@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.0.1 → 1.1.0

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-application.shared.resources-config.schemas.js

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+/**
+ * Application OAuth Clients Shared Resource Configuration
+ *
+ * Resource configuration for managing application-scoped registered OAuth
+ * clients. FAITHFUL MIRROR of `api-keys-application.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts`
+ * with a FOCUSED operation set: core READ/LIST/SEARCH/CREATE plus a REPOSITORY_ONLY
+ * DELETE (onParentDelete cascade) and custom ROTATE/REGENERATE. The
+ * DEACTIVATE/REACTIVATE/EXTEND_EXPIRY/USAGE_STATS custom ops from api-keys are
+ * intentionally deferred to the OIDC branch.
+ */
+import { z } from 'zod';
+import { OAuthClientApplicationSchema, OAuthClientStatus, } from './oauth-clients.shared.schemas.js';
+import { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions.js';
+import { ResourceOperationRiskLevel } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas.js';
+import { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas.js';
+import { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions.js';
+import { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas.js';
+import { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas.js';
+import { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.factory.js';
+import { CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas.js';
+// Sort and filter fields for application OAuth clients
+// App Admin gets enhanced filter fields with additional capabilities
+const APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS = {
+    status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus),
+    hasExpiration: z.boolean(),
+    lastUsedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by last usage
+    expiresAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by expiration
+};
+// App Admin gets additional sorting capabilities
+const APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS = ['createdAt', 'updatedAt', 'lastUsedAt', 'expiresAt', 'status'];
+// Custom operations enum for application OAuth clients
+export var AppOAuthClients_Operations;
+(function (AppOAuthClients_Operations) {
+    AppOAuthClients_Operations["ROTATE"] = "rotate";
+    AppOAuthClients_Operations["REGENERATE"] = "regenerate";
+})(AppOAuthClients_Operations || (AppOAuthClients_Operations = {}));
+/*
+Application OAuth Clients Resource Configuration Factory
+*/
+export const appOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization({
+    mainSchema: OAuthClientApplicationSchema,
+    resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_APPLICATION,
+    resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_APPLICATION],
+    resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,
+    isSystemResource: true, // Application OAuth clients are a core system resource
+    /**
+     * CREATE only, and opened for exactly one caller: RFC 7591 dynamic client registration
+     * (`POST /oauth/register`), which has no principal to act as and therefore cannot go through the
+     * ordinary API_CALL path.
+     *
+     * Modelled on `anonymousUsers`, the closest analogue in the framework — another resource whose rows
+     * are created for an unauthenticated caller through a server-side door, and which opts into
+     * `create` and nothing else. READ / UPDATE / DELETE stay refused: a system door on a
+     * credential-bearing resource should be exactly as wide as its one use.
+     *
+     * ⚠️ KNOWN CONSEQUENCE, stated rather than discovered later: the role-ceiling gate in
+     * `buildOAuthClientMintHandlers` lives on the API_CALL CREATE variant, so it does NOT run on this
+     * door. The registration endpoint therefore carries that duty itself — it REFUSES a request that
+     * mentions `roles` and writes `roles: []` explicitly. Any FUTURE `createAsSystem` caller on this
+     * resource inherits the same obligation and gets no help from the framework in remembering it.
+     */
+    systemAccessPolicy: { create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED },
+    coreOperations: [
+        CoreResourceOperation.READ,
+        CoreResourceOperation.LIST,
+        CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,
+        CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,
+        // DELETE is REPOSITORY_ONLY (no HTTP route): powers the composition
+        // onParentDelete cascade so client rows are physically removed when their
+        // owning application is deleted. Without it the cascade throws
+        // ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any application that still has OAuth-client rows.
