comisai 1.0.44 → 1.0.46

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/integrations/image-gen/image-gen-factory.d.ts

@@ -6,12 +6,11 @@ import type { Result } from "@comis/shared";
  * Returns `ok(undefined)` when the required API key is missing from SecretManager,
  * allowing graceful degradation (image generation disabled rather than erroring).
  *
- * 185 FOLD: this legacy skills factory now serves ONLY `fal` (CFG-01
- * explicit-config back-compat). The `openai` path was removed — the explicit
- * `openai` config now routes through the daemon's `openai-images` registered
- * pi-ai transport (setup-image-provider.ts), NOT a second skills adapter. Any
- * non-`fal` provider therefore hits the `default` error branch here (the daemon
- * selector resolves it upstream).
+ * This skills factory serves ONLY the `fal` provider. An explicit `openai` config
+ * routes through the daemon's `openai-images` registered pi-ai transport
+ * (setup-image-provider.ts), NOT a second skills adapter. Any non-`fal` provider
+ * therefore hits the `default` error branch here (the daemon selector resolves it
+ * upstream).
  *
  * @param config - Image generation configuration with provider selection
  * @param secretManager - Credential access for API keys

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/integrations/image-gen/image-gen-factory.js

@@ -6,12 +6,11 @@ import { createFalAdapter } from "./fal-adapter.js";
  * Returns `ok(undefined)` when the required API key is missing from SecretManager,
  * allowing graceful degradation (image generation disabled rather than erroring).
  *
- * 185 FOLD: this legacy skills factory now serves ONLY `fal` (CFG-01
- * explicit-config back-compat). The `openai` path was removed — the explicit
- * `openai` config now routes through the daemon's `openai-images` registered
- * pi-ai transport (setup-image-provider.ts), NOT a second skills adapter. Any
- * non-`fal` provider therefore hits the `default` error branch here (the daemon
- * selector resolves it upstream).
+ * This skills factory serves ONLY the `fal` provider. An explicit `openai` config
+ * routes through the daemon's `openai-images` registered pi-ai transport
+ * (setup-image-provider.ts), NOT a second skills adapter. Any non-`fal` provider
+ * therefore hits the `default` error branch here (the daemon selector resolves it
+ * upstream).
  *
  * @param config - Image generation configuration with provider selection
  * @param secretManager - Credential access for API keys

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/integrations/local-stt-adapter.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * In-process keyless whisper STT adapter (LOCAL-01 / LOCAL-02 / LOCAL-04).
+ * In-process keyless whisper STT adapter.
  *
  * The zero-config default rung of STT `auto`: it transcribes with NO key by
  * running whisper in-process via `@huggingface/transformers` (Transformers.js),
@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@
  * module-level singleton — the model loads once per process and is NOT evicted
  * by a per-call transcribe failure, only by a load failure; modulo a concurrent
  * cold start where two simultaneous first calls can each build it before the
- * promise is memoized — IN-01, a self-healing cold-start-only inefficiency).
+ * promise is memoized — a self-healing cold-start-only inefficiency).
  *
  * Design constraints (all enforced by local-stt-adapter.test.ts):
- *  - **Honest-degrade (LOCAL-02):** the engine is lazy-imported INSIDE a guarded
+ *  - **Honest-degrade:** the engine is lazy-imported INSIDE a guarded
  *    `await import("@huggingface/transformers")` — NEVER a top-level static
  *    import — so a missing/broken install (or its native ORT addon) yields
  *    `Result.err` rather than crashing the whole `@comis/skills` import graph.
@@ -20,11 +20,11 @@
  *  - **Audio decode:** the inbound Buffer is decoded to a 16 kHz mono
  *    `Float32Array` by shelling the existing ffmpeg binary (`-f f32le -ar 16000
  *    -ac 1`) — no new audio library (mirrors `audio-converter.ts`).
- *  - **Scoped cache (LOCAL-04):** `env.cacheDir` is set to
+ *  - **Scoped cache:** `env.cacheDir` is set to
  *    `safePath(dataDir, "models", "whisper")` (NEVER raw `path.join`) before the
  *    first `pipeline()` call; that path is already inside the daemon's
  *    `--allow-fs-write=${COMIS_DATA_DIR}` scope, so no new permission flag.
