@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.0.1 → 1.1.0

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-profile.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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When absent, the app-level\n   * brand is the intended default — resolve it from config `brandAssets` via\n   * `resolveBrandAsset` / `AppConfigurationService.resolveBrandLogoUrl`.\n   *\n   * DEFAULT-SEAM AUDIT (confirmed): this stored field has NO typed backend or\n   * frontend consumer beyond the resource pipeline — a symbol-level reference\n   * scan of `OrganizationBranding(Schema)` returns only this definition file.\n   * The one place that surfaces an organization's branding logo to a DTO is the\n   * auth login response (`authentication-orchestrator` → `organizationBranding`\n   * in `authentication.shared.dto.schemas.ts`), and it ALREADY applies the\n   * app-level default: at identification time only a domain was matched (the org\n   * profile is not loaded), so it resolves the app brand logo directly\n   * (`resolveBrandLogoUrl` LOCKUP → SYMBOL) rather than reading this field. All\n   * other org-branding surfacing goes through the generic resource display/edit\n   * pipeline, so the default is applied at the display site rather than forced\n   * onto this stored value — the field stays a pure per-org override. Because\n   * the only surfacing seam is already handled, no additional backend fallback\n   * seam is introduced here (invented seams are avoided by design).\n   *\n   * Kept `z.url()` (absolute) because this is direct user input, unlike the\n   * backend-populated `logoUrl` output fields (auth-response / email context)\n   * that accept app-relative brand-asset paths.\n   */\n  logo: z.url().optional(),\n  favicon: z.url().optional(),\n  primaryColor: ZodTypeForColors.optional(),\n  secondaryColor: ZodTypeForColors.optional(),\n  customDomain: z.string().min(1).max(100).optional(),\n});\nexport type OrganizationBranding = z.infer<typeof OrganizationBrandingSchema>;\n\nexport const OrganizationProfileSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n  organizationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  \n  // Company information\n  displayName: z.string().max(100).optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  domain: z.string().min(1).max(100).optional().isDBIndexed(),\n  phone: z.string().max(20).optional(),\n  website: z.url().optional(),\n  description: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n  \n  // Classification\n  industry: z.enum(OrganizationIndustry).optional().isDBIndexed(),\n  size: z.enum(OrganizationSize).optional().isDBIndexed(),\n  founded: z.date().optional(),\n  \n  // Location\n  address: AddressSchema.optional(),\n  timezone: z.string().default(CommonTimezone.UTC).isDBIndexed(),\n  \n  // Branding\n  // `.default(...)` (interior fully optional/defaulted) so the row is eager-seedable\n  // via onParentCreate — root-cause fix, consistent with sibling defaulted objects.\n  branding: OrganizationBrandingSchema.default(OrganizationBrandingSchema.parse({})),\n  \n  // Social links\n  socialLinks: z.object({\n    linkedin: z.url().optional(),\n    twitter: z.url().optional(),\n    facebook: z.url().optional(),\n    github: z.url().optional()\n  }).optional(),\n  \n  // Audit fields\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()\n});\nexport type OrganizationProfile = z.infer<typeof OrganizationProfileSchema>; "]}

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-unit-inheritance.shared.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/**
+ * Downward inheritance of a unit-scoped grant across the organization tree (plan decision D-C2).
+ *
+ * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT — expands a unit grant to exactly the subtree its
+ * `inheritanceType` declares, and to nothing else.
+ *
+ * ## What this expresses
+ *
+ * A role held at unit U reaches U's DESCENDANTS when U declares
+ * {@link OrganizationUnit_PermissionInheritanceType.INHERIT_DOWN}, and reaches U alone when it
+ * declares `NO_INHERITANCE`. There is no third direction: upward propagation was removed from the
+ * vocabulary (D-C2) because a role held at a leaf conferring authority over its ancestors is
+ * privilege escalation along the org chart.
+ *
+ * ## Prefix, never recursion
+ *
+ * The expansion is a PREFIX TEST over the materialized `path`, not a tree walk. That is the whole
+ * reason `path` is materialized: `descendants(U)` is `row.path.startsWith(subtreePrefix(U))`, an O(1)
+ * test per candidate with no per-level query. A recursive walk would reintroduce the N+1 the
+ * materialized path exists to remove, and would do it on the authorization hot path.
+ *
+ * ## Why this is pure, and where the I/O lives
+ *
+ * Reading the unit rows is the caller's job (the authorization gate, which holds the repositories).
+ * Keeping the rule itself pure means the traversal can be pinned exhaustively without a database, and
+ * means one function answers "which units does this grant actually reach" for every caller that ever
+ * needs it — the row filter, the write guard, and the audit record all consume the same answer.