+        CoreResourceOperation.DELETE
+    ],
+    customOperation: AppOAuthClients_Operations,
+    operationsConfiguration: {
+        [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
+                    isSearchable: false,
+                    searchableFields: [],
+                    searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },
+                    filterFields: APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS,
+                    sortFields: APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS,
+                    maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,
+                }
+            ],
+        },
+        [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
+                    // requestDto auto-derived from decorators
+                    customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({
+                        plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()
+                    }),
+                }
+            ],
+            userNotifications: [
+                {
+                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,
+                    channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        // Internal-only (REPOSITORY_ONLY, no HTTP route): powers the composition
+        // onParentDelete cascade so OAuth-client rows are physically removed when their
+        // owning application is deleted. Without a DELETE op the cascade
+        // (deleteChildrenImmediate) throws ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any application
+        // that still has client rows. Super-admin/HIGH: the app OAuth-client admin tier.
+        [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
+                }
+            ],
+        },
+        [AppOAuthClients_Operations.ROTATE]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
+                    // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default
+                    // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded
+                    // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be
+                    // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement
+                    // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.
+                    //
+                    // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a
+                    // regenerate "keeps the prior secret working" (see its own declaration), so it is additive
+                    // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.
+                    //
+                    // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a
+                    // high-impact action.
+                    requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,
+                    resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
+                    requestDto: z.object({
+                        oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())
+                    }),
+                    customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({
+                        plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),
+                        oldClientId: z.string(),
+                        oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()
+                    }),
+                }
+            ],
+            userNotifications: [
+                {
+                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,
+                    channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        [AppOAuthClients_Operations.REGENERATE]: {
+            variants: [
+                {
+                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+                    isDefault: true,
+                    roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation
+                    riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
+                    resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
+                    // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its
+                    // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously
+                    // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.
+                    // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps
+                    // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly
+                    // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the
+                    // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.
+                    // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.
+                    auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },
+                    // REGENERATE reissues the secret and nothing else — it takes no caller input
+                    // (contrast ROTATE, which accepts `oldSecretInvalidationDate`). Without this the
+                    // auto-derived UPDATE contract would apply: the reissue prefix returns
+                    // `{ ...input, hashedSecret, … }` and the dispatcher MERGES that onto the caller
+                    // payload, so `redirectUris`, `allowedScopes`, `allowedGrants` and `roles` would all
+                    // be writable through "regenerate". This resource exposes NO core UPDATE, so those
+                    // fields are meant to be immutable after minting, and the ceiling gate
+                    // (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`) runs in the CREATE handler only.
+                    // A rewritable `redirectUris` on a secret-reissue route is an auth-code
+                    // exfiltration primitive.
+                    // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE — least-privilege on client credentials.
+                    requestDto: z.object({}),
+                    customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({
+                        plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),
+                    }),
+                }
+            ],
+            userNotifications: [
+                {
+                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,