- *  - **Fail-closed + integrity (SEC-03):** the LIVE, prod-running integrity
+ *  - **Fail-closed + integrity:** the LIVE, prod-running integrity
  *    mechanism is the pinned `MODEL_IDS` anchor (only a hardcoded id is loaded;
  *    an unknown key → the pinned default) + the TLS HF-Hub source + the
  *    fail-closed load: a short/corrupt `pipeline()` load → `err` (kind
@@ -34,14 +34,14 @@
  *    OPTIONAL, **TEST-ONLY** seam: its default (`defaultStatModelCache`) returns
  *    `undefined`, so it enforces NOTHING off a real daemon (the transformers.js
  *    etag cache layout is not a documented contract — guessing a path to stat is
- *    the §2.10 bug class). Do NOT read the size-floor as live corrupt-download
+ *    itself a bug). Do NOT read the size-floor as live corrupt-download
  *    protection; the fail-closed LOAD is what catches a truncated download in
  *    prod. HONEST limit: transformers.js exposes NO caller-visible content-hash,
- *    so SEC-03 is pinned-id + TLS + fail-closed load (NOT a content-hash, and NOT
+ *    so integrity is pinned-id + TLS + fail-closed load (NOT a content-hash, and NOT
  *    a size-floor in prod). The TTS twin (`local-tts-adapter.ts`) deliberately
- *    carries NO size-floor seam at all — its SEC-03 scope is the same pinned-id +
+ *    carries NO size-floor seam at all — its integrity scope is the same pinned-id +
  *    TLS + fail-closed-load triad, MINUS the inert STT size seam.
- *  - **Redaction (SEC-01 light floor):** every surfaced error string is passed
+ *  - **Redaction (light floor):** every surfaced error string is passed
  *    through `sanitizeApiError`, which strips URLs (`[URL]`) and long tokens
  *    (`[REDACTED]`), so no credential-bearing `baseUrl`/token leaks.
  *
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ export interface LocalWhisperConfig {
      */
     readonly decodeToPcm16kF32?: (audio: Buffer, mime: string) => Promise<Result<Float32Array, Error>>;
     /**
-     * SEC-03 size-floor seam (OPTIONAL, **TEST-ONLY** — see below): after the
+     * Size-floor seam (OPTIONAL, **TEST-ONLY** — see below): after the
      * pipeline loads, resolve the on-disk size (bytes) of the cached model under
      * `cacheDir`, or `undefined` if it cannot be reliably determined. A size BELOW
      * {@link MODEL_SIZE_FLOOR_BYTES} is treated as a truncated/partial download →
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ export interface LocalWhisperConfig {
      * The DEFAULT ({@link defaultStatModelCache}) returns `undefined`, so the
      * size-floor ENFORCES NOTHING in production: the transformers.js etag cache
      * layout is NOT a documented contract, so production does NOT guess a fragile
-     * path to `fs.stat` (the §2.10 bug class) — and an unknown size must never be a
+     * path to `fs.stat` (a hand-built path may not exist) — and an unknown size must never be a
      * false corruption. The LIVE prod integrity floor is therefore the pinned id +
      * the fail-closed LOAD + the TLS HF-Hub source; this seam exists so the
      * fail-closed-on-implausible-size BRANCH is exercisable (tests inject a concrete
@@ -110,10 +110,10 @@ export interface LocalWhisperConfig {
  */
 export declare function __resetLocalWhisperPipelineForTests(): void;
 /**
- * A surfaced STT failure that CARRIES its domain `SttErrorKind` (WR-02).
+ * A surfaced STT failure that CARRIES its domain `SttErrorKind`.
  *
  * The adapter selects a `SttErrorKind` at each failure branch; attaching it to
- * the returned `Error` (rather than discarding it) lets the Phase-196 obs bridge
+ * the returned `Error` (rather than discarding it) lets the obs bridge
  * read `error.kind` directly instead of re-deriving it. Mirrors `VideoGenError`
  * (packages/core/src/media/video-error.ts) but kept adapter-local: this is not a
  * cross-package contract, so a lightweight `Error & { kind }` suffices and no
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ export interface SttDegradeError extends Error {
     readonly kind: SttErrorKind;
 }
 /**
- * TEST-ONLY: exercise the WR-04 PCM-boundary guard without shelling real ffmpeg.
+ * TEST-ONLY: exercise the PCM-boundary guard without shelling real ffmpeg.
  * Not exported on the package barrel — only imported by
  * `local-stt-adapter.test.ts` (same invariant as
  * `__resetLocalWhisperPipelineForTests`).

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/integrations/local-stt-adapter.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * In-process keyless whisper STT adapter (LOCAL-01 / LOCAL-02 / LOCAL-04).
+ * In-process keyless whisper STT adapter.
  *
  * The zero-config default rung of STT `auto`: it transcribes with NO key by
  * running whisper in-process via `@huggingface/transformers` (Transformers.js),
@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@
  * module-level singleton — the model loads once per process and is NOT evicted
  * by a per-call transcribe failure, only by a load failure; modulo a concurrent
  * cold start where two simultaneous first calls can each build it before the
- * promise is memoized — IN-01, a self-healing cold-start-only inefficiency).
+ * promise is memoized — a self-healing cold-start-only inefficiency).
  *
  * Design constraints (all enforced by local-stt-adapter.test.ts):
- *  - **Honest-degrade (LOCAL-02):** the engine is lazy-imported INSIDE a guarded
+ *  - **Honest-degrade:** the engine is lazy-imported INSIDE a guarded
  *    `await import("@huggingface/transformers")` — NEVER a top-level static
  *    import — so a missing/broken install (or its native ORT addon) yields
  *    `Result.err` rather than crashing the whole `@comis/skills` import graph.
