comisai 1.0.44 → 1.0.46

package/node_modules/@comis/memory/dist/schema-mental-models.js

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * The `mental_models` table DDL — the v2.31 Mental Model doc store (generalized
- * from the v2.26 Verified Learning WS2 / SKILL-01 `learned_skills` procedural
- * store). Each row is one advisory doc of `kind ∈ {skill, profile, topic}`
+ * The `mental_models` table DDL — the mental-model doc store (generalized
+ * from the `learned_skills` procedural store). Each row is one advisory doc of
+ * `kind ∈ {skill, profile, topic}`
  * (markdown `body`) distilled from successful trajectories; candidates are
  * admitted here at `trust=learned`, `state=candidate`, and a proof count drives
  * promote/demote/evict. A `kind='skill'` row materializes byte-identically to the
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  *
  * Forward-only, re-run-safe: `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` + `CREATE INDEX IF NOT
  * EXISTS` + `CREATE … VIRTUAL TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` only — no reverse DDL, no
- * branch on an old shape (design §9, additive) — PLUS a one-time copy-forward
+ * branch on an old shape (additive) — PLUS a one-time copy-forward
  * REBUILD from a pre-existing `learned_skills` table (below). Extracted from
  * `schema.ts` (which is at the 800-line cap), like `schema-outcome-events.ts` /
  * `schema-video-jobs.ts` — `initSchema` CALLS this so the table exists on every
@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@
  * `params_schema` / `mutating` advisory-metadata columns are KEPT (the surface
  * filter reads `mutating`). The dead `trigger` column is dropped too (zero
  * readers). The new `structured_body` / `history` JSON columns are provisioned
- * NULL this phase (Phase 223 populates `structured_body` via typed delta-ops).
+ * NULL for now (`structured_body` is populated later via typed delta-ops).
  *
- * ## SEC-01 trust ceiling (T-201-05) — the keystone
+ * ## Trust ceiling — the keystone
  *
  * `trust_level TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (trust_level IN ('learned')) DEFAULT 'learned'`
  * makes a learned doc STRUCTURALLY incapable of being `system`: the DB REJECTS
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  * `'learned'` in code (belt-and-suspenders) — a candidate claiming `trust:'system'`
  * is rejected by the DB AND never even reaches the column.
  *
- * ## SEC-01 isolation (T-201-06) — the multi-tenant boundary
+ * ## Tenant/agent isolation — the multi-tenant boundary
  *
  * `(tenant_id, agent_id)` are bare `NOT NULL` columns and lead every key/index;
  * the store filters EVERY statement on them, so a doc under one (tenant, agent)
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
  * Safe to call multiple times (all DDL uses IF NOT EXISTS; the copy-forward only
  * fires while a `learned_skills` table still exists). Called from `initSchema`
  * right after `ensureOutcomeEventsTable` so the table exists on every daemon
- * boot. The `CHECK` constraints pin the `trust_level` (the SEC-01 keystone),
+ * boot. The `CHECK` constraints pin the `trust_level` (the trust keystone),
  * `kind`, and `state` closed enums; the `UNIQUE (…)` is the lookup key +
  * idempotency backstop; the index serves the scoped `list()` read.
  *
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ export function ensureMentalModelsTable(db, embeddingDimensions, vecAvailable) {
     // column so the `'rebuild'` command (which re-reads the external content table)
     // can find it — naming it `content` here threw "no such column: content" on
     // every boot, silently leaving the index reliant on incremental triggers and
-    // never re-derivable after an unclean shutdown (WR-04).
+    // never re-derivable after an unclean shutdown.
     try {
         db.exec(`
       CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE IF NOT EXISTS mental_models_fts USING fts5(