+ */
+import { OrganizationUnit_PermissionInheritanceType } from './organization-units.shared.schemas';
+/**
+ * The unit fields inheritance depends on, read structurally so callers can pass whatever row shape
+ * they already hold without projecting it first.
+ *
+ * `path` and `inheritanceType` are optional because a row can reach this function without them — a
+ * projection that dropped them, or a row written before the field existed. Both cases resolve to the
+ * conservative answer; see {@link resolveOrganizationUnitInheritsDownward}.
+ */
+export type OrganizationUnitInheritanceNode = {
+    readonly _id: string;
+    readonly path?: string | null;
+    readonly inheritanceType?: OrganizationUnit_PermissionInheritanceType | null;
+};
+/**
+ * The result of expanding a grant: what it reaches, and which part of that came from inheritance.
+ *
+ * The split is not cosmetic. A grant at a ROOT unit with downward inheritance reaches the entire
+ * organization chart, which is functionally organization-wide access assembled from one narrow grant
+ * (plan decision D-C4, watch item 4). That must be LEGIBLE in the access record rather than looking
+ * like a narrow grant, so the two sets are reported separately and the audit surface keeps both.
+ */
+export type OrganizationUnitGrantExpansion = {
+    /** Every unit the grant reaches — the set the row predicate and the write guard use. */
+    readonly effectiveOrganizationUnitIds: string[];
+    /** The units reached ONLY through downward inheritance. Empty when nothing inherited. */
+    readonly inheritedOrganizationUnitIds: string[];
+};
+/**
+ * Does a role held at this unit propagate to its descendants?
+ *
+ * ⚠️ An ABSENT value resolves to `false`, which deliberately DIFFERS from the schema's write-time
+ * default of `INHERIT_DOWN`. A row that reaches an authorization decision without the field has
+ * bypassed the schema that would have supplied that default, and an authorization primitive must not
+ * widen a grant on data it cannot vouch for. The divergence is one-directional and fail-closed: the
+ * worst case is a grant that reaches fewer units than intended, never more.
+ */
+export declare function resolveOrganizationUnitInheritsDownward(unit: OrganizationUnitInheritanceNode): boolean;
+/**
+ * Expand directly-held unit grants across the tree.
+ *
+ * `grantedUnits` are the units whose role actually satisfied the operation — NOT every unit the
+ * principal belongs to. `organizationUnits` is the candidate set to test against; the caller scopes it
+ * (in practice, to the units of the organization the grants belong to), and this function never widens
+ * beyond what it is given.
+ *
+ * Units are matched by PREFIX, so a grant with downward inheritance reaches the whole subtree at any
+ * depth in one pass — a grandchild is found by the same test as a child, with no recursion.
+ *
+ * ## Status is deliberately NOT filtered
+ *
+ * An ARCHIVED or SUSPENDED descendant stays inside the grant. Archiving a branch records that it is no
+ * longer operationally active; it is not a revocation of access to the records that branch owns. Making
+ * it one would mean archiving silently removes rows from their manager's view — a data-visibility
+ * change disguised as a lifecycle change, and one that surfaces as missing data rather than as a
+ * refusal. If unit status should ever gate access, it belongs in an explicit, separately-audited rule.
+ */
+export declare function expandOrganizationUnitGrantThroughInheritance(grantedUnits: readonly OrganizationUnitInheritanceNode[], organizationUnits: readonly OrganizationUnitInheritanceNode[]): OrganizationUnitGrantExpansion;
+/**
+ * Does any of these grants propagate downward?
+ *
+ * The caller's cheap pre-check: when nothing inherits, the candidate set never has to be loaded at
+ * all, so a `NO_INHERITANCE` organization pays one lookup instead of two.
+ */
+export declare function anyOrganizationUnitGrantInheritsDownward(grantedUnits: readonly OrganizationUnitInheritanceNode[]): boolean;
+//# sourceMappingURL=organization-unit-inheritance.shared.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-unit-inheritance.shared.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-unit-inheritance.shared.js

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/**
+ * Downward inheritance of a unit-scoped grant across the organization tree (plan decision D-C2).
+ *
+ * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.SCOPE_CONFINEMENT — expands a unit grant to exactly the subtree its
+ * `inheritanceType` declares, and to nothing else.
+ *
+ * ## What this expresses
+ *
+ * A role held at unit U reaches U's DESCENDANTS when U declares
+ * {@link OrganizationUnit_PermissionInheritanceType.INHERIT_DOWN}, and reaches U alone when it
+ * declares `NO_INHERITANCE`. There is no third direction: upward propagation was removed from the
+ * vocabulary (D-C2) because a role held at a leaf conferring authority over its ancestors is
+ * privilege escalation along the org chart.
