@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.0.1 → 1.1.0

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.js

@@ -7,21 +7,76 @@
 import { z } from 'zod';
 import { OrganizationMemberSchema, OrganizationMemberStatus, } from './organization-members.shared.schemas.js';
 import { CoreResourceOperation } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions.js';
-import { ResourceOperationRiskLevel } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas.js';
+import { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, DefaultDeleteResponseSchema } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas.js';
 import { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions.js';
 import { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas.js';
 import { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas.js';
 import { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.factory.js';
-import { CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas.js';
-// Custom operations enum for organization members
+import { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas.js';
+import { CoreConsumableTokenTypes, ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode, } from '../security/authentications/consumable-token.shared.schemas.js';
+import { DurationUnit } from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';
+import { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas.js';
+import { DataPortabilityProvenance } from '../compliance/privacy/subject-export.shared.schemas.js';
+// Custom operations enum for organization members.
+// NOTE: cross-organization member transfer is intentionally NOT a framework
+// capability — moving a member between organizations is a tenant-boundary
+// crossing the framework does not sanction. Re-invite the identity in the
+// target organization instead.
+//
+// A membership row IS the invitation (there is no separate invitation resource):
+//   - CREATE      = invite (creates an `INVITED` row + mints the accept token).
+//   - REVOKE      = inviter/admin cancels a still-`INVITED` membership.
+//   - RESEND      = re-mint + re-send the accept token for an `INVITED` membership.
+//   - SUSPEND/REACTIVATE = lifecycle of an ACTIVE/SUSPENDED member.
+// Invitee-side accept/reject is the tokenized `/auth/acceptInvitation` flow
+// (auth controller + `Auth_Invitation` screen), NOT a resource operation.
+//
+// ROLE CHANGES ARE `UPDATE`, NOT A DEDICATED VERB. `PROMOTE` / `DEMOTE` were declared here
+// as `ORG_ADMIN`-gated `riskLevel: HIGH` operations taking `{ newRole, reason }`, and were
+// removed on 2026-08-01: they were ROUTED but never implemented, so the request fell through
+// to the generic core UPDATE, which persists only fields the resource schema declares.
+// `newRole` is not one, so every call answered **HTTP 200 having changed nothing** — and the
+// dangerous direction is DEMOTE: an admin demotes a compromised account, is told 200 OK, and
+// the account keeps its privileges. Re-declaring an explicit role-change verb is legitimate,
+// but only WITH a custom implementation that writes `roles` and calls
+// `assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling` — a custom implementation is addressed by an EXACT
+// operation path, so it does NOT inherit the UPDATE variant's ceiling gate. Follow the
+// organization-units MOVE/ARCHIVE pattern (a `prefixCoreOperations` hook returning the field
+// patch the core UPDATE persists). See
+// `.claude/plans/routed-unimplemented-operations-fail-closed.md`.
+//
+// GRANT_OWNERSHIP is the ONE exception to "role changes are UPDATE", and it exists for a reason
+// UPDATE structurally cannot serve: it is the only operation on this resource a caller who is NOT a
+// member of the organization may perform. See its config entry below.
 export var OrganizationMembers_Operations;
 (function (OrganizationMembers_Operations) {
-    OrganizationMembers_Operations["PROMOTE"] = "promote";
-    OrganizationMembers_Operations["DEMOTE"] = "demote";
     OrganizationMembers_Operations["SUSPEND"] = "suspend";
     OrganizationMembers_Operations["REACTIVATE"] = "reactivate";
-    OrganizationMembers_Operations["TRANSFER"] = "transfer";
+    OrganizationMembers_Operations["REVOKE"] = "revoke";
+    OrganizationMembers_Operations["RESEND"] = "resend";
+    OrganizationMembers_Operations["GRANT_OWNERSHIP"] = "grantOwnership";
 })(OrganizationMembers_Operations || (OrganizationMembers_Operations = {}));
+/**
+ * One semantic definition for invalidating an organization invitation.
+ *
+ * REVOKE attaches it declaratively, so HTTP and trusted service callers enter
+ * the same transactional revocation pipeline. Ordinary DELETE is
+ * intentionally excluded: it removes a non-INVITED membership, which has no
+ * invitation token to revoke.
+ */
+export const ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION = {
+    tokenTypes: [
+        CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,
+    ],
+    relatedIdField: '_id',
+};
+/**
+ * One predicate owns both invitation-token generation and invitation-email
+ * dispatch. Keeping the two declarative side effects on the same named gate
+ * prevents the polymorphic CREATE operation from drifting: an ACTIVE direct
+ * add must produce neither an accept token nor an invitation email.
