@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.0.1 → 1.1.0

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

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package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients.shared.schemas.js

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+/**
+ * OAuth Client Shared Schemas
+ *
+ * Frontend/backend shared schemas + DTOs for the registered OAuth-client
+ * credential resource (`organizationOAuthClients`, `applicationOAuthClients`).
+ * Backend-specific logic (secret minting/hashing, mint pipeline) stays in
+ * saas-backend-lib.
+ *
+ * This resource is a FAITHFUL MIRROR of the api-keys resource
+ * (`api-keys.shared.schemas.ts`): the same long-lived secret + rotation-grace
+ * shape, the same server-managed strip-seam contract, the same org|app scope
+ * split. It exists as its OWN resource (not a variant of api-keys) because the
+ * request-auth choke point routes a presented secret to a DISTINCT principal
+ * by the plaintext prefix (`oc_org_`/`oc_app_` vs the api-key `sk_org_`/`sk_app_`)
+ * — an OAuth client and an api-key both authenticate the SAME machine principal
+ * (`ORGANIZATION_MACHINE` / `APPLICATION_MACHINE`); they are distinct credential types, an api-key acts
+ * as an api-key principal.
+ *
+ * OIDC authorization code, interactive consent, persistent consent grants,
+ * exact redirect allowlists and public/confidential client classification are
+ * implemented. The resource remains the registered-client authority; issued
+ * codes, tokens and user consent records have their own runtime/storage owners.
+ */
+import { z } from 'zod';
+import { RolesSchema } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas.js';
+import { ApiKeyScope } from '../api-keys/api-keys.shared.schemas.js';
+// ===============================
+// OAUTH CLIENT ENUMS
+// ===============================
+/**
+ * Lifecycle status of a registered OAuth client. Mirrors `ApiKeyStatus`: an
+ * INACTIVE or EXPIRED client cannot mint tokens at the request-auth choke point.
+ */
+export var OAuthClientStatus;
+(function (OAuthClientStatus) {
+    OAuthClientStatus["ACTIVE"] = "active";
+    OAuthClientStatus["INACTIVE"] = "inactive";
+    OAuthClientStatus["EXPIRED"] = "expired";
+})(OAuthClientStatus || (OAuthClientStatus = {}));
+/**
+ * OAuth 2.0 grant types a registered client may be authorized to use. The trunk
+ * resource ships CLIENT_CREDENTIALS (the machine-to-machine front); the
+ * AUTHORIZATION_CODE / REFRESH_TOKEN arms are declared here so the OIDC branch can
+ * enable them per-client via `allowedGrants` without a schema reshape.
+ */
+/**
+ * How a client got registered — a TRUST classification, not a bookkeeping detail.
+ *
+ * Kept separate from `ApiKeyScope` on purpose. `scope` answers "which of this application's scopes
+ * owns the credential", and both of its members imply someone with standing inside the application
+ * created it. This enum answers "did anyone vouch for this client at all", and the two questions
+ * became independent the moment an anonymous caller could register one.
+ *
+ * semantic-literal-boundary: a closed Wildo vocabulary with one named runtime source. Every schema,
+ * default, comparison and mapping over registration provenance derives from THIS enum.
+ */
+export var OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin;
+(function (OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin) {
+    /**
+     * Created by a principal with standing in this application — an organization administrator
+     * through the org-clients API, a platform operator, or a seed. **The default**, so nothing that
+     * existed before dynamic registration changes posture.
+     */
+    OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin["OPERATOR"] = "operator";
+    /**
+     * Self-registered by an anonymous caller at the RFC 7591 `/register` endpoint.
+     *
+     * The client asserted its own name and redirect URIs and proved nothing. It is granted no roles,
+     * capped at identity scopes, and always faces the user's consent prompt.
+     */
+    OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin["DYNAMIC"] = "dynamic";
+})(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin || (OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin = {}));
+export var OAuthGrantType;
+(function (OAuthGrantType) {
+    OAuthGrantType["CLIENT_CREDENTIALS"] = "client_credentials";
+    OAuthGrantType["AUTHORIZATION_CODE"] = "authorization_code";
+    OAuthGrantType["REFRESH_TOKEN"] = "refresh_token";
+})(OAuthGrantType || (OAuthGrantType = {}));
+/**
+ * How a registered OAuth client authenticates AT THIS APP'S token endpoint (OIDC
+ * `token_endpoint_auth_method`) — the PROVIDER-side classification of OUR clients. Deliberately
+ * DISTINCT from `OAuth2_TokenEndpoint_AuthMethod` in `external-connectors-models`, which describes how
+ * Wildo-as-CLIENT authenticates to an EXTERNAL IdP's token endpoint (the opposite direction); the two
+ * are separate concepts even though they share the OAuth wire vocabulary. Values are the OIDC-registered
+ * method names advertised in the discovery document's `token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported`.
+ *
+ * - `NONE` — a PUBLIC client: no client secret at the token endpoint; the authorization_code exchange
+ *   relies on mandatory PKCE (S256) + exact redirect_uri (the OAuth 2.1 baseline for SPA / native /
+ *   agent clients). This is the default because a client is public unless its
+ *   server-side secret-retention and token authentication method are explicit.
+ * - `CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC` / `CLIENT_SECRET_POST` — a CONFIDENTIAL client: it MUST present its
+ *   `client_secret` (via HTTP Basic, or the request body, respectively) at the token endpoint, as
+ *   defense-in-depth on top of PKCE. Both map to "confidential" for enforcement — the basic-vs-body
+ *   distinction is a per-request transport choice the token endpoint already accepts either way.
+ */
+export var OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod;
+(function (OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod) {
+    OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod["NONE"] = "none";
+    OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod["CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC"] = "client_secret_basic";
+    OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod["CLIENT_SECRET_POST"] = "client_secret_post";
+})(OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod || (OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod = {}));
+/**
+ * The single semantic authority for the public-vs-confidential decision: a client is CONFIDENTIAL
+ * (must present its secret at the token endpoint) iff its `tokenEndpointAuthMethod` is not `NONE`.
+ * Every enforcement site (authorization_code secret check, revocation client-auth) derives from this
+ * helper rather than re-deciding, so the classification never drifts.
+ */
+export function isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod(method) {
+    return method !== OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod.NONE;
+}
+/**
+ * Safe redirect-URI policy for a registered OAuth client — the anti-open-redirect / anti-XSS gate
+ * on every entry of the `redirectUris` allowlist.