package/node_modules/@comis/memory/dist/schema-msteams-conversation.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/**
+ * The `msteams_conversation_refs` table DDL — the persisted map from a
+ * conversation id to its routing tuple `{serviceUrl, tenantId, threadId?}`.
+ * A reply rides the inbound activity's own routing; a PROACTIVE send (cron,
+ * heartbeat, an unsolicited notice) has no inbound activity, so it recovers the
+ * routing from HERE, on disk in the shared `memory.db`. The row is upserted on
+ * every inbound activity so the freshest tuple is always stored.
+ *
+ * Forward-only, re-run-safe: create-if-not-exists only, no destructive or reverse
+ * DDL. `initSchema` CALLS this so the table exists on every boot — a table defined
+ * here but not wired into initSchema is MISSING at runtime.
+ *
+ * THE KEY: `key` is `sha256(conversation_id)` (the store hashes the id), so the PK
+ * is a fixed-width digest regardless of the platform id's length or shape. The
+ * `idx_msteams_conv_updated` index on `updated_at_ms` serves the TTL prune (delete
+ * everything older than the window) and the cap eviction (keep the N most-recently
+ * updated) the store runs on every capture, so the table cannot grow unbounded.
+ *
+ * SECURITY — routing columns ONLY (`conversation_id`, `service_url`, `tenant_id`,
+ * `thread_id`, `updated_at_ms`): the stored `service_url`/`tenant_id` are routing,
+ * not credentials, and there is deliberately NO credential column and NO
+ * message-content column. The strictObject row schema REJECTS an extra column if
+ * the DDL ever drifts. A persisted `service_url` stays untrusted until the send
+ * path re-validates it against the host allowlist.
+ *
+ * `better-sqlite3` durability is WAL + path-based chmod (never fd-based file sync),
+ * so this DDL is permission-model-safe by construction — no fd-fs guard is needed.
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+import type Database from "better-sqlite3";
+/**
+ * Create the `msteams_conversation_refs` table + the `updated_at_ms` index that
+ * serves the TTL prune + cap eviction idempotently.
+ *
+ * Safe to call multiple times (all DDL uses IF NOT EXISTS). Called from
+ * `initSchema` so the table exists on every daemon boot.
+ *
+ * @param db - An open better-sqlite3 Database instance
+ */
+export declare function ensureMsTeamsConversationTable(db: Database.Database): void;

package/node_modules/@comis/memory/dist/schema-msteams-conversation.js

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+/**
+ * The `msteams_conversation_refs` table DDL — the persisted map from a
+ * conversation id to its routing tuple `{serviceUrl, tenantId, threadId?}`.
+ * A reply rides the inbound activity's own routing; a PROACTIVE send (cron,
+ * heartbeat, an unsolicited notice) has no inbound activity, so it recovers the
+ * routing from HERE, on disk in the shared `memory.db`. The row is upserted on
+ * every inbound activity so the freshest tuple is always stored.
+ *
+ * Forward-only, re-run-safe: create-if-not-exists only, no destructive or reverse
+ * DDL. `initSchema` CALLS this so the table exists on every boot — a table defined
+ * here but not wired into initSchema is MISSING at runtime.
+ *
+ * THE KEY: `key` is `sha256(conversation_id)` (the store hashes the id), so the PK
+ * is a fixed-width digest regardless of the platform id's length or shape. The
+ * `idx_msteams_conv_updated` index on `updated_at_ms` serves the TTL prune (delete
+ * everything older than the window) and the cap eviction (keep the N most-recently
+ * updated) the store runs on every capture, so the table cannot grow unbounded.
+ *
+ * SECURITY — routing columns ONLY (`conversation_id`, `service_url`, `tenant_id`,
+ * `thread_id`, `updated_at_ms`): the stored `service_url`/`tenant_id` are routing,
+ * not credentials, and there is deliberately NO credential column and NO
+ * message-content column. The strictObject row schema REJECTS an extra column if
+ * the DDL ever drifts. A persisted `service_url` stays untrusted until the send
+ * path re-validates it against the host allowlist.
+ *
+ * `better-sqlite3` durability is WAL + path-based chmod (never fd-based file sync),
+ * so this DDL is permission-model-safe by construction — no fd-fs guard is needed.
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+/**
+ * Create the `msteams_conversation_refs` table + the `updated_at_ms` index that
+ * serves the TTL prune + cap eviction idempotently.
+ *
+ * Safe to call multiple times (all DDL uses IF NOT EXISTS). Called from
+ * `initSchema` so the table exists on every daemon boot.
+ *
+ * @param db - An open better-sqlite3 Database instance
+ */
+export function ensureMsTeamsConversationTable(db) {
+    db.exec(`
+    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS msteams_conversation_refs (
+      key             TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+      conversation_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+      service_url     TEXT NOT NULL,
+      tenant_id       TEXT NOT NULL,
+      thread_id       TEXT,
+      updated_at_ms   INTEGER NOT NULL
+    )
+  `);
+    // Serves both the TTL prune (updated_at_ms < now - TTL) and the cap eviction
+    // (ORDER BY updated_at_ms DESC LIMIT CAP) the store runs on every capture.
+    db.exec(`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_msteams_conv_updated ON msteams_conversation_refs(updated_at_ms)`);
+}

