@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.0.1 → 1.1.0

package/dist/esm/compliance/audit-trails/security-audit-event-envelope.shared.schema.d.ts

@@ -6,16 +6,12 @@
  * Org SIEM export ships per-org security events to the customer's own SIEM.
  */
 import { z } from 'zod';
-import { AuditEventCategory, AuditEventSeverity } from './auditable-events.shared.schema.js';
+import { AuditEventCategory, AuditEventSeverity, CoreAuditableEventType } from './auditable-events.shared.schema';
 /** Outcome for SIEM envelope — success or failure. */
 export declare enum AuditEventOutcome {
     SUCCESS = "success",
     FAILURE = "failure"
 }
-/** @deprecated Use AuditEventCategory */
-export type SecurityAuditEventCategory = AuditEventCategory;
-/** @deprecated Use AuditEventSeverity */
-export type SecurityAuditEventSeverity = AuditEventSeverity;
 /** ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  * Security Audit Event Envelope Schema
  * ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
@@ -25,6 +21,9 @@ export declare const SecurityAuditEventEnvelopeSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     eventCategory: z.ZodEnum<typeof AuditEventCategory>;
     severity: z.ZodEnum<typeof AuditEventSeverity>;
     timestamp: z.ZodString;
+    correlationId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    clientInstanceId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    frontendServiceName: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
     organizationId: z.ZodString;
     organizationName: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
     applicationId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
@@ -43,11 +42,11 @@ export declare const SecurityAuditEventEnvelopeSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     geoLocation: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodObject<{
         country: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
         city: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    }, z.core.$strip, core.$ZodObjectExtra>>;
+    }, z.core.$strip>>;
     eventData: z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodAny>;
     outcome: z.ZodEnum<typeof AuditEventOutcome>;
     outcomeReason: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-}, z.core.$strip, core.$ZodObjectExtra>;
+}, z.core.$strip>;
 export type SecurityAuditEventEnvelope = z.infer<typeof SecurityAuditEventEnvelopeSchema>;
 /** ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
  * Event Classification Map
@@ -59,11 +58,27 @@ export interface AuditEventClassification {
     category: AuditEventCategory;
     severity: AuditEventSeverity;
 }
-export declare const AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION_MAP: Record<string, AuditEventClassification>;
+/**
+ * Every core auditable event's SIEM category and severity.
+ *
+ * **Total over `CoreAuditableEventType` on purpose.** It was `Record<string, …>`, which let two
+ * emitted event types — `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_READ` and `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_WRITE` — carry no entry at all
+ * while the lookup's own JSDoc claimed "all CoreAuditableEventType values are mapped". They silently
+ * took the fallback below, and because the fallback is one value, the WRITE inherited the READ's
+ * classification: the two events exist separately precisely because "a MUTATION under an ACL bypass is
+ * more sensitive than a read", and the classification erased that. A new core event type is now a
+ * compile error rather than a silent `DATA_ACCESS`/`INFO`.
+ *
+ * The lookup still tolerates unknown strings, because applications may define their own event types —
+ * the fallback covers THOSE, which is what it was for.
+ */
+export declare const AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION_MAP: Record<CoreAuditableEventType, AuditEventClassification>;
 /**
  * Look up the classification for an audit event type.
- * All CoreAuditableEventType values are mapped; unknown/custom event types
- * fall back to { category: 'data_access', severity: 'info' }.
+ *
+ * Every `CoreAuditableEventType` is mapped — enforced by the map's type, not by this comment, which
+ * asserted exactly that while two event types went unmapped for months. The fallback exists for
+ * APPLICATION-defined event types, which are ordinary strings the engine cannot enumerate.
  */
 export declare function getAuditEventClassification(eventType: string): AuditEventClassification;
 //# sourceMappingURL=security-audit-event-envelope.shared.schema.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/compliance/audit-trails/security-audit-event-envelope.shared.schema.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"security-audit-event-envelope.shared.schema.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/compliance/audit-trails/security-audit-event-envelope.shared.schema.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;GAMG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,kCAAkC,CAAC;AAElH,sDAAsD;AACtD,oBAAY,iBAAiB;IAC3B,OAAO,YAAY;IACnB,OAAO,YAAY;CACpB;AAED;;oEAEoE;AAEpE,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAuD3C,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,0BAA0B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,gCAAgC,CAAC,CAAC;AAE1F;;;;;oEAKoE;AAEpE,MAAM,WAAW,wBAAwB;IACvC,QAAQ,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;IAC7B,QAAQ,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;CAC9B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,8BAA8B,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAmUnG,CAAC;AAIF;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,2BAA2B,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,wBAAwB,CAEvF"}

package/dist/esm/compliance/audit-trails/security-audit-event-envelope.shared.schema.js

@@ -23,6 +23,22 @@ export const SecurityAuditEventEnvelopeSchema = z.object({
     eventCategory: z.enum(AuditEventCategory),
     severity: z.enum(AuditEventSeverity),
     timestamp: z.string(),
+    /** Request-correlation id (groups every event of one request; matches the app's logs/errors). */
+    correlationId: z.string().optional(),
+    /**
+     * Client-install id — groups an actor's events across sessions and logins, the correlation NIST
+     * SP 800-53 AU-6(3) asks for at review time. Present ONLY for applications that opted into
+     * `compliance.clientInstanceIdScope`; absent (never null-filled) for every other application, so a
+     * SIEM rule keying on it simply never matches rather than seeing an empty field.
+     */
+    clientInstanceId: z.string().optional(),
+    /**
+     * Which frontend SURFACE the request came from (app / website / docs). Carried for the same reason as
+     * the two ids above: an external reviewer correlating in the SIEM needs the same origin axes the audit
+     * row has, and shipping two of the three origin signals was an asymmetry with no rationale behind it.
+     * Absent for non-HTTP (job / cron / internal) events.