+ *
+ * The authorization_code flow matches a request's `redirect_uri` by EXACT string against this
+ * allowlist, and the authorize handler then emits the matched value as the browser's navigation
+ * target (`redirect_to`). A registered entry is therefore a literal, user-navigated URL, so the
+ * allowlist must never contain a scheme or shape that can execute script or redirect off-origin:
+ *
+ *  - `https:` — allowed for any host/port (the standard for web / SPA / agent RPs).
+ *  - `http:`  — allowed ONLY for a loopback host (`localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `::1`), per OAuth 2.1
+ *               + RFC 8252 (native / CLI / dev clients); loopback is unreachable by a network
+ *               attacker, so plain http there is safe.
+ *  - a PRIVATE-USE URI scheme (`cursor:`, `com.example.app:`) — allowed, because that is how a native
+ *               app receives the code on a platform with no loopback listener. See below.
+ *  - everything else — `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, and plain `http:` to a
+ *               NON-loopback host — is REJECTED.
+ *  - a fragment (`#…`) is REJECTED (RFC 6749 §3.1.2: a redirect endpoint URI MUST NOT include one).
+ *  - embedded credentials (`https://user:pass@host`) are REJECTED (a phishing / host-confusion vector).
+ *  - leading/trailing whitespace is REJECTED — the WHATWG `URL` constructor silently trims it, so a
+ *    padded value would parse to a different string than the one exact-matched at authorize time.
+ *
+ * ## Private-use schemes: why they were added on 2026-08-11
+ *
+ * This policy previously refused every non-http(s) scheme, and the note here said to extend it
+ * "deliberately" if an app ever needed one. A real client made that concrete: Cursor registered
+ * `cursor://anysphere.cursor-mcp/oauth/callback` and was refused, which means **no native MCP client
+ * using a custom-scheme callback could register with a Wildo application at all.** None of our own
+ * lanes could have found it — every one of them registers `http://localhost/...`.
+ *
+ * The standard sanctions the pattern: native apps "MAY use whichever redirect option suits their
+ * needs best, taking into account platform-specific implementation details", and private-use URI
+ * scheme redirection is one of the three named options.
+ * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 7 and § 7.1 (Private-Use URI Scheme Redirection).
+ *
+ * The known weakness is NOT that such a URI is unsafe to navigate to — it is that the code may reach
+ * the wrong recipient: "A limitation of using private-use URI schemes for redirect URIs is that
+ * multiple apps can typically register the same scheme, which makes it indeterminate as to which app
+ * will receive the authorization code."
+ * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 8.1 (Protecting the Authorization Code).
+ *
+ * That is an interception risk, and PKCE is the mitigation the same section prescribes. This server
+ * REQUIRES PKCE and advertises `S256` alone, so a code delivered to the wrong app is unusable without
+ * the verifier. Refusing the scheme outright bought no protection PKCE does not already provide, and
+ * cost the entire native-client ecosystem.
+ *
+ * What is still refused is what actually executes or reads local state — the danger is the SCHEME's
+ * capability, not its unfamiliarity, so the check is a denylist of dangerous schemes rather than an
+ * allowlist of known apps. An allowlist is impossible here by construction: the set of legitimate app
+ * schemes is open, and every entry would be a new client the framework has to be taught about.
+ *
+ * Rejected alternatives: `z.string().url()` (the original guard) accepts every dangerous scheme; a
+ * strict https-only rule is too tight for the native/CLI loopback flow; requiring a reverse-DNS
+ * scheme (`com.example.app:`, which RFC 8252 § 7.1 RECOMMENDS) was rejected because it would still
+ * refuse `cursor:` — the recommendation binds the app author, not the authorization server, and a
+ * server that enforces it rejects conformant clients for a style violation.
+ *
+ * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION — registered OAuth redirect targets are constrained to
+ * safe absolute URLs, closing an open-redirect / stored-XSS delegation primitive.
+ */
+const DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES = new Set([
+    // Executes script in the navigating context — the open-redirect-to-XSS primitive this guard exists
+    // to close.
+    'javascript:',
+    'vbscript:',
+    // Carries its own payload, so the "redirect target" IS attacker-authored content.
+    'data:',
+    'blob:',
+    // Reads local state rather than handing the code to an application.
+    'file:',
+    'filesystem:',
+    // Browser-internal surfaces; never a native app's callback.
+    'about:',
+    'chrome:',
+    'chrome-extension:',
+    'moz-extension:',
+    'view-source:',
+]);
+/**
+ * The WHATWG "special" schemes, minus the two handled explicitly above.
+ *
+ * These are web-platform schemes with defined network semantics — never a native app's private-use
+ * callback. Refusing them is what keeps "private-use scheme" meaning what it says: an app-owned
+ * scheme, not any string that happens to parse. `ftp:` in particular was pinned as refused before
+ * private-use schemes were admitted, and it stays refused.
+ */
+const NON_CALLBACK_SPECIAL_SCHEMES = new Set(['ftp:', 'ws:', 'wss:', 'file:']);
+/** RFC 3986 § 3.1 scheme grammar: ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "-" / "." ), plus the WHATWG colon. */
+const RFC3986_SCHEME_PATTERN = /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:$/;
+export function isSafeOAuthRedirectUri(value) {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0 || value !== value.trim())
+        return false;
+    let url;
+    try {
+        url = new URL(value);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+    if (url.hash)
+        return false;
+    if (url.username || url.password)
+        return false;
+    if (url.protocol === 'https:')
+        return true;
+    if (url.protocol === 'http:') {
+        const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase();
+        return host === 'localhost' || host === '127.0.0.1' || host === '::1' || host === '[::1]';
+    }
+    // A private-use scheme for a native app. Refused only when the scheme itself confers a dangerous
+    // capability; the shape is otherwise held to the same rules as an https target (no fragment, no
+    // embedded credentials, both checked above), and interception is answered by mandatory PKCE.
+    const scheme = url.protocol.toLowerCase();
+    if (DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES.has(scheme))
+        return false;
+    if (NON_CALLBACK_SPECIAL_SCHEMES.has(scheme))
+        return false;
+    return RFC3986_SCHEME_PATTERN.test(scheme);
+}
+// ===============================
+// CORE OAUTH CLIENT SCHEMAS
+// ===============================
+/**
+ * Base schema for extension (needs to be z.object for `.extend()` to work).
+ *
+ * `scope` reuses `ApiKeyScope` (ORGANIZATION|APPLICATION) — the same primary-scope
+ * split as api-keys; the org/app variants narrow it to a literal + add the FK.