package/node_modules/@comis/memory/dist/schema-obs-token.d.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * co-location precedent. `initSchema` CALLS these so they run on every boot,
  * AFTER the base `obs_token_usage` CREATE.
  *
- * Two PERSIST-02 / AUDIT-01 migrations:
+ * Two migrations:
  *  - `ensureObsTokenColumns` — the forward-only `obs_token_usage` cost-correctness
  *    column upgrade + the dead `cache_retention` DROP.
  *  - `ensureObsAuditTable` — the dedicated `obs_audit_events` table + indexes.
@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@
  */
 import type Database from "better-sqlite3";
 /**
- * Forward-only upgrade of `obs_token_usage` for the cost-correctness work
- * (PERSIST-02 / observability-excellence WS5). Two parts, both idempotent:
+ * Forward-only upgrade of `obs_token_usage` for the cost-correctness work.
+ * Two parts, both idempotent:
  *
- * 1. DROP the dead `cache_retention` column (OQ3 ruling = DROP — no event field
- *    ever populated it; the `retention_changed` cache-break reason is a DIFFERENT
+ * 1. DROP the dead `cache_retention` column (no event field ever populated it;
+ *    the `retention_changed` cache-break reason is a DIFFERENT
  *    table). SQLite has no `DROP COLUMN`, so when the column is still present we run
  *    the standard transactional table-REBUILD (the `memory_usefulness` precedent in
  *    schema.ts): CREATE a `_new` table without it, `INSERT … SELECT` every other
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ import type Database from "better-sqlite3";
  * 2. ADD the 6 new columns via the `ensureMemoryColumns` guarded-ALTER idiom
  *    (`warmup_turn`/`cache_eligible` as INTEGER 0/1 flags, `cost_correction`/
  *    `pending_cache_investment_usd` as REAL, `pricing_state` as TEXT, and the
- *    COST-01 `tool_tag` as TEXT — the JSON distinct-tool array). All nullable
+ *    `tool_tag` as TEXT — the JSON distinct-tool array). All nullable
  *    → O(1), no rewrite, no backfill (existing rows get NULL).
  *
  * Net post-condition (fresh OR existing DB): the 6 columns present, `cache_retention`
@@ -39,14 +39,14 @@ import type Database from "better-sqlite3";
  */
 export declare function ensureObsTokenColumns(db: Database.Database): void;
 /**
- * Create the dedicated `obs_audit_events` security-audit table + its two indexes
- * (AUDIT-01/02). A DEDICATED table (not `obs_diagnostics`) per the §14 ruling —
- * distinct retention + actor/outcome/severity attribution columns + a regulatory
- * grep surface. The sink (Plan 03) resolves `tenant_id` from the trace context else
- * persists the `''` system-scope sentinel (`tenant_id` is NOT NULL); `agent_id`
- * stays NULL when absent. `refs` is a scrubbed JSON blob. This plan (176-01) owns
- * the DDL + the `AuditEventRow` type; the insert/query methods + JSONL writer land
- * in Plan 03. Idempotent (`CREATE … IF NOT EXISTS`).
+ * Create the dedicated `obs_audit_events` security-audit table + its two indexes.
+ * A DEDICATED table (not `obs_diagnostics`) — distinct retention +
+ * actor/outcome/severity attribution columns + a regulatory grep surface. The
+ * sink resolves `tenant_id` from the trace context else persists the `''`
+ * system-scope sentinel (`tenant_id` is NOT NULL); `agent_id` stays NULL when
+ * absent. `refs` is a scrubbed JSON blob. This module owns the DDL + the
+ * `AuditEventRow` type; the insert/query methods + JSONL writer live elsewhere.
+ * Idempotent (`CREATE … IF NOT EXISTS`).
  *
  * @param db - An open better-sqlite3 Database.
  */