+     */
+    frontendServiceName: z.string().optional(),
     // Context
     organizationId: z.string(),
     organizationName: z.string().optional(),
@@ -51,12 +67,32 @@ export const SecurityAuditEventEnvelopeSchema = z.object({
     outcome: z.enum(AuditEventOutcome),
     outcomeReason: z.string().optional(),
 });
+/**
+ * Every core auditable event's SIEM category and severity.
+ *
+ * **Total over `CoreAuditableEventType` on purpose.** It was `Record<string, …>`, which let two
+ * emitted event types — `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_READ` and `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_WRITE` — carry no entry at all
+ * while the lookup's own JSDoc claimed "all CoreAuditableEventType values are mapped". They silently
+ * took the fallback below, and because the fallback is one value, the WRITE inherited the READ's
+ * classification: the two events exist separately precisely because "a MUTATION under an ACL bypass is
+ * more sensitive than a read", and the classification erased that. A new core event type is now a
+ * compile error rather than a silent `DATA_ACCESS`/`INFO`.
+ *
+ * The lookup still tolerates unknown strings, because applications may define their own event types —
+ * the fallback covers THOSE, which is what it was for.
+ */
 export const AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION_MAP = {
     // Authentication Events
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_LOGIN]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_LOGOUT]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_LOGIN_FAILED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_ACCOUNT_LOCKED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.MACHINE_AUTH_SUCCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.MACHINE_AUTH_FAILED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    // Machine RESOURCE-ACCESS (token-USE): an authorized, expected per-request access to an A2A/MCP
+    // surface — DATA_ACCESS/INFO, mirroring FIELD_ACCESS. The security signal is the volume/pattern a
+    // SIEM derives from this stream, not any single row.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.MACHINE_ACCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSWORD_CHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_MFA_ENABLED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_MFA_DISABLED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
@@ -72,10 +108,34 @@ export const AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION_MAP = {
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_CREATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_DELETED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    // Application-Role Administration — AUTHORIZATION (not USER_LIFECYCLE): the event is an
+    // access-control decision, and an org SIEM filtering on the authorization category must see
+    // application-role grants alongside `ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED`. Same WARNING severity as
+    // that event for the same reason — a privilege change is never routine INFO traffic.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_APP_ROLES_CHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    // The application has NO usable super-administrator. CRITICAL rather than WARNING: unlike a role
+    // change (a decision someone made, which an auditor reviews), this is a state nobody can undo from
+    // inside the product — every recovery door is gated on the very role that is missing. AUTHORIZATION
+    // because it is the absence of an authorization principal, not a user-lifecycle transition.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.APPLICATION_SUPER_ADMIN_FLOOR_BREACHED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_OWNER_FLOOR_BREACHED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },
     // Organization Lifecycle Events
     [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_CREATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_DELETED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_DELETION_REQUESTED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_RESTORED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_SUSPENDED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_ACTIVATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    // WARNING rather than INFO: the event covers BOTH directions, and the restricting direction
+    // (suspend / deactivate) is what an access review is looking for. Grading the pair by its
+    // less-serious half would bury suspensions among routine noise; the payload carries
+    // `previousStatus` → `newStatus`, so a consumer that wants only lifts can still filter.
+    // `USER_LIFECYCLE`, not `AUTHORIZATION`: the event records what CHANGED (a subject's lifecycle
+    // status) rather than its consequence. Every subject it covers — a user row, a membership row —
+    // is a person's participation in the product, and grading it by consequence would scatter it
+    // among role grants that answer a different question.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_STATUS_TRANSITION_PERFORMED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
     // Organization Member Events
     [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_JOINED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
@@ -88,9 +148,55 @@ export const AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION_MAP = {
     [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PREFERENCES_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROFILE_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_UNIT_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    // Per-unit role assignment — AUTHORIZATION (not ORG_MANAGEMENT, unlike its ORGANIZATION_UNIT_UPDATED
+    // neighbour): the unit's own record-keeping confers nothing, whereas `OrganizationUnitMember.role`
+    // is read back into `initiatorRoles` as a unit-narrowed grant. Narrower blast radius than
+    // ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED, but the same KIND of decision, so it carries the same category
+    // and severity — an org SIEM filtering on authorization must see both.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    // Revocation of a unit assignment. AUTHORIZATION deliberately, where the ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_REMOVED
+    // above is ORG_MANAGEMENT: removing a MEMBER is a directory action whose authority loss is a
+    // side effect, whereas an assignment row exists ONLY to confer a role — deleting it IS the
+    // revocation. Same category and severity as the grant it closes, so an authorization-filtered
+    // trail never shows unit privileges granted and never removed.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBER_REMOVED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
     // Organization Security Management Events
     [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_SSO_CONFIGURATION_CHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIGURED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    // Application Security Configuration Events
+    // WARNING mirrors the SSO-configuration-changed sibling: a change to the authentication assurance
+    // posture (MFA / password / lockout) is more than record-keeping (INFO) yet is not an active
+    // breach (ERROR). Category ORG_MANAGEMENT keeps it in the same security-configuration cluster a
+    // reviewer already queries for SSO/SIEM/SCIM configuration changes.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.APPLICATION_AUTH_POLICY_CHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    // Outbound M2M Webhook Events
+    // WARNING rather than INFO, and the choice is externally grounded rather than taste — it was
+    // challenged on the reasonable objection that every LEGITIMATE connectivity test then emits a
+    // warning-level row.
+    //
+    // NIST SP 800-53 does not settle it directly: AU-6 treats what counts as "inappropriate or
+    // unusual activity" as an explicit ORGANIZATION-DEFINED assignment and prescribes no INFO /
+    // WARNING / CRITICAL vocabulary at all, so no NIST rule is broken in either direction. What NIST
+    // does settle is the REMEDY for noise: AU-6(1) automated review integration, AU-6(3) correlation
+    // across repositories, and supplemental guidance letting organizations tune review "frequency,
+    // scope, and/or depth". Volume is answered by correlating and tuning REVIEW — never by demoting
+    // the record itself, which would destroy the signal rather than manage it.