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@
  *  - **Audio decode:** the inbound Buffer is decoded to a 16 kHz mono
  *    `Float32Array` by shelling the existing ffmpeg binary (`-f f32le -ar 16000
  *    -ac 1`) — no new audio library (mirrors `audio-converter.ts`).
- *  - **Scoped cache (LOCAL-04):** `env.cacheDir` is set to
+ *  - **Scoped cache:** `env.cacheDir` is set to
  *    `safePath(dataDir, "models", "whisper")` (NEVER raw `path.join`) before the
  *    first `pipeline()` call; that path is already inside the daemon's
  *    `--allow-fs-write=${COMIS_DATA_DIR}` scope, so no new permission flag.
- *  - **Fail-closed + integrity (SEC-03):** the LIVE, prod-running integrity
+ *  - **Fail-closed + integrity:** the LIVE, prod-running integrity
  *    mechanism is the pinned `MODEL_IDS` anchor (only a hardcoded id is loaded;
  *    an unknown key → the pinned default) + the TLS HF-Hub source + the
  *    fail-closed load: a short/corrupt `pipeline()` load → `err` (kind
@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@
  *    OPTIONAL, **TEST-ONLY** seam: its default (`defaultStatModelCache`) returns
  *    `undefined`, so it enforces NOTHING off a real daemon (the transformers.js
  *    etag cache layout is not a documented contract — guessing a path to stat is
- *    the §2.10 bug class). Do NOT read the size-floor as live corrupt-download
+ *    itself a bug). Do NOT read the size-floor as live corrupt-download
  *    protection; the fail-closed LOAD is what catches a truncated download in
  *    prod. HONEST limit: transformers.js exposes NO caller-visible content-hash,
- *    so SEC-03 is pinned-id + TLS + fail-closed load (NOT a content-hash, and NOT
+ *    so integrity is pinned-id + TLS + fail-closed load (NOT a content-hash, and NOT
  *    a size-floor in prod). The TTS twin (`local-tts-adapter.ts`) deliberately
- *    carries NO size-floor seam at all — its SEC-03 scope is the same pinned-id +
+ *    carries NO size-floor seam at all — its integrity scope is the same pinned-id +
  *    TLS + fail-closed-load triad, MINUS the inert STT size seam.
- *  - **Redaction (SEC-01 light floor):** every surfaced error string is passed
+ *  - **Redaction (light floor):** every surfaced error string is passed
  *    through `sanitizeApiError`, which strips URLs (`[URL]`) and long tokens
  *    (`[REDACTED]`), so no credential-bearing `baseUrl`/token leaks.
  *
@@ -66,16 +66,16 @@ const DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_SIZE_MB = 25;
 const DECODE_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
 /**
  * Exact ONNX whisper repo ids per size (the `onnx-community/*` Transformers.js-
- * compatible repos). This is the SEC-03 "pinned model id" anchor: only these
+ * compatible repos). This is the "pinned model id" anchor: only these
  * hardcoded ids are ever loaded — an unknown/blank model key resolves to the
  * pinned default ({@link DEFAULT_MODEL}) below, so no caller-supplied/arbitrary
  * remote id can be fetched. Fetched over TLS from the HF Hub (`allowRemoteModels`).
  *
- * SEC-03 HONEST scope: this is pinned-id + TLS + the fail-closed
+ * HONEST integrity scope: this is pinned-id + TLS + the fail-closed
  * `model_load_failed` seam + an OPTIONAL post-load size-floor — NOT a pinned
  * content-hash. Transformers.js etag-caches the download but exposes no
  * caller-visible content-hash API, so no cryptographic-integrity claim is made
- * (documented in voice.mdx by Plan 04).
+ * (documented in voice.mdx).
  */
 const MODEL_IDS = {
     tiny: "onnx-community/whisper-tiny",
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ const MODEL_IDS = {
     small: "onnx-community/whisper-small",
 };
 /**
- * SEC-03 size-floor: a cached whisper model below this many bytes is treated as
+ * Size-floor: a cached whisper model below this many bytes is treated as
  * a truncated/partial download (corruption), never a valid model. The smallest
  * pinned model (whisper-tiny, q8) is multiple MB on disk; 1 MB is a conservative
  * floor that no real model undershoots but a near-zero/partial file trips. Only
@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ const MODEL_IDS = {
 const MODEL_SIZE_FLOOR_BYTES = 1024 * 1024; // 1 MB
 /**
  * Module-level singleton: memoizes the `pipeline(...)` promise so the model
- * loads once per process (LOCAL-01 "2nd call no re-download"). It is reset to
+ * loads once per process ("2nd call no re-download"). It is reset to
  * `undefined` ONLY on a LOAD error (fail-closed retry — never a memoized partial
- * model). A per-call TRANSCRIBE failure does NOT reset it (WR-01) — a bad audio
+ * model). A per-call TRANSCRIBE failure does NOT reset it — a bad audio
  * input must not thrash the good, already-loaded model.
