@xelauvas/xela-cli 0.1.0

package/src/tools/PowerShellTool/powershellPermissions.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1648 @@
+/**
+ * PowerShell-specific permission checking, adapted from bashPermissions.ts
+ * for case-insensitive cmdlet matching.
+ */
+
+import { resolve } from 'path'
+import type { ToolPermissionContext, ToolUseContext } from '../../Tool.js'
+import type {
+  PermissionDecisionReason,
+  PermissionResult,
+} from '../../types/permissions.js'
+import { getCwd } from '../../utils/cwd.js'
+import { isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo } from '../../utils/git.js'
+import type { PermissionRule } from '../../utils/permissions/PermissionRule.js'
+import type { PermissionUpdate } from '../../utils/permissions/PermissionUpdateSchema.js'
+import {
+  createPermissionRequestMessage,
+  getRuleByContentsForToolName,
+} from '../../utils/permissions/permissions.js'
+import {
+  matchWildcardPattern,
+  parsePermissionRule,
+  type ShellPermissionRule,
+  suggestionForExactCommand as sharedSuggestionForExactCommand,
+} from '../../utils/permissions/shellRuleMatching.js'
+import {
+  classifyCommandName,
+  deriveSecurityFlags,
+  getAllCommandNames,
+  getFileRedirections,
+  type ParsedCommandElement,
+  type ParsedPowerShellCommand,
+  PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS,
+  parsePowerShellCommand,
+  stripModulePrefix,
+} from '../../utils/powershell/parser.js'
+import { containsVulnerableUncPath } from '../../utils/shell/readOnlyCommandValidation.js'
+import { isDotGitPathPS, isGitInternalPathPS } from './gitSafety.js'
+import {
+  checkPermissionMode,
+  isSymlinkCreatingCommand,
+} from './modeValidation.js'
+import {
+  checkPathConstraints,
+  dangerousRemovalDeny,
+  isDangerousRemovalRawPath,
+} from './pathValidation.js'
+import { powershellCommandIsSafe } from './powershellSecurity.js'
+import {
+  argLeaksValue,
+  isAllowlistedCommand,
+  isCwdChangingCmdlet,
+  isProvablySafeStatement,
+  isReadOnlyCommand,
+  isSafeOutputCommand,
+  resolveToCanonical,
+} from './readOnlyValidation.js'
+import { POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME } from './toolName.js'
+
+// Matches `$var = `, `$var += `, `$env:X = `, `$x ??= ` etc. Used to strip
+// nested assignment prefixes in the parse-failed fallback path.
+const PS_ASSIGN_PREFIX_RE = /^\$[\w:]+\s*(?:[+\-*/%]|\?\?)?\s*=\s*/
+
+/**
+ * Cmdlets that can place a file at a caller-specified path. The
+ * git-internal-paths guard checks whether any arg is a git-internal path
+ * (hooks/, refs/, objects/, HEAD). Non-creating writers (remove-item,
+ * clear-content) are intentionally absent — they can't plant new hooks.
+ */
+const GIT_SAFETY_WRITE_CMDLETS = new Set([
+  'new-item',
+  'set-content',
+  'add-content',
+  'out-file',
+  'copy-item',
+  'move-item',
+  'rename-item',
+  'expand-archive',
+  'invoke-webrequest',
+  'invoke-restmethod',
+  'tee-object',
+  'export-csv',
+  'export-clixml',
+])
+
+/**
+ * External archive-extraction applications that write files to cwd with
+ * archive-controlled paths. `tar -xf payload.tar; git status` defeats
+ * isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo (TOCTOU): the check runs at
+ * permission-eval time, tar extracts HEAD/hooks/refs/ AFTER the check and
+ * BEFORE git runs. Unlike GIT_SAFETY_WRITE_CMDLETS (where we can inspect
+ * args for git-internal paths), archive contents are opaque — any
+ * extraction preceding git must ask. Matched by name only (lowercase,
+ * with and without .exe).
+ */
+const GIT_SAFETY_ARCHIVE_EXTRACTORS = new Set([
+  'tar',
+  'tar.exe',
+  'bsdtar',
+  'bsdtar.exe',
+  'unzip',
+  'unzip.exe',
+  '7z',
+  '7z.exe',
+  '7za',
+  '7za.exe',
+  'gzip',
+  'gzip.exe',
+  'gunzip',
+  'gunzip.exe',
+  'expand-archive',
+])
+
+/**
+ * Extract the command name from a PowerShell command string.
+ * Uses the parser to get the first command name from the AST.
+ */
+async function extractCommandName(command: string): Promise<string> {
+  const trimmed = command.trim()
+  if (!trimmed) {
+    return ''
+  }
+  const parsed = await parsePowerShellCommand(trimmed)
+  const names = getAllCommandNames(parsed)
+  return names[0] ?? ''
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse a permission rule string into a structured rule object.
+ * Delegates to shared parsePermissionRule.
+ */
+export function powershellPermissionRule(
+  permissionRule: string,
+): ShellPermissionRule {
+  return parsePermissionRule(permissionRule)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate permission update suggestion for exact command match.
+ *
+ * Skip exact-command suggestion for commands that can't round-trip cleanly:
+ * - Multi-line: newlines don't survive normalization, rule would never match
+ * - Literal *: storing `Remove-Item * -Force` verbatim re-parses as a wildcard
+ *   rule via hasWildcards() (matches `^Remove-Item .* -Force$`). Escaping to
+ *   `\*` creates a dead rule — parsePermissionRule's exact branch returns the
+ *   raw string with backslash intact, so `Remove-Item \* -Force` never matches
+ *   the incoming `Remove-Item * -Force`. Globs are unsafe to exact-auto-allow
+ *   anyway; prefix suggestion still offered. (finding #12)
+ */
+function suggestionForExactCommand(command: string): PermissionUpdate[] {
+  if (command.includes('\n') || command.includes('*')) {
+    return []
+  }
+  return sharedSuggestionForExactCommand(POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME, command)
+}
+
+/**
+ * PowerShell input schema type - simplified for initial implementation
+ */
+type PowerShellInput = {
+  command: string
+  timeout?: number
+}
+
+/**
+ * Filter rules by contents matching an input command.
+ * PowerShell-specific: uses case-insensitive matching throughout.
+ * Follows the same structure as BashTool's local filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput.
+ */
+function filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
+  input: PowerShellInput,
+  rules: Map<string, PermissionRule>,
+  matchMode: 'exact' | 'prefix',
+  behavior: 'deny' | 'ask' | 'allow',
+): PermissionRule[] {
+  const command = input.command.trim()
+
+  function strEquals(a: string, b: string): boolean {
+    return a.toLowerCase() === b.toLowerCase()
+  }
+  function strStartsWith(str: string, prefix: string): boolean {
+    return str.toLowerCase().startsWith(prefix.toLowerCase())
+  }
+  // SECURITY: stripModulePrefix on RULE names widens the
+  // secondary-canonical match — a deny rule `Module\Remove-Item:*` blocking
+  // `rm` is the intent (fail-safe over-match), but an allow rule
+  // `ModuleA\Get-Thing:*` also matching `ModuleB\Get-Thing` is fail-OPEN.
+  // Deny/ask over-match is fine; allow must never over-match.
+  function stripModulePrefixForRule(name: string): string {
+    if (behavior === 'allow') {
+      return name
+    }
+    return stripModulePrefix(name)
+  }
+
+  // Extract the first word (command name) from the input for canonical matching.
+  // Keep both raw (for slicing the original `command` string) and stripped
+  // (for canonical resolution) versions. For module-qualified inputs like
+  // `Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\Invoke-Expression foo`, rawCmdName holds the
+  // full token so `command.slice(rawCmdName.length)` yields the correct rest.
+  const rawCmdName = command.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? ''
+  const inputCmdName = stripModulePrefix(rawCmdName)
+  const inputCanonical = resolveToCanonical(inputCmdName)
+
+  // Build a version of the command with the canonical name substituted
+  // e.g., 'rm foo.txt' -> 'remove-item foo.txt' so deny rules on Remove-Item also block rm.
+  // SECURITY: Normalize the whitespace separator between name and args to a
+  // single space. PowerShell accepts any whitespace (tab, etc.) as separator,
+  // but prefix rule matching uses `prefix + ' '` (literal space). Without this,
+  // `rm\t./x` canonicalizes to `remove-item\t./x` and misses the deny rule
+  // `Remove-Item:*`, while acceptEdits auto-allow (using AST cmd.name) still
+  // matches — a deny-rule bypass. Build unconditionally (not just when the
+  // canonical differs) so non-space-separated raw commands are also normalized.