package/node_modules/@comis/memory/dist/schema-obs-token.js

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * co-location precedent. `initSchema` CALLS these so they run on every boot,
  * AFTER the base `obs_token_usage` CREATE.
  *
- * Two PERSIST-02 / AUDIT-01 migrations:
+ * Two migrations:
  *  - `ensureObsTokenColumns` — the forward-only `obs_token_usage` cost-correctness
  *    column upgrade + the dead `cache_retention` DROP.
  *  - `ensureObsAuditTable` — the dedicated `obs_audit_events` table + indexes.
@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@
  * @module
  */
 /**
- * Forward-only upgrade of `obs_token_usage` for the cost-correctness work
- * (PERSIST-02 / observability-excellence WS5). Two parts, both idempotent:
+ * Forward-only upgrade of `obs_token_usage` for the cost-correctness work.
+ * Two parts, both idempotent:
  *
- * 1. DROP the dead `cache_retention` column (OQ3 ruling = DROP — no event field
- *    ever populated it; the `retention_changed` cache-break reason is a DIFFERENT
+ * 1. DROP the dead `cache_retention` column (no event field ever populated it;
+ *    the `retention_changed` cache-break reason is a DIFFERENT
  *    table). SQLite has no `DROP COLUMN`, so when the column is still present we run
  *    the standard transactional table-REBUILD (the `memory_usefulness` precedent in
  *    schema.ts): CREATE a `_new` table without it, `INSERT … SELECT` every other
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
  * 2. ADD the 6 new columns via the `ensureMemoryColumns` guarded-ALTER idiom
  *    (`warmup_turn`/`cache_eligible` as INTEGER 0/1 flags, `cost_correction`/
  *    `pending_cache_investment_usd` as REAL, `pricing_state` as TEXT, and the
- *    COST-01 `tool_tag` as TEXT — the JSON distinct-tool array). All nullable
+ *    `tool_tag` as TEXT — the JSON distinct-tool array). All nullable
  *    → O(1), no rewrite, no backfill (existing rows get NULL).
  *
  * Net post-condition (fresh OR existing DB): the 6 columns present, `cache_retention`
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ export function ensureObsTokenColumns(db) {
         db.exec(`ALTER TABLE obs_token_usage ADD COLUMN pending_cache_investment_usd REAL`);
     if (!cols2.has("pricing_state"))
         db.exec(`ALTER TABLE obs_token_usage ADD COLUMN pricing_state TEXT`);
-    // COST-01 (Phase 179): the per-turn tool tag — the IDENTICAL 6th additive,
+    // The per-turn tool tag — the IDENTICAL 6th additive,
     // forward-only, nullable ALTER (no migration framework, no dual-read shim).
     // Stores the JSON-stringified DISTINCT tool array (content-free names only);
     // NULL on existing rows (they survive verbatim) and on no-tool turns.
@@ -109,14 +109,14 @@ export function ensureObsTokenColumns(db) {
         db.exec(`ALTER TABLE obs_token_usage ADD COLUMN tool_tag TEXT`);
 }
 /**
- * Create the dedicated `obs_audit_events` security-audit table + its two indexes
- * (AUDIT-01/02). A DEDICATED table (not `obs_diagnostics`) per the §14 ruling —
- * distinct retention + actor/outcome/severity attribution columns + a regulatory
- * grep surface. The sink (Plan 03) resolves `tenant_id` from the trace context else
- * persists the `''` system-scope sentinel (`tenant_id` is NOT NULL); `agent_id`
- * stays NULL when absent. `refs` is a scrubbed JSON blob. This plan (176-01) owns
- * the DDL + the `AuditEventRow` type; the insert/query methods + JSONL writer land
- * in Plan 03. Idempotent (`CREATE … IF NOT EXISTS`).
+ * Create the dedicated `obs_audit_events` security-audit table + its two indexes.
+ * A DEDICATED table (not `obs_diagnostics`) — distinct retention +
+ * actor/outcome/severity attribution columns + a regulatory grep surface. The
+ * sink resolves `tenant_id` from the trace context else persists the `''`
+ * system-scope sentinel (`tenant_id` is NOT NULL); `agent_id` stays NULL when
+ * absent. `refs` is a scrubbed JSON blob. This module owns the DDL + the
+ * `AuditEventRow` type; the insert/query methods + JSONL writer live elsewhere.
+ * Idempotent (`CREATE … IF NOT EXISTS`).
  *
  * @param db - An open better-sqlite3 Database.
  */