+    //
+    // OWASP's Logging Vocabulary Cheat Sheet is the concrete industry answer and puts this at WARN:
+    // successful, authorized ADMINISTRATIVE operations sit at WARN (`user_created`, `user_updated`,
+    // `sys_startup` / `sys_shutdown` / `sys_restart`), while INFO is reserved for routine end-user
+    // activity (`authn_login_success`, `session_created`, a user's own `authn_password_change`). The
+    // rationale is that administrative operations are high-risk and abuse-prone regardless of whether
+    // any single instance succeeded. `testEndpoint` is precisely that shape — admin-gated, and it
+    // makes the SYSTEM open an outbound connection to an operator-supplied URL — so it belongs beside
+    // the `sys_*` state changes, not beside a user login. (OWASP likewise grades
+    // `excess_rate_limit_exceeded` at WARN, which is this operation's own refusal mode.)
+    //
+    // The load-bearing property: a burst of probes across many hosts is the shape of egress
+    // reconnaissance, and that pattern is only visible if the individual rows are not filtered out by
+    // default. If a deployment finds the volume genuinely noisy, tune the SIEM's review per AU-6 —
+    // do not silently downgrade this to INFO.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.WEBHOOK_ENDPOINT_TEST_DISPATCHED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
     // SCIM Directory Provisioning Events
     [CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_TOKEN_CREATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_TOKEN_REVOKED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
@@ -100,6 +206,10 @@ export const AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION_MAP = {
     // Password Reset Events (H5)
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSWORD_RESET_REQUESTED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSWORD_RESET_COMPLETED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    // CRITICAL, one step above the self-service arms: an administrator reaching into another
+    // account's credentials is the shape of both a legitimate incident response AND an insider
+    // takeover, so it must page rather than merely accumulate.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSWORD_RESET_FORCED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },
     // Registration & Verification Events (H5)
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_REGISTERED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_EMAIL_VERIFIED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
@@ -148,16 +258,129 @@ export const AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION_MAP = {
     // One-Off Session Events (W7.3b)
     [CoreAuditableEventType.ONE_OFF_TOKEN_CREATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
     [CoreAuditableEventType.ONE_OFF_TOKEN_EXCHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    // Revocation is an ADMINISTRATIVE credential-termination — a super-admin cancels an un-exchanged
+    // one-off/impersonation token. Per OWASP's Logging Vocabulary, administrative operations are WARNING
+    // even when successful and authorized: a SOC wants one-off-token revocations visible (incident
+    // response, or an abuse burst of cancellations). CREATED/EXCHANGED stay INFO (routine mint/use); the
+    // revoke is the operator intervention, which is the higher-signal row.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.ONE_OFF_TOKEN_REVOKED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    // Cross-Frontend Handoff Events (cross-app-jwt-propagation Step 2)
+    // Issuance is a credential-minting action (re-issues fresh JWT pair AND a single-use
+    // AUTH_CODE_EXCHANGE token bound to the user). WARNING severity matches other
+    // cross-session credential events (USER_PASSWORD_RESET_COMPLETED, USER_PASSKEY_REGISTERED)
+    // so SOC dashboards flag unusual handoff issuance bursts (e.g. token-issuance abuse).
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_CROSS_FRONTEND_HANDOFF_ISSUED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
     // Field Access Events
     [CoreAuditableEventType.FIELD_ACCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    // Resource-Operation Events — a HIGH/CRITICAL operation took effect on a resource.
+    // AUTHORIZATION rather than DATA_ACCESS: this event exists to evidence that a privileged ACTION
+    // was exercised (role/status/credential/tenant mutations), not that data was read — FIELD_ACCESS
+    // owns the disclosure axis. WARNING rather than INFO because every emission is by construction a
+    // HIGH or CRITICAL verb (or an explicit opt-in), so an INFO floor would hide the whole family
+    // beneath the routine-read noise on a SOC dashboard; and not CRITICAL because these are
+    // AUTHORIZED administrative actions, so reserving CRITICAL for anomalies (binding violations,
+    // token-reuse) keeps that level meaningful.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    // The REFUSAL twin. AUTHORIZATION for the same reason as the success row — it IS an access-control
+    // decision, just the negative one.
+    //
+    // WARNING, and deliberately NOT graded by the refused operation's `riskLevel`: severity is a pure
+    // function of event type for every other member of this map, AND the SIEM dispatcher re-derives it
+    // from the event type independently (`_passesEventFilter`), so a per-row severity would have to be
+    // threaded through two authorities and would still leave this the only type whose severity is not
+    // a property of its kind. Danger grading rides the row's `riskLevel` field, which is already the
+    // framework's canonical danger axis; burst grading rides `eventData.occurrenceCount`.
+    //
+    // WARNING also matches the AUTHENTICATION twins (USER_LOGIN_FAILED, MACHINE_AUTH_FAILED): a single
+    // refusal is a fail-closed control working correctly, not an incident. CRITICAL stays reserved for
+    // anomalies — and the anomaly here is the PATTERN (many refusals), which a SOC rule builds from
+    // `occurrenceCount` rather than from one row's severity.
+    //
+    // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_DENIED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    // WARNING, not CRITICAL, and the choice is deliberate. A platform operator reaching into a tenant
+    // is SANCTIONED here (see the event's schema JSDoc) — most support work is exactly this — so
+    // CRITICAL would cry wolf on routine activity and train reviewers to filter the category out. The
+    // signal worth escalating on is the `admissionDeclared: false` subset, which a SIEM rule can select
+    // precisely because the field is on the payload.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATIVE_ACCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    // INFO, unlike the WARNING sibling above: an application-wide directory read is the sanctioned,
+    // ordinary use of a surface built for it, and grading it WARNING would bury the genuine crossings.