+  const rest = command.slice(rawCmdName.length).replace(/^\s+/, ' ')
+  const canonicalCommand = inputCanonical + rest
+
+  return Array.from(rules.entries())
+    .filter(([ruleContent]) => {
+      const rule = powershellPermissionRule(ruleContent)
+
+      // Also resolve the rule's command name to canonical for cross-matching
+      // e.g., a deny rule for 'rm' should also block 'Remove-Item'
+      function matchesCommand(cmd: string): boolean {
+        switch (rule.type) {
+          case 'exact':
+            return strEquals(rule.command, cmd)
+          case 'prefix':
+            switch (matchMode) {
+              case 'exact':
+                return strEquals(rule.prefix, cmd)
+              case 'prefix': {
+                if (strEquals(cmd, rule.prefix)) {
+                  return true
+                }
+                return strStartsWith(cmd, rule.prefix + ' ')
+              }
+            }
+            break
+          case 'wildcard':
+            if (matchMode === 'exact') {
+              return false
+            }
+            return matchWildcardPattern(rule.pattern, cmd, true)
+        }
+      }
+
+      // Check against the original command
+      if (matchesCommand(command)) {
+        return true
+      }
+
+      // Also check against the canonical form of the command
+      // This ensures 'deny Remove-Item' also blocks 'rm', 'del', 'ri', etc.
+      if (matchesCommand(canonicalCommand)) {
+        return true
+      }
+
+      // Also resolve the rule's command name to canonical and compare
+      // This ensures 'deny rm' also blocks 'Remove-Item'
+      // SECURITY: stripModulePrefix applied to DENY/ASK rule command
+      // names too, not just input. Otherwise a deny rule written as
+      // `Microsoft.PowerShell.Management\Remove-Item:*` is bypassed by `rm`,
+      // `del`, or plain `Remove-Item` — resolveToCanonical won't match the
+      // module-qualified form against COMMON_ALIASES.
+      if (rule.type === 'exact') {
+        const rawRuleCmdName = rule.command.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? ''
+        const ruleCanonical = resolveToCanonical(
+          stripModulePrefixForRule(rawRuleCmdName),
+        )
+        if (ruleCanonical === inputCanonical) {
+          // Rule and input resolve to same canonical cmdlet
+          // SECURITY: use normalized `rest` not a raw re-slice
+          // from `command`. The raw slice preserves tab separators so
+          // `Remove-Item\t./secret.txt` vs deny rule `rm ./secret.txt` misses.
+          // Normalize both sides identically.
+          const ruleRest = rule.command
+            .slice(rawRuleCmdName.length)
+            .replace(/^\s+/, ' ')
+          const inputRest = rest
+          if (strEquals(ruleRest, inputRest)) {
+            return true
+          }
+        }
+      } else if (rule.type === 'prefix') {
+        const rawRuleCmdName = rule.prefix.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? ''
+        const ruleCanonical = resolveToCanonical(
+          stripModulePrefixForRule(rawRuleCmdName),
+        )
+        if (ruleCanonical === inputCanonical) {
+          const ruleRest = rule.prefix
+            .slice(rawRuleCmdName.length)
+            .replace(/^\s+/, ' ')
+          const canonicalPrefix = inputCanonical + ruleRest
+          if (matchMode === 'exact') {
+            if (strEquals(canonicalPrefix, canonicalCommand)) {
+              return true
+            }
+          } else {
+            if (
+              strEquals(canonicalCommand, canonicalPrefix) ||
+              strStartsWith(canonicalCommand, canonicalPrefix + ' ')
+            ) {
+              return true
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      } else if (rule.type === 'wildcard') {
+        // Resolve the wildcard pattern's command name to canonical and re-match
+        // This ensures 'deny rm *' also blocks 'Remove-Item secret.txt'
+        const rawRuleCmdName = rule.pattern.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? ''
+        const ruleCanonical = resolveToCanonical(
+          stripModulePrefixForRule(rawRuleCmdName),
+        )
+        if (ruleCanonical === inputCanonical && matchMode !== 'exact') {
+          // Rebuild the pattern with the canonical cmdlet name
+          // Normalize separator same as exact and prefix branches.
+          // Without this, a wildcard rule `rm\t*` produces canonicalPattern
+          // with a literal tab that never matches the space-normalized
+          // canonicalCommand.
+          const ruleRest = rule.pattern
+            .slice(rawRuleCmdName.length)
+            .replace(/^\s+/, ' ')
+          const canonicalPattern = inputCanonical + ruleRest
+          if (matchWildcardPattern(canonicalPattern, canonicalCommand, true)) {
+            return true
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+      return false
+    })
+    .map(([, rule]) => rule)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get matching rules for input across all rule types (deny, ask, allow)
+ */
+function matchingRulesForInput(
+  input: PowerShellInput,
+  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
+  matchMode: 'exact' | 'prefix',
+) {
+  const denyRuleByContents = getRuleByContentsForToolName(
+    toolPermissionContext,
+    POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
+    'deny',
+  )
+  const matchingDenyRules = filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
+    input,
+    denyRuleByContents,
+    matchMode,
+    'deny',
+  )
+
+  const askRuleByContents = getRuleByContentsForToolName(
+    toolPermissionContext,
+    POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
+    'ask',
+  )
+  const matchingAskRules = filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
+    input,
+    askRuleByContents,
+    matchMode,
+    'ask',
+  )
+
+  const allowRuleByContents = getRuleByContentsForToolName(
+    toolPermissionContext,
+    POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
+    'allow',
+  )
+  const matchingAllowRules = filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
+    input,
+    allowRuleByContents,
+    matchMode,
+    'allow',
+  )
+
+  return { matchingDenyRules, matchingAskRules, matchingAllowRules }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if the command is an exact match for a permission rule.
+ */
+export function powershellToolCheckExactMatchPermission(
+  input: PowerShellInput,
+  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
+): PermissionResult {
+  const trimmedCommand = input.command.trim()
+  const { matchingDenyRules, matchingAskRules, matchingAllowRules } =
+    matchingRulesForInput(input, toolPermissionContext, 'exact')
+
+  if (matchingDenyRules[0] !== undefined) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'deny',
+      message: `Permission to use ${POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME} with command ${trimmedCommand} has been denied.`,
+      decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: matchingDenyRules[0] },
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (matchingAskRules[0] !== undefined) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'ask',
+      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME),
+      decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: matchingAskRules[0] },
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (matchingAllowRules[0] !== undefined) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'allow',
+      updatedInput: input,
+      decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: matchingAllowRules[0] },
+    }
+  }
+
+  const decisionReason: PermissionDecisionReason = {
+    type: 'other' as const,
+    reason: 'This command requires approval',
+  }
+  return {
+    behavior: 'passthrough',
+    message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
+      POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
+      decisionReason,
+    ),
+    decisionReason,
+    suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(trimmedCommand),
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check permission for a PowerShell command including prefix matches.
+ */
+export function powershellToolCheckPermission(
+  input: PowerShellInput,
+  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
+): PermissionResult {
+  const command = input.command.trim()
+
+  // 1. Check exact match first
+  const exactMatchResult = powershellToolCheckExactMatchPermission(
+    input,
+    toolPermissionContext,
+  )
+
+  // 1a. Deny/ask if exact command has a rule
+  if (
+    exactMatchResult.behavior === 'deny' ||
+    exactMatchResult.behavior === 'ask'
+  ) {
+    return exactMatchResult
+  }
+
+  // 2. Find all matching rules (prefix or exact)
+  const { matchingDenyRules, matchingAskRules, matchingAllowRules } =
+    matchingRulesForInput(input, toolPermissionContext, 'prefix')
+
+  // 2a. Deny if command has a deny rule
+  if (matchingDenyRules[0] !== undefined) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'deny',
+      message: `Permission to use ${POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
+      decisionReason: {
+        type: 'rule',
+        rule: matchingDenyRules[0],
+      },
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 2b. Ask if command has an ask rule
+  if (matchingAskRules[0] !== undefined) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'ask',
+      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME),
+      decisionReason: {
+        type: 'rule',
+        rule: matchingAskRules[0],
+      },
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 3. Allow if command had an exact match allow
+  if (exactMatchResult.behavior === 'allow') {
+    return exactMatchResult
+  }
+
+  // 4. Allow if command has an allow rule
+  if (matchingAllowRules[0] !== undefined) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'allow',
+      updatedInput: input,
+      decisionReason: {
+        type: 'rule',
+        rule: matchingAllowRules[0],
+      },
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 5. Passthrough since no rules match, will trigger permission prompt
+  const decisionReason = {
+    type: 'other' as const,
+    reason: 'This command requires approval',
+  }
+  return {
+    behavior: 'passthrough',
+    message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
+      POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
+      decisionReason,
+    ),
+    decisionReason,
+    suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(command),
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Information about a sub-command for permission checking.