  */
 let pipelinePromise;
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ export function __resetLocalWhisperPipelineForTests() {
 }
 /**
  * Attach a domain `SttErrorKind` onto an Error and brand it as a
- * `SttDegradeError` (WR-02). Used for the clean-message guard branches
+ * `SttDegradeError`. Used for the clean-message guard branches
  * (empty buffer / oversize) where the message needs no third-party
  * sanitization — only the kind. Writable assign; public shape is readonly.
  */
@@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ function withKind(error, kind) {
 }
 /**
  * Build a redacted, hint-bearing, kind-carrying Error for a surfaced failure
- * branch that wraps a third-party `cause` (WR-02). The `kind` is attached so the
- * Phase-196 obs path can read it without re-deriving; the free-text `detail` is
+ * branch that wraps a third-party `cause`. The `kind` is attached so the
+ * obs path can read it without re-deriving; the free-text `detail` is
  * run through `sanitizeApiError` (strips URLs → `[URL]`, long tokens →
  * `[REDACTED]`) so no credential-bearing `baseUrl`/token leaks.
  */
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ function degraded(hint, cause, kind) {
 }
 /**
  * Convert a raw f32le PCM buffer (as ffmpeg writes it) into a copied
- * `Float32Array`, validating the decode at the boundary (WR-04).
+ * `Float32Array`, validating the decode at the boundary.
  *
  * A zero-byte buffer means ffmpeg "succeeded" (exit 0) but produced no PCM —
  * a valid container with no decodable audio stream, or a 0-duration clip. A
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ function pcmBufferToSamples(pcmBuffer) {
     return ok(Float32Array.from(samples));
 }
 /**
- * TEST-ONLY: exercise the WR-04 PCM-boundary guard without shelling real ffmpeg.
+ * TEST-ONLY: exercise the PCM-boundary guard without shelling real ffmpeg.
  * Not exported on the package barrel — only imported by
  * `local-stt-adapter.test.ts` (same invariant as
  * `__resetLocalWhisperPipelineForTests`).
@@ -162,9 +162,9 @@ export function __pcmBufferToSamplesForTests(pcmBuffer) {
  * Default ffmpeg decode: shells ffmpeg to raw 16 kHz mono f32 PCM, then reads it
  * into a Float32Array. Mirrors `audio-converter.ts:extractWaveform` (s16le/8000
  * → f32le/16000). Returns a `degraded(...)` `err` carrying kind `dependency`
- * (IN-02: the kind is now ATTACHED to the surfaced error, not discarded — see
- * `degraded`) on any ffmpeg failure OR an empty / non-4-byte-multiple decode
- * (WR-04). Never throws. The temp file is always cleaned up.
+ * (the kind is ATTACHED to the surfaced error, not discarded — see
+ * `degraded`) on any ffmpeg failure OR an empty / non-4-byte-multiple decode.
+ * Never throws. The temp file is always cleaned up.
  */
 async function defaultDecodeToPcm16kF32(audio, _mime) {
     const tempDir = os.tmpdir();
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ async function defaultDecodeToPcm16kF32(audio, _mime) {
         await fs.writeFile(inputPath, audio);
         await execFileAsync("ffmpeg", ["-y", "-i", inputPath, "-f", "f32le", "-ac", "1", "-ar", "16000", tempPcm], { timeout: DECODE_TIMEOUT_MS });
         const pcmBuffer = await fs.readFile(tempPcm);
-        // WR-04: validate the decode (empty / non-4-byte-multiple) at the boundary.
+        // Validate the decode (empty / non-4-byte-multiple) at the boundary.
         return pcmBufferToSamples(pcmBuffer);
     }
     catch (e) {
@@ -186,11 +186,11 @@ async function defaultDecodeToPcm16kF32(audio, _mime) {
     }
 }
 /**
- * Default SEC-03 size-floor seam: ALWAYS returns `undefined` (size unknown), so
+ * Default size-floor seam: ALWAYS returns `undefined` (size unknown), so
  * the size-floor enforces NOTHING in production — it is inert by default and the
  * floor branch only ever fires when a test injects a concrete size. The
  * transformers.js etag cache layout is NOT a documented contract, so production
- * does NOT guess a model-file path to `fs.stat` (the §2.10 bug class — a
+ * does NOT guess a model-file path to `fs.stat` (a
  * hand-built path that may not exist). The LIVE prod integrity floor is the
  * pinned id + the fail-closed LOAD (`model_load_failed`) + the TLS HF-Hub source,
  * NOT this seam. `safePath` would be used (never raw `path.join`) by any future
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ export function createLocalWhisperAdapter(cfg) {
     const loadEngine = cfg.loadEngine ?? defaultLoadEngine;
     const decode = cfg.decodeToPcm16kF32 ?? defaultDecodeToPcm16kF32;
     const statModelCache = cfg.statModelCache ?? defaultStatModelCache;
-    // SEC-03 pinned-id anchor: only a hardcoded MODEL_IDS value is ever loaded; an
+    // Pinned-id anchor: only a hardcoded MODEL_IDS value is ever loaded; an
     // unknown/blank key resolves to the pinned default — never the raw caller key.