+ *
+ * SECRET + ROTATION GRACE (`hashedSecret`/`secretPrefix`/`previous*`) mirror the
+ * api-key `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix`/`previous*` fields VERBATIM (same decorators,
+ * same server-managed strip-seam contract). Unlike api-keys — which declare
+ * `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix` on the concrete org/app variant schemas — the OAuth
+ * client keeps them on the base: every scope persists the identical secret shape,
+ * so a single base declaration is the honest single source of truth.
+ */
+export const OAuthClientSchemaBase = z.object({
+    _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(), // == clientId
+    name: z.string().min(1).max(100).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),
+    description: z.string().max(500).optional(),
+    scope: z.enum(ApiKeyScope).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),
+    // `.isAuditEvidence()` — the roles an OAuth client acts with. Same reasoning as the API-key
+    // authority field: roles are the single authorization axis, so their before/after IS the
+    // evidence. assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE
+    roles: z.array(RolesSchema).default([]).isAuditEvidence(),
+    // OIDC IDENTITY scopes this client may request in the authorization_code flow (e.g. `openid`,
+    // `profile`, `email`) — validated against the requested `scope` when minting the ID token /
+    // serving `/oauth/userinfo`. This is IDENTITY only: it is NOT an authorization axis. Authorization
+    // is roles-only (scope-based authorization was deleted 2026-07-21 — do NOT re-introduce it). Empty
+    // for pure client_credentials machine clients (they carry no scopes; their access is roles-only).
+    allowedScopes: z.array(z.string()).default([]),
+    // Grant types this client is authorized to use. Defaults to the machine front.
+    allowedGrants: z.array(z.enum(OAuthGrantType)).default([OAuthGrantType.CLIENT_CREDENTIALS]),
+    // OIDC authorization_code: exact-match allowlist of redirect URIs. Empty for pure
+    // client_credentials clients. An authorization request's `redirect_uri` MUST equal one of
+    // these by EXACT string match (no wildcards / no substring) — the anti-open-redirect guard.
+    // Each entry is additionally constrained to a SAFE absolute URL by `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri`
+    // (https anywhere · http loopback only · no javascript:/data:/fragment/embedded-credentials) so a
+    // malicious registered entry cannot become a stored-XSS / off-origin redirect navigation target.
+    redirectUris: z
+        .array(z.string().refine(isSafeOAuthRedirectUri, {
+        message: 'redirect_uri must be an absolute https URL (or an http loopback URL) with no fragment or embedded credentials',
+    }))
+        // Bounded. RFC 7591 sets no limit, and one is needed here because `/oauth/register` accepts this
+        // array from an ANONYMOUS caller: without a ceiling a single registration can carry an arbitrary
+        // number of URIs, and the per-IP registration limit bounds how MANY registrations happen, not how
+        // large each one is. 50 is far above any real client — several environments times a few loopback
+        // ports — so this constrains only abuse. Every entry is independently constrained by
+        // `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri`, so this is a storage bound, not an authorization one.
+        .max(50)
+        .default([]),
+    // OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0: exact-match allowlist of POST-LOGOUT redirect URIs (revocation-C). When
+    // an RP calls `/oauth/end-session` with a `post_logout_redirect_uri`, that value MUST equal one of these
+    // by EXACT string match — the SAME anti-open-redirect discipline as `redirectUris` (no wildcards, no
+    // substring). A non-matching value is refused and the OP lands the user on its own logged-out page rather
+    // than redirecting back to the RP. Empty for clients that never drive an interactive logout (pure
+    // client_credentials machines). Each entry is independently held to a SAFE absolute URL by
+    // `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri` (https anywhere · http loopback only · no fragment/embedded-credentials), and
+    // the array is `.max(50)`-bounded for the same anonymous-`/oauth/register` abuse reason as `redirectUris`.
+    // spec-cite: OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout 1.0 §2 (`post_logout_redirect_uri` MUST have been
+    // registered with the OP).
+    postLogoutRedirectUris: z
+        .array(z.string().refine(isSafeOAuthRedirectUri, {
+        message: 'post_logout_redirect_uri must be an absolute https URL (or an http loopback URL) with no fragment or embedded credentials',
+    }))
+        .max(50)
+        .default([]),
+    // OIDC INTERACTIVE CONSENT gate. When TRUE, the authorization_code flow requires EXPLICIT user
+    // consent before a code is minted: `/oauth/authorize` returns `consent_required` (with a single-use
+    // consent-request token + the client/resource/scope details) instead of auto-issuing the code, and
+    // the user must approve at `/oauth/authorize/decision`. Defaults FALSE = a first-party / trusted
+    // client whose consent is auto-granted (the pre-consent behavior, so machine + trusted clients are
+    // UNAFFECTED). Set TRUE for a THIRD-PARTY client that acts on the user's behalf and must therefore
+    // be explicitly authorized by the user before it can obtain a delegated token. The gate is
+    // SERVER-owned (a client property, never a request parameter) so a third-party client cannot
+    // suppress its own consent prompt.
+    requiresConsent: z.boolean().default(false),
+    // OIDC `token_endpoint_auth_method` — PUBLIC (`NONE`, the default: PKCE-only, no secret at the token
+    // endpoint) vs CONFIDENTIAL (`CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC`/`POST`: the authorization_code exchange AND token
+    // revocation REQUIRE the client to present its `client_secret`, defense-in-depth over PKCE). Default
+    // `NONE` is the safe default: a server-side confidential client must opt into
+    // a secret-bearing token-endpoint method explicitly.
+    // Settable at create/update — flipping a client confidential simply starts requiring the secret it
+    // already has. The public-vs-confidential decision is derived ONLY via
+    // `isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod`, never by re-comparing the enum inline.
+    tokenEndpointAuthMethod: z.enum(OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod).default(OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod.NONE).isSummaryField(),
+    // `.isAuditEvidence()` — whether this client's delegated access is live.
+    // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE
+    status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus).default(OAuthClientStatus.ACTIVE).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence(),
+    expiresAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),
+    lastUsedAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    // ── Client secret ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // `hashedSecret` is the lookup key for the client-credentials token exchange
+    // (the request-auth choke point resolves a presented secret against it on every
+    // exchange). Without an index this is an O(n) collection scan; the compound
+    // unique guarantees only one active row per hash — cryptographically near-
+    // impossible to collide by accident, but a uniqueness contract avoids two rows
+    // being returned to the resolver on a hash collision and prevents shadow-client
+    // duplicates during rotation. Backend-only (a secret hash, never surfaced except
+    // once at creation via `isReturnedAtCreation`, which the mint postfix correlates
+    // the one-time plaintext against). `.excludeFrom{Create,Update}()` — the client
+    // never supplies it; the mint impl is the single server-side choke point.