+ */
+type SubCommandInfo = {
+  text: string
+  element: ParsedCommandElement
+  statement: ParsedPowerShellCommand['statements'][number] | null
+  isSafeOutput: boolean
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract sub-commands that need independent permission checking from a parsed command.
+ * Safe output cmdlets (Format-Table, Select-Object, etc.) are flagged but NOT
+ * filtered out — step 4.4 still checks deny rules against them (deny always
+ * wins), step 5 skips them for approval collection (they inherit the permission
+ * of the preceding command).
+ *
+ * Also includes nested commands from control flow statements (if, for, foreach, etc.)
+ * to ensure commands hidden inside control flow are checked.
+ *
+ * Returns sub-command info including both text and the parsed element for accurate
+ * suggestion generation.
+ */
+async function getSubCommandsForPermissionCheck(
+  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
+  originalCommand: string,
+): Promise<SubCommandInfo[]> {
+  if (!parsed.valid) {
+    // Return a fallback element for unparsed commands
+    return [
+      {
+        text: originalCommand,
+        element: {
+          name: await extractCommandName(originalCommand),
+          nameType: 'unknown',
+          elementType: 'CommandAst',
+          args: [],
+          text: originalCommand,
+        },
+        statement: null,
+        isSafeOutput: false,
+      },
+    ]
+  }
+
+  const subCommands: SubCommandInfo[] = []
+
+  // Check direct commands in pipelines
+  for (const statement of parsed.statements) {
+    for (const cmd of statement.commands) {
+      // Only check actual commands (CommandAst), not expressions
+      if (cmd.elementType !== 'CommandAst') {
+        continue
+      }
+      subCommands.push({
+        text: cmd.text,
+        element: cmd,
+        statement,
+        // SECURITY: nameType gate — scripts\\Out-Null strips to Out-Null and
+        // would match SAFE_OUTPUT_CMDLETS, but PowerShell runs the .ps1 file.
+        // isSafeOutput: true causes step 5 to filter this command out of the
+        // approval list, so it would silently execute. See isAllowlistedCommand.
+        // SECURITY: args.length === 0 gate — Out-Null -InputObject:(1 > /etc/x)
+        // was filtered as safe-output (name-only) → step-5 subCommands empty →
+        // auto-allow → redirection inside paren writes file. Only zero-arg
+        // Out-String/Out-Null/Out-Host invocations are provably safe.
+        isSafeOutput:
+          cmd.nameType !== 'application' &&
+          isSafeOutputCommand(cmd.name) &&
+          cmd.args.length === 0,
+      })
+    }
+
+    // Also check nested commands from control flow statements
+    if (statement.nestedCommands) {
+      for (const cmd of statement.nestedCommands) {
+        subCommands.push({
+          text: cmd.text,
+          element: cmd,
+          statement,
+          isSafeOutput:
+            cmd.nameType !== 'application' &&
+            isSafeOutputCommand(cmd.name) &&
+            cmd.args.length === 0,
+        })
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (subCommands.length > 0) {
+    return subCommands
+  }
+
+  // Fallback for commands with no sub-commands
+  return [
+    {
+      text: originalCommand,
+      element: {
+        name: await extractCommandName(originalCommand),
+        nameType: 'unknown',
+        elementType: 'CommandAst',
+        args: [],
+        text: originalCommand,
+      },
+      statement: null,
+      isSafeOutput: false,
+    },
+  ]
+}
+
+/**
+ * Main permission check function for PowerShell tool.
+ *
+ * This function implements the full permission flow:
+ * 1. Check exact match against deny/ask/allow rules
+ * 2. Check prefix match against rules
+ * 3. Run security check via powershellCommandIsSafe()
+ * 4. Return appropriate PermissionResult
+ *
+ * @param input - The PowerShell tool input
+ * @param context - The tool use context (for abort signal and session info)
+ * @returns Promise resolving to PermissionResult
+ */
+export async function powershellToolHasPermission(
+  input: PowerShellInput,
+  context: ToolUseContext,
+): Promise<PermissionResult> {
+  const toolPermissionContext = context.getAppState().toolPermissionContext
+  const command = input.command.trim()
+
+  // Empty command check
+  if (!command) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'allow',
+      updatedInput: input,
+      decisionReason: {
+        type: 'other',
+        reason: 'Empty command is safe',
+      },
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Parse the command once and thread through all sub-functions
+  const parsed = await parsePowerShellCommand(command)
+
+  // SECURITY: Check deny/ask rules BEFORE parse validity check.
+  // Deny rules operate on the raw command string and don't need the parsed AST.
+  // This ensures explicit deny rules still block commands even when parsing fails.
+  // 1. Check exact match first
+  const exactMatchResult = powershellToolCheckExactMatchPermission(
+    input,
+    toolPermissionContext,
+  )
+
+  // Exact command was denied
+  if (exactMatchResult.behavior === 'deny') {
+    return exactMatchResult
+  }
+
+  // 2. Check prefix/wildcard rules
+  const { matchingDenyRules, matchingAskRules } = matchingRulesForInput(
+    input,
+    toolPermissionContext,
+    'prefix',
+  )
+
+  // 2a. Deny if command has a deny rule
+  if (matchingDenyRules[0] !== undefined) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'deny',
+      message: `Permission to use ${POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
+      decisionReason: {
+        type: 'rule',
+        rule: matchingDenyRules[0],
+      },
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 2b. Ask if command has an ask rule — DEFERRED into decisions[].
+  // Previously this early-returned before sub-command deny checks ran, so
+  // `Get-Process; Invoke-Expression evil` with ask(Get-Process:*) +
+  // deny(Invoke-Expression:*) would show the ask dialog and the deny never
+  // fired. Now: store the ask, push into decisions[] after parse succeeds.
+  // If parse fails, returned before the parse-error ask (preserves the
+  // rule-attributed decisionReason when pwsh is unavailable).
+  let preParseAskDecision: PermissionResult | null = null
+  if (matchingAskRules[0] !== undefined) {
+    preParseAskDecision = {
+      behavior: 'ask',
+      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME),
+      decisionReason: {
+        type: 'rule',
+        rule: matchingAskRules[0],
+      },
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Block UNC paths — reading from UNC paths can trigger network requests
+  // and leak NTLM/Kerberos credentials. DEFERRED into decisions[].
+  // The raw-string UNC check must not early-return before sub-command deny
+  // (step 4+). Same fix as 2b above.
+  if (preParseAskDecision === null && containsVulnerableUncPath(command)) {
+    preParseAskDecision = {
+      behavior: 'ask',
+      message:
+        'Command contains a UNC path that could trigger network requests',
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 2c. Exact allow rules short-circuit here ONLY when parsing failed AND
+  // no pre-parse ask (2b prefix or UNC) is pending. Converting 2b/UNC from
+  // early-return to deferred-assign meant 2c
+  // fired before L648 consumed preParseAskDecision — silently overriding the
+  // ask with allow. Parse-succeeded path enforces ask > allow via the reduce
+  // (L917); without this guard, parse-failed was inconsistent.
+  // This ensures user-configured exact allow rules work even when pwsh is
+  // unavailable. When parsing succeeds, the exact allow check is deferred to
+  // after step 4.4 (sub-command deny/ask) — matching BashTool's ordering where
+  // the main-flow exact allow at bashPermissions.ts:1520 runs after sub-command
+  // deny checks (1442-1458). Without this, an exact allow on a compound command
+  // would bypass deny rules on sub-commands.
+  //
+  // SECURITY (parse-failed branch): the nameType guard in step 5 lives
+  // inside the sub-command loop, which only runs when parsed.valid.
+  // This is the !parsed.valid escape hatch. Input-side stripModulePrefix
+  // is unconditional — `scripts\build.exe --flag` strips to `build.exe`,
+  // canonicalCommand matches exact allow, and without this guard we'd
+  // return allow here and execute the local script. classifyCommandName
+  // is a pure string function (no AST needed). `scripts\build.exe` →
+  // 'application' (has `\`). Same tradeoff as step 5: `build.exe` alone
+  // also classifies 'application' (has `.`) so legitimate executable
+  // exact-allows downgrade to ask when pwsh is degraded — fail-safe.
