@devo-bmad-custom/agent-orchestration 1.0.2 → 1.0.4

package/src/.agents/skills/security-review/references/ssrf.md

@@ -1,415 +1,415 @@
-# Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Prevention Reference
-
-## Overview
-
-SSRF vulnerabilities allow attackers to induce the server-side application to make HTTP requests to an arbitrary domain of the attacker's choosing. This can be used to:
-
-- Access internal services not exposed to the internet
-- Read cloud metadata (AWS, GCP, Azure credentials)
-- Scan internal networks
-- Bypass firewalls and access controls
-- Exploit internal services with known vulnerabilities
-
-## Attack Scenarios
-
-### Cloud Metadata Access (AWS)
-
-```bash
-# Attacker provides URL:
-http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/role-name
-
-# Server fetches and returns AWS credentials:
-{
-  "AccessKeyId": "ASIA...",
-  "SecretAccessKey": "...",
-  "Token": "..."
-}
-```
-
-### Internal Service Access
-
-```bash
-# Attacker provides URL:
-http://localhost:8080/admin/delete-all
-http://internal-service.local/sensitive-data
-
-# Server makes request to internal service that trusts localhost
-```
-
-### Port Scanning
-
-```bash
-# Attacker probes internal network:
-http://192.168.1.1:22    # SSH
-http://192.168.1.1:3306  # MySQL
-http://192.168.1.1:6379  # Redis
-```
-
----
-
-## Prevention Strategies
-
-### 1. Input Validation (Allowlist)
-
-**Preferred when target hosts are known.**
-
-```python
-# VULNERABLE: No validation
-def fetch_url(url):
-    return requests.get(url).content
-
-# SAFE: Allowlist of permitted domains
-ALLOWED_DOMAINS = {'api.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'}
-
-def fetch_url(url):
-    parsed = urlparse(url)
-
-    # Validate scheme
-    if parsed.scheme not in ('http', 'https'):
-        raise ValueError("Invalid URL scheme")
-
-    # Validate domain against allowlist
-    if parsed.hostname not in ALLOWED_DOMAINS:
-        raise ValueError("Domain not allowed")
-
-    return requests.get(url).content
-```
-
-### 2. Block Internal Networks (Denylist)
-
-**Additional defense layer when allowlist isn't practical.**
-
-```python
-import ipaddress
-import socket
-
-BLOCKED_RANGES = [
-    ipaddress.ip_network('127.0.0.0/8'),      # Loopback
-    ipaddress.ip_network('10.0.0.0/8'),       # Private
-    ipaddress.ip_network('172.16.0.0/12'),    # Private
-    ipaddress.ip_network('192.168.0.0/16'),   # Private
-    ipaddress.ip_network('169.254.0.0/16'),   # Link-local (metadata)
-    ipaddress.ip_network('0.0.0.0/8'),        # Current network
-    ipaddress.ip_network('100.64.0.0/10'),    # Shared address space
-    ipaddress.ip_network('192.0.0.0/24'),     # IETF Protocol
-    ipaddress.ip_network('192.0.2.0/24'),     # Documentation
-    ipaddress.ip_network('198.51.100.0/24'),  # Documentation
-    ipaddress.ip_network('203.0.113.0/24'),   # Documentation
-    ipaddress.ip_network('224.0.0.0/4'),      # Multicast
-    ipaddress.ip_network('240.0.0.0/4'),      # Reserved
-]
-
-def is_internal_ip(ip_str):
-    try:
-        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
-        return any(ip in network for network in BLOCKED_RANGES)
-    except ValueError:
-        return True  # Invalid IP, block it
-
-def validate_url(url):
-    parsed = urlparse(url)
-
-    # Validate scheme
-    if parsed.scheme not in ('http', 'https'):
-        raise ValueError("Invalid URL scheme")
-
-    # Resolve hostname to IP
-    hostname = parsed.hostname
-    if not hostname:
-        raise ValueError("Invalid URL")
-
-    # Check for IP address directly in URL
-    try:
-        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
-        if is_internal_ip(str(ip)):
-            raise ValueError("Internal IP addresses not allowed")
-    except ValueError:
-        # It's a hostname, resolve it
-        try:
-            ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
-            if is_internal_ip(ip):
-                raise ValueError("Domain resolves to internal IP")
-        except socket.gaierror:
-            raise ValueError("Could not resolve hostname")