+ *
+ * ## Prefix, never recursion
+ *
+ * The expansion is a PREFIX TEST over the materialized `path`, not a tree walk. That is the whole
+ * reason `path` is materialized: `descendants(U)` is `row.path.startsWith(subtreePrefix(U))`, an O(1)
+ * test per candidate with no per-level query. A recursive walk would reintroduce the N+1 the
+ * materialized path exists to remove, and would do it on the authorization hot path.
+ *
+ * ## Why this is pure, and where the I/O lives
+ *
+ * Reading the unit rows is the caller's job (the authorization gate, which holds the repositories).
+ * Keeping the rule itself pure means the traversal can be pinned exhaustively without a database, and
+ * means one function answers "which units does this grant actually reach" for every caller that ever
+ * needs it — the row filter, the write guard, and the audit record all consume the same answer.
+ */
+import { OrganizationUnit_PermissionInheritanceType } from './organization-units.shared.schemas.js';
+import { isOrganizationUnitInSubtree } from './organization-units.shared.path.js';
+/**
+ * Does a role held at this unit propagate to its descendants?
+ *
+ * ⚠️ An ABSENT value resolves to `false`, which deliberately DIFFERS from the schema's write-time
+ * default of `INHERIT_DOWN`. A row that reaches an authorization decision without the field has
+ * bypassed the schema that would have supplied that default, and an authorization primitive must not
+ * widen a grant on data it cannot vouch for. The divergence is one-directional and fail-closed: the
+ * worst case is a grant that reaches fewer units than intended, never more.
+ */
+export function resolveOrganizationUnitInheritsDownward(unit) {
+    return unit.inheritanceType === OrganizationUnit_PermissionInheritanceType.INHERIT_DOWN;
+}
+/**
+ * Expand directly-held unit grants across the tree.
+ *
+ * `grantedUnits` are the units whose role actually satisfied the operation — NOT every unit the
+ * principal belongs to. `organizationUnits` is the candidate set to test against; the caller scopes it
+ * (in practice, to the units of the organization the grants belong to), and this function never widens
+ * beyond what it is given.
+ *
+ * Units are matched by PREFIX, so a grant with downward inheritance reaches the whole subtree at any
+ * depth in one pass — a grandchild is found by the same test as a child, with no recursion.
+ *
+ * ## Status is deliberately NOT filtered
+ *
+ * An ARCHIVED or SUSPENDED descendant stays inside the grant. Archiving a branch records that it is no
+ * longer operationally active; it is not a revocation of access to the records that branch owns. Making
+ * it one would mean archiving silently removes rows from their manager's view — a data-visibility
+ * change disguised as a lifecycle change, and one that surfaces as missing data rather than as a
+ * refusal. If unit status should ever gate access, it belongs in an explicit, separately-audited rule.
+ */
+export function expandOrganizationUnitGrantThroughInheritance(grantedUnits, organizationUnits) {
+    const effectiveUnitIds = new Set();
+    const inheritedUnitIds = new Set();
+    for (const grantedUnit of grantedUnits) {
+        if (grantedUnit._id)
+            effectiveUnitIds.add(grantedUnit._id);
+    }
+    for (const grantedUnit of grantedUnits) {
+        if (!grantedUnit._id || !resolveOrganizationUnitInheritsDownward(grantedUnit))
+            continue;
+        const subtreeRoot = { _id: grantedUnit._id, path: grantedUnit.path ?? '' };
+        for (const candidateUnit of organizationUnits) {
+            if (!candidateUnit._id || effectiveUnitIds.has(candidateUnit._id))
+                continue;
+            if (isOrganizationUnitInSubtree({ path: candidateUnit.path ?? '' }, subtreeRoot)) {
+                effectiveUnitIds.add(candidateUnit._id);
+                inheritedUnitIds.add(candidateUnit._id);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        effectiveOrganizationUnitIds: [...effectiveUnitIds],
+        inheritedOrganizationUnitIds: [...inheritedUnitIds],
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Does any of these grants propagate downward?
+ *
+ * The caller's cheap pre-check: when nothing inherits, the candidate set never has to be loaded at
+ * all, so a `NO_INHERITANCE` organization pays one lookup instead of two.