+  // Module-qualified cmdlets (Module\Cmdlet) also classify 'application'
+  // (same `\`); same fail-safe over-fire.
+  if (
+    exactMatchResult.behavior === 'allow' &&
+    !parsed.valid &&
+    preParseAskDecision === null &&
+    classifyCommandName(command.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? '') !== 'application'
+  ) {
+    return exactMatchResult
+  }
+
+  // 0. Check if command can be parsed - if not, require approval but don't suggest persisting
+  // This matches Bash behavior: invalid syntax triggers a permission prompt but we don't
+  // recommend saving invalid commands to settings
+  // NOTE: This check is intentionally AFTER deny/ask rules so explicit rules still work
+  // even when the parser fails (e.g., pwsh unavailable).
+  if (!parsed.valid) {
+    // SECURITY: Fallback sub-command deny scan for parse-failed path.
+    // The sub-command deny loop at L851+ needs the AST; when parsing fails
+    // (command exceeds MAX_COMMAND_LENGTH, pwsh unavailable, timeout, bad
+    // JSON), we'd return 'ask' without ever checking sub-command deny rules.
+    // Attack: `Get-ChildItem # <~2000 chars padding> ; Invoke-Expression evil`
+    // → padding forces valid=false → generic ask prompt, deny(iex:*) never
+    // fires. This fallback splits on PowerShell separators/grouping and runs
+    // each fragment through the SAME rule matcher as step 2a (prefix deny).
+    // Conservative: fragments inside string literals/comments may false-positive
+    // deny — safe here (parse-failed is already a degraded state, and this is
+    // a deny-DOWNGRADE fix). Match against full fragment (not just first token)
+    // so multi-word rules like `Remove-Item foo:*` still fire; the matcher's
+    // canonical resolution handles aliases (`iex` → `Invoke-Expression`).
+    //
+    // SECURITY: backtick is PS escape/line-continuation, NOT a separator.
+    // Splitting on it would fragment `Invoke-Ex`pression` into non-matching
+    // pieces. Instead: collapse backtick-newline (line continuation) so
+    // `Invoke-Ex`<nl>pression` rejoins, strip remaining backticks (escape
+    // chars — ``x → x), then split on actual statement/grouping separators.
+    const backtickStripped = command
+      .replace(/`[\r\n]+\s*/g, '')
+      .replace(/`/g, '')
+    for (const fragment of backtickStripped.split(/[;|\n\r{}()&]+/)) {
+      const trimmedFrag = fragment.trim()
+      if (!trimmedFrag) continue // skip empty fragments
+      // Skip the full command ONLY if it starts with a cmdlet name (no
+      // assignment prefix). The full command was already checked at 2a, but
+      // 2a uses the raw text — $x %= iex as first token `$x` misses the
+      // deny(iex:*) rule. If normalization would change the fragment
+      // (assignment prefix, dot-source), don't skip — let it be re-checked
+      // after normalization. (bug #10/#24)
+      if (
+        trimmedFrag === command &&
+        !/^\$[\w:]/.test(trimmedFrag) &&
+        !/^[&.]\s/.test(trimmedFrag)
+      ) {
+        continue
+      }
+      // SECURITY: Normalize invocation-operator and assignment prefixes before
+      // rule matching (findings #5/#22). The splitter gives us the raw fragment
+      // text; matchingRulesForInput extracts the first token as the cmdlet name.
+      // Without normalization:
+      //   `$x = Invoke-Expression 'p'` → first token `$x` → deny(iex:*) misses
+      //   `. Invoke-Expression 'p'`    → first token `.`  → deny(iex:*) misses
+      //   `& 'Invoke-Expression' 'p'`  → first token `&` removed by split but
+      //                                  `'Invoke-Expression'` retains quotes
+      //                                  → deny(iex:*) misses
+      // The parse-succeeded path handles these via AST (parser.ts:839 strips
+      // quotes from rawNameUnstripped; invocation operators are separate AST
+      // nodes). This fallback mirrors that normalization.
+      // Loop strips nested assignments: $x = $y = iex → $y = iex → iex
+      let normalized = trimmedFrag
+      let m: RegExpMatchArray | null
+      while ((m = normalized.match(PS_ASSIGN_PREFIX_RE))) {
+        normalized = normalized.slice(m[0].length)
+      }
+      normalized = normalized.replace(/^[&.]\s+/, '') // & cmd, . cmd (dot-source)
+      const rawFirst = normalized.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? ''
+      const firstTok = rawFirst.replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, '')
+      const normalizedFrag = firstTok + normalized.slice(rawFirst.length)
+      // SECURITY: parse-independent dangerous-removal hard-deny. The
+      // isDangerousRemovalPath check in checkPathConstraintsForStatement
+      // requires a valid AST; when pwsh times out or is unavailable,
+      // `Remove-Item /` degrades from hard-deny to generic ask. Check
+      // raw positional args here so root/home/system deletion is denied
+      // regardless of parser availability. Conservative: only positional
+      // args (skip -Param tokens); over-deny in degraded state is safe
+      // (same deny-downgrade rationale as the sub-command scan above).
+      if (resolveToCanonical(firstTok) === 'remove-item') {
+        for (const arg of normalized.split(/\s+/).slice(1)) {
+          if (PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS.has(arg[0] ?? '')) continue
+          if (isDangerousRemovalRawPath(arg)) {
+            return dangerousRemovalDeny(arg)
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      const { matchingDenyRules: fragDenyRules } = matchingRulesForInput(
+        { command: normalizedFrag },
+        toolPermissionContext,
+        'prefix',
+      )
+      if (fragDenyRules[0] !== undefined) {
+        return {
+          behavior: 'deny',
+          message: `Permission to use ${POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
+          decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: fragDenyRules[0] },
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    // Preserve pre-parse ask messaging when parse fails. The deferred ask
+    // (2b prefix rule or UNC) carries a better decisionReason than the
+    // generic parse-error ask. Sub-command deny can't run the AST loop
+    // without a parse, so the fallback scan above is best-effort.
+    if (preParseAskDecision !== null) {
+      return preParseAskDecision
+    }
+    const decisionReason = {
+      type: 'other' as const,
+      reason: `Command contains malformed syntax that cannot be parsed: ${parsed.errors[0]?.message ?? 'unknown error'}`,
+    }
+    return {
+      behavior: 'ask',
+      decisionReason,
+      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
+        POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
+        decisionReason,
+      ),
+      // No suggestions - don't recommend persisting invalid syntax
+    }
+  }
+
+  // ========================================================================
+  // COLLECT-THEN-REDUCE: post-parse decisions (deny > ask > allow > passthrough)
+  // ========================================================================
+  // Ported from bashPermissions.ts:1446-1472. Every post-parse check pushes
+  // its decision into a single array; a single reduce applies precedence.
+  // This structurally closes the ask-before-deny bug class: an 'ask' from an
+  // earlier check (security flags, provider paths, cd+git) can no longer mask
+  // a 'deny' from a later check (sub-command deny, checkPathConstraints).
+  //
+  // Supersedes the firstSubCommandAskRule stash from commit 8f5ae6c56b — that
+  // fix only patched step 4; steps 3, 3.5, 4.42 had the same flaw. The stash
+  // pattern is also fragile: the next author who writes `return ask` is back
+  // where we started. Collect-then-reduce makes the bypass impossible to write.
+  //
+  // First-of-each-behavior wins (array order = step order), so single-check
+  // ask messages are unchanged vs. sequential-early-return.
+  //
+  // Pre-parse deny checks above (exact/prefix deny) stay sequential: they
+  // fire even when pwsh is unavailable. Pre-parse asks (prefix ask, raw UNC)
+  // are now deferred here so sub-command deny (step 4) beats them.
+
+  // Gather sub-commands once (used by decisions 3, 4, and fallthrough step 5).
+  const allSubCommands = await getSubCommandsForPermissionCheck(parsed, command)
+
+  const decisions: PermissionResult[] = []
+
+  // Decision: deferred pre-parse ask (2b prefix ask or UNC path).
+  // Pushed first so its message wins over later asks (first-of-behavior wins),
+  // but the reduce ensures any deny in decisions[] still beats it.