+ */
+const isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation = ({ currentObject, }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED;
 const ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS = ['status', 'role', 'joinedAt'];
 const ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_FILTER_FIELDS = {
     status: z.enum(OrganizationMemberStatus),
@@ -36,6 +91,26 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
     resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS],
     resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,
     isSystemResource: true,
+    // create: invitation-accept was the historical opt-in; now the org-admin INVITE, SSO/SCIM
+    //   JIT, and org-auto-create-on-registration all create members in-process with explicit
+    //   `userId` + `organizationId` FKs on a request-context-less EC (stripped by the
+    //   client-shaped CREATE DTO, re-attached by `createAsSystem`).
+    // read/list: the invitee's own pending-invitation inbox reads INVITED rows cross-org
+    //   BEFORE the invitee is a scoped member — authorized by `userId`-ownership at the
+    //   entry point (`listMyPendingInvitations`/`loadOwnedPendingInvitation`), not org role.
+    // update: invitation ACCEPTANCE flips INVITED → ACTIVE in-process; the invitee is not an
+    //   org admin, so the status flip goes through the trusted system path.
+    systemAccessPolicy: {
+        exportSubject: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,
+        create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,
+        read: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,
+        list: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,
+        update: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,
+    },
+    /**
+     * Subject-export disclosure. The subject's OWN membership rows (org, roles, title) — not other members' data.
+     */
+    portabilityPolicy: { defaultProvenance: DataPortabilityProvenance.OBSERVED },
     coreOperations: [
         CoreResourceOperation.READ,
         CoreResourceOperation.LIST,
@@ -57,25 +132,53 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                 }
             ]
         },
+        // CREATE is POLYMORPHIC — two intents on one op:
+        //  • INVITE (BRANCH B): the org admin supplies `userEmail` (the strict identity
+        //    anchor); the CREATE prefix find-or-creates the `User` by it (`PENDING_INVITATION`
+        //    if new) and FORCES `status: INVITED`. A single-use accept token is minted AFTER the
+        //    row is created (relatedId = the membership `_id`, STABLE across `INVITED → ACTIVE`
+        //    so the emailed link never orphans); the pipeline injects it into the invite email and
+        //    the dispatcher builds the accept link (`emailLinkPath → /invitation?token=…`, consumed
+        //    by `/auth/acceptInvitation`). No `grantedRoles`: the accept handler reads the
+        //    membership's own `roles` when it flips the row to ACTIVE.
+        //  • DIRECT-ADD (BRANCH A): the caller supplies `userId` (founder org-owner grant,
+        //    SSO-JIT, SCIM) and the row persists `ACTIVE` — there is nothing to accept.
+        // Token generation and notification dispatch share one named predicate.
+        // The INVITE branch mints one accept token and sends one post-commit email;
+        // the ACTIVE direct-add branch does neither.
         [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {
             variants: [
                 {
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can add members
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can invite members
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
-                    // Allow explicit organizationId in payload for internal provisioning flows
-                    // requestDto auto-derived from decorators
+                    // requestDto auto-derived from decorators (userEmail + roles +
+                    // organizationUnitsMembership + userTitle; userId/status/invitedByUserId/
+                    // invitedAt are server-injected via `.excludeFromCreate()`).
+                    tokenGeneration: {
+                        tokenType: CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,
+                        consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE,
+                        expiresIn: { value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS },
+                        relatedIdField: '_id',
+                        emailLinkPath: '/invitation',
+                        // Mint the accept token for real invites only — never for an ACTIVE direct-add.
+                        condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,
+                    },
                 }
             ],
+            // Deliver the invite email to the INVITEE (`userEmail`) via the
+            // email-by-address path — the invitee may be a brand-new `PENDING_INVITATION`
+            // user with no session. Carries the `acceptUrl` (`/invitation?token=…`) built
+            // from the token minted above. `target: USER_SELF` is retained only so the
+            // derived template ref stays `…create.user-self` and the accept link routes to
+            // the main (non-admin) app.
             userNotifications: [
                 {
                     target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,
                     channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
-                },
-                {
-                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,
-                    channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                    recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',
+                    condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,
                 }
             ]
         },
@@ -107,7 +210,24 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                     roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
                     isSearchable: true,
-                    searchableFields: ['userEmail', 'userFirstName', 'userLastName'],
+                    // `userEmail` is a denormalized, immutable own-field (mirror of the linked
+                    // user's email, captured at membership creation). First/last name are NOT
+                    // denormalized onto the member row — they live on `USER_PROFILES` and are
+                    // mutable there — so they are searched RELATIONALLY: the framework runs a
+                    // secondary match on `USER_PROFILES` (its own searchable fields) and folds
+                    // the matching `userId`s into an `$in` on this row's `userId`. The member
+                    // query stays org-scoped, so this is tenant-safe; names are never stale
+                    // because they are read live from the profile at search time. See
+                    // SearchableRelationDescriptor in resources-config.shared.schemas.ts.