+    hashedSecret: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isUnique().isBackendOnly({ isReturnedAtCreation: true }).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    // First 8 chars of the plaintext secret — persisted + shown in lists
+    // (`.isSummaryField()`) so an admin can identify a client without revealing the
+    // secret. Server-managed.
+    secretPrefix: z.string().length(8).isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    // ── Rotation grace window ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    // When a client secret is ROTATED or REGENERATEd, the PRIOR secret is retained
+    // here so it keeps authenticating during an overlap window — callers can migrate
+    // to the new secret without a hard cutover. The client-credentials exchange
+    // resolves a presented secret against the current `hashedSecret` OR this
+    // `previousHashedSecret` while the window is open (`previousSecretInvalidationDate`
+    // is null or in the future) AND the client is ACTIVE. All three are server-managed
+    // by the rotate/regenerate impls only — never client-settable
+    // (`.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()`).
+    //
+    // `previousHashedSecret` — `sha256` of the prior secret; the auth path looks a
+    // presented secret up against it, so it is `.isDBIndexed()`. Backend-only (a
+    // secret hash, never surfaced). Absent until the first rotation.
+    previousHashedSecret: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().isBackendOnly().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    // First 8 chars of the prior secret — retained for support/audit display while
+    // the previous secret is still valid (not a secret, so surfaced). Overwritten on
+    // the next rotation.
+    previousSecretPrefix: z.string().length(8).optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    // When the previous secret stops authenticating. `null`/absent = no scheduled
+    // invalidation (REGENERATE overlap — the prior secret stays valid until the next
+    // rotation). A future date (ROTATE `oldSecretInvalidationDate`) = honored until
+    // then, then rejected. `now`/past (ROTATE default) = immediate hard cutover.
+    // Surfaced so operators can see when the old secret dies.
+    previousSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    // ── How this client came to exist ─────────────────────────────────────────
+    // WHO registered this client, which is a different question from WHERE the row lives.
+    //
+    // Every other client on this collection was created by someone with standing in this application:
+    // an organization administrator, or a platform operator. A DYNAMIC client was created by an
+    // anonymous caller at the RFC 7591 `/register` endpoint, and proved nothing about itself.
+    //
+    // The field exists because the STORAGE LOCATION can no longer carry that meaning. A dynamically
+    // registered client has no organization, so it must live on the APPLICATION collection — and
+    // `scope: APPLICATION` otherwise means "platform-operator first-party", the most trusted posture
+    // there is. Without this discriminator a stranger's client would inherit that trust purely from
+    // where it was filed. `ResolvedAuthorizationClient` reads it and maps DYNAMIC to
+    // `AuthorizationClientTenancy.UNAFFILIATED`, so the authorize path treats it like a CIMD client:
+    // always consent, identity scopes only.
+    //
+    // `.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()` is load-bearing, not hygiene: this is a TRUST
+    // CLASSIFICATION, and a caller who could set it could file itself as OPERATOR. Only the
+    // registration endpoint writes it, through the system door. Authenticated
+    // administrative registration receives OPERATOR by default because that
+    // administrator vouches for the client.
+    // `.isAuditEvidence()` — a change here changes how much this client is trusted.
+    // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE
+    registrationOrigin: z.enum(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin)
+        .default(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin.OPERATOR)
+        .isDBIndexed()
+        .isSummaryField()
+        .excludeFromCreate()
+        .excludeFromUpdate()
+        .isAuditEvidence(),
+});
+export const OAuthClientOrganizationSchema = OAuthClientSchemaBase.extend({
+    scope: z.literal(ApiKeyScope.ORGANIZATION),
+    organizationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),
+});
+export const OAuthClientApplicationSchema = OAuthClientSchemaBase.extend({
+    scope: z.literal(ApiKeyScope.APPLICATION),
+    applicationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=oauth-clients.shared.schemas.js.map

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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* OAuth Client Shared Schemas\n *\n * Frontend/backend shared schemas + DTOs for the registered OAuth-client\n * credential resource (`organizationOAuthClients`, `applicationOAuthClients`).\n * Backend-specific logic (secret minting/hashing, mint pipeline) stays in\n * saas-backend-lib.\n *\n * This resource is a FAITHFUL MIRROR of the api-keys resource\n * (`api-keys.shared.schemas.ts`): the same long-lived secret + rotation-grace\n * shape, the same server-managed strip-seam contract, the same org|app scope\n * split. It exists as its OWN resource (not a variant of api-keys) because the\n * request-auth choke point routes a presented secret to a DISTINCT principal\n * by the plaintext prefix (`oc_org_`/`oc_app_` vs the api-key `sk_org_`/`sk_app_`)\n * — an OAuth client and an api-key both authenticate the SAME machine principal\n * (`ORGANIZATION_MACHINE` / `APPLICATION_MACHINE`); they are distinct credential types, an api-key acts\n * as an api-key principal.\n *\n * OIDC authorization code, interactive consent, persistent consent grants,\n * exact redirect allowlists and public/confidential client classification are\n * implemented. The resource remains the registered-client authority; issued\n * codes, tokens and user consent records have their own runtime/storage owners.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { RolesSchema } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { ApiKeyScope } from '../api-keys/api-keys.shared.schemas';\n\n// ===============================\n// OAUTH CLIENT ENUMS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Lifecycle status of a registered OAuth client. Mirrors `ApiKeyStatus`: an\n * INACTIVE or EXPIRED client cannot mint tokens at the request-auth choke point.\n */\nexport enum OAuthClientStatus {\n  ACTIVE = 'active',\n  INACTIVE = 'inactive',\n  EXPIRED = 'expired',\n}\n\n/**\n * OAuth 2.0 grant types a registered client may be authorized to use. The trunk\n * resource ships CLIENT_CREDENTIALS (the machine-to-machine front); the\n * AUTHORIZATION_CODE / REFRESH_TOKEN arms are declared here so the OIDC branch can\n * enable them per-client via `allowedGrants` without a schema reshape.\n */\n/**\n * How a client got registered — a TRUST classification, not a bookkeeping detail.\n *\n * Kept separate from `ApiKeyScope` on purpose. `scope` answers \"which of this application's scopes\n * owns the credential\", and both of its members imply someone with standing inside the application\n * created it. This enum answers \"did anyone vouch for this client at all\", and the two questions\n * became independent the moment an anonymous caller could register one.\n *\n * semantic-literal-boundary: a closed Wildo vocabulary with one named runtime source. Every schema,\n * default, comparison and mapping over registration provenance derives from THIS enum.\n */\nexport enum OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin {\n  /**\n   * Created by a principal with standing in this application — an organization administrator\n   * through the org-clients API, a platform operator, or a seed. **The default**, so nothing that\n   * existed before dynamic registration changes posture.