-
-    return True
-```
-
-### 3. Disable Redirects
-
-```python
-# VULNERABLE: Follows redirects (can bypass IP checks)
-response = requests.get(url, allow_redirects=True)
-# Attacker: http://attacker.com/redirect -> http://169.254.169.254/
-
-# SAFE: Don't follow redirects automatically
-response = requests.get(url, allow_redirects=False)
-
-# If redirects needed, validate each location
-def safe_fetch(url, max_redirects=5):
-    for _ in range(max_redirects):
-        validate_url(url)  # Validate before each request
-        response = requests.get(url, allow_redirects=False)
-
-        if response.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
-            url = response.headers.get('Location')
-            if not url:
-                raise ValueError("Redirect without Location")
-            continue
-
-        return response
-
-    raise ValueError("Too many redirects")
-```
-
-### 4. DNS Rebinding Protection
-
-```python
-import socket
-import time
-
-def safe_fetch_with_dns_pinning(url):
-    parsed = urlparse(url)
-    hostname = parsed.hostname
-
-    # Resolve DNS and pin the IP
-    ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
-
-    # Validate IP is not internal
-    if is_internal_ip(ip):
-        raise ValueError("Internal IP not allowed")
-
-    # Make request directly to IP with Host header
-    # This prevents DNS rebinding attacks
-    modified_url = url.replace(hostname, ip)
-    headers = {'Host': hostname}
-
-    response = requests.get(
-        modified_url,
-        headers=headers,
-        allow_redirects=False,
-        verify=True  # Still verify TLS with original hostname
-    )
-
-    return response
-```
-
-### 5. Cloud Metadata Protection
-
-#### AWS IMDSv2
-
-```bash
-# Require IMDSv2 (token-based) - mitigates SSRF
-aws ec2 modify-instance-metadata-options \
-    --instance-id i-1234567890abcdef0 \
-    --http-tokens required \
-    --http-endpoint enabled
-```
-
-```python
-# With IMDSv2, attacker would need two requests:
-# 1. PUT to get token (SSRF usually only does GET)
-# 2. GET with token in header
-
-# Block metadata IP regardless
-if '169.254.169.254' in url or '169.254.170.2' in url:
-    raise ValueError("Metadata endpoints not allowed")
-```
-
-#### GCP
-
-```python
-# Block GCP metadata
-BLOCKED_HOSTS = [
-    'metadata.google.internal',
-    'metadata.google.com',
-    '169.254.169.254'
-]
-```
-
-#### Azure
-
-```python
-# Block Azure metadata
-BLOCKED_HOSTS = [
-    '169.254.169.254',
-    'management.azure.com'
-]
-```
-
----
-
-## Framework-Specific Mitigations
-
-### Python (requests)
-
-```python
-from urllib.parse import urlparse
-import requests
-
-class SafeRequests:
-    @staticmethod
-    def get(url, **kwargs):
-        validate_url(url)
-        kwargs['allow_redirects'] = False
-        kwargs['timeout'] = (5, 30)  # Connect and read timeout
-        return requests.get(url, **kwargs)
-```
-
-### Node.js
-
-```javascript
-const axios = require('axios');
-const url = require('url');
-const dns = require('dns').promises;
-
-async function safeFetch(targetUrl) {
-    const parsed = new URL(targetUrl);
-
-    // Validate scheme
-    if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(parsed.protocol)) {
-        throw new Error('Invalid scheme');
-    }
-
-    // Resolve and check IP
-    const addresses = await dns.lookup(parsed.hostname);
-    if (isInternalIP(addresses.address)) {
-        throw new Error('Internal IP not allowed');
-    }
-
-    return axios.get(targetUrl, {
-        maxRedirects: 0,
-        timeout: 30000
-    });
-}
-```
-
-### Java
-
-```java
-public class SafeURLConnection {
-    private static final Set<String> ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS = Set.of("http", "https");
-
-    public static URLConnection openConnection(String urlString) throws IOException {
-        URL url = new URL(urlString);
-
-        if (!ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS.contains(url.getProtocol())) {
-            throw new SecurityException("Protocol not allowed");