+                    searchableFields: [
+                        'userEmail',
+                        {
+                            localField: 'userId',
+                            relatedResource: CoreResourceType.USER_PROFILES,
+                            relatedJoinField: 'userId',
+                            fields: ['firstName', 'lastName'],
+                        },
+                    ],
                     searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },
                     filterFields: ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_FILTER_FIELDS,
                     sortFields: ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS,
@@ -123,6 +243,22 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                     roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can update member details
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
                     // requestDto auto-derived from decorators
+                    //
+                    // Audited despite being below the HIGH/CRITICAL floor: since PROMOTE / DEMOTE were removed
+                    // (2026-08-01), **this operation IS the only org-member role-change path**, and a role
+                    // change is an access-control decision whatever the verb's risk level says. MEDIUM is the
+                    // right answer for the UI axis riskLevel primarily serves — updating a member's details
+                    // does not deserve a danger-zone affordance or a typed confirmation — but it is the wrong
+                    // answer for the evidence axis, and this flag is exactly that divergence.
+                    //
+                    // This also closes the follow-up left open by the routed-unimplemented-operations sweep:
+                    // `CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED` is declared and classified but
+                    // emitted by nothing, so org-member role changes produced no trail at all. The generic
+                    // mechanism covers it — with `roles` marked as audit evidence, the row carries the before
+                    // and after sets — rather than adding a sixth hand-rolled emission.
+                    //
+                    // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — evidence of privilege grant/revocation.
+                    auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },
                 }
             ],
             userNotifications: [
@@ -139,6 +275,11 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                     isDefault: true,
                     roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can remove members
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
+                    // Accepted/non-pending members use ordinary DELETE. A pending invite
+                    // is cancelled through REVOKE, which atomically revokes its accept
+                    // token. Keeping the vocabularies disjoint avoids making every
+                    // active-member removal token-coupled.
+                    enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status !== OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,
                 }
             ],
             userNotifications: [
@@ -148,43 +289,97 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                 }
             ]
         },
-        [OrganizationMembers_Operations.PROMOTE]: {
+        /**
+         * The higher-tier repair door for the organization-owner floor — the second half of the
+         * industry pattern described in `.claude/rules/administrative-continuity-floors.md`.
+         *
+         * ## Why this cannot be UPDATE
+         *
+         * The floor refuses to let the last `ORG_OWNER` be removed, demoted or deactivated. That is the
+         * correct tenant-tier answer, but on its own it converts every mistake that DID strand a tenant
+         * — a direct database edit, a restore from a mid-erasure backup, an acknowledged erasure under
+         * GDPR Art. 17, a seed that authored no owner — into a permanent lockout, because
+         * `validateParentScopeAccess` denies a non-member on ORGANIZATIONS scope and there is no
+         * `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN` bypass. Both denials are pinned in
+         * `cross-tenant-super-admin-reach.mongo.integration.test.ts`. So no tenant member can grant the
+         * role (they would need the authority they just lost) and no platform administrator can reach
+         * the row at all. GitHub solves this with an Enterprise owner one tier up; this is that tier.
+         *
+         * ## Why it is a distinct verb rather than a flag on UPDATE
+         *
+         * `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration` relaxes the SCOPE check for the variant that carries
+         * it. Putting it on generic UPDATE would open every field of every membership row in every
+         * tenant to a cross-tenant caller. The whole safety argument is that the opened surface is
+         * exactly one field with one direction, so it is authored as its own operation whose custom
+         * implementation ignores the payload for anything but the justification.
+         *
+         * ## Deliberate narrowness
+         *
+         * - **Promotes an EXISTING member** (Microsoft Loop's rule). It cannot mint a membership, so it
+         *   never creates an identity inside a tenant nobody owns.
+         * - **Additive only.** It adds the owner-conferring role; it cannot remove roles, so it can
+         *   never be used to demote and is not a second path through the floor.
+         * - **`justification` is required**, not optional. This is a break-glass action against a tenant
+         *   the operator is not a member of; the audit row is worth nothing without the why. `AC-2(7)`
+         *   asks for privileged assignment to be monitored — the trail IS the control here, since by
+         *   construction no authorization check downstream can second-guess the caller.
+         *
+         * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY — restore administrability of a scope
+         * that has no usable administrator.
+         * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — evidence of privilege grant.
+         */
+        [OrganizationMembers_Operations.GRANT_OWNERSHIP]: {
             variants: [
                 {
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can promote members
-                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
+                    // Platform tier only. This is the role set the operation-roles gate checks INDEPENDENTLY
+                    // of the scope admission below: a caller holding this key at ORGANIZATIONS scope resolves
+                    // it against the organization role table, which does not contain it, and is denied there.
