REVIEW): re-attach ONLY — NEVER create. When `true` and `hasSession` is
+     * Re-attach ONLY — NEVER create. When `true` and `hasSession` is
      * false, {@link createTmuxBackend} returns `undefined` (the session is genuinely gone; the
      * worker's `reattach` handler replies `ok:false` → the registry flips `lost`). This is the
      * recover-on-boot path: a fresh `new-session` would spawn a SECOND CLI against a session
-     * whose liveness we could not confirm — a double-drive (I10). Absent/false ⇒ create-or-attach.
+     * whose liveness we could not confirm — a double-drive. Absent/false ⇒ create-or-attach.
      */
     forceAttachOnly?: boolean;
 }
 /**
- * Create a tmux backend handle for a session. On construction it makes the OPS-05 survival
+ * Create a tmux backend handle for a session. On construction it makes the survival
  * decision ONCE: `hasSession(comis-<id>)` ? ATTACH (the session survived a restart) : CREATE
  * (`new-session -d`) then ATTACH. It configures the session for transparent driving
  * (`status off` + `prefix None`), then spawns the node-pty `tmux attach` that IS the
@@ -167,7 +166,7 @@ export interface TmuxBackendDeps {
  * NEVER an unconditional `new-session`: re-creating an existing session would discard the
  * surviving session's state (the whole point of tmux survival).
  *
- * BL-01 (165-REVIEW): with `forceAttachOnly:true` (the recover-on-boot re-attach path) a
+ * With `forceAttachOnly:true` (the recover-on-boot re-attach path) a
  * GONE session (`hasSession` false) returns `undefined` instead of creating — the caller
  * (the worker's `reattach` handler) then replies `ok:false`, NEVER a fresh CLI.
  */