\n   */\n  OPERATOR = 'operator',\n  /**\n   * Self-registered by an anonymous caller at the RFC 7591 `/register` endpoint.\n   *\n   * The client asserted its own name and redirect URIs and proved nothing. It is granted no roles,\n   * capped at identity scopes, and always faces the user's consent prompt.\n   */\n  DYNAMIC = 'dynamic',\n}\n\nexport enum OAuthGrantType {\n  CLIENT_CREDENTIALS = 'client_credentials',\n  AUTHORIZATION_CODE = 'authorization_code',\n  REFRESH_TOKEN = 'refresh_token',\n}\n\n/**\n * How a registered OAuth client authenticates AT THIS APP'S token endpoint (OIDC\n * `token_endpoint_auth_method`) — the PROVIDER-side classification of OUR clients. Deliberately\n * DISTINCT from `OAuth2_TokenEndpoint_AuthMethod` in `external-connectors-models`, which describes how\n * Wildo-as-CLIENT authenticates to an EXTERNAL IdP's token endpoint (the opposite direction); the two\n * are separate concepts even though they share the OAuth wire vocabulary. Values are the OIDC-registered\n * method names advertised in the discovery document's `token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported`.\n *\n * - `NONE` — a PUBLIC client: no client secret at the token endpoint; the authorization_code exchange\n *   relies on mandatory PKCE (S256) + exact redirect_uri (the OAuth 2.1 baseline for SPA / native /\n *   agent clients). This is the default because a client is public unless its\n *   server-side secret-retention and token authentication method are explicit.\n * - `CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC` / `CLIENT_SECRET_POST` — a CONFIDENTIAL client: it MUST present its\n *   `client_secret` (via HTTP Basic, or the request body, respectively) at the token endpoint, as\n *   defense-in-depth on top of PKCE. Both map to \"confidential\" for enforcement — the basic-vs-body\n *   distinction is a per-request transport choice the token endpoint already accepts either way.\n */\nexport enum OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod {\n  NONE = 'none',\n  CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC = 'client_secret_basic',\n  CLIENT_SECRET_POST = 'client_secret_post',\n}\n\n/**\n * The single semantic authority for the public-vs-confidential decision: a client is CONFIDENTIAL\n * (must present its secret at the token endpoint) iff its `tokenEndpointAuthMethod` is not `NONE`.\n * Every enforcement site (authorization_code secret check, revocation client-auth) derives from this\n * helper rather than re-deciding, so the classification never drifts.\n */\nexport function isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod(method: OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod): boolean {\n  return method !== OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod.NONE;\n}\n\n/**\n * Safe redirect-URI policy for a registered OAuth client — the anti-open-redirect / anti-XSS gate\n * on every entry of the `redirectUris` allowlist.\n *\n * The authorization_code flow matches a request's `redirect_uri` by EXACT string against this\n * allowlist, and the authorize handler then emits the matched value as the browser's navigation\n * target (`redirect_to`). A registered entry is therefore a literal, user-navigated URL, so the\n * allowlist must never contain a scheme or shape that can execute script or redirect off-origin:\n *\n *  - `https:` — allowed for any host/port (the standard for web / SPA / agent RPs).\n *  - `http:`  — allowed ONLY for a loopback host (`localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `::1`), per OAuth 2.1\n *               + RFC 8252 (native / CLI / dev clients); loopback is unreachable by a network\n *               attacker, so plain http there is safe.\n *  - a PRIVATE-USE URI scheme (`cursor:`, `com.example.app:`) — allowed, because that is how a native\n *               app receives the code on a platform with no loopback listener. See below.\n *  - everything else — `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, and plain `http:` to a\n *               NON-loopback host — is REJECTED.\n *  - a fragment (`#…`) is REJECTED (RFC 6749 §3.1.2: a redirect endpoint URI MUST NOT include one).\n *  - embedded credentials (`https://user:pass@host`) are REJECTED (a phishing / host-confusion vector).\n *  - leading/trailing whitespace is REJECTED — the WHATWG `URL` constructor silently trims it, so a\n *    padded value would parse to a different string than the one exact-matched at authorize time.\n *\n * ## Private-use schemes: why they were added on 2026-08-11\n *\n * This policy previously refused every non-http(s) scheme, and the note here said to extend it\n * \"deliberately\" if an app ever needed one. A real client made that concrete: Cursor registered\n * `cursor://anysphere.cursor-mcp/oauth/callback` and was refused, which means **no native MCP client\n * using a custom-scheme callback could register with a Wildo application at all.** None of our own\n * lanes could have found it — every one of them registers `http://localhost/...`.\n *\n * The standard sanctions the pattern: native apps \"MAY use whichever redirect option suits their\n * needs best, taking into account platform-specific implementation details\", and private-use URI\n * scheme redirection is one of the three named options.\n * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 7 and § 7.1 (Private-Use URI Scheme Redirection).\n *\n * The known weakness is NOT that such a URI is unsafe to navigate to — it is that the code may reach\n * the wrong recipient: \"A limitation of using private-use URI schemes for redirect URIs is that\n * multiple apps can typically register the same scheme, which makes it indeterminate as to which app\n * will receive the authorization code.\"\n * spec-cite: RFC 8252 § 8.1 (Protecting the Authorization Code).\n *\n * That is an interception risk, and PKCE is the mitigation the same section prescribes. This server\n * REQUIRES PKCE and advertises `S256` alone, so a code delivered to the wrong app is unusable without\n * the verifier. Refusing the scheme outright bought no protection PKCE does not already provide, and\n * cost the entire native-client ecosystem.\n *\n * What is still refused is what actually executes or reads local state — the danger is the SCHEME's\n * capability, not its unfamiliarity, so the check is a denylist of dangerous schemes rather than an\n * allowlist of known apps. An allowlist is impossible here by construction: the set of legitimate app\n * schemes is open, and every entry would be a new client the framework has to be taught about.\n *\n * Rejected alternatives: `z.string().url()` (the original guard) accepts every dangerous scheme; a\n * strict https-only rule is too tight for the native/CLI loopback flow; requiring a reverse-DNS\n * scheme (`com.example.app:`, which RFC 8252 § 7.1 RECOMMENDS) was rejected because it would still\n * refuse `cursor:` — the recommendation binds the app author, not the authorization server, and a\n * server that enforces it rejects conformant clients for a style violation.\n *\n * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.REDIRECT_TARGET_VALIDATION — registered OAuth redirect targets are constrained to\n * safe absolute URLs, closing an open-redirect / stored-XSS delegation primitive.\n */\nconst DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  // Executes script in the navigating context — the open-redirect-to-XSS primitive this guard exists\n  // to close.\n  'javascript:',\n  'vbscript:',\n  // Carries its own payload, so the \"redirect target\" IS attacker-authored content.\n  'data:',\n  'blob:',\n  // Reads local state rather than handing the code to an application.\n  'file:',\n  'filesystem:',\n  // Browser-internal surfaces; never a native app's callback.