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,
                     resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
+                    // THE cross-tenant admission. Without it the operation is unreachable by the only
+                    // principal it exists for, because a platform administrator is by definition not a member
+                    // of the stranded tenant.
+                    admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,
                     requestDto: z.object({
-                        newRole: z.string().min(1),
-                        reason: z.string().max(500).optional()
+                        justification: z.string().min(1).max(1000),
                     }),
-                }
+                    // No `auditableEvent` declaration: CRITICAL is inside `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so the
+                    // event emits on the risk level alone and `auditBelowRiskFloor` would be inert here. The
+                    // before/after role sets ride along because `roles` carries `.isAuditEvidence()` — which is
+                    // what makes the trail answer the question that matters about this door: WHO was made an
+                    // owner of a tenant, by a caller who was not in it.
+                },
             ],
             userNotifications: [
                 {
-                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,
-                    channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
-                },
-                {
+                    // The tenant learns that its ownership changed from outside. An operator repairing a
+                    // stranded tenant is legitimate; an operator quietly granting themselves an ally inside a
+                    // customer's tenant is not, and the difference is only visible to the tenant if it is told.
                     target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,
                     channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
-                }
-            ]
+                },
+            ],
         },
-        [OrganizationMembers_Operations.DEMOTE]: {
+        [OrganizationMembers_Operations.SUSPEND]: {
             variants: [
                 {
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can demote members
-                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can suspend members
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,
                     resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
                     requestDto: z.object({
-                        newRole: z.string().min(1),
-                        reason: z.string().max(500).optional()
+                        suspensionReason: z.string().min(1).max(500),
+                        suspensionEndDate: z.date().optional()
                     }),
+                    // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (ACTIVE → SUSPENDED, carrying
+                    // `suspensionEndDate` onto the row's `scheduledReactivationAt`). SUSPEND is legal only
+                    // from ACTIVE: an INVITED row has not accepted yet — cancel it with REVOKE, which also
+                    // revokes the accept token — and an INACTIVE one is already out.
+                    enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.ACTIVE,
                 }
             ],
             userNotifications: [
@@ -198,18 +393,28 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                 }
             ]
         },
-        [OrganizationMembers_Operations.SUSPEND]: {
+        [OrganizationMembers_Operations.REACTIVATE]: {
             variants: [
                 {
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can suspend members
-                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can reactivate members
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
                     resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
                     requestDto: z.object({
-                        suspensionReason: z.string().min(1).max(500),
-                        suspensionEndDate: z.date().optional()
+                        reason: z.string().max(500).optional()
                     }),
+                    // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (SUSPENDED → ACTIVE, clearing any
+                    // pending `scheduledReactivationAt`). Legal only from SUSPENDED: reactivating an INVITED
+                    // row would skip acceptance and grant a membership nobody agreed to.
+                    enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.SUSPENDED,
+                    // MEDIUM sits below `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so without this the RESTORE half of the
+                    // pair would go untrailed while SUSPEND (CRITICAL) is recorded — a trail showing every
+                    // suspension and none of the lifts, which reads as a member still suspended a year after
+                    // they were reinstated. The risk level answers "how alarming is the affordance"; this
+                    // answers "is it evidence an auditor needs", and for the inverse of a CRITICAL verb it is.
+                    // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE
+                    auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },
                 }
             ],
             userNotifications: [
@@ -223,56 +428,91 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                 }
             ]
         },
-        [OrganizationMembers_Operations.REACTIVATE]: {
+        // REVOKE — inviter/admin cancels a still-`INVITED` membership. The exact
+        // custom implementation DELETES the row and atomically revokes its accept
+        // token. The paired PENDING_INVITATION user is retained here and reaped by
+        // deferred hygiene only after it is old and still has no memberships:
+        // point-operation cleanup cannot predicate-lock "zero memberships" against
+        // a concurrent invitation insert under Mongo snapshot isolation. `reason`
+        // is captured in the audit payload, not persisted on the deleted row.
+        [OrganizationMembers_Operations.REVOKE]: {
             variants: [
                 {
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can reactivate members
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
-                    resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
+                    resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,
                     requestDto: z.object({
                         reason: z.string().max(500).optional()
                     }),
-                }
+                    tokenRevocation: ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION,
+                    // REVOKE has an exact API custom registration; `resourceOperationLike`
+                    // selects DELETE persistence/DTO semantics but does not inherit the
+                    // core DELETE custom implementation. Its real return is the delete
+                    // envelope, declared explicitly so output validation matches runtime.
+                    customResponseDto: DefaultDeleteResponseSchema,
+                    // Only a still-pending invite can be revoked — an ACTIVE member is removed
+                    // via DELETE, not "revoked". Gates the roster action (paired with the preset's
+                    // `WHEN_AVAILABLE`, the button shows only on INVITED rows) AND fail-closes the
+                    // backend (`services-registry-handler` throws SERVICE_RESOURCE_OPERATION_DISABLED
+                    // → 403 if invoked on a non-INVITED row).