+    // The subset worth escalating is selected on `returnedCount` — an operator paging 40,000 rows is an
+    // export — which is why that field is on the payload rather than inferred from the row count.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.PLATFORM_DIRECTORY_ACCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    // WARNING for the same reason as its sibling above: requesting and deciding elevations is routine
+    // operator traffic, and CRITICAL here would train reviewers to filter the category out. The subset
+    // worth escalating is `autoApprovalReason: TENANT_CANNOT_APPROVE`, which a SIEM rule selects on and
+    // which the emitter additionally carries at a higher `riskLevel`.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.PLATFORM_ACCESS_GRANT_LIFECYCLE]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    // Retained-Data (Impersonalization) Access Events
+    // A privileged, human-attributed see-through read over RETAINED (impersonalized) records. WARNING —
+    // elevated vs a normal FIELD_ACCESS/INFO read because it reveals data the retention boundary hides,
+    // so SOC dashboards surface it; but an AUTHORIZED compliance action, not an anomaly ⇒ not CRITICAL.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.RETAINED_DATA_ACCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    // The single most sensitive disclosure the framework performs — everything held about one person,
+    // handed out. Same DATA_ACCESS / WARNING classification as a retained-data see-through: authorized
+    // and expected, but always worth a reviewer's eye.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    // INFO, with the page-vs-whole-table distinction carried by the per-emission `riskLevel` (LOW/HIGH)
+    // rather than by severity — see AuditableEvent_CollectionDataExport_EventDataSchema. A routine page
+    // download raised to WARNING would train reviewers to skim the channel it shares with real signals.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    // Routine, authorized read-through of an EXTERNAL system's rows — the value is the queryable
+    // trail (who/which provider/which entity/how much), not an alarm. WARNING would put every
+    // ordinary external read beside see-through privileged access and train reviewers to skim.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.HTTP_API_READ_THROUGH_ACCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    // The sanctioned mechanics of a data-protection request (D6 stance 6b) — routine, not an alarm.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.HTTP_API_EXTERNAL_ERASURE]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    // A deliberate, per-request erasure hole (D6 stance 6c) — the record is the control, so it must
+    // surface in every severity-filtered view an operator actually reads.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.HTTP_API_NON_ERASURE_ACKNOWLEDGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },
+    // OAuth2 / OIDC Provider Events (Wildo AS the authorization server). Delegated-authority grants +
+    // consent decisions are AUTHORIZATION; token lifecycle (refresh/revoke) is AUTHENTICATION. Severity:
+    // a third party gaining/holding user-acting access is WARNING (notable, SOC-dashboard-worthy, but an
+    // authorized/consented action ⇒ not CRITICAL); a cross-user binding violation or refresh-token theft
+    // is CRITICAL; a denial/routine refresh/revoke is INFO.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_DELEGATED_TOKEN_ISSUED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANTED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CONSENT_DENIED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANT_PERSISTED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    // WARNING, not INFO: an unauthenticated party created a durable identity. Individually routine
+    // when the feature is enabled, but the SHAPE an operator must be able to alert on is a spike —
+    // which only reads as a spike if each one is above the noise floor.
+    // AUTHENTICATION/WARNING: a refused client identity is an authentication-front event, and the
+    // SSRF variant is an attack rather than a misconfiguration. WARNING keeps a spike visible without
+    // making an ordinary allow-list miss look like an incident.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CIMD_CLIENT_REFUSED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_DYNAMIC_CLIENT_REGISTERED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_TOKEN_REFRESHED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_TOKEN_REVOKED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_RP_INITIATED_LOGOUT]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CODE_EXCHANGE_FAILED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CONSENT_BINDING_VIOLATION]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_REFRESH_TOKEN_REUSE_DETECTED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },
+    // System-context (ACL-bypass) trail. Both were UNMAPPED until 2026-08-11 and took the fallback.
+    // The READ keeps exactly what the fallback gave it — its declaration already documented
+    // `DATA_ACCESS`/`INFO` as intended ("an expected, authorized internal read — not an anomaly"), so
+    // this only stops that intent depending on a default nobody had noticed it was relying on.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.SYSTEM_CONTEXT_READ]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },
+    // The WRITE is raised to WARNING, following `RETAINED_DATA_ACCESS` — the other privileged-access
+    // event in this file — which reasons that an authorized-but-elevated access is WARNING and not
+    // CRITICAL because it is expected rather than anomalous. Category deliberately UNCHANGED: moving it
+    // to AUTHORIZATION would drop it for every tenant whose export filters on categories, which is a
+    // worse failure than an under-graded severity. This is the classification the event's own
+    // declaration asks for and had never received.
+    [CoreAuditableEventType.SYSTEM_CONTEXT_WRITE]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },
 };
 const DEFAULT_AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION = { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO };
 /**
  * Look up the classification for an audit event type.
- * All CoreAuditableEventType values are mapped; unknown/custom event types
- * fall back to { category: 'data_access', severity: 'info' }.
+ *
+ * Every `CoreAuditableEventType` is mapped — enforced by the map's type, not by this comment, which
+ * asserted exactly that while two event types went unmapped for months. The fallback exists for
+ * APPLICATION-defined event types, which are ordinary strings the engine cannot enumerate.