+  if (preParseAskDecision !== null) {
+    decisions.push(preParseAskDecision)
+  }
+
+  // Decision: security check — was step 3 (:630-650).
+  // powershellCommandIsSafe returns 'ask' for subexpressions, script blocks,
+  // encoded commands, download cradles, etc. Only 'ask' | 'passthrough'.
+  const safetyResult = powershellCommandIsSafe(command, parsed)
+  if (safetyResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
+    const decisionReason: PermissionDecisionReason = {
+      type: 'other' as const,
+      reason:
+        safetyResult.behavior === 'ask' && safetyResult.message
+          ? safetyResult.message
+          : 'This command contains patterns that could pose security risks and requires approval',
+    }
+    decisions.push({
+      behavior: 'ask',
+      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
+        POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
+        decisionReason,
+      ),
+      decisionReason,
+      suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(command),
+    })
+  }
+
+  // Decision: using statements / script requirements — invisible to AST block walk.
+  // `using module ./evil.psm1` loads and executes a module's top-level script body;
+  // `using assembly ./evil.dll` loads a .NET assembly (module initializers run).
+  // `#Requires -Modules <name>` triggers module loading from PSModulePath.
+  // These are siblings of the named blocks on ScriptBlockAst, not children, so
+  // Process-BlockStatements and all downstream command walkers never see them.
+  // Without this check, a decoy cmdlet like Get-Process fills subCommands,
+  // bypassing the empty-statement fallback, and isReadOnlyCommand auto-allows.
+  if (parsed.hasUsingStatements) {
+    const decisionReason: PermissionDecisionReason = {
+      type: 'other' as const,
+      reason:
+        'Command contains a `using` statement that may load external code (module or assembly)',
+    }
+    decisions.push({
+      behavior: 'ask',
+      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
+        POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
+        decisionReason,
+      ),
+      decisionReason,
+      suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(command),
+    })
+  }
+  if (parsed.hasScriptRequirements) {
+    const decisionReason: PermissionDecisionReason = {
+      type: 'other' as const,
+      reason:
+        'Command contains a `#Requires` directive that may trigger module loading',
+    }
+    decisions.push({
+      behavior: 'ask',
+      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
+        POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
+        decisionReason,
+      ),
+      decisionReason,
+      suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(command),
+    })
+  }
+
+  // Decision: resolved-arg provider/UNC scan — was step 3.5 (:652-709).
+  // Provider paths (env:, HKLM:, function:) access non-filesystem resources.
+  // UNC paths can leak NTLM/Kerberos credentials on Windows. The raw-string
+  // UNC check above (pre-parse) misses backtick-escaped forms; cmd.args has
+  // backtick escapes resolved by the parser. Labeled loop breaks on FIRST
+  // match (same as the previous early-return).
+  // Provider prefix matches both the short form (`env:`, `HKLM:`) and the
+  // fully-qualified form (`Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKLM\...`).
+  // The optional `(?:[\w.]+\\)?` handles the module-qualified prefix; `::?`
+  // matches either single-colon drive syntax or double-colon provider syntax.
+  const NON_FS_PROVIDER_PATTERN =
+    /^(?:[\w.]+\\)?(env|hklm|hkcu|function|alias|variable|cert|wsman|registry)::?/i
+  function extractProviderPathFromArg(arg: string): string {
+    // Handle colon parameter syntax: -Path:env:HOME → extract 'env:HOME'.
+    // SECURITY: PowerShell's tokenizer accepts en-dash/em-dash/horizontal-bar
+    // (U+2013/2014/2015) as parameter prefixes. `–Path:env:HOME` (en-dash)
+    // must also strip the `–Path:` prefix or NON_FS_PROVIDER_PATTERN won't
+    // match (pattern is `^(env|...):` which fails on `–Path:env:...`).
+    let s = arg
+    if (s.length > 0 && PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS.has(s[0]!)) {
+      const colonIdx = s.indexOf(':', 1) // skip the leading dash
+      if (colonIdx > 0) {
+        s = s.substring(colonIdx + 1)
+      }
+    }
+    // Strip backtick escapes before matching: `Registry`::HKLM\...` has a
+    // backtick before `::` that the PS tokenizer removes at runtime but that
+    // would otherwise prevent the ^-anchored pattern from matching.
+    return s.replace(/`/g, '')
+  }
+  function providerOrUncDecisionForArg(arg: string): PermissionResult | null {
+    const value = extractProviderPathFromArg(arg)
+    if (NON_FS_PROVIDER_PATTERN.test(value)) {
+      return {
+        behavior: 'ask',
+        message: `Command argument '${arg}' uses a non-filesystem provider path and requires approval`,
+      }
+    }
+    if (containsVulnerableUncPath(value)) {
+      return {
+        behavior: 'ask',
+        message: `Command argument '${arg}' contains a UNC path that could trigger network requests`,
+      }
+    }
+    return null
+  }
+  providerScan: for (const statement of parsed.statements) {
+    for (const cmd of statement.commands) {
+      if (cmd.elementType !== 'CommandAst') continue
+      for (const arg of cmd.args) {
+        const decision = providerOrUncDecisionForArg(arg)
+        if (decision !== null) {
+          decisions.push(decision)
+          break providerScan
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (statement.nestedCommands) {
+      for (const cmd of statement.nestedCommands) {
+        for (const arg of cmd.args) {
+          const decision = providerOrUncDecisionForArg(arg)
+          if (decision !== null) {
+            decisions.push(decision)
+            break providerScan
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Decision: per-sub-command deny/ask rules — was step 4 (:711-803).
+  // Each sub-command produces at most one decision (deny or ask). Deny rules
+  // on LATER sub-commands still beat ask rules on EARLIER ones via the reduce.
+  // No stash needed — the reduce structurally enforces deny > ask.
+  //
+  // SECURITY: Always build a canonical command string from AST-derived data
+  // (element.name + space-joined args) and check rules against it too. Deny
+  // and allow must use the same normalized form to close asymmetries:
+  //   - Invocation operators (`& 'Remove-Item' ./x`): raw text starts with `&`,
+  //     splitting on whitespace yields the operator, not the cmdlet name.
+  //   - Non-space whitespace (`rm\t./x`): raw prefix match uses `prefix + ' '`
+  //     (literal space), but PowerShell accepts any whitespace separator.
+  //     checkPermissionMode auto-allow (using AST cmd.name) WOULD match while
+  //     deny-rule match on raw text would miss — a deny-rule bypass.
+  //   - Module prefixes (`Microsoft.PowerShell.Management\Remove-Item`):
+  //     element.name has the module prefix stripped.
+  for (const { text: subCmd, element } of allSubCommands) {
+    // element.name is quote-stripped at the parser (transformCommandAst) so
+    // `& 'Invoke-Expression' 'x'` yields name='Invoke-Expression', not
+    // "'Invoke-Expression'". canonicalSubCmd is built from the same stripped
+    // name, so deny-rule prefix matching on `Invoke-Expression:*` hits.
+    const canonicalSubCmd =
+      element.name !== '' ? [element.name, ...element.args].join(' ') : null
+
+    const subInput = { command: subCmd }
+    const { matchingDenyRules: subDenyRules, matchingAskRules: subAskRules } =
+      matchingRulesForInput(subInput, toolPermissionContext, 'prefix')
+    let matchedDenyRule = subDenyRules[0]
+    let matchedAskRule = subAskRules[0]
+
+    if (matchedDenyRule === undefined && canonicalSubCmd !== null) {
+      const {
+        matchingDenyRules: canonicalDenyRules,
+        matchingAskRules: canonicalAskRules,
+      } = matchingRulesForInput(
+        { command: canonicalSubCmd },
+        toolPermissionContext,
+        'prefix',
+      )
+      matchedDenyRule = canonicalDenyRules[0]
+      if (matchedAskRule === undefined) {
+        matchedAskRule = canonicalAskRules[0]
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (matchedDenyRule !== undefined) {
+      decisions.push({
+        behavior: 'deny',
+        message: `Permission to use ${POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
+        decisionReason: {
+          type: 'rule',
+          rule: matchedDenyRule,
+        },
+      })
+    } else if (matchedAskRule !== undefined) {
+      decisions.push({
+        behavior: 'ask',
+        message: createPermissionRequestMessage(POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME),
+        decisionReason: {
+          type: 'rule',
+          rule: matchedAskRule,
+        },
+      })
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Decision: cd+git compound guard — was step 4.42 (:805-833).