+                    channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                }
+            ]
+        }
+    },
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=oauth-clients-application.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-application.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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* Application OAuth Clients Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for managing application-scoped registered OAuth\n * clients. FAITHFUL MIRROR of `api-keys-application.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts`\n * with a FOCUSED operation set: core READ/LIST/SEARCH/CREATE plus a REPOSITORY_ONLY\n * DELETE (onParentDelete cascade) and custom ROTATE/REGENERATE. The\n * DEACTIVATE/REACTIVATE/EXTEND_EXPIRY/USAGE_STATS custom ops from api-keys are\n * intentionally deferred to the OIDC branch.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OAuthClientApplicationSchema,\n  OAuthClientStatus,\n} from './oauth-clients.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\n\n// Sort and filter fields for application OAuth clients\n\n// App Admin gets enhanced filter fields with additional capabilities\nconst APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OAuthClientStatus),\n  hasExpiration: z.boolean(),\n  lastUsedAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by last usage\n  expiresAt: z.date(), // Admin can filter by expiration\n};\n\n// App Admin gets additional sorting capabilities\nconst APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS = ['createdAt', 'updatedAt', 'lastUsedAt', 'expiresAt', 'status'] as const;\n\n// Custom operations enum for application OAuth clients\nexport enum AppOAuthClients_Operations {\n  ROTATE = 'rotate', // Generate new secret and invalidate old one\n  REGENERATE = 'regenerate', // Generate new secret without invalidating old one\n}\n\ntype AppOAuthClientsCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE;\n\n/*\nApplication OAuth Clients Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const appOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof AppOAuthClients_Operations,\n  AppOAuthClientsCoreOperations,\n  typeof OAuthClientApplicationSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OAuthClientApplicationSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_APPLICATION,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.OAUTH_CLIENTS_APPLICATION],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true, // Application OAuth clients are a core system resource\n\n  /**\n   * CREATE only, and opened for exactly one caller: RFC 7591 dynamic client registration\n   * (`POST /oauth/register`), which has no principal to act as and therefore cannot go through the\n   * ordinary API_CALL path.\n   *\n   * Modelled on `anonymousUsers`, the closest analogue in the framework — another resource whose rows\n   * are created for an unauthenticated caller through a server-side door, and which opts into\n   * `create` and nothing else. READ / UPDATE / DELETE stay refused: a system door on a\n   * credential-bearing resource should be exactly as wide as its one use.\n   *\n   * ⚠️ KNOWN CONSEQUENCE, stated rather than discovered later: the role-ceiling gate in\n   * `buildOAuthClientMintHandlers` lives on the API_CALL CREATE variant, so it does NOT run on this\n   * door. The registration endpoint therefore carries that duty itself — it REFUSES a request that\n   * mentions `roles` and writes `roles: []` explicitly. Any FUTURE `createAsSystem` caller on this\n   * resource inherits the same obligation and gets no help from the framework in remembering it.\n   */\n  systemAccessPolicy: { create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED },\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    // DELETE is REPOSITORY_ONLY (no HTTP route): powers the composition\n    // onParentDelete cascade so client rows are physically removed when their\n    // owning application is deleted. Without it the cascade throws\n    // ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any application that still has OAuth-client rows.\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: AppOAuthClients_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: false,\n          searchableFields: [],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: APP_OAUTH_CLIENTS_ADMIN_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 100,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // Internal-only (REPOSITORY_ONLY, no HTTP route): powers the composition\n    // onParentDelete cascade so OAuth-client rows are physically removed when their\n    // owning application is deleted. Without a DELETE op the cascade\n    // (deleteChildrenImmediate) throws ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any application\n    // that still has client rows. Super-admin/HIGH: the app OAuth-client admin tier.\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [AppOAuthClients_Operations.ROTATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // ROTATE is a secret handback plus a caller-chosen cutover. The default\n          // invalidation boundary is now, while a future boundary creates a bounded\n          // overlap. Once that boundary passes, the previous secret cannot be\n          // restored. An unauthorized caller also walks away with the replacement\n          // credential, so a live session alone is deliberately insufficient.\n          //\n          // Its sibling REGENERATE is NOT gated, and the difference is the whole criterion: a\n          // regenerate \"keeps the prior secret working\" (see its own declaration), so it is additive\n          // and recoverable. Gate the irreversible, not merely the sensitive.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.STEP_UP_AUTHENTICATION — re-proof of identity before a\n          // high-impact action.