+                    enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,
+                },
             ],
+            // Two emails (distinct templates, disambiguated by `customNotificationRef`):
+            //  • the INVITEE (`recipientEmailField: 'userEmail'`) — "your invitation was revoked";
+            //  • the ADMIN/initiator (`USER_SELF`) — confirmation of the action.
+            // Both USER_SELF+EMAIL, so each MUST carry a unique `customNotificationRef`.
             userNotifications: [
                 {
                     target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,
                     channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                    recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',
+                    customNotificationRef: 'invitee',
                 },
                 {
-                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,
+                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,
                     channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                    customNotificationRef: 'admin',
                 }
             ]
         },
-        [OrganizationMembers_Operations.TRANSFER]: {
+        // RESEND — re-mint the accept token (revoking any prior one for this membership)
+        // and re-send the invite email with the fresh accept link. Only valid while the
+        // membership is `INVITED`.
+        [OrganizationMembers_Operations.RESEND]: {
             variants: [
                 {
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Only super admins can transfer members between orgs
-                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
                     resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
-                    requestDto: z.object({
-                        targetOrganizationId: z.string().min(1),
-                        transferReason: z.string().min(1).max(500),
-                        newRole: z.string().min(1)
-                    }),
+                    requestDto: z.object({}),
+                    tokenGeneration: {
+                        tokenType: CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,
+                        consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE,
+                        expiresIn: { value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS },
+                        relatedIdField: '_id',
+                        revokeExistingForSameRelated: true,
+                        emailLinkPath: '/invitation',
+                        condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,
+                    },
+                    // Resend is meaningful only while the invite is pending. Same dual enforcement
+                    // as REVOKE: hides the roster action on non-INVITED rows and 403s server-side.
+                    enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,
                 }
             ],
             userNotifications: [
                 {
                     target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,
                     channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
-                },
-                {
-                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,
-                    channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                    recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',
+                    condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,
                 }
             ]
         }
     },
 });
-//# sourceMappingURL=organization-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=organization-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Organization Members Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for organization member management.\n * Comprehensive member lifecycle and role management.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OrganizationMemberSchema,\n  OrganizationMemberStatus,\n} from './organization-members.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship, DefaultDeleteResponseSchema } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport {\n  CoreConsumableTokenTypes,\n  ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode,\n} from '../security/authentications/consumable-token.shared.schemas';\nimport type {\n  TokenRevocationConfig,\n} from '../security/authentications/consumable-token.shared.schemas';\nimport { DurationUnit } from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';\n\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { DataPortabilityProvenance } from '../compliance/privacy/subject-export.shared.schemas';\n\n// Custom operations enum for organization members.\n// NOTE: cross-organization member transfer is intentionally NOT a framework\n// capability — moving a member between organizations is a tenant-boundary\n// crossing the framework does not sanction. Re-invite the identity in the\n// target organization instead.\n//\n// A membership row IS the invitation (there is no separate invitation resource):\n//   - CREATE      = invite (creates an `INVITED` row + mints the accept token).\n//   - REVOKE      = inviter/admin cancels a still-`INVITED` membership.\n//   - RESEND      = re-mint + re-send the accept token for an `INVITED` membership.\n//   - SUSPEND/REACTIVATE = lifecycle of an ACTIVE/SUSPENDED member.\n// Invitee-side accept/reject is the tokenized `/auth/acceptInvitation` flow\n// (auth controller + `Auth_Invitation` screen), NOT a resource operation.\n//\n// ROLE CHANGES ARE `UPDATE`, NOT A DEDICATED VERB. `PROMOTE` / `DEMOTE` were declared here\n// as `ORG_ADMIN`-gated `riskLevel: HIGH` operations taking `{ newRole, reason }`, and were\n// removed on 2026-08-01: they were ROUTED but never implemented, so the request fell through\n// to the generic core UPDATE, which persists only fields the resource schema declares.\n// `newRole` is not one, so every call answered **HTTP 200 having changed nothing** — and the\n// dangerous direction is DEMOTE: an admin demotes a compromised account, is told 200 OK, and\n// the account keeps its privileges. Re-declaring an explicit role-change verb is legitimate,\n// but only WITH a custom implementation that writes `roles` and calls\n// `assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling` — a custom implementation is addressed by an EXACT\n// operation path, so it does NOT inherit the UPDATE variant's ceiling gate. Follow the\n// organization-units MOVE/ARCHIVE pattern (a `prefixCoreOperations` hook returning the field\n// patch the core UPDATE persists). See\n// `.claude/plans/routed-unimplemented-operations-fail-closed.md`.