  */
 export function getAuditEventClassification(eventType) {
     return AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION_MAP[eventType] ?? DEFAULT_AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION;
 }
-//# sourceMappingURL=security-audit-event-envelope.shared.schema.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=security-audit-event-envelope.shared.schema.js.map

package/dist/esm/compliance/audit-trails/security-audit-event-envelope.shared.schema.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Security Audit Event Envelope — the structured JSON payload sent to customer SIEM.\n * \n * This is the canonical format for events exported via the org-level SIEM export pipeline.\n * Different from platform observability (which ships to Axiom/Datadog for platform ops).\n * Org SIEM export ships per-org security events to the customer's own SIEM.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AuditEventCategory, AuditEventSeverity, CoreAuditableEventType } from './auditable-events.shared.schema';\n\n/** Outcome for SIEM envelope — success or failure. */\nexport enum AuditEventOutcome {\n  SUCCESS = 'success',\n  FAILURE = 'failure',\n}\n\n/** ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n * Security Audit Event Envelope Schema\n * ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */\n\nexport const SecurityAuditEventEnvelopeSchema = z.object({\n  // Standard fields (always present)\n  eventId: z.string(),\n  eventType: z.string(),\n  eventCategory: z.enum(AuditEventCategory),\n  severity: z.enum(AuditEventSeverity),\n  timestamp: z.string(),\n  /** Request-correlation id (groups every event of one request; matches the app's logs/errors). */\n  correlationId: z.string().optional(),\n  /**\n   * Client-install id — groups an actor's events across sessions and logins, the correlation NIST\n   * SP 800-53 AU-6(3) asks for at review time. Present ONLY for applications that opted into\n   * `compliance.clientInstanceIdScope`; absent (never null-filled) for every other application, so a\n   * SIEM rule keying on it simply never matches rather than seeing an empty field.\n   */\n  clientInstanceId: z.string().optional(),\n  /**\n   * Which frontend SURFACE the request came from (app / website / docs). Carried for the same reason as\n   * the two ids above: an external reviewer correlating in the SIEM needs the same origin axes the audit\n   * row has, and shipping two of the three origin signals was an asymmetry with no rationale behind it.\n   * Absent for non-HTTP (job / cron / internal) events.\n   */\n  frontendServiceName: z.string().optional(),\n\n  // Context\n  organizationId: z.string(),\n  organizationName: z.string().optional(),\n  applicationId: z.string().optional(),\n  applicationName: z.string().optional(),\n  userId: z.string().optional(),\n  userEmail: z.string().optional(),\n\n  // Source\n  sourceService: z.string(),\n  sourceVersion: z.string(),\n  sourceEnvironment: z.string(),\n\n  // Auth-specific context (when applicable)\n  authMethod: z.string().optional(),\n  authSource: z.string().optional(),\n  providerRef: z.string().optional(),\n  connectionType: z.string().optional(),\n  ipAddress: z.string().optional(),\n  userAgent: z.string().optional(),\n  geoLocation: z.object({\n    country: z.string().optional(),\n    city: z.string().optional(),\n  }).optional(),\n\n  // Event-specific data\n  eventData: z.record(z.string(), z.any()),\n\n  // Outcome\n  outcome: z.enum(AuditEventOutcome),\n  outcomeReason: z.string().optional(),\n});\n\nexport type SecurityAuditEventEnvelope = z.infer<typeof SecurityAuditEventEnvelopeSchema>;\n\n/** ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n * Event Classification Map\n * \n * Maps each CoreAuditableEventType to its category and severity.\n * Used by the dispatcher to classify events for SIEM filtering.\n * ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */\n\nexport interface AuditEventClassification {\n  category: AuditEventCategory;\n  severity: AuditEventSeverity;\n}\n\n/**\n * Every core auditable event's SIEM category and severity.\n *\n * **Total over `CoreAuditableEventType` on purpose.** It was `Record<string, …>`, which let two\n * emitted event types — `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_READ` and `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_WRITE` — carry no entry at all\n * while the lookup's own JSDoc claimed \"all CoreAuditableEventType values are mapped\". They silently\n * took the fallback below, and because the fallback is one value, the WRITE inherited the READ's\n * classification: the two events exist separately precisely because \"a MUTATION under an ACL bypass is\n * more sensitive than a read\", and the classification erased that. A new core event type is now a\n * compile error rather than a silent `DATA_ACCESS`/`INFO`.\n *\n * The lookup still tolerates unknown strings, because applications may define their own event types —\n * the fallback covers THOSE, which is what it was for.\n */\nexport const AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION_MAP: Record<CoreAuditableEventType, AuditEventClassification> = {\n  // Authentication Events\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_LOGIN]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_LOGOUT]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_LOGIN_FAILED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_ACCOUNT_LOCKED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.MACHINE_AUTH_SUCCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.MACHINE_AUTH_FAILED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  // Machine RESOURCE-ACCESS (token-USE): an authorized, expected per-request access to an A2A/MCP\n  // surface — DATA_ACCESS/INFO, mirroring FIELD_ACCESS. The security signal is the volume/pattern a\n  // SIEM derives from this stream, not any single row.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.MACHINE_ACCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSWORD_CHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_MFA_ENABLED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_MFA_DISABLED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SESSION_EXPIRED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n\n  // SSO Authentication Events\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SSO_LOGIN]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SSO_LOGIN_FAILED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SSO_ENFORCEMENT_BLOCKED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_TOKEN_REFRESHED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n\n  // Emergency Access Events\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.EMERGENCY_ACCESS_USED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },\n\n  // User Lifecycle Events\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_CREATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_DELETED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n\n  // Application-Role Administration — AUTHORIZATION (not USER_LIFECYCLE): the event is an\n  // access-control decision, and an org SIEM filtering on the authorization category must see\n  // application-role grants alongside `ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED`. Same WARNING severity as\n  // that event for the same reason — a privilege change is never routine INFO traffic.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_APP_ROLES_CHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // The application has NO usable super-administrator. CRITICAL rather than WARNING: unlike a role\n  // change (a decision someone made, which an auditor reviews), this is a state nobody can undo from\n  // inside the product — every recovery door is gated on the very role that is missing. AUTHORIZATION\n  // because it is the absence of an authorization principal, not a user-lifecycle transition.