+ */
+export function anyOrganizationUnitGrantInheritsDownward(grantedUnits) {
+    return grantedUnits.some(resolveOrganizationUnitInheritsDownward);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=organization-unit-inheritance.shared.js.map

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-unit-inheritance.shared.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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There is no third direction: upward propagation was removed from the\n * vocabulary (D-C2) because a role held at a leaf conferring authority over its ancestors is\n * privilege escalation along the org chart.\n *\n * ## Prefix, never recursion\n *\n * The expansion is a PREFIX TEST over the materialized `path`, not a tree walk. That is the whole\n * reason `path` is materialized: `descendants(U)` is `row.path.startsWith(subtreePrefix(U))`, an O(1)\n * test per candidate with no per-level query. A recursive walk would reintroduce the N+1 the\n * materialized path exists to remove, and would do it on the authorization hot path.\n *\n * ## Why this is pure, and where the I/O lives\n *\n * Reading the unit rows is the caller's job (the authorization gate, which holds the repositories).\n * Keeping the rule itself pure means the traversal can be pinned exhaustively without a database, and\n * means one function answers \"which units does this grant actually reach\" for every caller that ever\n * needs it — the row filter, the write guard, and the audit record all consume the same answer.\n */\n\nimport { OrganizationUnit_PermissionInheritanceType } from './organization-units.shared.schemas';\nimport { isOrganizationUnitInSubtree } from './organization-units.shared.path';\n\n/**\n * The unit fields inheritance depends on, read structurally so callers can pass whatever row shape\n * they already hold without projecting it first.\n *\n * `path` and `inheritanceType` are optional because a row can reach this function without them — a\n * projection that dropped them, or a row written before the field existed. Both cases resolve to the\n * conservative answer; see {@link resolveOrganizationUnitInheritsDownward}.\n */\nexport type OrganizationUnitInheritanceNode = {\n  readonly _id: string;\n  readonly path?: string | null;\n  readonly inheritanceType?: OrganizationUnit_PermissionInheritanceType | null;\n};\n\n/**\n * The result of expanding a grant: what it reaches, and which part of that came from inheritance.\n *\n * The split is not cosmetic. A grant at a ROOT unit with downward inheritance reaches the entire\n * organization chart, which is functionally organization-wide access assembled from one narrow grant\n * (plan decision D-C4, watch item 4). That must be LEGIBLE in the access record rather than looking\n * like a narrow grant, so the two sets are reported separately and the audit surface keeps both.\n */\nexport type OrganizationUnitGrantExpansion = {\n  /** Every unit the grant reaches — the set the row predicate and the write guard use. */\n  readonly effectiveOrganizationUnitIds: string[];\n  /** The units reached ONLY through downward inheritance. Empty when nothing inherited. */\n  readonly inheritedOrganizationUnitIds: string[];\n};\n\n/**\n * Does a role held at this unit propagate to its descendants?\n *\n * ⚠️ An ABSENT value resolves to `false`, which deliberately DIFFERS from the schema's write-time\n * default of `INHERIT_DOWN`. A row that reaches an authorization decision without the field has\n * bypassed the schema that would have supplied that default, and an authorization primitive must not\n * widen a grant on data it cannot vouch for. The divergence is one-directional and fail-closed: the\n * worst case is a grant that reaches fewer units than intended, never more.\n */\nexport function resolveOrganizationUnitInheritsDownward(unit: OrganizationUnitInheritanceNode): boolean {\n  return unit.inheritanceType === OrganizationUnit_PermissionInheritanceType.INHERIT_DOWN;\n}\n\n/**\n * Expand directly-held unit grants across the tree.\n *\n * `grantedUnits` are the units whose role actually satisfied the operation — NOT every unit the\n * principal belongs to. `organizationUnits` is the candidate set to test against; the caller scopes it\n * (in practice, to the units of the organization the grants belong to), and this function never widens\n * beyond what it is given.\n *\n * Units are matched by PREFIX, so a grant with downward inheritance reaches the whole subtree at any\n * depth in one pass — a grandchild is found by the same test as a child, with no recursion.\n *\n * ## Status is deliberately NOT filtered\n *\n * An ARCHIVED or SUSPENDED descendant stays inside the grant. Archiving a branch records that it is no\n * longer operationally active; it is not a revocation of access to the records that branch owns. Making\n * it one would mean archiving silently removes rows from their manager's view — a data-visibility\n * change disguised as a lifecycle change, and one that surfaces as missing data rather than as a\n * refusal. If unit status should ever gate access, it belongs in an explicit, separately-audited rule.\n */\nexport function expandOrganizationUnitGrantThroughInheritance(\n  grantedUnits: readonly OrganizationUnitInheritanceNode[],\n  organizationUnits: readonly OrganizationUnitInheritanceNode[],\n): OrganizationUnitGrantExpansion {\n  const effectiveUnitIds = new Set<string>();\n  const inheritedUnitIds = new Set<string>();\n\n  for (const grantedUnit of grantedUnits) {\n    if (grantedUnit._id) effectiveUnitIds.add(grantedUnit._id);\n  }\n\n  for (const grantedUnit of grantedUnits) {\n    if (!grantedUnit._id || !resolveOrganizationUnitInheritsDownward(grantedUnit)) continue;\n\n    const subtreeRoot = { _id: grantedUnit._id, path: grantedUnit.path ?? '' };\n    for (const candidateUnit of organizationUnits) {\n      if (!candidateUnit._id || effectiveUnitIds.has(candidateUnit._id)) continue;\n      if (isOrganizationUnitInSubtree({ path: candidateUnit.path ?? '' }, subtreeRoot)) {\n        effectiveUnitIds.add(candidateUnit._id);\n        inheritedUnitIds.add(candidateUnit._id);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    effectiveOrganizationUnitIds: [...effectiveUnitIds],\n    inheritedOrganizationUnitIds: [...inheritedUnitIds],\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Does any of these grants propagate downward?