package/node_modules/@comis/memory/dist/schema-outcome-events.d.ts

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 /**
- * The `outcome_events` ledger DDL — the v2.26 Verified Learning (WS1) durable
- * record of a finished trajectory's net task-outcome (OUTCOME-01). Every row is
+ * The `outcome_events` ledger DDL — the durable record of a finished
+ * trajectory's net task-outcome. Every row is
  * one raw observation from one signal source (tool / pipeline / correction /
  * judge / reaction / explicit); `resolve()` fuses all rows for a trajectory into
  * one verdict (precedence-first then confidence).
  *
  * Forward-only, re-run-safe: `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` + `CREATE INDEX IF NOT
- * EXISTS` only — no destructive or reverse DDL, no branch on an old shape (design
- * §9, additive). Extracted from `schema.ts` (which is at the 800-line cap), like
+ * EXISTS` only — no destructive or reverse DDL, no branch on an old shape
+ * (additive). Extracted from `schema.ts` (which is at the 800-line cap), like
  * `schema-video-jobs.ts` — `initSchema` CALLS this so the table exists on every
  * boot.
  *
@@ -15,14 +15,17 @@
  * `(tenant_id, agent_id, trajectory_id, source, observed_at)` computed in the
  * store before insert, AND the table carries a `UNIQUE (…)` backstop on that
  * tuple — a replayed observation is a no-op at BOTH layers (the store inserts
- * `ON CONFLICT … DO NOTHING`; OUTCOME-01 / T-198-09).
+ * `ON CONFLICT … DO NOTHING`).
  *
- * SECURITY (SEC-01 / T-198-05): `(tenant_id, agent_id)` are bare `NOT NULL`
+ * SECURITY: `(tenant_id, agent_id)` are bare `NOT NULL`
  * columns and lead every key/index — the store filters EVERY statement on them,
  * so a row under one (tenant, agent) is never visible to a read under another in
- * the multi-agent DB. No trust column exists (T-198-10): `confidence` /
+ * the multi-agent DB. No trust column exists: `confidence` /
  * `sender_trust` are descriptive, never authorization. No message bodies are
- * stored — ids + closed enums + confidence only (content-free, §V12).
+ * stored — ids + closed enums + confidence only (content-free). `procedure_descriptor`
+ * holds ONLY a JSON array of content-free tool NAMES (the pre-flight footprint) —
+ * never args/bodies/secrets — and is NOT part of any key/index (the sha256 id tuple
+ * is untouched).
  *
  * `better-sqlite3` durability is WAL + path-based chmod (never fd-based file
  * sync), so this DDL is permission-model-safe by construction — no fd-fs guard is

package/node_modules/@comis/memory/dist/schema-outcome-events.js

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
- * The `outcome_events` ledger DDL — the v2.26 Verified Learning (WS1) durable
- * record of a finished trajectory's net task-outcome (OUTCOME-01). Every row is
+ * The `outcome_events` ledger DDL — the durable record of a finished
+ * trajectory's net task-outcome. Every row is
  * one raw observation from one signal source (tool / pipeline / correction /
  * judge / reaction / explicit); `resolve()` fuses all rows for a trajectory into
  * one verdict (precedence-first then confidence).
  *
  * Forward-only, re-run-safe: `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` + `CREATE INDEX IF NOT
- * EXISTS` only — no destructive or reverse DDL, no branch on an old shape (design
- * §9, additive). Extracted from `schema.ts` (which is at the 800-line cap), like
+ * EXISTS` only — no destructive or reverse DDL, no branch on an old shape
+ * (additive). Extracted from `schema.ts` (which is at the 800-line cap), like
  * `schema-video-jobs.ts` — `initSchema` CALLS this so the table exists on every
  * boot.
  *
@@ -16,14 +16,17 @@
  * `(tenant_id, agent_id, trajectory_id, source, observed_at)` computed in the
  * store before insert, AND the table carries a `UNIQUE (…)` backstop on that
  * tuple — a replayed observation is a no-op at BOTH layers (the store inserts
- * `ON CONFLICT … DO NOTHING`; OUTCOME-01 / T-198-09).
+ * `ON CONFLICT … DO NOTHING`).
  *
- * SECURITY (SEC-01 / T-198-05): `(tenant_id, agent_id)` are bare `NOT NULL`
+ * SECURITY: `(tenant_id, agent_id)` are bare `NOT NULL`
  * columns and lead every key/index — the store filters EVERY statement on them,
  * so a row under one (tenant, agent) is never visible to a read under another in
- * the multi-agent DB. No trust column exists (T-198-10): `confidence` /
+ * the multi-agent DB. No trust column exists: `confidence` /
  * `sender_trust` are descriptive, never authorization. No message bodies are
- * stored — ids + closed enums + confidence only (content-free, §V12).
+ * stored — ids + closed enums + confidence only (content-free). `procedure_descriptor`
+ * holds ONLY a JSON array of content-free tool NAMES (the pre-flight footprint) —
+ * never args/bodies/secrets — and is NOT part of any key/index (the sha256 id tuple
+ * is untouched).
  *
  * `better-sqlite3` durability is WAL + path-based chmod (never fd-based file
  * sync), so this DDL is permission-model-safe by construction — no fd-fs guard is
@@ -55,9 +58,27 @@ export function ensureOutcomeEventsTable(db) {
       sender_trust    TEXT,
       recalled_ids    TEXT,
       used_skill_ids  TEXT,
+      procedure_descriptor TEXT,
       observed_at     INTEGER NOT NULL,
       UNIQUE (tenant_id, agent_id, trajectory_id, source, observed_at)
     );
     CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS outcome_events_scope ON outcome_events(tenant_id, agent_id, trajectory_id);
   `);
+    // Forward-only, re-run-safe migration for the `procedure_descriptor` column.
+    // `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` is a no-op on a table a PRIOR build (without this
+    // column) already created, so a fresh db gets the column from the CREATE above
+    // while an already-created `~/.comis/memory.db` needs this ALTER. Guard it with a
+    // `PRAGMA table_info` column-exists check so the ALTER runs at most once and
+    // re-running ensureOutcomeEventsTable never throws (a duplicate ADD COLUMN would).
+    // The additive column is nullable — every prior row reads back NULL (no descriptor).
+    // The sha256 id tuple `(tenant_id, agent_id, trajectory_id, source, observed_at)` is
+    // UNTOUCHED — the descriptor is a content-free attribution column, in no key/index.
+    // PRAGMA table_info shape is the sanctioned inline-object cast (the
+    // schema-video-jobs.ts:76-81 precedent) — the untyped-sqlite gate exempts
+    // `as { name: string }[]` (a one-off PRAGMA projection, not a domain row that needs
+    // the RowMapper); `as Array<{...}>` would trip it.
+    const cols = new Set(db.prepare(`PRAGMA table_info(outcome_events)`).all().map((r) => r.name));
+    if (!cols.has("procedure_descriptor")) {
+        db.exec(`ALTER TABLE outcome_events ADD COLUMN procedure_descriptor TEXT`);
+    }
 }