\n  'about:',\n  'chrome:',\n  'chrome-extension:',\n  'moz-extension:',\n  'view-source:',\n]);\n\n/**\n * The WHATWG \"special\" schemes, minus the two handled explicitly above.\n *\n * These are web-platform schemes with defined network semantics — never a native app's private-use\n * callback. Refusing them is what keeps \"private-use scheme\" meaning what it says: an app-owned\n * scheme, not any string that happens to parse. `ftp:` in particular was pinned as refused before\n * private-use schemes were admitted, and it stays refused.\n */\nconst NON_CALLBACK_SPECIAL_SCHEMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(['ftp:', 'ws:', 'wss:', 'file:']);\n\n/** RFC 3986 § 3.1 scheme grammar: ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / \"+\" / \"-\" / \".\" ), plus the WHATWG colon. */\nconst RFC3986_SCHEME_PATTERN = /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:$/;\n\nexport function isSafeOAuthRedirectUri(value: string): boolean {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0 || value !== value.trim()) return false;\n  let url: URL;\n  try {\n    url = new URL(value);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (url.hash) return false;\n  if (url.username || url.password) return false;\n  if (url.protocol === 'https:') return true;\n  if (url.protocol === 'http:') {\n    const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase();\n    return host === 'localhost' || host === '127.0.0.1' || host === '::1' || host === '[::1]';\n  }\n  // A private-use scheme for a native app. Refused only when the scheme itself confers a dangerous\n  // capability; the shape is otherwise held to the same rules as an https target (no fragment, no\n  // embedded credentials, both checked above), and interception is answered by mandatory PKCE.\n  const scheme = url.protocol.toLowerCase();\n  if (DANGEROUS_REDIRECT_URI_SCHEMES.has(scheme)) return false;\n  if (NON_CALLBACK_SPECIAL_SCHEMES.has(scheme)) return false;\n  return RFC3986_SCHEME_PATTERN.test(scheme);\n}\n\n// ===============================\n// CORE OAUTH CLIENT SCHEMAS\n// ===============================\n\n/**\n * Base schema for extension (needs to be z.object for `.extend()` to work).\n *\n * `scope` reuses `ApiKeyScope` (ORGANIZATION|APPLICATION) — the same primary-scope\n * split as api-keys; the org/app variants narrow it to a literal + add the FK.\n *\n * SECRET + ROTATION GRACE (`hashedSecret`/`secretPrefix`/`previous*`) mirror the\n * api-key `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix`/`previous*` fields VERBATIM (same decorators,\n * same server-managed strip-seam contract). Unlike api-keys — which declare\n * `hashedKey`/`keyPrefix` on the concrete org/app variant schemas — the OAuth\n * client keeps them on the base: every scope persists the identical secret shape,\n * so a single base declaration is the honest single source of truth.\n */\nexport const OAuthClientSchemaBase = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(), // == clientId\n  name: z.string().min(1).max(100).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  description: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n  scope: z.enum(ApiKeyScope).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — the roles an OAuth client acts with. Same reasoning as the API-key\n  // authority field: roles are the single authorization axis, so their before/after IS the\n  // evidence. assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  roles: z.array(RolesSchema).default([]).isAuditEvidence(),\n  // OIDC IDENTITY scopes this client may request in the authorization_code flow (e.g. `openid`,\n  // `profile`, `email`) — validated against the requested `scope` when minting the ID token /\n  // serving `/oauth/userinfo`. This is IDENTITY only: it is NOT an authorization axis. Authorization\n  // is roles-only (scope-based authorization was deleted 2026-07-21 — do NOT re-introduce it). Empty\n  // for pure client_credentials machine clients (they carry no scopes; their access is roles-only).\n  allowedScopes: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  // Grant types this client is authorized to use. Defaults to the machine front.\n  allowedGrants: z.array(z.enum(OAuthGrantType)).default([OAuthGrantType.CLIENT_CREDENTIALS]),\n  // OIDC authorization_code: exact-match allowlist of redirect URIs. Empty for pure\n  // client_credentials clients. An authorization request's `redirect_uri` MUST equal one of\n  // these by EXACT string match (no wildcards / no substring) — the anti-open-redirect guard.\n  // Each entry is additionally constrained to a SAFE absolute URL by `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri`\n  // (https anywhere · http loopback only · no javascript:/data:/fragment/embedded-credentials) so a\n  // malicious registered entry cannot become a stored-XSS / off-origin redirect navigation target.\n  redirectUris: z\n    .array(\n      z.string().refine(isSafeOAuthRedirectUri, {\n        message: 'redirect_uri must be an absolute https URL (or an http loopback URL) with no fragment or embedded credentials',\n      }),\n    )\n    // Bounded. RFC 7591 sets no limit, and one is needed here because `/oauth/register` accepts this\n    // array from an ANONYMOUS caller: without a ceiling a single registration can carry an arbitrary\n    // number of URIs, and the per-IP registration limit bounds how MANY registrations happen, not how\n    // large each one is. 50 is far above any real client — several environments times a few loopback\n    // ports — so this constrains only abuse. Every entry is independently constrained by\n    // `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri`, so this is a storage bound, not an authorization one.\n    .max(50)\n    .default([]),\n  // OIDC RP-Initiated Logout 1.0: exact-match allowlist of POST-LOGOUT redirect URIs (revocation-C). When\n  // an RP calls `/oauth/end-session` with a `post_logout_redirect_uri`, that value MUST equal one of these\n  // by EXACT string match — the SAME anti-open-redirect discipline as `redirectUris` (no wildcards, no\n  // substring). A non-matching value is refused and the OP lands the user on its own logged-out page rather\n  // than redirecting back to the RP. Empty for clients that never drive an interactive logout (pure\n  // client_credentials machines). Each entry is independently held to a SAFE absolute URL by\n  // `isSafeOAuthRedirectUri` (https anywhere · http loopback only · no fragment/embedded-credentials), and\n  // the array is `.max(50)`-bounded for the same anonymous-`/oauth/register` abuse reason as `redirectUris`.\n  // spec-cite: OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout 1.0 §2 (`post_logout_redirect_uri` MUST have been\n  // registered with the OP).\n  postLogoutRedirectUris: z\n    .array(\n      z.string().refine(isSafeOAuthRedirectUri, {\n        message: 'post_logout_redirect_uri must be an absolute https URL (or an http loopback URL) with no fragment or embedded credentials',\n      }),\n    )\n    .max(50)\n    .default([]),\n  // OIDC INTERACTIVE CONSENT gate. When TRUE, the authorization_code flow requires EXPLICIT user\n  // consent before a code is minted: `/oauth/authorize` returns `consent_required` (with a single-use\n  // consent-request token + the client/resource/scope details) instead of auto-issuing the code, and\n  // the user must approve at `/oauth/authorize/decision`. Defaults FALSE = a first-party / trusted\n  // client whose consent is auto-granted (the pre-consent behavior, so machine + trusted clients are\n  // UNAFFECTED). Set TRUE for a THIRD-PARTY client that acts on the user's behalf and must therefore\n  // be explicitly authorized by the user before it can obtain a delegated token. The gate is\n  // SERVER-owned (a client property, never a request parameter) so a third-party client cannot\n  // suppress its own consent prompt.