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.APPLICATION_SUPER_ADMIN_FLOOR_BREACHED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_OWNER_FLOOR_BREACHED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },\n\n  // Organization Lifecycle Events\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_CREATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_DELETED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_DELETION_REQUESTED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_RESTORED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_SUSPENDED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_ACTIVATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  // WARNING rather than INFO: the event covers BOTH directions, and the restricting direction\n  // (suspend / deactivate) is what an access review is looking for. Grading the pair by its\n  // less-serious half would bury suspensions among routine noise; the payload carries\n  // `previousStatus` → `newStatus`, so a consumer that wants only lifts can still filter.\n  // `USER_LIFECYCLE`, not `AUTHORIZATION`: the event records what CHANGED (a subject's lifecycle\n  // status) rather than its consequence. Every subject it covers — a user row, a membership row —\n  // is a person's participation in the product, and grading it by consequence would scatter it\n  // among role grants that answer a different question.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_STATUS_TRANSITION_PERFORMED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // Organization Member Events\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_JOINED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_STATUS_CHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_REMOVED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // Organization Config Events\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_NOTIFICATIONS_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PREFERENCES_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_PROFILE_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_UNIT_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n\n  // Per-unit role assignment — AUTHORIZATION (not ORG_MANAGEMENT, unlike its ORGANIZATION_UNIT_UPDATED\n  // neighbour): the unit's own record-keeping confers nothing, whereas `OrganizationUnitMember.role`\n  // is read back into `initiatorRoles` as a unit-narrowed grant. Narrower blast radius than\n  // ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED, but the same KIND of decision, so it carries the same category\n  // and severity — an org SIEM filtering on authorization must see both.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // Revocation of a unit assignment. AUTHORIZATION deliberately, where the ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_REMOVED\n  // above is ORG_MANAGEMENT: removing a MEMBER is a directory action whose authority loss is a\n  // side effect, whereas an assignment row exists ONLY to confer a role — deleting it IS the\n  // revocation. Same category and severity as the grant it closes, so an authorization-filtered\n  // trail never shows unit privileges granted and never removed.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_UNIT_MEMBER_REMOVED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // Organization Security Management Events\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_SSO_CONFIGURATION_CHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIGURED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n\n  // Application Security Configuration Events\n  // WARNING mirrors the SSO-configuration-changed sibling: a change to the authentication assurance\n  // posture (MFA / password / lockout) is more than record-keeping (INFO) yet is not an active\n  // breach (ERROR). Category ORG_MANAGEMENT keeps it in the same security-configuration cluster a\n  // reviewer already queries for SSO/SIEM/SCIM configuration changes.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.APPLICATION_AUTH_POLICY_CHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // Outbound M2M Webhook Events\n  // WARNING rather than INFO, and the choice is externally grounded rather than taste — it was\n  // challenged on the reasonable objection that every LEGITIMATE connectivity test then emits a\n  // warning-level row.\n  //\n  // NIST SP 800-53 does not settle it directly: AU-6 treats what counts as \"inappropriate or\n  // unusual activity\" as an explicit ORGANIZATION-DEFINED assignment and prescribes no INFO /\n  // WARNING / CRITICAL vocabulary at all, so no NIST rule is broken in either direction. What NIST\n  // does settle is the REMEDY for noise: AU-6(1) automated review integration, AU-6(3) correlation\n  // across repositories, and supplemental guidance letting organizations tune review \"frequency,\n  // scope, and/or depth\". Volume is answered by correlating and tuning REVIEW — never by demoting\n  // the record itself, which would destroy the signal rather than manage it.\n  //\n  // OWASP's Logging Vocabulary Cheat Sheet is the concrete industry answer and puts this at WARN:\n  // successful, authorized ADMINISTRATIVE operations sit at WARN (`user_created`, `user_updated`,\n  // `sys_startup` / `sys_shutdown` / `sys_restart`), while INFO is reserved for routine end-user\n  // activity (`authn_login_success`, `session_created`, a user's own `authn_password_change`). The\n  // rationale is that administrative operations are high-risk and abuse-prone regardless of whether\n  // any single instance succeeded. `testEndpoint` is precisely that shape — admin-gated, and it\n  // makes the SYSTEM open an outbound connection to an operator-supplied URL — so it belongs beside\n  // the `sys_*` state changes, not beside a user login. (OWASP likewise grades\n  // `excess_rate_limit_exceeded` at WARN, which is this operation's own refusal mode.)\n  //\n  // The load-bearing property: a burst of probes across many hosts is the shape of egress\n  // reconnaissance, and that pattern is only visible if the individual rows are not filtered out by\n  // default. If a deployment finds the volume genuinely noisy, tune the SIEM's review per AU-6 —\n  // do not silently downgrade this to INFO.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.WEBHOOK_ENDPOINT_TEST_DISPATCHED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // SCIM Directory Provisioning Events\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_TOKEN_CREATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_TOKEN_REVOKED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_USER_PROVISIONED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_USER_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_USER_DEACTIVATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // Password Reset Events (H5)\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSWORD_RESET_REQUESTED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSWORD_RESET_COMPLETED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  // CRITICAL, one step above the self-service arms: an administrator reaching into another\n  // account's credentials is the shape of both a legitimate incident response AND an insider\n  // takeover, so it must page rather than merely accumulate.