+  // When cd/Set-Location is paired with git, don't allow without prompting —
+  // cd to a malicious directory makes git dangerous (fake hooks, bare repo
+  // attacks). Collect-then-reduce keeps the improvement over BashTool: in
+  // bash, cd+git (B9, line 1416) runs BEFORE sub-command deny (B11), so cd+git
+  // ask masks deny. Here, both are in the same decision array; deny wins.
+  //
+  // SECURITY: NO cd-to-CWD no-op exclusion. A previous iteration excluded
+  // `Set-Location .` as a no-op, but the "first non-dash arg" heuristic used
+  // to extract the target is fooled by colon-bound params:
+  // `Set-Location -Path:/etc .` — real target is /etc, heuristic sees `.`,
+  // exclusion fires, bypass. The UX case (model emitting `Set-Location .; foo`)
+  // is rare; the attack surface isn't worth the special-case. Any cd-family
+  // cmdlet in the compound sets this flag, period.
+  // Only flag compound cd when there are multiple sub-commands. A standalone
+  // `Set-Location ./subdir` is not a TOCTOU risk (no later statement resolves
+  // relative paths against stale cwd). Without this, standalone cd forces the
+  // compound guard, suppressing the per-subcommand auto-allow path. (bug #25)
+  const hasCdSubCommand =
+    allSubCommands.length > 1 &&
+    allSubCommands.some(({ element }) => isCwdChangingCmdlet(element.name))
+  // Symlink-create compound guard (finding #18 / bug 001+004): when the
+  // compound creates a filesystem link, subsequent writes through that link
+  // land outside the validator's view. Same TOCTOU shape as cwd desync.
+  const hasSymlinkCreate =
+    allSubCommands.length > 1 &&
+    allSubCommands.some(({ element }) => isSymlinkCreatingCommand(element))
+  const hasGitSubCommand = allSubCommands.some(
+    ({ element }) => resolveToCanonical(element.name) === 'git',
+  )
+  if (hasCdSubCommand && hasGitSubCommand) {
+    decisions.push({
+      behavior: 'ask',
+      message:
+        'Compound commands with cd/Set-Location and git require approval to prevent bare repository attacks',
+    })
+  }
+
+  // cd+write compound guard — SUBSUMED by checkPathConstraints(compoundCommandHasCd).
+  // Previously this block pushed 'ask' when hasCdSubCommand && hasAcceptEditsWrite,
+  // but checkPathConstraints now receives hasCdSubCommand and pushes 'ask' for ANY
+  // path operation (read or write) in a cd-compound — broader coverage at the path
+  // layer (BashTool parity). The step-5 !hasCdSubCommand gates and modeValidation's
+  // compound-cd guard remain as defense-in-depth for paths that don't reach
+  // checkPathConstraints (e.g., cmdlets not in CMDLET_PATH_CONFIG).
+
+  // Decision: bare-git-repo guard — bash parity.
+  // If cwd has HEAD/objects/refs/ without a valid .git/HEAD, Git treats
+  // cwd as a bare repository and runs hooks from cwd. Attacker creates
+  // hooks/pre-commit, deletes .git/HEAD, then any git subcommand runs it.
+  // Port of BashTool readOnlyValidation.ts isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo.
+  if (hasGitSubCommand && isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo()) {
+    decisions.push({
+      behavior: 'ask',
+      message:
+        'Git command in a directory with bare-repository indicators (HEAD, objects/, refs/ in cwd without .git/HEAD). Git may execute hooks from cwd.',
+    })
+  }
+
+  // Decision: git-internal-paths write guard — bash parity.
+  // Compound command creates HEAD/objects/refs/hooks/ then runs git → the
+  // git subcommand executes freshly-created malicious hooks. Check all
+  // extracted write paths + redirection targets against git-internal patterns.
+  // Port of BashTool commandWritesToGitInternalPaths, adapted for AST.
+  if (hasGitSubCommand) {
+    const writesToGitInternal = allSubCommands.some(
+      ({ element, statement }) => {
+        // Redirection targets on this sub-command (raw Extent.Text — quotes
+        // and ./ intact; normalizer handles both)
+        for (const r of element.redirections ?? []) {
+          if (isGitInternalPathPS(r.target)) return true
+        }
+        // Write cmdlet args (new-item HEAD; mkdir hooks; set-content hooks/pre-commit)
+        const canonical = resolveToCanonical(element.name)
+        if (!GIT_SAFETY_WRITE_CMDLETS.has(canonical)) return false
+        // Raw arg text — normalizer strips colon-bound params, quotes, ./, case.
+        // PS ArrayLiteralAst (`New-Item a,hooks/pre-commit`) surfaces as a single
+        // comma-joined arg — split before checking.
+        if (
+          element.args
+            .flatMap(a => a.split(','))
+            .some(a => isGitInternalPathPS(a))
+        ) {
+          return true
+        }
+        // Pipeline input: `"hooks/pre-commit" | New-Item -ItemType File` binds the
+        // string to -Path at runtime. The path is in a non-CommandAst pipeline
+        // element, not in element.args. The hasExpressionSource guard at step 5
+        // already forces approval here; this check just adds the git-internal
+        // warning text.
+        if (statement !== null) {
+          for (const c of statement.commands) {
+            if (c.elementType === 'CommandAst') continue
+            if (isGitInternalPathPS(c.text)) return true
+          }
+        }
+        return false
+      },
+    )
+    // Also check top-level file redirections (> hooks/pre-commit)
+    const redirWritesToGitInternal = getFileRedirections(parsed).some(r =>
+      isGitInternalPathPS(r.target),
+    )
+    if (writesToGitInternal || redirWritesToGitInternal) {
+      decisions.push({
+        behavior: 'ask',
+        message:
+          'Command writes to a git-internal path (HEAD, objects/, refs/, hooks/, .git/) and runs git. This could plant a malicious hook that git then executes.',
+      })
+    }
+    // SECURITY: Archive-extraction TOCTOU. isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo
+    // checks at permission-eval time; `tar -xf x.tar; git status` extracts
+    // bare-repo indicators AFTER the check, BEFORE git runs. Unlike write
+    // cmdlets (where we inspect args for git-internal paths), archive
+    // contents are opaque — any extraction in a compound with git must ask.
+    const hasArchiveExtractor = allSubCommands.some(({ element }) =>
+      GIT_SAFETY_ARCHIVE_EXTRACTORS.has(element.name.toLowerCase()),
+    )
+    if (hasArchiveExtractor) {
+      decisions.push({
+        behavior: 'ask',
+        message:
+          'Compound command extracts an archive and runs git. Archive contents may plant bare-repository indicators (HEAD, hooks/, refs/) that git then treats as the repository root.',
+      })
+    }
+  }
+
+  // .git/ writes are dangerous even WITHOUT a git subcommand — a planted
+  // .git/hooks/pre-commit fires on the user's next commit. Unlike the
+  // bare-repo check above (which gates on hasGitSubCommand because `hooks/`
+  // is a common project dirname), `.git/` is unambiguous.
+  {
+    const found =
+      allSubCommands.some(({ element }) => {
+        for (const r of element.redirections ?? []) {
+          if (isDotGitPathPS(r.target)) return true
+        }
+        const canonical = resolveToCanonical(element.name)
+        if (!GIT_SAFETY_WRITE_CMDLETS.has(canonical)) return false
+        return element.args.flatMap(a => a.split(',')).some(isDotGitPathPS)
+      }) || getFileRedirections(parsed).some(r => isDotGitPathPS(r.target))
+    if (found) {
+      decisions.push({
+        behavior: 'ask',
+        message:
+          'Command writes to .git/ — hooks or config planted there execute on the next git operation.',
+      })
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Decision: path constraints — was step 4.44 (:835-845).
+  // The deny-capable check that was being masked by earlier asks. Returns
+  // 'deny' when an Edit(...) deny rule matches an extracted path (pathValidation
+  // lines ~994, 1088, 1160, 1210), 'ask' for paths outside working dirs, or
+  // 'passthrough'.
+  //
+  // Thread hasCdSubCommand (BashTool compoundCommandHasCd parity): when the
+  // compound contains a cwd-changing cmdlet, checkPathConstraints forces 'ask'
+  // for any statement with path operations — relative paths resolve against the
+  // stale validator cwd, not PowerShell's runtime cwd. This is the architectural
+  // fix for the CWD-desync cluster (findings #3/#21/#27/#28), replacing the
+  // per-auto-allow-site guards with a single gate at the path-resolution layer.