package/node_modules/@comis/memory/dist/schema-outward-ledger.d.ts

@@ -1,32 +1,32 @@
 /**
  * The `outward_send_ledger` table DDL — the three-state exactly-once outward-send
- * ledger the Phase-216 resume engine reconciles on boot (ONCE-01/ONCE-02/ONCE-03).
+ * ledger the resume engine reconciles on boot.
  * A send-intent is persisted HERE, on disk in the shared `memory.db`, BEFORE the
  * irreversible chat-platform call, so a daemon CRASH mid-send leaves a durable,
  * reconcilable trace rather than a lost message OR a blind replay (a second
  * 10,000-user DM blast on restart).
  *
  * Forward-only, re-run-safe: create-if-not-exists only, no destructive or reverse
- * DDL (design §9). Extracted from `schema.ts` (which is at the 800-line cap) —
- * `initSchema` CALLS this so the table exists on every boot (Pitfall 5: a table
+ * DDL. Extracted from `schema.ts` (which is at the 800-line cap) —
+ * `initSchema` CALLS this so the table exists on every boot (a table
  * defined here but not wired into initSchema is MISSING at runtime).
  *
- * THE IDEMPOTENCY KEY (ONCE-02, T-216-10): the UNIQUE index
+ * THE IDEMPOTENCY KEY: the UNIQUE index
  * `idx_osl_idempotency` on `(root_run_id, step_index)` is what makes the send
  * exactly-once. The `step_index` half is allocated by the durable_runs
- * `allocateOutwardStep` monotonic counter (HIGH-1), so a REPLAYED step collides
- * on this index — a second `begin` is an err the wrap site (Plan 05) treats as
+ * `allocateOutwardStep` monotonic counter, so a REPLAYED step collides
+ * on this index — a second `begin` is an err the wrap site treats as
  * "already in flight, do NOT double-send". This store has NO blind
  * `in_flight → pending` bulk reset (the `delivery-queue-adapter.ts:141-145`
- * anti-pattern §9 forbids, T-216-09): recovery is PER-ROW via the
- * `listUnreconciled` scan → the engine asks the platform `reconcileSend?`
- * (Plan 04), never a blanket UPDATE.
+ * bulk-reset anti-pattern): recovery is PER-ROW via the
+ * `listUnreconciled` scan → the engine asks the platform `reconcileSend?`,
+ * never a blanket UPDATE.
  *
- * SECURITY — CONTENT-FREE (T-216-11, mirrors video_jobs T-189-02 / durable_runs
- * T-216-05): `content_digest` is a sha256 set by the caller and is the ONLY
+ * SECURITY — CONTENT-FREE (mirrors video_jobs / durable_runs):
+ * `content_digest` is a sha256 set by the caller and is the ONLY
  * content trace. There is deliberately NO `body` / `text` / `message` column and
  * NO secret / token / bearer / api_key column — the reconcile matches on the
- * digest + a time window, NEVER the message text (§2.7 / §15). A recipient list
+ * digest + a time window, NEVER the message text. A recipient list
  * is routing only (`channel_id`), never a stored secret.
  *
  * `better-sqlite3` durability is WAL + path-based chmod (never fd-based file