     const modelId = MODEL_IDS[modelKey] ?? MODEL_IDS[DEFAULT_MODEL];
     return {
@@ -229,13 +229,13 @@ export function createLocalWhisperAdapter(cfg) {
             // 1. Empty-buffer guard — runs before any engine load or decode.
             if (audio.byteLength === 0) {
                 // Carry the kind like every other branch (clean message, no third-party
-                // cause to sanitize → withKind, not degraded). IN-02: this is really a
+                // cause to sanitize → withKind, not degraded). This is really a
                 // VALIDATION failure (bad input), but the closed SttErrorKind vocabulary
                 // (voice-error.ts) has no `validation` member, so `dependency` is the
                 // deliberate vocabulary mapping here — NOT a real missing-dependency.
                 return err(withKind(new Error("Audio buffer is empty"), "dependency"));
             }
-            // 2. Size cap. IN-02: also a validation failure; `dependency` is the
+            // 2. Size cap. Also a validation failure; `dependency` is the
             //    deliberate mapping (the SttErrorKind union has no `validation` member).
             const fileSizeMb = audio.byteLength / (1024 * 1024);
             if (fileSizeMb > maxFileSizeMb) {
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ export function createLocalWhisperAdapter(cfg) {
             if (!pcm.ok) {
                 return pcm;
             }
-            // 4. Lazy engine load — honest-degrade (LOCAL-02), never a module-load crash.
+            // 4. Lazy engine load — honest-degrade, never a module-load crash.
             let mod;
             try {
                 mod = await loadEngine();
@@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ export function createLocalWhisperAdapter(cfg) {
             catch (e) {
                 return err(degraded("Local whisper engine unavailable — install @huggingface/transformers or set transcription.local.baseUrl to a local whisper server", e, "dependency"));
             }
-            // 5. Singleton pipeline build — fail-closed ONLY on a bad load (SEC-03
-            //    seam). IN-01: memoize the pipeline() PROMISE synchronously the moment
+            // 5. Singleton pipeline build — fail-closed ONLY on a bad load. Memoize
+            //    the pipeline() PROMISE synchronously the moment
             //    the engine module is in hand — there is NO `await` between the
             //    `undefined` check and the assignment, so two near-simultaneous first
             //    calls that reach here serialize on the one shared promise rather than
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ export function createLocalWhisperAdapter(cfg) {
             let transcriber;
             try {
                 if (pipelinePromise === undefined) {
-                    mod.env["cacheDir"] = cacheDir; // scoped, inside --allow-fs-write (LOCAL-04)
+                    mod.env["cacheDir"] = cacheDir; // scoped, inside --allow-fs-write
                     mod.env["allowRemoteModels"] = true; // first-run HF-Hub download over TLS
                     pipelinePromise = mod.pipeline("automatic-speech-recognition", modelId, {
                         dtype: "q8", // quantized → minimal first-run download
@@ -277,20 +277,20 @@ export function createLocalWhisperAdapter(cfg) {
             catch (e) {
                 // Fail-closed: a failed/partial LOAD is NOT memoized — reset so a
                 // transient load failure can retry on the next call. This reset is
-                // correct ONLY for the load branch (WR-01).
+                // correct ONLY for the load branch.
                 pipelinePromise = undefined;
                 return err(degraded("Local whisper model failed to load — the download may be incomplete or the model id is unavailable", e, "model_load_failed"));
             }
-            // SEC-03 size-floor (OPTIONAL, TEST-ONLY seam — inert in prod): a
+            // Size-floor (OPTIONAL, TEST-ONLY seam — inert in prod): a
             // pipeline() that "loaded" but whose on-disk model is implausibly small is
-            // a truncated/partial download masquerading as a working model (the
-            // v2.24/188 silent-corrupt-download lesson). When the injected size seam
-            // reports a concrete sub-floor size, FAIL CLOSED and reset the singleton
-            // (same fail-closed discipline as the load catch) so the bad model is never
-            // memoized and a re-download is retried. The DEFAULT seam returns
-            // `undefined` (cache layout is not a documented contract → no path guess),
-            // so this branch enforces NOTHING off a real daemon — the live SEC-03
-            // protection for a corrupt download is the fail-closed LOAD above, not this.