\n  requiresConsent: z.boolean().default(false),\n  // OIDC `token_endpoint_auth_method` — PUBLIC (`NONE`, the default: PKCE-only, no secret at the token\n  // endpoint) vs CONFIDENTIAL (`CLIENT_SECRET_BASIC`/`POST`: the authorization_code exchange AND token\n  // revocation REQUIRE the client to present its `client_secret`, defense-in-depth over PKCE). Default\n  // `NONE` is the safe default: a server-side confidential client must opt into\n  // a secret-bearing token-endpoint method explicitly.\n  // Settable at create/update — flipping a client confidential simply starts requiring the secret it\n  // already has. The public-vs-confidential decision is derived ONLY via\n  // `isConfidentialTokenEndpointAuthMethod`, never by re-comparing the enum inline.\n  tokenEndpointAuthMethod: z.enum(OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod).default(OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod.NONE).isSummaryField(),\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — whether this client's delegated access is live.\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus).default(OAuthClientStatus.ACTIVE).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence(),\n  expiresAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField(),\n  lastUsedAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Client secret ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n  // `hashedSecret` is the lookup key for the client-credentials token exchange\n  // (the request-auth choke point resolves a presented secret against it on every\n  // exchange). Without an index this is an O(n) collection scan; the compound\n  // unique guarantees only one active row per hash — cryptographically near-\n  // impossible to collide by accident, but a uniqueness contract avoids two rows\n  // being returned to the resolver on a hash collision and prevents shadow-client\n  // duplicates during rotation. Backend-only (a secret hash, never surfaced except\n  // once at creation via `isReturnedAtCreation`, which the mint postfix correlates\n  // the one-time plaintext against). `.excludeFrom{Create,Update}()` — the client\n  // never supplies it; the mint impl is the single server-side choke point.\n  hashedSecret: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isUnique().isBackendOnly({ isReturnedAtCreation: true }).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 chars of the plaintext secret — persisted + shown in lists\n  // (`.isSummaryField()`) so an admin can identify a client without revealing the\n  // secret. Server-managed.\n  secretPrefix: z.string().length(8).isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── Rotation grace window ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n  // When a client secret is ROTATED or REGENERATEd, the PRIOR secret is retained\n  // here so it keeps authenticating during an overlap window — callers can migrate\n  // to the new secret without a hard cutover. The client-credentials exchange\n  // resolves a presented secret against the current `hashedSecret` OR this\n  // `previousHashedSecret` while the window is open (`previousSecretInvalidationDate`\n  // is null or in the future) AND the client is ACTIVE. All three are server-managed\n  // by the rotate/regenerate impls only — never client-settable\n  // (`.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()`).\n  //\n  // `previousHashedSecret` — `sha256` of the prior secret; the auth path looks a\n  // presented secret up against it, so it is `.isDBIndexed()`. Backend-only (a\n  // secret hash, never surfaced). Absent until the first rotation.\n  previousHashedSecret: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().isBackendOnly().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // First 8 chars of the prior secret — retained for support/audit display while\n  // the previous secret is still valid (not a secret, so surfaced). Overwritten on\n  // the next rotation.\n  previousSecretPrefix: z.string().length(8).optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  // When the previous secret stops authenticating. `null`/absent = no scheduled\n  // invalidation (REGENERATE overlap — the prior secret stays valid until the next\n  // rotation). A future date (ROTATE `oldSecretInvalidationDate`) = honored until\n  // then, then rejected. `now`/past (ROTATE default) = immediate hard cutover.\n  // Surfaced so operators can see when the old secret dies.\n  previousSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().optional().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n\n  // ── How this client came to exist ─────────────────────────────────────────\n  // WHO registered this client, which is a different question from WHERE the row lives.\n  //\n  // Every other client on this collection was created by someone with standing in this application:\n  // an organization administrator, or a platform operator. A DYNAMIC client was created by an\n  // anonymous caller at the RFC 7591 `/register` endpoint, and proved nothing about itself.\n  //\n  // The field exists because the STORAGE LOCATION can no longer carry that meaning. A dynamically\n  // registered client has no organization, so it must live on the APPLICATION collection — and\n  // `scope: APPLICATION` otherwise means \"platform-operator first-party\", the most trusted posture\n  // there is. Without this discriminator a stranger's client would inherit that trust purely from\n  // where it was filed. `ResolvedAuthorizationClient` reads it and maps DYNAMIC to\n  // `AuthorizationClientTenancy.UNAFFILIATED`, so the authorize path treats it like a CIMD client:\n  // always consent, identity scopes only.\n  //\n  // `.excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()` is load-bearing, not hygiene: this is a TRUST\n  // CLASSIFICATION, and a caller who could set it could file itself as OPERATOR. Only the\n  // registration endpoint writes it, through the system door. Authenticated\n  // administrative registration receives OPERATOR by default because that\n  // administrator vouches for the client.\n  // `.isAuditEvidence()` — a change here changes how much this client is trusted.\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n  registrationOrigin: z.enum(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin)\n    .default(OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin.OPERATOR)\n    .isDBIndexed()\n    .isSummaryField()\n    .excludeFromCreate()\n    .excludeFromUpdate()\n    .isAuditEvidence(),\n\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientBase = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientSchemaBase>;\n\nexport const OAuthClientOrganizationSchema = OAuthClientSchemaBase.extend({\n  scope: z.literal(ApiKeyScope.ORGANIZATION),\n  organizationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientOrganization = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientOrganizationSchema>;\n\nexport const OAuthClientApplicationSchema = OAuthClientSchemaBase.extend({\n  scope: z.literal(ApiKeyScope.APPLICATION),\n  applicationId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type OAuthClientApplication = z.infer<typeof OAuthClientApplicationSchema>;\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-consent-grants.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/**
+ * OIDC Persistent Consent Grants — Resource Configuration
+ *
+ * USER_SELF-scoped (the scope is derived from the `USERS → OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANTS` composition
+ * relationship). READ / LIST / DELETE are OWNER-facing (`API_CALL` + `APP_USER`): the framework's
+ * USER_SELF primary-scope filter restricts every result to the authenticated caller's own grants, so a
+ * user can list their "authorized apps" and revoke one, and nobody can see or delete another user's
+ * grants. CREATE / UPDATE are SYSTEM-only (`INTERNAL_CALL`): the OIDC consent-decision endpoint is the
+ * sole writer, via the `createAsSystem` / `updateAsSystem` primitives.