package/node_modules/@comis/memory/dist/schema-outward-ledger.js

@@ -1,33 +1,33 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 /**
  * The `outward_send_ledger` table DDL — the three-state exactly-once outward-send
- * ledger the Phase-216 resume engine reconciles on boot (ONCE-01/ONCE-02/ONCE-03).
+ * ledger the resume engine reconciles on boot.
  * A send-intent is persisted HERE, on disk in the shared `memory.db`, BEFORE the
  * irreversible chat-platform call, so a daemon CRASH mid-send leaves a durable,
  * reconcilable trace rather than a lost message OR a blind replay (a second
  * 10,000-user DM blast on restart).
  *
  * Forward-only, re-run-safe: create-if-not-exists only, no destructive or reverse
- * DDL (design §9). Extracted from `schema.ts` (which is at the 800-line cap) —
- * `initSchema` CALLS this so the table exists on every boot (Pitfall 5: a table
+ * DDL. Extracted from `schema.ts` (which is at the 800-line cap) —
+ * `initSchema` CALLS this so the table exists on every boot (a table
  * defined here but not wired into initSchema is MISSING at runtime).
  *
- * THE IDEMPOTENCY KEY (ONCE-02, T-216-10): the UNIQUE index
+ * THE IDEMPOTENCY KEY: the UNIQUE index
  * `idx_osl_idempotency` on `(root_run_id, step_index)` is what makes the send
  * exactly-once. The `step_index` half is allocated by the durable_runs
- * `allocateOutwardStep` monotonic counter (HIGH-1), so a REPLAYED step collides
- * on this index — a second `begin` is an err the wrap site (Plan 05) treats as
+ * `allocateOutwardStep` monotonic counter, so a REPLAYED step collides
+ * on this index — a second `begin` is an err the wrap site treats as
  * "already in flight, do NOT double-send". This store has NO blind
  * `in_flight → pending` bulk reset (the `delivery-queue-adapter.ts:141-145`
- * anti-pattern §9 forbids, T-216-09): recovery is PER-ROW via the
- * `listUnreconciled` scan → the engine asks the platform `reconcileSend?`
- * (Plan 04), never a blanket UPDATE.
+ * bulk-reset anti-pattern): recovery is PER-ROW via the
+ * `listUnreconciled` scan → the engine asks the platform `reconcileSend?`,
+ * never a blanket UPDATE.
  *
- * SECURITY — CONTENT-FREE (T-216-11, mirrors video_jobs T-189-02 / durable_runs
- * T-216-05): `content_digest` is a sha256 set by the caller and is the ONLY
+ * SECURITY — CONTENT-FREE (mirrors video_jobs / durable_runs):
+ * `content_digest` is a sha256 set by the caller and is the ONLY
  * content trace. There is deliberately NO `body` / `text` / `message` column and
  * NO secret / token / bearer / api_key column — the reconcile matches on the
- * digest + a time window, NEVER the message text (§2.7 / §15). A recipient list
+ * digest + a time window, NEVER the message text. A recipient list
  * is routing only (`channel_id`), never a stored secret.
  *
  * `better-sqlite3` durability is WAL + path-based chmod (never fd-based file
@@ -64,11 +64,11 @@ export function ensureOutwardLedgerTable(db) {
       updated_at_ms       INTEGER NOT NULL
     )
   `);
-    // ONCE-02 (T-216-10): the idempotency key. A replayed (root_run_id, step_index)
+    // The idempotency key. A replayed (root_run_id, step_index)
     // collides here, so a second begin() is the "already in flight" err — there is
     // NO second outward send.
     db.exec(`CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_osl_idempotency ON outward_send_ledger(root_run_id, step_index)`);
-    // ONCE-03: the partial recovery-scan index — serves listUnreconciled(), which
+    // The partial recovery-scan index — serves listUnreconciled(), which
     // returns ONLY the still-in-flight rows the boot reconcile loop must resolve.
     db.exec(`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_osl_unknown ON outward_send_ledger(state) WHERE state IN ('unknown_after_send','send_attempt_started')`);
 }