\n//\n// GRANT_OWNERSHIP is the ONE exception to \"role changes are UPDATE\", and it exists for a reason\n// UPDATE structurally cannot serve: it is the only operation on this resource a caller who is NOT a\n// member of the organization may perform. See its config entry below.\nexport enum OrganizationMembers_Operations {\n  SUSPEND = 'suspend',\n  REACTIVATE = 'reactivate',\n  REVOKE = 'revoke',\n  RESEND = 'resend',\n  GRANT_OWNERSHIP = 'grantOwnership',\n}\n\n/**\n * One semantic definition for invalidating an organization invitation.\n *\n * REVOKE attaches it declaratively, so HTTP and trusted service callers enter\n * the same transactional revocation pipeline. Ordinary DELETE is\n * intentionally excluded: it removes a non-INVITED membership, which has no\n * invitation token to revoke.\n */\nexport const ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION = {\n  tokenTypes: [\n    CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n  ],\n  relatedIdField: '_id',\n} satisfies TokenRevocationConfig;\n\n/**\n * One predicate owns both invitation-token generation and invitation-email\n * dispatch. Keeping the two declarative side effects on the same named gate\n * prevents the polymorphic CREATE operation from drifting: an ACTIVE direct\n * add must produce neither an accept token nor an invitation email.\n */\nconst isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation = ({\n  currentObject,\n}: {\n  currentObject: Record<string, unknown>;\n}): boolean =>\n  currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED;\n\nconst ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS = ['status', 'role', 'joinedAt'];\n\nconst ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OrganizationMemberStatus),\n  role: z.string(),\n};\n\ntype OrganizationMembersCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.COUNT;\n\n/*\nOrganization Members Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof OrganizationMembers_Operations,\n  OrganizationMembersCoreOperations,\n  typeof OrganizationMemberSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OrganizationMemberSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true,\n\n  // create: invitation-accept was the historical opt-in; now the org-admin INVITE, SSO/SCIM\n  //   JIT, and org-auto-create-on-registration all create members in-process with explicit\n  //   `userId` + `organizationId` FKs on a request-context-less EC (stripped by the\n  //   client-shaped CREATE DTO, re-attached by `createAsSystem`).\n  // read/list: the invitee's own pending-invitation inbox reads INVITED rows cross-org\n  //   BEFORE the invitee is a scoped member — authorized by `userId`-ownership at the\n  //   entry point (`listMyPendingInvitations`/`loadOwnedPendingInvitation`), not org role.\n  // update: invitation ACCEPTANCE flips INVITED → ACTIVE in-process; the invitee is not an\n  //   org admin, so the status flip goes through the trusted system path.\n  systemAccessPolicy: {\n    exportSubject: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    read: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    list: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    update: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n  },\n\n  /**\n   * Subject-export disclosure. The subject's OWN membership rows (org, roles, title) — not other members' data.\n   */\n  portabilityPolicy: { defaultProvenance: DataPortabilityProvenance.OBSERVED },\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.COUNT,\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: OrganizationMembers_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.COUNT]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // CREATE is POLYMORPHIC — two intents on one op:\n    //  • INVITE (BRANCH B): the org admin supplies `userEmail` (the strict identity\n    //    anchor); the CREATE prefix find-or-creates the `User` by it (`PENDING_INVITATION`\n    //    if new) and FORCES `status: INVITED`. A single-use accept token is minted AFTER the\n    //    row is created (relatedId = the membership `_id`, STABLE across `INVITED → ACTIVE`\n    //    so the emailed link never orphans); the pipeline injects it into the invite email and\n    //    the dispatcher builds the accept link (`emailLinkPath → /invitation?token=…`, consumed\n    //    by `/auth/acceptInvitation`). No `grantedRoles`: the accept handler reads the\n    //    membership's own `roles` when it flips the row to ACTIVE.\n    //  • DIRECT-ADD (BRANCH A): the caller supplies `userId` (founder org-owner grant,\n    //    SSO-JIT, SCIM) and the row persists `ACTIVE` — there is nothing to accept.\n    // Token generation and notification dispatch share one named predicate.\n    // The INVITE branch mints one accept token and sends one post-commit email;\n    // the ACTIVE direct-add branch does neither.\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can invite members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators (userEmail + roles +\n          // organizationUnitsMembership + userTitle; userId/status/invitedByUserId/\n          // invitedAt are server-injected via `.excludeFromCreate()`).\n          tokenGeneration: {\n            tokenType: CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n            consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE,\n            expiresIn: { value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS },\n            relatedIdField: '_id',\n            emailLinkPath: '/invitation',\n            // Mint the accept token for real invites only — never for an ACTIVE direct-add.\n            condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n          },\n        }\n      ],\n      // Deliver the invite email to the INVITEE (`userEmail`) via the\n      // email-by-address path — the invitee may be a brand-new `PENDING_INVITATION`\n      // user with no session. Carries the `acceptUrl` (`/invitation?token=…`) built\n      // from the token minted above. `target: USER_SELF` is retained only so the\n      // derived template ref stays `…create.user-self` and the accept link routes to\n      // the main (non-admin) app.