\n *\n * The caller's cheap pre-check: when nothing inherits, the candidate set never has to be loaded at\n * all, so a `NO_INHERITANCE` organization pays one lookup instead of two.\n */\nexport function anyOrganizationUnitGrantInheritsDownward(\n  grantedUnits: readonly OrganizationUnitInheritanceNode[],\n): boolean {\n  return grantedUnits.some(resolveOrganizationUnitInheritsDownward);\n}\n"]}

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-unit-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/**
+ * Organization Unit Member Shared Resource Configuration
+ *
+ * The junction resource that replaced `OrganizationMember.organizationUnitsMembership` (plan
+ * decision D-B5). See {@link OrganizationUnitMemberSchema} for why the embedded array could not
+ * carry these semantics.
+ */
+import { z } from 'zod';
+import { CoreResourceOperation } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';
+import { ResourceRelationship } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas';
+import { CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';
+type OrganizationUnitMemberCoreOperations = CoreResourceOperation.READ | CoreResourceOperation.LIST | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE | CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE;
+/**
+ * Organization Unit Member Resource Configuration Factory.
+ *
+ * Read access is ORG_MEMBER (the org chart and who sits where is ordinary directory information
+ * inside a tenant); every WRITE is ORG_ADMIN, because a unit assignment is a role grant and becomes
+ * live authority once WS-C wires units into authorization.
+ */
+export declare const organizationUnitMemberResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory: (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => import("..").ResourceConfiguration<Record<string, never>, OrganizationUnitMemberCoreOperations, import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodObject<{
+    _id: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
+    organizationId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>;
+    organizationUnitId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>;
+    organizationMemberId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>;
+    role: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodEnum<typeof CORE_ORG_ROLES>, z.ZodString]>>>;
+    createdAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>>;
+    updatedAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>>;
+}, z.core.$strip>>>;
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=organization-unit-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-unit-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-unit-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.js

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/**
+ * Organization Unit Member Shared Resource Configuration
+ *
+ * The junction resource that replaced `OrganizationMember.organizationUnitsMembership` (plan
+ * decision D-B5). See {@link OrganizationUnitMemberSchema} for why the embedded array could not
+ * carry these semantics.
+ */
+import { z } from 'zod';
+import { OrganizationUnitMemberSchema } from './organization-unit-members.shared.schemas.js';
+import { CoreResourceOperation } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions.js';
+import { ResourceOperationRiskLevel } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas.js';
+import { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions.js';
+import { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas.js';
+import { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.factory.js';
+import { CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas.js';
+const ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBER_FILTER_FIELDS = {
+    organizationUnitId: z.string(),
+    organizationMemberId: z.string(),
+    role: z.string(),
+};
+/**
+ * Organization Unit Member Resource Configuration Factory.
+ *
+ * Read access is ORG_MEMBER (the org chart and who sits where is ordinary directory information
+ * inside a tenant); every WRITE is ORG_ADMIN, because a unit assignment is a role grant and becomes
+ * live authority once WS-C wires units into authorization.
+ */
+export const organizationUnitMemberResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization({
+    mainSchema: OrganizationUnitMemberSchema,
+    resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBERS,
+    resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBERS],
+    resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,
+    isSystemResource: true,
+    coreOperations: [
+        CoreResourceOperation.READ,
+        CoreResourceOperation.LIST,
+        CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,
+        CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
+        CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,
+    ],
+    operationsConfiguration: {
+        [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    // A unit assignment is a role grant; the role-ceiling gate additionally bounds WHICH role
+                    // an admin may grant here.