+            // a truncated/partial download masquerading as a working model. When the
+            // injected size seam reports a concrete sub-floor size, FAIL CLOSED and
+            // reset the singleton (same fail-closed discipline as the load catch) so
+            // the bad model is never memoized and a re-download is retried. The
+            // DEFAULT seam returns `undefined` (cache layout is not a documented
+            // contract → no path guess), so this branch enforces NOTHING off a real
+            // daemon — the live protection for a corrupt download is the fail-closed
+            // LOAD above, not this.
             let modelBytes;
             try {
                 modelBytes = await statModelCache(cacheDir, modelId);
@@ -306,13 +306,13 @@ export function createLocalWhisperAdapter(cfg) {
                 return err(degraded("Local whisper model failed integrity check — the cached model is implausibly small (incomplete/truncated download)", new Error(`model bytes=${modelBytes} below floor=${MODEL_SIZE_FLOOR_BYTES}`), "model_load_failed"));
             }
             // 6. Transcribe — a per-call inference failure does NOT evict the good,
-            //    already-loaded model (WR-01). The singleton stays memoized; a bad
+            //    already-loaded model. The singleton stays memoized; a bad
             //    audio input is not a reason to thrash the load-once pipeline. The
             //    kind is `dependency` (a runtime inference failure), NOT
             //    `model_load_failed` (the model loaded fine).
             try {
                 const out = await transcriber(pcm.value);
-                // WR-03: out.text is the result of an injected/dynamically-imported
+                // out.text is the result of an injected/dynamically-imported
                 // third-party fn; the `text: string` type is an assertion, not a
                 // runtime guarantee. Validate at the boundary so an unexpected shape
                 // ({ text: undefined }, a chunked array, {}) surfaces as an honest err

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/integrations/local-stt-probe.d.ts

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
 /**
- * One-shot boot probe for the keyless local STT engine (LOCAL-02).
+ * One-shot boot probe for the keyless local STT engine.
  *
  * `detectLocalSttEngine` answers, ONCE at daemon boot, the question the
- * Phase-193 resolver predicate `localEngineAvailable()` needs: can the `local`
+ * resolver predicate `localEngineAvailable()` needs: can the `local`
  * STT rung actually transcribe? It NEVER throws and it NEVER downloads a model
  * — it only checks cheap signals (a short-timeout reachability fetch to a
  * configured server, OR engine-importability + ffmpeg presence). The boolean
  * result is captured by the daemon wiring and closed over as a synchronous
- * `() => boolean` (Plan 03), so the resolver does no per-call I/O.
+ * `() => boolean`, so the resolver does no per-call I/O.
  *
- * Availability rule (CONTEXT decision I6):
+ * Availability rule:
  *   1. `baseUrl` set + reachable  → available, mode "baseUrl" (the in-process
  *      engine is NOT consulted — a reachable local OpenAI-compatible whisper
  *      server is sufficient).
@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@
  *      importable → available, mode "in-process".
  *   3. otherwise → not available, mode "none".
  *
- * Security (SEC-02): the configured `baseUrl` is validated by
+ * Security: the configured `baseUrl` is validated by
  * `validateLocalServerUrl` (the inverse SSRF guard — ALLOW loopback + an
  * explicit allowlist, DENY public/private egress, keep the cloud-metadata deny)
  * BEFORE the reachability fetch fires. A non-loopback/unconfigured baseUrl is
  * treated as not-reachable (the guard rejects it and the probe falls through to
  * the in-process path) so a mis/maliciously-configured URL can never drive an
  * SSRF fetch from the boot probe. The reachability check itself is a
- * short-timeout fetch wrapped in a try (any error → not-reachable), and (CR-01)
+ * short-timeout fetch wrapped in a try (any error → not-reachable), and it
  * is PINNED to the IP the guard resolved (undici dispatcher) so a hostname that
  * passed as loopback cannot be rebound to a different IP at connect time
  * (DNS-rebinding/TOCTOU). No credential-bearing URL is logged.
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ export interface LocalSttProbeResult {
 }
 /** Dependencies for the one-shot local STT boot probe. */
 export interface LocalSttProbeDeps {
-    /** Optional local OpenAI-compatible whisper server URL (LOCAL-03). */
+    /** Optional local OpenAI-compatible whisper server URL. */
     readonly baseUrl?: string;
     /** Whether ffmpeg is available (the in-process path needs it to decode). */
     readonly ffmpegAvailable: boolean;

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/integrations/local-stt-probe.js

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * One-shot boot probe for the keyless local STT engine (LOCAL-02).
+ * One-shot boot probe for the keyless local STT engine.
  *
  * `detectLocalSttEngine` answers, ONCE at daemon boot, the question the
- * Phase-193 resolver predicate `localEngineAvailable()` needs: can the `local`
+ * resolver predicate `localEngineAvailable()` needs: can the `local`
  * STT rung actually transcribe? It NEVER throws and it NEVER downloads a model
  * — it only checks cheap signals (a short-timeout reachability fetch to a
  * configured server, OR engine-importability + ffmpeg presence). The boolean
  * result is captured by the daemon wiring and closed over as a synchronous
- * `() => boolean` (Plan 03), so the resolver does no per-call I/O.
+ * `() => boolean`, so the resolver does no per-call I/O.
  *
- * Availability rule (CONTEXT decision I6):
+ * Availability rule:
  *   1. `baseUrl` set + reachable  → available, mode "baseUrl" (the in-process
  *      engine is NOT consulted — a reachable local OpenAI-compatible whisper
  *      server is sufficient).