\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can read member info\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can list organization members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          // `userEmail` is a denormalized, immutable own-field (mirror of the linked\n          // user's email, captured at membership creation). First/last name are NOT\n          // denormalized onto the member row — they live on `USER_PROFILES` and are\n          // mutable there — so they are searched RELATIONALLY: the framework runs a\n          // secondary match on `USER_PROFILES` (its own searchable fields) and folds\n          // the matching `userId`s into an `$in` on this row's `userId`. The member\n          // query stays org-scoped, so this is tenant-safe; names are never stale\n          // because they are read live from the profile at search time. See\n          // SearchableRelationDescriptor in resources-config.shared.schemas.ts.\n          searchableFields: [\n            'userEmail',\n            {\n              localField: 'userId',\n              relatedResource: CoreResourceType.USER_PROFILES,\n              relatedJoinField: 'userId',\n              fields: ['firstName', 'lastName'],\n            },\n          ],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 50,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can update member details\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          //\n          // Audited despite being below the HIGH/CRITICAL floor: since PROMOTE / DEMOTE were removed\n          // (2026-08-01), **this operation IS the only org-member role-change path**, and a role\n          // change is an access-control decision whatever the verb's risk level says. MEDIUM is the\n          // right answer for the UI axis riskLevel primarily serves — updating a member's details\n          // does not deserve a danger-zone affordance or a typed confirmation — but it is the wrong\n          // answer for the evidence axis, and this flag is exactly that divergence.\n          //\n          // This also closes the follow-up left open by the routed-unimplemented-operations sweep:\n          // `CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED` is declared and classified but\n          // emitted by nothing, so org-member role changes produced no trail at all. The generic\n          // mechanism covers it — with `roles` marked as audit evidence, the row carries the before\n          // and after sets — rather than adding a sixth hand-rolled emission.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — evidence of privilege grant/revocation.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can remove members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // Accepted/non-pending members use ordinary DELETE. A pending invite\n          // is cancelled through REVOKE, which atomically revokes its accept\n          // token. Keeping the vocabularies disjoint avoids making every\n          // active-member removal token-coupled.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status !== OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    /**\n     * The higher-tier repair door for the organization-owner floor — the second half of the\n     * industry pattern described in `.claude/rules/administrative-continuity-floors.md`.\n     *\n     * ## Why this cannot be UPDATE\n     *\n     * The floor refuses to let the last `ORG_OWNER` be removed, demoted or deactivated. That is the\n     * correct tenant-tier answer, but on its own it converts every mistake that DID strand a tenant\n     * — a direct database edit, a restore from a mid-erasure backup, an acknowledged erasure under\n     * GDPR Art. 17, a seed that authored no owner — into a permanent lockout, because\n     * `validateParentScopeAccess` denies a non-member on ORGANIZATIONS scope and there is no\n     * `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN` bypass. Both denials are pinned in\n     * `cross-tenant-super-admin-reach.mongo.integration.test.ts`. So no tenant member can grant the\n     * role (they would need the authority they just lost) and no platform administrator can reach\n     * the row at all. GitHub solves this with an Enterprise owner one tier up; this is that tier.\n     *\n     * ## Why it is a distinct verb rather than a flag on UPDATE\n     *\n     * `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration` relaxes the SCOPE check for the variant that carries\n     * it. Putting it on generic UPDATE would open every field of every membership row in every\n     * tenant to a cross-tenant caller. The whole safety argument is that the opened surface is\n     * exactly one field with one direction, so it is authored as its own operation whose custom\n     * implementation ignores the payload for anything but the justification.\n     *\n     * ## Deliberate narrowness\n     *\n     * - **Promotes an EXISTING member** (Microsoft Loop's rule). It cannot mint a membership, so it\n     *   never creates an identity inside a tenant nobody owns.\n     * - **Additive only.** It adds the owner-conferring role; it cannot remove roles, so it can\n     *   never be used to demote and is not a second path through the floor.\n     * - **`justification` is required**, not optional. This is a break-glass action against a tenant\n     *   the operator is not a member of; the audit row is worth nothing without the why. `AC-2(7)`\n     *   asks for privileged assignment to be monitored — the trail IS the control here, since by\n     *   construction no authorization check downstream can second-guess the caller.\n     *\n     * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY — restore administrability of a scope\n     * that has no usable administrator.\n     * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — evidence of privilege grant.\n     */\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.GRANT_OWNERSHIP]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          // Platform tier only. This is the role set the operation-roles gate checks INDEPENDENTLY\n          // of the scope admission below: a caller holding this key at ORGANIZATIONS scope resolves\n          // it against the organization role table, which does not contain it, and is denied there.