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
+                },
+            ],
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
+                },
+            ],
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
+                    filterFields: ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBER_FILTER_FIELDS,
+                },
+            ],
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
+                },
+            ],
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
+                },
+            ],
+        },
+    },
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=organization-unit-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-unit-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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See {@link OrganizationUnitMemberSchema} for why the embedded array could not\n * carry these semantics.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { OrganizationUnitMemberSchema } from './organization-unit-members.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourceRelationship } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\n\nimport { CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\n\nconst ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBER_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  organizationUnitId: z.string(),\n  organizationMemberId: z.string(),\n  role: z.string(),\n};\n\ntype OrganizationUnitMemberCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE;\n\n/**\n * Organization Unit Member Resource Configuration Factory.\n *\n * Read access is ORG_MEMBER (the org chart and who sits where is ordinary directory information\n * inside a tenant); every WRITE is ORG_ADMIN, because a unit assignment is a role grant and becomes\n * live authority once WS-C wires units into authorization.\n */\nexport const organizationUnitMemberResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  Record<string, never>,\n  OrganizationUnitMemberCoreOperations,\n  typeof OrganizationUnitMemberSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OrganizationUnitMemberSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBERS,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBERS],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true,\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n  ],\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          // A unit assignment is a role grant; the role-ceiling gate additionally bounds WHICH role\n          // an admin may grant here.\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          filterFields: ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBER_FILTER_FIELDS,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n  },\n});\n"]}

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-unit-members.shared.schemas.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/**
+ * Organization Unit Member Shared Schemas
+ *
+ * The junction between an organization MEMBERSHIP and an organization UNIT: "this member holds this
+ * role inside this unit of the org chart".
+ *
+ * ## Why this is a resource and not an embedded array (plan decision D-B5)
+ *
+ * This started life as `OrganizationMember.organizationUnitsMembership` — an embedded
+ * `[{ organizationUnitId, role }]` array. That shape could not carry the semantics it claimed:
+ *
+ *  - **It was not portably queryable.** A dot-path filter into an array-valued field works on Mongo
+ *    and resolves to `NULL` on PostgreSQL (matching nothing), there is no first-class containment
+ *    operator, and the application-side fallback is stripped by the LIST summary projection. BOTH
+ *    available routes fail **OPEN**. Anything that had to ask "who is assigned to this unit?" —
+ *    the unit DELETE dependents guard, and any future authorization read — would have silently
+ *    passed on one adapter.
+ *  - **It could not be a relationship.** With no registered edge there was no cascade, so unit
+ *    assignments outlived both the unit and the membership that justified them.
+ *  - **It admitted duplicates.** An array has no uniqueness; a member could carry two different
+ *    roles for the same unit with no defined winner.
+ *
+ * As a first-class junction all three close: the assignment is queryable on every adapter, the
+ * `ORGANIZATION_UNITS → ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBERS` edge lets the unit DELETE guard finally cover
+ * assigned members, and {@link OrganizationUnitMemberSchema}'s business key makes "one role per
+ * member per unit" a persisted invariant instead of a convention.
+ *
+ * ## An authorization axis — live since WS-C phase 2
+ *
+ * ⚠️ `role` here IS read by the authorization path. `appendUnitScopedRoles` emits one
+ * `initiatorRoles` entry per assignment, carrying `organizationUnitId` as a NARROWING discriminator
+ * beside the organization-wide entry; every consumer that unions `initiatorRoles` partitions on that
+ * field first (`isOrganizationWideRoleInfo`). So a unit role is live authority — bounded to one unit,
+ * never tenant-wide. Two consequences for anything touching this field:
+ *
+ *  - The role-ceiling gate governs who may ASSIGN it (both write paths carry it explicitly, see
+ *    {@link OrganizationUnitMemberSchema.shape.role}).
+ *  - Every change to it is an access-control decision and emits
+ *    `ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED`, the narrowed twin of the organization-wide
+ *    `ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED`.
+ *
+ * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE · WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — least-privilege and evidence on unit-scoped
+ * role assignment.
+ */
+import { z } from 'zod';
+export declare const OrganizationUnitMemberSchema: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodObject<{
+    _id: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
+    organizationId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>;
+    organizationUnitId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>;
+    organizationMemberId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>;
+    role: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodEnum<typeof import("..").CORE_ORG_ROLES>, z.ZodString]>>>;
+    createdAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>>;
+    updatedAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>>;
+}, z.core.$strip>>;
+export type OrganizationUnitMember = z.infer<typeof OrganizationUnitMemberSchema>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=organization-unit-members.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-unit-members.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-unit-members.shared.schemas.js

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/**
+ * Organization Unit Member Shared Schemas
+ *
+ * The junction between an organization MEMBERSHIP and an organization UNIT: "this member holds this
+ * role inside this unit of the org chart".