+ *
+ * `systemAccessPolicy` opts the write + read verbs into the `*AsSystem` door (default is fail-closed
+ * FORBIDDEN): the decision endpoint create/updates a grant with no request-context FK to attach
+ * (`userId` is re-attached from the schema allowlist on the system path), and the authorize endpoint
+ * read/lists a user's grants to decide whether to skip the prompt. There is no `delete` system-access
+ * verb (none exists); owner revoke goes through the `API_CALL` DELETE route, and the USERS
+ * `onParentDelete` composition cascade deletes grants directly at the repository layer (variant-agnostic).
+ */
+import { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';
+import { ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';
+export declare const oauthConsentGrantsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory: (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => import("../..").ResourceConfiguration<undefined, CoreResourceOperation.READ | CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE | CoreResourceOperation.LIST, import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("zod").ZodObject<{
+    _id: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("zod").ZodString>>;
+    userId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("zod").ZodString>>>>;
+    clientId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("zod").ZodString>>;
+    resource: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("zod").ZodOptional<import("zod").ZodString>>>;
+    scopes: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("zod").ZodDefault<import("zod").ZodArray<import("zod").ZodString>>>;
+    expiresAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("zod").ZodOptional<import("zod").ZodDate>>;
+    createdAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("zod").ZodDefault<import("zod").ZodDate>>>>>;
+    updatedAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("zod").ZodDefault<import("zod").ZodDate>>>>;
+}, import("zod/v4/core").$strip>>>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=oauth-consent-grants.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-consent-grants.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"oauth-consent-grants.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/security/oauth-clients/oauth-consent-grants.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AAKH,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAwD,MAAM,mDAAmD,CAAC;AAChJ,OAAO,EAA4D,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,0CAA0C,CAAC;AAI1I,eAAO,MAAM,6DAA6D,GACxE,wBAAwB,oBAAoB,EAAE;;;;;;;;;kCA+D9C,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-consent-grants.shared.resources-config.schemas.js

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/**
+ * OIDC Persistent Consent Grants — Resource Configuration
+ *
+ * USER_SELF-scoped (the scope is derived from the `USERS → OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANTS` composition
+ * relationship). READ / LIST / DELETE are OWNER-facing (`API_CALL` + `APP_USER`): the framework's
+ * USER_SELF primary-scope filter restricts every result to the authenticated caller's own grants, so a
+ * user can list their "authorized apps" and revoke one, and nobody can see or delete another user's
+ * grants. CREATE / UPDATE are SYSTEM-only (`INTERNAL_CALL`): the OIDC consent-decision endpoint is the
+ * sole writer, via the `createAsSystem` / `updateAsSystem` primitives.
+ *
+ * `systemAccessPolicy` opts the write + read verbs into the `*AsSystem` door (default is fail-closed
+ * FORBIDDEN): the decision endpoint create/updates a grant with no request-context FK to attach
+ * (`userId` is re-attached from the schema allowlist on the system path), and the authorize endpoint
+ * read/lists a user's grants to decide whether to skip the prompt. There is no `delete` system-access
+ * verb (none exists); owner revoke goes through the `API_CALL` DELETE route, and the USERS
+ * `onParentDelete` composition cascade deletes grants directly at the repository layer (variant-agnostic).
+ */
+import { OAuthConsentGrantSchema } from './oauth-consent-grants.shared.schemas.js';
+import { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.factory.js';
+import { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas.js';
+import { CoreResourceOperation, CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions.js';
+import { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas.js';
+import { CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas.js';
+import { DataPortabilityProvenance } from '../../compliance/privacy/subject-export.shared.schemas.js';
+export const oauthConsentGrantsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization({
+    mainSchema: OAuthConsentGrantSchema,
+    resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANTS,
+    resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANTS],
+    resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,
+    isSystemResource: true,
+    // The OIDC consent-decision endpoint stores/updates grants via createAsSystem/updateAsSystem (the
+    // client-shaped CREATE DTO strips the context FK `userId`, re-attached from the schema allowlist on
+    // the system path); the authorize endpoint reads/lists a user's grants via readAsSystem/listAsSystem
+    // to decide whether to skip the consent prompt. Default is fail-closed FORBIDDEN, so opt each in.
+    systemAccessPolicy: {
+        exportSubject: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,
+        create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,
+        update: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,
+        read: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,
+        list: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,
+    },
+    portabilityPolicy: { defaultProvenance: DataPortabilityProvenance.SUBJECT_PROVIDED },
+    coreOperations: [
+        CoreResourceOperation.READ,
+        CoreResourceOperation.LIST,
+        CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,
+        CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
+        CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,
+    ],
+    operationsConfiguration: {
+        // Owner-facing: the USER_SELF primary-scope filter restricts results to the caller's own grants.
+        [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {
+            variants: [
+                { variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL, isDefault: true, roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_USER], riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW },
+            ],
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {
+            variants: [
+                { variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL, isDefault: true, roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_USER], riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW },
+            ],
+        },
+        // System-only: the consent-decision endpoint is the sole writer (createAsSystem / updateAsSystem).
+        [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {
+            variants: [
+                { variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL, isDefault: true, roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM },
+            ],
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {
+            variants: [
+                { variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL, isDefault: true, roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM },
+            ],
+        },
+        // Owner-facing revoke (USER_SELF filter → own grant only). The USERS onParentDelete composition
+        // cascade also deletes grants, directly at the repository layer (variant-agnostic — it only requires
+        // a DELETE op to exist).
+        [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {
+            variants: [
+                { variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL, isDefault: true, roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_USER], riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM },
+            ],
+        },
+    },
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=oauth-consent-grants.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map