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSWORD_RESET_FORCED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },\n\n  // Registration & Verification Events (H5)\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_REGISTERED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_EMAIL_VERIFIED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_VERIFICATION_EMAIL_RESENT]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n\n  // MFA Lifecycle Events (H5)\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_MFA_SETUP_STARTED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_MFA_SETUP_COMPLETED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_MFA_EMAIL_OTP_SENT]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n\n  // WebAuthn/Passkey Events (Phase G1)\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSKEY_REGISTERED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSKEY_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSKEY_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSKEY_REMOVED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // Magic Link Events (Phase G2)\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_MAGIC_LINK_SENT]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_MAGIC_LINK_VERIFIED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_MAGIC_LINK_FAILED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // SMS OTP Events (Phase G2)\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SMS_OTP_SENT]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SMS_OTP_VERIFIED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_SMS_OTP_FAILED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // Phone Verification Events (Phase G2)\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PHONE_VERIFIED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PHONE_VERIFICATION_FAILED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // OAuth2 Provider Restriction Events (Phase G3)\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH2_PROVIDER_BLOCKED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // SCIM Extended Events\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_TOKEN_GENERATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_TOKEN_ROTATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_PROVISIONING_CONFIG_UPDATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SCIM_PROVISIONING_FAILED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },\n\n  // SAML Authentication Events (AUTH-2, D19.4)\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SAML_LOGIN_INITIATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SAML_LOGIN_SUCCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SAML_LOGIN_FAILED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SAML_ASSERTION_REPLAY_DETECTED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SAML_CERT_EXPIRING]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SAML_SLO_INITIATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SAML_SLO_COMPLETED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SAML_METADATA_PARSED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SAML_EMAIL_CHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // Method Management Events (#13f)\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_PASSWORD_SET]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_TOTP_DISABLED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_IDENTITY_LINK_REMOVED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // One-Off Session Events (W7.3b)\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ONE_OFF_TOKEN_CREATED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ONE_OFF_TOKEN_EXCHANGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  // Revocation is an ADMINISTRATIVE credential-termination — a super-admin cancels an un-exchanged\n  // one-off/impersonation token. Per OWASP's Logging Vocabulary, administrative operations are WARNING\n  // even when successful and authorized: a SOC wants one-off-token revocations visible (incident\n  // response, or an abuse burst of cancellations). CREATED/EXCHANGED stay INFO (routine mint/use); the\n  // revoke is the operator intervention, which is the higher-signal row.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.ONE_OFF_TOKEN_REVOKED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // Cross-Frontend Handoff Events (cross-app-jwt-propagation Step 2)\n  // Issuance is a credential-minting action (re-issues fresh JWT pair AND a single-use\n  // AUTH_CODE_EXCHANGE token bound to the user). WARNING severity matches other\n  // cross-session credential events (USER_PASSWORD_RESET_COMPLETED, USER_PASSKEY_REGISTERED)\n  // so SOC dashboards flag unusual handoff issuance bursts (e.g. token-issuance abuse).\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_CROSS_FRONTEND_HANDOFF_ISSUED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // Field Access Events\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.FIELD_ACCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n\n  // Resource-Operation Events — a HIGH/CRITICAL operation took effect on a resource.\n  // AUTHORIZATION rather than DATA_ACCESS: this event exists to evidence that a privileged ACTION\n  // was exercised (role/status/credential/tenant mutations), not that data was read — FIELD_ACCESS\n  // owns the disclosure axis. WARNING rather than INFO because every emission is by construction a\n  // HIGH or CRITICAL verb (or an explicit opt-in), so an INFO floor would hide the whole family\n  // beneath the routine-read noise on a SOC dashboard; and not CRITICAL because these are\n  // AUTHORIZED administrative actions, so reserving CRITICAL for anomalies (binding violations,\n  // token-reuse) keeps that level meaningful.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // The REFUSAL twin. AUTHORIZATION for the same reason as the success row — it IS an access-control\n  // decision, just the negative one.\n  //\n  // WARNING, and deliberately NOT graded by the refused operation's `riskLevel`: severity is a pure\n  // function of event type for every other member of this map, AND the SIEM dispatcher re-derives it\n  // from the event type independently (`_passesEventFilter`), so a per-row severity would have to be\n  // threaded through two authorities and would still leave this the only type whose severity is not\n  // a property of its kind. Danger grading rides the row's `riskLevel` field, which is already the\n  // framework's canonical danger axis; burst grading rides `eventData.occurrenceCount`.\n  //\n  // WARNING also matches the AUTHENTICATION twins (USER_LOGIN_FAILED, MACHINE_AUTH_FAILED): a single\n  // refusal is a fail-closed control working correctly, not an incident. CRITICAL stays reserved for\n  // anomalies — and the anomaly here is the PATTERN (many refusals), which a SOC rule builds from\n  // `occurrenceCount` rather than from one row's severity.\n  //\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.AUTHORIZATION_DECISION_AUDIT\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.RESOURCE_OPERATION_DENIED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  // WARNING, not CRITICAL, and the choice is deliberate. A platform operator reaching into a tenant\n  // is SANCTIONED here (see the event's schema JSDoc) — most support work is exactly this — so\n  // CRITICAL would cry wolf on routine activity and train reviewers to filter the category out. The\n  // signal worth escalating on is the `admissionDeclared: false` subset, which a SIEM rule can select\n  // precisely because the field is on the payload.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.CROSS_TENANT_ADMINISTRATIVE_ACCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  // INFO, unlike the WARNING sibling above: an application-wide directory read is the sanctioned,\n  // ordinary use of a surface built for it, and grading it WARNING would bury the genuine crossings.\n  // The subset worth escalating is selected on `returnedCount` — an operator paging 40,000 rows is an\n  // export — which is why that field is on the payload rather than inferred from the row count.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.PLATFORM_DIRECTORY_ACCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  // WARNING for the same reason as its sibling above: requesting and deciding elevations is routine\n  // operator traffic, and CRITICAL here would train reviewers to filter the category out. The subset\n  // worth escalating is `autoApprovalReason: TENANT_CANNOT_APPROVE`, which a SIEM rule selects on and\n  // which the emitter additionally carries at a higher `riskLevel`.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.PLATFORM_ACCESS_GRANT_LIFECYCLE]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n\n  // Retained-Data (Impersonalization) Access Events\n  // A privileged, human-attributed see-through read over RETAINED (impersonalized) records. WARNING —\n  // elevated vs a normal FIELD_ACCESS/INFO read because it reveals data the retention boundary hides,\n  // so SOC dashboards surface it; but an AUTHORIZED compliance action, not an anomaly ⇒ not CRITICAL.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.RETAINED_DATA_ACCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  // The single most sensitive disclosure the framework performs — everything held about one person,\n  // handed out. Same DATA_ACCESS / WARNING classification as a retained-data see-through: authorized\n  // and expected, but always worth a reviewer's eye.