@@ -18,14 +18,14 @@
  *      importable → available, mode "in-process".
  *   3. otherwise → not available, mode "none".
  *
- * Security (SEC-02): the configured `baseUrl` is validated by
+ * Security: the configured `baseUrl` is validated by
  * `validateLocalServerUrl` (the inverse SSRF guard — ALLOW loopback + an
  * explicit allowlist, DENY public/private egress, keep the cloud-metadata deny)
  * BEFORE the reachability fetch fires. A non-loopback/unconfigured baseUrl is
  * treated as not-reachable (the guard rejects it and the probe falls through to
  * the in-process path) so a mis/maliciously-configured URL can never drive an
  * SSRF fetch from the boot probe. The reachability check itself is a
- * short-timeout fetch wrapped in a try (any error → not-reachable), and (CR-01)
+ * short-timeout fetch wrapped in a try (any error → not-reachable), and it
  * is PINNED to the IP the guard resolved (undici dispatcher) so a hostname that
  * passed as loopback cannot be rebound to a different IP at connect time
  * (DNS-rebinding/TOCTOU). No credential-bearing URL is logged.
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ const DEFAULT_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 1_500;
  * (refused, DNS, timeout, non-2xx is still "reachable") resolves `false`. The
  * SSRF guard (`validateLocalServerUrl`) has already run in `detectLocalSttEngine`
  * BEFORE this fetch — so this only ever fetches a loopback/explicitly-allowed
- * host (SEC-02).
+ * host.
  *
- * CR-01: the fetch is PINNED to `pinnedIp` (the IP the guard already resolved)
+ * The fetch is PINNED to `pinnedIp` (the IP the guard already resolved)
  * via an undici dispatcher, so a hostname that resolved to loopback at
  * validation cannot be rebound to a different IP at connect time (the
  * DNS-rebinding/TOCTOU gap a plain re-resolving fetch left open). TLS SNI is
@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ async function safeBoolean(check) {
  */
 export async function detectLocalSttEngine(deps) {
     const timeoutMs = deps.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS;
-    // 1. A reachable configured server is sufficient (I6) — do NOT consult the
-    //    in-process engine. SEC-02: the baseUrl is SSRF-guarded BEFORE the
+    // 1. A reachable configured server is sufficient — do NOT consult the
+    //    in-process engine. The baseUrl is SSRF-guarded BEFORE the
     //    reachability check fires (guard-before-fetch). validateLocalServerUrl
     //    ALLOWS loopback + an explicit allowlist and DENIES public/private egress
     //    (keeping the cloud-metadata deny); a rejected URL is treated as
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ export async function detectLocalSttEngine(deps) {
     if (baseUrl) {
         const guard = await validateLocalServerUrl(baseUrl);
         if (guard.ok) {
-            // CR-01: the default reachability fetch pins the connection to the IP the
+            // The default reachability fetch pins the connection to the IP the
             // guard just resolved (guard.value.ip). An injected `fetchProbe` test seam
             // bypasses the real fetch entirely (the guard still gates it above).
             const validatedIp = guard.value.ip;

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/integrations/local-tts-adapter.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * In-process keyless local/Piper TTS adapter (TTS-02).
+ * In-process keyless local/Piper TTS adapter.
  *
  * The offline keyless rung of TTS `auto` (`edge → local/piper →
  * honest-unavailable`): it synthesizes speech with NO key and NO network at
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@
  *    retry — never a silent partial-model success. The pinned `MODEL_ID` anchor
  *    (only a hardcoded single-speaker MMS-TTS id is loaded) + the TLS HF-Hub
  *    source are the integrity floor (transformers.js exposes NO caller-visible
- *    content-hash — same honest limit as STT SEC-03).
- *  - **Redaction (SEC-01 light floor):** every surfaced error string is passed
+ *    content-hash — same honest limit as STT).
+ *  - **Redaction (light floor):** every surfaced error string is passed
  *    through `sanitizeApiError`, which strips URLs (`[URL]`) and long tokens
  *    (`[REDACTED]`), so no credential-bearing `baseUrl`/token leaks.
  *
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ export interface LocalTtsConfig {
 export declare function __resetLocalTtsPipelineForTests(): void;
 /**
  * A surfaced TTS failure that CARRIES its domain `SttErrorKind`. The same error
- * vocabulary serves STT and TTS (design §17 / Assumption A3 — the resolver and
- * the obs bridge read `error.kind` directly instead of re-deriving it). Kept
+ * vocabulary serves STT and TTS (the resolver and the obs bridge read
+ * `error.kind` directly instead of re-deriving it). Kept
  * adapter-local; the helper RETURNS the error to `Result.err` (no raw throw).
  */
 export interface TtsDegradeError extends Error {

package/node_modules/@comis/skills/dist/tools/integrations/local-tts-adapter.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * In-process keyless local/Piper TTS adapter (TTS-02).
+ * In-process keyless local/Piper TTS adapter.