+  const pathResult = checkPathConstraints(
+    input,
+    parsed,
+    toolPermissionContext,
+    hasCdSubCommand,
+  )
+  if (pathResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
+    decisions.push(pathResult)
+  }
+
+  // Decision: exact allow (parse-succeeded case) — was step 4.45 (:861-867).
+  // Matches BashTool ordering: sub-command deny → path constraints → exact
+  // allow. Reduce enforces deny > ask > allow, so the exact allow only
+  // surfaces when no deny or ask fired — same as sequential.
+  //
+  // SECURITY: nameType gate — mirrors the parse-failed guard at L696-700.
+  // Input-side stripModulePrefix is unconditional: `scripts\Get-Content`
+  // strips to `Get-Content`, canonicalCommand matches exact allow. Without
+  // this gate, allow enters decisions[] and reduce returns it before step 5
+  // can inspect nameType — PowerShell runs the local .ps1 file. The AST's
+  // nameType for the first command element is authoritative when parse
+  // succeeded; 'application' means a script/executable path, not a cmdlet.
+  // SECURITY: Same argLeaksValue gate as the per-subcommand loop below
+  // (finding #32). Without it, `PowerShell(Write-Output:*)` exact-matches
+  // `Write-Output $env:ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, pushes allow to decisions[], and
+  // reduce returns it before the per-subcommand gate ever runs. The
+  // allSubCommands.every check ensures NO command in the statement leaks
+  // (a single-command exact-allow has one element; a pipeline has several).
+  //
+  // SECURITY: nameType gate must check ALL subcommands, not just [0]
+  // (finding #10). canonicalCommand at L171 collapses `\n` → space, so
+  // `code\n.\build.ps1` (two statements) matches exact rule
+  // `PowerShell(code .\build.ps1)`. Checking only allSubCommands[0] lets the
+  // second statement (nameType=application, a script path) through. Require
+  // EVERY subcommand to have nameType !== 'application'.
+  if (
+    exactMatchResult.behavior === 'allow' &&
+    allSubCommands[0] !== undefined &&
+    allSubCommands.every(
+      sc =>
+        sc.element.nameType !== 'application' &&
+        !argLeaksValue(sc.text, sc.element),
+    )
+  ) {
+    decisions.push(exactMatchResult)
+  }
+
+  // Decision: read-only allowlist — was step 4.5 (:869-885).
+  // Mirrors Bash auto-allow for ls, cat, git status, etc. PowerShell
+  // equivalents: Get-Process, Get-ChildItem, Get-Content, git log, etc.
+  // Reduce places this below sub-command ask rules (ask > allow).
+  if (isReadOnlyCommand(command, parsed)) {
+    decisions.push({
+      behavior: 'allow',
+      updatedInput: input,
+      decisionReason: {
+        type: 'other',
+        reason: 'Command is read-only and safe to execute',
+      },
+    })
+  }
+
+  // Decision: file redirections — was :887-900.
+  // Redirections (>, >>, 2>) write to arbitrary paths. isReadOnlyCommand
+  // already rejects redirections internally so this can't conflict with the
+  // read-only allow above. Reduce places it above checkPermissionMode allow.
+  const fileRedirections = getFileRedirections(parsed)
+  if (fileRedirections.length > 0) {
+    decisions.push({
+      behavior: 'ask',
+      message:
+        'Command contains file redirections that could write to arbitrary paths',
+      suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(command),
+    })
+  }
+
+  // Decision: mode-specific handling (acceptEdits) — was step 4.7 (:902-906).
+  // checkPermissionMode only returns 'allow' | 'passthrough'.
+  const modeResult = checkPermissionMode(input, parsed, toolPermissionContext)
+  if (modeResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
+    decisions.push(modeResult)
+  }
+
+  // REDUCE: deny > ask > allow > passthrough. First of each behavior type
+  // wins (preserves step-order messaging for single-check cases). If nothing
+  // decided, fall through to step 5 per-sub-command approval collection.
+  const deniedDecision = decisions.find(d => d.behavior === 'deny')
+  if (deniedDecision !== undefined) {
+    return deniedDecision
+  }
+  const askDecision = decisions.find(d => d.behavior === 'ask')
+  if (askDecision !== undefined) {
+    return askDecision
+  }
+  const allowDecision = decisions.find(d => d.behavior === 'allow')
+  if (allowDecision !== undefined) {
+    return allowDecision
+  }
+
+  // 5. Pipeline/statement splitting: check each sub-command independently.
+  // This prevents a prefix rule like "Get-Process:*" from silently allowing
+  // piped commands like "Get-Process | Stop-Process -Force".
+  // Note: deny rules are already checked above (4.4), so this loop handles
+  // ask rules, explicit allow rules, and read-only allowlist fallback.
+
+  // Filter out safe output cmdlets (Format-Table, etc.) — they were checked
+  // for deny rules in step 4.4 but shouldn't need independent approval here.
+  // Also filter out cd/Set-Location to CWD (model habit, Bash parity).
+  const subCommands = allSubCommands.filter(({ element, isSafeOutput }) => {
+    if (isSafeOutput) {
+      return false
+    }
+    // SECURITY: nameType gate — sixth location. Filtering out of the approval
+    // list is a form of auto-allow. scripts\\Set-Location . would match below
+    // (stripped name 'Set-Location', arg '.' → CWD) and be silently dropped,
+    // then scripts\\Set-Location.ps1 executes with no prompt. Keep 'application'
+    // commands in the list so they reach isAllowlistedCommand (which rejects them).
+    if (element.nameType === 'application') {
+      return true
+    }
+    const canonical = resolveToCanonical(element.name)
+    if (canonical === 'set-location' && element.args.length > 0) {
+      // SECURITY: use PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS, not ASCII-only startsWith('-').
+      // `Set-Location –Path .` (en-dash) would otherwise treat `–Path` as the
+      // target, resolve it against cwd (mismatch), and keep the command in the
+      // approval list — correct. But `Set-Location –LiteralPath evil` with
+      // en-dash would find `–LiteralPath` as "target", mismatch cwd, stay in
+      // list — also correct. The risk is the inverse: a Unicode-dash parameter
+      // being treated as the positional target. Use the tokenizer dash set.
+      const target = element.args.find(
+        a => a.length === 0 || !PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS.has(a[0]!),
+      )
+      if (target && resolve(getCwd(), target) === getCwd()) {
+        return false
+      }
+    }
+    return true
+  })
+
+  // Note: cd+git compound guard already ran at step 4.42. If we reach here,
+  // either there's no cd or no git in the compound.
+
+  const subCommandsNeedingApproval: string[] = []
+  // Statements whose sub-commands were PUSHED to subCommandsNeedingApproval
+  // in the step-5 loop below. The fail-closed gate (after the loop) only
+  // pushes statements NOT tracked here — prevents duplicate suggestions where
+  // both "Get-Process" (sub-command) AND "$x = Get-Process" (full statement)
+  // appear.
+  //
+  // SECURITY: track on PUSH only, not on loop entry.
+  // If a statement's only sub-commands `continue` via user allow rules
+  // (L1113), marking it seen at loop-entry would make the fail-closed gate
+  // skip it — auto-allowing invisible non-CommandAst content like bare
+  // `$env:SECRET` inside control flow. Example attack: user approves
+  // Get-Process, then `if ($true) { Get-Process; $env:SECRET }` — Get-Process
+  // is allow-ruled (continue, no push), $env:SECRET is VariableExpressionAst
+  // (not a sub-command), statement marked seen → gate skips → auto-allow →
+  // secret leaks. Tracking on push only: statement stays unseen → gate fires
+  // → ask.
+  const statementsSeenInLoop = new Set<
+    ParsedPowerShellCommand['statements'][number]
+  >()
+
+  for (const { text: subCmd, element, statement } of subCommands) {
+    // Check deny rules FIRST - user explicit rules take precedence over allowlist
+    const subInput = { command: subCmd }
+    const subResult = powershellToolCheckPermission(
+      subInput,
+      toolPermissionContext,
+    )
+
+    if (subResult.behavior === 'deny') {
+      return {
+        behavior: 'deny',
+        message: `Permission to use ${POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
+        decisionReason: subResult.decisionReason,
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (subResult.behavior === 'ask') {
+      if (statement !== null) {
+        statementsSeenInLoop.add(statement)
+      }
+      subCommandsNeedingApproval.push(subCmd)
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Explicitly allowed by a user rule — BUT NOT for applications/scripts.