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SUBJECT_DATA_EXPORT]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  // INFO, with the page-vs-whole-table distinction carried by the per-emission `riskLevel` (LOW/HIGH)\n  // rather than by severity — see AuditableEvent_CollectionDataExport_EventDataSchema. A routine page\n  // download raised to WARNING would train reviewers to skim the channel it shares with real signals.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.COLLECTION_DATA_EXPORT]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  // Routine, authorized read-through of an EXTERNAL system's rows — the value is the queryable\n  // trail (who/which provider/which entity/how much), not an alarm. WARNING would put every\n  // ordinary external read beside see-through privileged access and train reviewers to skim.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.HTTP_API_READ_THROUGH_ACCESS]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  // The sanctioned mechanics of a data-protection request (D6 stance 6b) — routine, not an alarm.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.HTTP_API_EXTERNAL_ERASURE]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  // A deliberate, per-request erasure hole (D6 stance 6c) — the record is the control, so it must\n  // surface in every severity-filtered view an operator actually reads.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.HTTP_API_NON_ERASURE_ACKNOWLEDGED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },\n\n  // OAuth2 / OIDC Provider Events (Wildo AS the authorization server). Delegated-authority grants +\n  // consent decisions are AUTHORIZATION; token lifecycle (refresh/revoke) is AUTHENTICATION. Severity:\n  // a third party gaining/holding user-acting access is WARNING (notable, SOC-dashboard-worthy, but an\n  // authorized/consented action ⇒ not CRITICAL); a cross-user binding violation or refresh-token theft\n  // is CRITICAL; a denial/routine refresh/revoke is INFO.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_DELEGATED_TOKEN_ISSUED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANTED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CONSENT_DENIED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CONSENT_GRANT_PERSISTED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  // WARNING, not INFO: an unauthenticated party created a durable identity. Individually routine\n  // when the feature is enabled, but the SHAPE an operator must be able to alert on is a spike —\n  // which only reads as a spike if each one is above the noise floor.\n  // AUTHENTICATION/WARNING: a refused client identity is an authentication-front event, and the\n  // SSRF variant is an attack rather than a misconfiguration. WARNING keeps a spike visible without\n  // making an ordinary allow-list miss look like an incident.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CIMD_CLIENT_REFUSED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_DYNAMIC_CLIENT_REGISTERED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_TOKEN_REFRESHED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_TOKEN_REVOKED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_RP_INITIATED_LOGOUT]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CODE_EXCHANGE_FAILED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.OAUTH_CONSENT_BINDING_VIOLATION]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.USER_REFRESH_TOKEN_REUSE_DETECTED]: { category: AuditEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION, severity: AuditEventSeverity.CRITICAL },\n\n  // System-context (ACL-bypass) trail. Both were UNMAPPED until 2026-08-11 and took the fallback.\n  // The READ keeps exactly what the fallback gave it — its declaration already documented\n  // `DATA_ACCESS`/`INFO` as intended (\"an expected, authorized internal read — not an anomaly\"), so\n  // this only stops that intent depending on a default nobody had noticed it was relying on.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SYSTEM_CONTEXT_READ]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO },\n  // The WRITE is raised to WARNING, following `RETAINED_DATA_ACCESS` — the other privileged-access\n  // event in this file — which reasons that an authorized-but-elevated access is WARNING and not\n  // CRITICAL because it is expected rather than anomalous. Category deliberately UNCHANGED: moving it\n  // to AUTHORIZATION would drop it for every tenant whose export filters on categories, which is a\n  // worse failure than an under-graded severity. This is the classification the event's own\n  // declaration asks for and had never received.\n  [CoreAuditableEventType.SYSTEM_CONTEXT_WRITE]: { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.WARNING },\n};\n\nconst DEFAULT_AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION: AuditEventClassification = { category: AuditEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS, severity: AuditEventSeverity.INFO };\n\n/**\n * Look up the classification for an audit event type.\n *\n * Every `CoreAuditableEventType` is mapped — enforced by the map's type, not by this comment, which\n * asserted exactly that while two event types went unmapped for months. The fallback exists for\n * APPLICATION-defined event types, which are ordinary strings the engine cannot enumerate.\n */\nexport function getAuditEventClassification(eventType: string): AuditEventClassification {\n  return AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION_MAP[eventType as CoreAuditableEventType] ?? DEFAULT_AUDIT_EVENT_CLASSIFICATION;\n}\n"]}

package/dist/esm/compliance/data-classification/data-classification.shared.schemas.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/** Generic information-sensitivity vocabulary used independently of any assurance source or application compliance program. */
+export declare enum Compliance_DataClassification {
+    PUBLIC = "public",
+    INTERNAL = "internal",
+    CONFIDENTIAL = "confidential",
+    RESTRICTED = "restricted"
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=data-classification.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/compliance/data-classification/data-classification.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"data-classification.shared.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/compliance/data-classification/data-classification.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,+HAA+H;AAC/H,oBAAY,6BAA6B;IACvC,MAAM,WAAW;IACjB,QAAQ,aAAa;IACrB,YAAY,iBAAiB;IAC7B,UAAU,eAAe;CAC1B"}

package/dist/esm/compliance/data-classification/data-classification.shared.schemas.js

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+/** Generic information-sensitivity vocabulary used independently of any assurance source or application compliance program. */
+export var Compliance_DataClassification;
+(function (Compliance_DataClassification) {
+    Compliance_DataClassification["PUBLIC"] = "public";
+    Compliance_DataClassification["INTERNAL"] = "internal";
+    Compliance_DataClassification["CONFIDENTIAL"] = "confidential";
+    Compliance_DataClassification["RESTRICTED"] = "restricted";
+})(Compliance_DataClassification || (Compliance_DataClassification = {}));
+//# sourceMappingURL=data-classification.shared.schemas.js.map

package/dist/esm/compliance/data-classification/data-classification.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"data-classification.shared.schemas.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/compliance/data-classification/data-classification.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,+HAA+H;AAC/H,MAAM,CAAN,IAAY,6BAKX;AALD,WAAY,6BAA6B;IACvC,kDAAiB,CAAA;IACjB,sDAAqB,CAAA;IACrB,8DAA6B,CAAA;IAC7B,0DAAyB,CAAA;AAC3B,CAAC,EALW,6BAA6B,KAA7B,6BAA6B,QAKxC","sourcesContent":["/** Generic information-sensitivity vocabulary used independently of any assurance source or application compliance program. */\nexport enum Compliance_DataClassification {\n  PUBLIC = \"public\",\n  INTERNAL = \"internal\",\n  CONFIDENTIAL = \"confidential\",\n  RESTRICTED = \"restricted\",\n}\n"]}