\n          requiresStepUpAuthentication: true,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date().min(new Date(), 'Invalidation date must be in the future or now').default(() => new Date())\n          }),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n            oldClientId: z.string(),\n            oldSecretInvalidationDate: z.date()\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [AppOAuthClients_Operations.REGENERATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN], // Admin-only operation\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // REGENERATE mints and hands over a LIVE credential, so it needs an audit row — but its\n          // MEDIUM risk sits below the automatic HIGH/CRITICAL floor, which is why it previously\n          // recorded nothing on either axis while its HIGH sibling ROTATE recorded the operation.\n          // MEDIUM is correct on the UI axis (no danger-zone affordance for a reissue that keeps\n          // the prior secret working) and wrong on the evidence axis; this declaration is exactly\n          // that divergence. Raising `riskLevel` instead would buy the row by mis-declaring the\n          // verb's danger. Same reasoning as `organizationMembers | UPDATE`.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.SECRETS.DISCLOSURE_AUDIT — credential issuance is attributable.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n          // REGENERATE reissues the secret and nothing else — it takes no caller input\n          // (contrast ROTATE, which accepts `oldSecretInvalidationDate`). Without this the\n          // auto-derived UPDATE contract would apply: the reissue prefix returns\n          // `{ ...input, hashedSecret, … }` and the dispatcher MERGES that onto the caller\n          // payload, so `redirectUris`, `allowedScopes`, `allowedGrants` and `roles` would all\n          // be writable through \"regenerate\". This resource exposes NO core UPDATE, so those\n          // fields are meant to be immutable after minting, and the ceiling gate\n          // (`assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling`) runs in the CREATE handler only.\n          // A rewritable `redirectUris` on a secret-reissue route is an auth-code\n          // exfiltration primitive.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.LEAST_PRIVILEGE — least-privilege on client credentials.\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          customResponseDto: OAuthClientApplicationSchema.extend({\n            plainSecret: z.string().min(1).isEphemeral(),\n          }),\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.APPLICATION_ADMINISTRATOR,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  },\n});\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/**
+ * Organization OAuth Clients Shared Resource Configuration
+ *
+ * Resource configuration for managing organization-scoped registered OAuth
+ * clients. FAITHFUL MIRROR of `api-keys-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts`
+ * with a FOCUSED operation set: core READ/LIST/SEARCH/CREATE/DELETE/COUNT plus
+ * custom ROTATE/REGENERATE. The DEACTIVATE/REACTIVATE/EXTEND_EXPIRY/USAGE_STATS
+ * custom ops from api-keys are intentionally deferred to the OIDC branch.
+ */
+import { z } from 'zod';
+import { OAuthClientStatus } from './oauth-clients.shared.schemas';
+import { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';
+import { ResourceRelationship } from '../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';
+import { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';
+export declare enum OrgOAuthClients_Operations {
+    ROTATE = "rotate",// Generate new secret and invalidate old one
+    REGENERATE = "regenerate"
+}
+type OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations = CoreResourceOperation.READ | CoreResourceOperation.LIST | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE | CoreResourceOperation.COUNT;
+export declare const orgOAuthClientsResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory: (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => import("../..").ResourceConfiguration<typeof OrgOAuthClients_Operations, OrgOAuthClientsCoreOperations, z.ZodObject<{
+    _id: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
+    name: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
+    description: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    roles: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodEnum<typeof CORE_APP_ROLES>, z.ZodEnum<typeof CORE_ORG_ROLES>, z.ZodString]>>>>;
+    allowedScopes: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+    allowedGrants: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodEnum<typeof import("./oauth-clients.shared.schemas").OAuthGrantType>>>;
+    redirectUris: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+    postLogoutRedirectUris: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
+    requiresConsent: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
+    tokenEndpointAuthMethod: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof import("./oauth-clients.shared.schemas").OAuthTokenEndpointAuthMethod>>>;
+    status: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof OAuthClientStatus>>>>>;
+    expiresAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>;
+    lastUsedAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>>;
+    createdAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>>;
+    updatedAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>;
+    hashedSecret: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>>;
+    secretPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>;
+    previousHashedSecret: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>;
+    previousSecretPrefix: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>;
+    previousSecretInvalidationDate: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>;
+    registrationOrigin: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodEnum<typeof import("./oauth-clients.shared.schemas").OAuthClientRegistrationOrigin>>>>>>>;
+    scope: z.ZodLiteral<import("../..").ApiKeyScope.ORGANIZATION>;
+    organizationId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>;
+}, z.core.$strip>>;
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/security/oauth-clients/oauth-clients-organization.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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