+ *
+ * ## Why this is a resource and not an embedded array (plan decision D-B5)
+ *
+ * This started life as `OrganizationMember.organizationUnitsMembership` — an embedded
+ * `[{ organizationUnitId, role }]` array. That shape could not carry the semantics it claimed:
+ *
+ *  - **It was not portably queryable.** A dot-path filter into an array-valued field works on Mongo
+ *    and resolves to `NULL` on PostgreSQL (matching nothing), there is no first-class containment
+ *    operator, and the application-side fallback is stripped by the LIST summary projection. BOTH
+ *    available routes fail **OPEN**. Anything that had to ask "who is assigned to this unit?" —
+ *    the unit DELETE dependents guard, and any future authorization read — would have silently
+ *    passed on one adapter.
+ *  - **It could not be a relationship.** With no registered edge there was no cascade, so unit
+ *    assignments outlived both the unit and the membership that justified them.
+ *  - **It admitted duplicates.** An array has no uniqueness; a member could carry two different
+ *    roles for the same unit with no defined winner.
+ *
+ * As a first-class junction all three close: the assignment is queryable on every adapter, the
+ * `ORGANIZATION_UNITS → ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBERS` edge lets the unit DELETE guard finally cover
+ * assigned members, and {@link OrganizationUnitMemberSchema}'s business key makes "one role per
+ * member per unit" a persisted invariant instead of a convention.
+ *
+ * ## An authorization axis — live since WS-C phase 2
+ *
+ * ⚠️ `role` here IS read by the authorization path. `appendUnitScopedRoles` emits one
+ * `initiatorRoles` entry per assignment, carrying `organizationUnitId` as a NARROWING discriminator
+ * beside the organization-wide entry; every consumer that unions `initiatorRoles` partitions on that
+ * field first (`isOrganizationWideRoleInfo`). So a unit role is live authority — bounded to one unit,
+ * never tenant-wide. Two consequences for anything touching this field:
+ *
+ *  - The role-ceiling gate governs who may ASSIGN it (both write paths carry it explicitly, see
+ *    {@link OrganizationUnitMemberSchema.shape.role}).
+ *  - Every change to it is an access-control decision and emits
+ *    `ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED`, the narrowed twin of the organization-wide
+ *    `ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED`.
+ *
+ * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE · WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — least-privilege and evidence on unit-scoped
+ * role assignment.
+ */
+import { z } from 'zod';
+import { OrgRolesSchema } from '../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas.js';
+export const OrganizationUnitMemberSchema = z.object({
+    _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),
+    /**
+     * Tenant anchor. Denormalized from the parent membership so tenant scoping and the contextual
+     * filter resolve on this row alone — an authorization-adjacent read must never depend on a join
+     * to establish which tenant a row belongs to.
+     */
+    organizationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    /** The unit of the org chart this assignment targets. */
+    organizationUnitId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    /**
+     * The organization MEMBERSHIP being assigned — deliberately the membership, not the user.
+     *
+     * A unit assignment presupposes membership of the owning organization, so the membership row is
+     * the true semantic parent: it carries the tenant binding and its deletion is exactly when the
+     * assignment stops meaning anything (hence the cascade on that edge). Pointing at `userId`
+     * instead would model a user as assignable to a unit of an organization they may not belong to.
+     *
+     * A denormalized `userId` copy was considered for a one-hop "unit roles for this user" read and
+     * REJECTED: the execution-context builder already holds the member rows (and therefore their
+     * `_id`s) at the point it would need this, so the copy would buy nothing and add a field that can
+     * drift.
+     */
+    organizationMemberId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    /**
+     * The role this member holds WITHIN this unit.
+     *
+     * The only mutable field on the row, and deliberately so: re-grading an assignment through UPDATE
+     * keeps the row's identity (and its `createdAt` provenance) intact, where a delete-plus-create
+     * would silently reset both. The two coordinates that IDENTIFY the assignment
+     * (`organizationMemberId`, `organizationUnitId`) are `.excludeFromUpdate()`, so an edit can change
+     * what the assignment GRANTS but never what it is ABOUT.
+     *
+     * Both write paths — CREATE and UPDATE — are governed by the role-ceiling gate
+     * (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`): a principal cannot grant a unit role it does not
+     * itself hold. Because a custom implementation resolves by an exact operation-path key, each path
+     * carries the gate explicitly; neither inherits it from the other.