-        }
-
-        InetAddress address = InetAddress.getByName(url.getHost());
-        if (isInternalIP(address)) {
-            throw new SecurityException("Internal IP not allowed");
-        }
-
-        HttpURLConnection connection = (HttpURLConnection) url.openConnection();
-        connection.setInstanceFollowRedirects(false);
-        connection.setConnectTimeout(5000);
-        connection.setReadTimeout(30000);
-
-        return connection;
-    }
-}
-```
-
----
-
-## Common Bypass Techniques to Block
-
-### URL Encoding
-
-```python
-# Bypasses:
-http://169.254.169.254/  # Normal
-http://169%2e254%2e169%2e254/  # URL encoded dots
-http://0251.0376.0251.0376/  # Octal
-http://0xa9fea9fe/  # Hex
-http://2852039166/  # Decimal
-
-# Defense: Normalize and decode URL before validation
-from urllib.parse import unquote
-
-def normalize_url(url):
-    return unquote(url)
-```
-
-### DNS Rebinding
-
-```python
-# Attack: Domain initially resolves to public IP, then internal IP
-# First request: attacker.com -> 1.2.3.4 (passes validation)
-# DNS changes: attacker.com -> 192.168.1.1
-# Second request goes to internal IP
-
-# Defense: Pin DNS resolution and re-validate
-```
-
-### IPv6
-
-```python
-# Bypasses:
-http://[::1]/  # localhost
-http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/  # IPv4-mapped IPv6
-http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:169.254.169.254]/
-
-# Defense: Check both IPv4 and IPv6 ranges
-BLOCKED_RANGES.extend([
-    ipaddress.ip_network('::1/128'),        # IPv6 loopback
-    ipaddress.ip_network('fc00::/7'),       # IPv6 private
-    ipaddress.ip_network('fe80::/10'),      # IPv6 link-local
-])
-```
-
-### Alternate Representations
-
-```python
-# localhost alternatives:
-localhost
-127.0.0.1
-127.0.0.2  # Any 127.x.x.x is loopback
-2130706433  # Decimal for 127.0.0.1
-0x7f000001  # Hex
-0177.0.0.1  # Octal
-127.1       # Short form
-```
-
----
-
-## Grep Patterns for Detection
-
-```bash
-# URL fetching functions
-grep -rn "requests\.get\|requests\.post\|urllib\.request\|urlopen\|fetch\|axios" --include="*.py" --include="*.js"
-
-# URL from user input
-grep -rn "request\.args\|request\.form\|request\.json\|req\.query\|req\.body" --include="*.py" --include="*.js" | grep -i "url"
-
-# Potential SSRF sinks
-grep -rn "curl_exec\|file_get_contents\|fopen\|readfile" --include="*.php"
-
-# Missing validation
-grep -rn "requests\.get(url\|fetch(url" --include="*.py" --include="*.js"
-```
-
----
-
-## Testing Checklist
-
-- [ ] User-controlled URLs validated against allowlist
-- [ ] Internal IP ranges blocked (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
-- [ ] Cloud metadata IPs blocked (169.254.169.254)
-- [ ] IPv6 internal addresses blocked
-- [ ] URL redirects not followed blindly
-- [ ] DNS rebinding protected against
-- [ ] URL encoding/alternate representations handled
-- [ ] IMDSv2 required (AWS environments)
-- [ ] Timeouts configured to prevent DoS
-
----
-
-## References
-
-- [OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)
-- [CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html)
-- [AWS IMDSv2 Documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/configuring-instance-metadata-service.html)
-- [PortSwigger SSRF Guide](https://portswigger.net/web-security/ssrf)
+# Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Prevention Reference
+
+## Overview
+
+SSRF vulnerabilities allow attackers to induce the server-side application to make HTTP requests to an arbitrary domain of the attacker's choosing. This can be used to:
+
+- Access internal services not exposed to the internet
+- Read cloud metadata (AWS, GCP, Azure credentials)
+- Scan internal networks
+- Bypass firewalls and access controls
+- Exploit internal services with known vulnerabilities
+
+## Attack Scenarios
+
+### Cloud Metadata Access (AWS)
+
+```bash
+# Attacker provides URL:
+http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/role-name
+
+# Server fetches and returns AWS credentials:
+{
+  "AccessKeyId": "ASIA...",
+  "SecretAccessKey": "...",
+  "Token": "..."