  *
  * The offline keyless rung of TTS `auto` (`edge → local/piper →
  * honest-unavailable`): it synthesizes speech with NO key and NO network at
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@
  *    retry — never a silent partial-model success. The pinned `MODEL_ID` anchor
  *    (only a hardcoded single-speaker MMS-TTS id is loaded) + the TLS HF-Hub
  *    source are the integrity floor (transformers.js exposes NO caller-visible
- *    content-hash — same honest limit as STT SEC-03).
- *  - **Redaction (SEC-01 light floor):** every surfaced error string is passed
+ *    content-hash — same honest limit as STT).
+ *  - **Redaction (light floor):** every surfaced error string is passed
  *    through `sanitizeApiError`, which strips URLs (`[URL]`) and long tokens
  *    (`[REDACTED]`), so no credential-bearing `baseUrl`/token leaks.
  *
@@ -68,11 +68,11 @@ const OUTPUT_MIME = "audio/mpeg";
  * only this hardcoded id is ever loaded — no caller-supplied/arbitrary remote
  * id can be fetched). `Xenova/mms-tts-eng` is a VITS/MMS-TTS English voice that
  * needs NO speaker-embeddings tensor (unlike SpeechT5), so it synthesizes from
- * text alone. Confirmed at the Wave-0 SHIP smoke check (Task 1): the 4.2.0 dist
- * builds the `text-to-audio` pipeline against it and synthesizes a real f32
- * waveform. Fetched over TLS from the HF Hub (`allowRemoteModels`).
+ * text alone. The transformers.js `text-to-audio` pipeline builds against it and
+ * synthesizes a real f32 waveform. Fetched over TLS from the HF Hub
+ * (`allowRemoteModels`).
  *
- * Integrity scope (same honest limit as STT SEC-03): pinned id + TLS + the
+ * Integrity scope (same honest limit as STT): pinned id + TLS + the
  * fail-closed `model_load_failed` seam — NOT a pinned content-hash
  * (transformers.js etag-caches but exposes no caller-visible content-hash API).
  */
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ export function createLocalTtsAdapter(cfg) {
     const loadEngine = cfg.loadEngine ?? defaultLoadEngine;
     const encodeWaveform = cfg.encodeWaveform ?? defaultEncodeWaveform;
     return {
-        // WR-01: `_options` (voice/format/speed) is intentionally ignored. The pinned
+        // `_options` (voice/format/speed) is intentionally ignored. The pinned
         // Xenova/mms-tts-eng model is single-speaker (so `voice` is meaningless) and
         // this offline rung ALWAYS emits `OUTPUT_MIME` ("audio/mpeg") — the requested
         // `format` is NOT honored here; the voice pipeline re-encodes downstream
@@ -188,13 +188,13 @@ export function createLocalTtsAdapter(cfg) {
         // caller must not assume the returned MIME matches a requested format.
         async synthesize(text, _options) {
             // 1. Empty-text guard — runs before any engine load (mirror edge-tts).
-            //    IN-02: a validation failure, but the closed SttErrorKind vocabulary
+            //    A validation failure, but the closed SttErrorKind vocabulary
             //    (voice-error.ts) has no `validation` member → `dependency` is the
             //    deliberate mapping, NOT a real missing-dependency failure.
             if (text.length === 0) {
                 return err(withKind(new Error("Text is empty"), "dependency"));
             }
-            // 2. Max-length guard. IN-02: validation failure, `dependency` per the
+            // 2. Max-length guard. A validation failure, `dependency` per the
             //    vocabulary constraint above.
             if (text.length > maxTextLength) {
                 return err(withKind(new Error(`Text length ${text.length} exceeds maximum of ${maxTextLength} characters`), "dependency"));
@@ -243,12 +243,12 @@ export function createLocalTtsAdapter(cfg) {
             if (!(waveform instanceof Float32Array)) {
                 return err(degraded("Local TTS returned no waveform — unexpected engine output shape", new Error(`unexpected audio type: ${typeof output?.audio}`), "dependency"));
             }
-            // IN-03 (known INFO, deferred): a missing/zero/NaN sampling_rate paired
-            // with a valid waveform falls back to 16000 rather than surfacing a
-            // degraded err. The pinned MMS-TTS model always returns a valid rate in
-            // practice, so this is not currently observed; tightening it to an honest
-            // err (consistent with the waveform-shape guard above) is a follow-up so as
-            // not to risk a behavior regression in this security-hardening pass.
+            // Known limitation: a missing/zero/NaN sampling_rate paired with a valid
+            // waveform falls back to 16000 rather than surfacing a degraded err. The
+            // pinned MMS-TTS model always returns a valid rate in practice, so this is
+            // not currently observed; tightening it to an honest err (consistent with
+            // the waveform-shape guard above) is a possible follow-up, kept as a
+            // fallback here to avoid a behavior regression.
             const samplingRate = typeof output.sampling_rate === "number" && output.sampling_rate > 0
                 ? output.sampling_rate
                 : 16000;