\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // THE cross-tenant admission. Without it the operation is unreachable by the only\n          // principal it exists for, because a platform administrator is by definition not a member\n          // of the stranded tenant.\n          admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            justification: z.string().min(1).max(1000),\n          }),\n          // No `auditableEvent` declaration: CRITICAL is inside `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so the\n          // event emits on the risk level alone and `auditBelowRiskFloor` would be inert here. The\n          // before/after role sets ride along because `roles` carries `.isAuditEvidence()` — which is\n          // what makes the trail answer the question that matters about this door: WHO was made an\n          // owner of a tenant, by a caller who was not in it.\n        },\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          // The tenant learns that its ownership changed from outside. An operator repairing a\n          // stranded tenant is legitimate; an operator quietly granting themselves an ally inside a\n          // customer's tenant is not, and the difference is only visible to the tenant if it is told.\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.SUSPEND]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can suspend members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            suspensionReason: z.string().min(1).max(500),\n            suspensionEndDate: z.date().optional()\n          }),\n          // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (ACTIVE → SUSPENDED, carrying\n          // `suspensionEndDate` onto the row's `scheduledReactivationAt`). SUSPEND is legal only\n          // from ACTIVE: an INVITED row has not accepted yet — cancel it with REVOKE, which also\n          // revokes the accept token — and an INACTIVE one is already out.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.ACTIVE,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.REACTIVATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can reactivate members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            reason: z.string().max(500).optional()\n          }),\n          // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (SUSPENDED → ACTIVE, clearing any\n          // pending `scheduledReactivationAt`). Legal only from SUSPENDED: reactivating an INVITED\n          // row would skip acceptance and grant a membership nobody agreed to.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.SUSPENDED,\n          // MEDIUM sits below `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so without this the RESTORE half of the\n          // pair would go untrailed while SUSPEND (CRITICAL) is recorded — a trail showing every\n          // suspension and none of the lifts, which reads as a member still suspended a year after\n          // they were reinstated. The risk level answers \"how alarming is the affordance\"; this\n          // answers \"is it evidence an auditor needs\", and for the inverse of a CRITICAL verb it is.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // REVOKE — inviter/admin cancels a still-`INVITED` membership. The exact\n    // custom implementation DELETES the row and atomically revokes its accept\n    // token. The paired PENDING_INVITATION user is retained here and reaped by\n    // deferred hygiene only after it is old and still has no memberships:\n    // point-operation cleanup cannot predicate-lock \"zero memberships\" against\n    // a concurrent invitation insert under Mongo snapshot isolation. `reason`\n    // is captured in the audit payload, not persisted on the deleted row.\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.REVOKE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            reason: z.string().max(500).optional()\n          }),\n          tokenRevocation:\n            ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION,\n          // REVOKE has an exact API custom registration; `resourceOperationLike`\n          // selects DELETE persistence/DTO semantics but does not inherit the\n          // core DELETE custom implementation. Its real return is the delete\n          // envelope, declared explicitly so output validation matches runtime.\n          customResponseDto: DefaultDeleteResponseSchema,\n          // Only a still-pending invite can be revoked — an ACTIVE member is removed\n          // via DELETE, not \"revoked\". Gates the roster action (paired with the preset's\n          // `WHEN_AVAILABLE`, the button shows only on INVITED rows) AND fail-closes the\n          // backend (`services-registry-handler` throws SERVICE_RESOURCE_OPERATION_DISABLED\n          // → 403 if invoked on a non-INVITED row).\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        },\n      ],\n      // Two emails (distinct templates, disambiguated by `customNotificationRef`):\n      //  • the INVITEE (`recipientEmailField: 'userEmail'`) — \"your invitation was revoked\";\n      //  • the ADMIN/initiator (`USER_SELF`) — confirmation of the action.\n      // Both USER_SELF+EMAIL, so each MUST carry a unique `customNotificationRef`.\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          customNotificationRef: 'invitee',\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          customNotificationRef: 'admin',\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // RESEND — re-mint the accept token (revoking any prior one for this membership)\n    // and re-send the invite email with the fresh accept link. Only valid while the\n    // membership is `INVITED`.\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.RESEND]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          tokenGeneration: {\n            tokenType: CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n            consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE,\n            expiresIn: { value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS },\n            relatedIdField: '_id',\n            revokeExistingForSameRelated: true,\n            emailLinkPath: '/invitation',\n            condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n          },\n          // Resend is meaningful only while the invite is pending. Same dual enforcement\n          // as REVOKE: hides the roster action on non-INVITED rows and 403s server-side.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  },\n});\n"]}