+     */
+    role: OrgRolesSchema.isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),
+    createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+}).businessKeySet([
+    'organizationMemberId',
+    'organizationUnitId',
+]);
+//# sourceMappingURL=organization-unit-members.shared.schemas.js.map

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-unit-members.shared.schemas.js.map

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That shape could not carry the semantics it claimed:\n *\n *  - **It was not portably queryable.** A dot-path filter into an array-valued field works on Mongo\n *    and resolves to `NULL` on PostgreSQL (matching nothing), there is no first-class containment\n *    operator, and the application-side fallback is stripped by the LIST summary projection. BOTH\n *    available routes fail **OPEN**. Anything that had to ask \"who is assigned to this unit?\" —\n *    the unit DELETE dependents guard, and any future authorization read — would have silently\n *    passed on one adapter.\n *  - **It could not be a relationship.** With no registered edge there was no cascade, so unit\n *    assignments outlived both the unit and the membership that justified them.\n *  - **It admitted duplicates.** An array has no uniqueness; a member could carry two different\n *    roles for the same unit with no defined winner.\n *\n * As a first-class junction all three close: the assignment is queryable on every adapter, the\n * `ORGANIZATION_UNITS → ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBERS` edge lets the unit DELETE guard finally cover\n * assigned members, and {@link OrganizationUnitMemberSchema}'s business key makes \"one role per\n * member per unit\" a persisted invariant instead of a convention.\n *\n * ## An authorization axis — live since WS-C phase 2\n *\n * ⚠️ `role` here IS read by the authorization path. `appendUnitScopedRoles` emits one\n * `initiatorRoles` entry per assignment, carrying `organizationUnitId` as a NARROWING discriminator\n * beside the organization-wide entry; every consumer that unions `initiatorRoles` partitions on that\n * field first (`isOrganizationWideRoleInfo`). So a unit role is live authority — bounded to one unit,\n * never tenant-wide. Two consequences for anything touching this field:\n *\n *  - The role-ceiling gate governs who may ASSIGN it (both write paths carry it explicitly, see\n *    {@link OrganizationUnitMemberSchema.shape.role}).\n *  - Every change to it is an access-control decision and emits\n *    `ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED`, the narrowed twin of the organization-wide\n *    `ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED`.\n *\n * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE · WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — least-privilege and evidence on unit-scoped\n * role assignment.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\nimport { OrgRolesSchema } from '../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\n\nexport const OrganizationUnitMemberSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n  /**\n   * Tenant anchor. Denormalized from the parent membership so tenant scoping and the contextual\n   * filter resolve on this row alone — an authorization-adjacent read must never depend on a join\n   * to establish which tenant a row belongs to.\n   */\n  organizationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  /** The unit of the org chart this assignment targets. */\n  organizationUnitId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  /**\n   * The organization MEMBERSHIP being assigned — deliberately the membership, not the user.\n   *\n   * A unit assignment presupposes membership of the owning organization, so the membership row is\n   * the true semantic parent: it carries the tenant binding and its deletion is exactly when the\n   * assignment stops meaning anything (hence the cascade on that edge). Pointing at `userId`\n   * instead would model a user as assignable to a unit of an organization they may not belong to.\n   *\n   * A denormalized `userId` copy was considered for a one-hop \"unit roles for this user\" read and\n   * REJECTED: the execution-context builder already holds the member rows (and therefore their\n   * `_id`s) at the point it would need this, so the copy would buy nothing and add a field that can\n   * drift.\n   */\n  organizationMemberId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  /**\n   * The role this member holds WITHIN this unit.\n   *\n   * The only mutable field on the row, and deliberately so: re-grading an assignment through UPDATE\n   * keeps the row's identity (and its `createdAt` provenance) intact, where a delete-plus-create\n   * would silently reset both. The two coordinates that IDENTIFY the assignment\n   * (`organizationMemberId`, `organizationUnitId`) are `.excludeFromUpdate()`, so an edit can change\n   * what the assignment GRANTS but never what it is ABOUT.\n   *\n   * Both write paths — CREATE and UPDATE — are governed by the role-ceiling gate\n   * (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`): a principal cannot grant a unit role it does not\n   * itself hold. Because a custom implementation resolves by an exact operation-path key, each path\n   * carries the gate explicitly; neither inherits it from the other.\n   */\n  role: OrgRolesSchema.isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n}).businessKeySet([\n  'organizationMemberId',\n  'organizationUnitId',\n]);\n\nexport type OrganizationUnitMember = z.infer<typeof OrganizationUnitMemberSchema>;\n"]}