package/node_modules/@comis/memory/dist/schema-pinned.d.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import type Database from "better-sqlite3";
 /**
  * Additively ensure the `memories` table carries the `pinned` column.
- * Forward-only additive contract (design §4.1): SQLite has no
+ * Forward-only additive contract: SQLite has no
  * `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`, so the add is guarded by a `PRAGMA table_info(memories)`
  * presence check. Safe on every boot, including a live `~/.comis` DB created before
  * the column existed — existing rows get DEFAULT 0 (O(1) add; no table rewrite, no

package/node_modules/@comis/memory/dist/schema-pinned.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /**
  * Additively ensure the `memories` table carries the `pinned` column.
- * Forward-only additive contract (design §4.1): SQLite has no
+ * Forward-only additive contract: SQLite has no
  * `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`, so the add is guarded by a `PRAGMA table_info(memories)`
  * presence check. Safe on every boot, including a live `~/.comis` DB created before
  * the column existed — existing rows get DEFAULT 0 (O(1) add; no table rewrite, no
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ export function ensurePinnedColumn(db) {
     // CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS is safe regardless of whether the column existed.
     // MUST be called AFTER the ALTER (the column must exist for the index expression).
     //
-    // WR-02: `created_at DESC` in the partial index expression requires SQLite >= 3.38.0
+    // `created_at DESC` in the partial index expression requires SQLite >= 3.38.0
     // for full covering-index use (DESC in index expressions). The bundled better-sqlite3
     // v12.10.0 ships SQLite 3.53.0 (verified 2026-06-04), well above 3.38.0 — the sort
     // is covered and no performance concern exists. This comment is the verification receipt.

package/node_modules/@comis/memory/dist/schema-trigram.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /**
- * Trigram twin DDL — FTS-01's table half (Phase 180).
+ * Trigram twin DDL — the trigram-search table half.
  *
  * Three SELF-CONTAINED FTS5 trigram twins that mirror the lossless base tables,
  * plus the base-table delete-mirror triggers and the WHEN-guarded memories
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
  *   - `lcd_summaries_fts_tri`  ← lcd_summaries  (conversation_id/agent_id/summary_id UNINDEXED)
  *   - `memory_fts_tri`         ← memories       (no scope columns — the rowid-JOIN lane)
  *
- * The twins are the substrate every wave-2 search/write plan targets: appends
- * write `normalizeForSearch(content)` into them (TS-side, plans 180-05/06) so a
+ * The twins are the substrate the search/write paths target: appends
+ * write `normalizeForSearch(content)` into them (TS-side) so a
  * script-routed `MATCH` can read Hebrew/Arabic/Cyrillic/CJK; the base-table
  * triggers below close the ~5 delete/update bypass sites BY CONSTRUCTION — a
  * delete needs no normalizer, and a missed TS write site can never leave
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@
  *
  * These twins store their OWN `content` (no `content=`/`content_rowid=` option).
  * An external-content twin would expose the FTS5 `'rebuild'` command, which
- * re-reads the RAW base-table text — silently UNDOING the FTS-02 normalization
- * the twins exist to hold. The doctor backfill (plan 180-08) instead feeds
+ * re-reads the RAW base-table text — silently UNDOING the normalization
+ * the twins exist to hold. The doctor backfill instead feeds
  * normalized text explicitly. These twins are NOT content-free shadow tables —
- * storing their own content is exactly the G10 mechanism (orphaned rows stay
- * matchable until a SCOPED DELETE removes them — plan 180-05's wipe-list close).
+ * storing their own content is exactly the mechanism that keeps orphaned rows
+ * matchable until a SCOPED DELETE removes them (the scoped-wipe path).
  *
  * ## Per-block boot safety (each twin CREATE + its trigger(s) are ONE block)
  *
@@ -34,11 +34,10 @@
  * trigger(s): a base-table existence guard + the CREATE-then-triggers in a single
  * `db.exec` means a failed twin CREATE (trigram absent) skips that twin's
  * triggers — no orphan trigger can ever reference a missing twin and break a
- * base-table DELETE (T-180-02-02/04). Search probes availability at query time
- * (`isTriAvailable`, plan 180-05) and degrades to the scan floors; it never
+ * base-table DELETE. Search probes availability at query time
+ * (`isTriAvailable`) and degrades to the scan floors; it never
  * hard-fails. Forward-only: every CREATE is guarded re-run-safe, no DROP /
- * down-migration (design §9). Static SQL, no interpolated identifiers
- * (T-131-02-01).
+ * down-migration. Static SQL, no interpolated identifiers.
  *
  * @module
  */