+    // SECURITY: INPUT-side stripModulePrefix is unconditional, so
+    // `scripts\Get-Content /etc/shadow` strips to 'Get-Content' and matches
+    // an allow rule `Get-Content:*`. Without the nameType guard, continue
+    // skips all checks and the local script runs. nameType is classified from
+    // the RAW name pre-strip — `scripts\Get-Content` → 'application' (has `\`).
+    // Module-qualified cmdlets also classify 'application' — fail-safe over-fire.
+    // An application should NEVER be auto-allowed by a cmdlet allow rule.
+    if (
+      subResult.behavior === 'allow' &&
+      element.nameType !== 'application' &&
+      !hasSymlinkCreate
+    ) {
+      // SECURITY: User allow rule asserts the cmdlet is safe, NOT that
+      // arbitrary variable expansion through it is safe. A user who allows
+      // PowerShell(Write-Output:*) did not intend to auto-allow
+      // `Write-Output $env:ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`. Apply the same argLeaksValue
+      // gate that protects the built-in allowlist path below — rejects
+      // Variable/Other/ScriptBlock/SubExpression elementTypes and colon-bound
+      // expression children. (security finding #32)
+      //
+      // SECURITY: Also skip when the compound contains a symlink-creating
+      // command (finding — symlink+read gap). New-Item -ItemType SymbolicLink
+      // can redirect subsequent reads to arbitrary paths. The built-in
+      // allowlist path (below) and acceptEdits path both gate on
+      // !hasSymlinkCreate; the user-rule path must too.
+      if (argLeaksValue(subCmd, element)) {
+        if (statement !== null) {
+          statementsSeenInLoop.add(statement)
+        }
+        subCommandsNeedingApproval.push(subCmd)
+        continue
+      }
+      continue
+    }
+    if (subResult.behavior === 'allow') {
+      // nameType === 'application' with a matching allow rule: the rule was
+      // written for a cmdlet, but this is a script/executable masquerading.
+      // Don't continue; fall through to approval (NOT deny — the user may
+      // actually want to run `scripts\Get-Content` and will see a prompt).
+      if (statement !== null) {
+        statementsSeenInLoop.add(statement)
+      }
+      subCommandsNeedingApproval.push(subCmd)
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // SECURITY: fail-closed gate. Do NOT take the allowlist shortcut unless
+    // the parent statement is a PipelineAst where every element is a
+    // CommandAst. This subsumes the previous hasExpressionSource check
+    // (expression sources are one way a statement fails the gate) and also
+    // rejects assignments, chain operators, control flow, and any future
+    // AST type by construction. Examples this blocks:
+    //   'env:SECRET_API_KEY' | Get-Content  — CommandExpressionAst element
+    //   $x = Get-Process                   — AssignmentStatementAst
+    //   Get-Process && Get-Service         — PipelineChainAst
+    // Explicit user allow rules (above) run before this gate but apply their
+    // own argLeaksValue check; both paths now gate argument elementTypes.
+    //
+    // SECURITY: Also skip when the compound contains a cwd-changing cmdlet
+    // (finding #27 — cd+read gap). isAllowlistedCommand validates Get-Content
+    // in isolation, but `Set-Location ~; Get-Content ./.ssh/id_rsa` runs
+    // Get-Content from ~, not from the validator's cwd. Path validation saw
+    // /project/.ssh/id_rsa; runtime reads ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Same gate as the
+    // checkPermissionMode call below and the checkPathConstraints threading.
+    if (
+      statement !== null &&
+      !hasCdSubCommand &&
+      !hasSymlinkCreate &&
+      isProvablySafeStatement(statement) &&
+      isAllowlistedCommand(element, subCmd)
+    ) {
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Check per-sub-command acceptEdits mode (BashTool parity).
+    // Delegate to checkPermissionMode on a single-statement AST so that ALL
+    // of its guards apply: expression pipeline sources (non-CommandAst elements),
+    // security flags (subexpressions, script blocks, assignments, splatting, etc.),
+    // and the ACCEPT_EDITS_ALLOWED_CMDLETS allowlist. This keeps one source of
+    // truth for what makes a statement safe in acceptEdits mode — any future
+    // hardening of checkPermissionMode automatically applies here.
+    //
+    // Pass parsed.variables (not []) so splatting from any statement in the
+    // compound command is visible. Conservative: if we can't tell which statement
+    // a splatted variable affects, assume it affects all of them.
+    //
+    // SECURITY: Skip this auto-allow path when the compound contains a
+    // cwd-changing command (Set-Location/Push-Location/Pop-Location). The
+    // synthetic single-statement AST strips compound context, so
+    // checkPermissionMode cannot see the cd in other statements. Without this
+    // gate, `Set-Location ./.claude; Set-Content ./settings.json '...'` would
+    // pass: Set-Content is checked in isolation, matches ACCEPT_EDITS_ALLOWED_CMDLETS,
+    // and auto-allows — but PowerShell runs it from the changed cwd, writing to
+    // .claude/settings.json (a Claude config file the path validator didn't check).
+    // This matches BashTool's compoundCommandHasCd guard.
+    if (statement !== null && !hasCdSubCommand && !hasSymlinkCreate) {
+      const subModeResult = checkPermissionMode(
+        { command: subCmd },
+        {
+          valid: true,
+          errors: [],
+          variables: parsed.variables,
+          hasStopParsing: parsed.hasStopParsing,
+          originalCommand: subCmd,
+          statements: [statement],
+        },
+        toolPermissionContext,
+      )
+      if (subModeResult.behavior === 'allow') {
+        continue
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Not allowlisted, no mode auto-allow, and no explicit rule — needs approval
+    if (statement !== null) {
+      statementsSeenInLoop.add(statement)
+    }
+    subCommandsNeedingApproval.push(subCmd)
+  }
+
+  // SECURITY: fail-closed gate (second half). The step-5 loop above only
+  // iterates sub-commands that getSubCommandsForPermissionCheck surfaced
+  // AND survived the safe-output filter. Statements that produce zero
+  // CommandAst sub-commands (bare $env:SECRET) or whose only sub-commands
+  // were filtered as safe-output ($env:X | Out-String) never enter the loop.
+  // Without this, they silently auto-allow on empty subCommandsNeedingApproval.
+  //
+  // Only push statements NOT tracked above: if the loop PUSHED any
+  // sub-command from a statement, the user will see a prompt. Pushing the
+  // statement text too creates a duplicate suggestion where accepting the
+  // sub-command rule does not prevent re-prompting.
+  // If all sub-commands `continue`d (allow-ruled / allowlisted / mode-allowed)
+  // the statement is NOT tracked and the gate re-checks it below — this is
+  // the fail-closed property.
+  for (const stmt of parsed.statements) {
+    if (!isProvablySafeStatement(stmt) && !statementsSeenInLoop.has(stmt)) {
+      subCommandsNeedingApproval.push(stmt.text)
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (subCommandsNeedingApproval.length === 0) {
+    // SECURITY: empty-list auto-allow is only safe when there's nothing
+    // unverifiable. If the pipeline has script blocks, every safe-output
+    // cmdlet was filtered at :1032, but the block content wasn't verified —
+    // non-command AST nodes (AssignmentStatementAst etc.) are invisible to
+    // getAllCommands. `Where-Object {$true} | Sort-Object {$env:PATH='evil'}`
+    // would auto-allow here. hasAssignments is top-level-only (parser.ts:1385)
+    // so it doesn't catch nested assignments either. Prompt instead.
+    if (deriveSecurityFlags(parsed).hasScriptBlocks) {
+      return {
+        behavior: 'ask',
+        message: createPermissionRequestMessage(POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME),
+        decisionReason: {
+          type: 'other',
+          reason:
+            'Pipeline consists of output-formatting cmdlets with script blocks — block content cannot be verified',
+        },
+      }
+    }
+    return {
+      behavior: 'allow',
+      updatedInput: input,
+      decisionReason: {
+        type: 'other',
+        reason: 'All pipeline commands are individually allowed',
+      },
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 6. Some sub-commands need approval — build suggestions
+  const decisionReason = {
+    type: 'other' as const,
+    reason: 'This command requires approval',
+  }
+
+  const pendingSuggestions: PermissionUpdate[] = []
+  for (const subCmd of subCommandsNeedingApproval) {
+    pendingSuggestions.push(...suggestionForExactCommand(subCmd))
+  }
+
+  return {
+    behavior: 'passthrough',
+    message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
+      POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
+      decisionReason,
+    ),
+    decisionReason,
+    suggestions: pendingSuggestions,
+  }
+}