+}
+```
+
+### Internal Service Access
+
+```bash
+# Attacker provides URL:
+http://localhost:8080/admin/delete-all
+http://internal-service.local/sensitive-data
+
+# Server makes request to internal service that trusts localhost
+```
+
+### Port Scanning
+
+```bash
+# Attacker probes internal network:
+http://192.168.1.1:22    # SSH
+http://192.168.1.1:3306  # MySQL
+http://192.168.1.1:6379  # Redis
+```
+
+---
+
+## Prevention Strategies
+
+### 1. Input Validation (Allowlist)
+
+**Preferred when target hosts are known.**
+
+```python
+# VULNERABLE: No validation
+def fetch_url(url):
+    return requests.get(url).content
+
+# SAFE: Allowlist of permitted domains
+ALLOWED_DOMAINS = {'api.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'}
+
+def fetch_url(url):
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+
+    # Validate scheme
+    if parsed.scheme not in ('http', 'https'):
+        raise ValueError("Invalid URL scheme")
+
+    # Validate domain against allowlist
+    if parsed.hostname not in ALLOWED_DOMAINS:
+        raise ValueError("Domain not allowed")
+
+    return requests.get(url).content
+```
+
+### 2. Block Internal Networks (Denylist)
+
+**Additional defense layer when allowlist isn't practical.**
+
+```python
+import ipaddress
+import socket
+
+BLOCKED_RANGES = [
+    ipaddress.ip_network('127.0.0.0/8'),      # Loopback
+    ipaddress.ip_network('10.0.0.0/8'),       # Private
+    ipaddress.ip_network('172.16.0.0/12'),    # Private
+    ipaddress.ip_network('192.168.0.0/16'),   # Private
+    ipaddress.ip_network('169.254.0.0/16'),   # Link-local (metadata)
+    ipaddress.ip_network('0.0.0.0/8'),        # Current network
+    ipaddress.ip_network('100.64.0.0/10'),    # Shared address space
+    ipaddress.ip_network('192.0.0.0/24'),     # IETF Protocol
+    ipaddress.ip_network('192.0.2.0/24'),     # Documentation
+    ipaddress.ip_network('198.51.100.0/24'),  # Documentation
+    ipaddress.ip_network('203.0.113.0/24'),   # Documentation
+    ipaddress.ip_network('224.0.0.0/4'),      # Multicast
+    ipaddress.ip_network('240.0.0.0/4'),      # Reserved
+]
+
+def is_internal_ip(ip_str):
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
+        return any(ip in network for network in BLOCKED_RANGES)
+    except ValueError:
+        return True  # Invalid IP, block it
+
+def validate_url(url):
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+
+    # Validate scheme
+    if parsed.scheme not in ('http', 'https'):
+        raise ValueError("Invalid URL scheme")
+
+    # Resolve hostname to IP
+    hostname = parsed.hostname
+    if not hostname:
+        raise ValueError("Invalid URL")
+
+    # Check for IP address directly in URL
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
+        if is_internal_ip(str(ip)):
+            raise ValueError("Internal IP addresses not allowed")
+    except ValueError:
+        # It's a hostname, resolve it
+        try:
+            ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
+            if is_internal_ip(ip):
+                raise ValueError("Domain resolves to internal IP")
+        except socket.gaierror:
+            raise ValueError("Could not resolve hostname")
+
+    return True
+```
+
+### 3. Disable Redirects
+
+```python
+# VULNERABLE: Follows redirects (can bypass IP checks)
+response = requests.get(url, allow_redirects=True)
+# Attacker: http://attacker.com/redirect -> http://169.254.169.254/
+
+# SAFE: Don't follow redirects automatically
+response = requests.get(url, allow_redirects=False)
+
+# If redirects needed, validate each location
+def safe_fetch(url, max_redirects=5):
+    for _ in range(max_redirects):
+        validate_url(url)  # Validate before each request
+        response = requests.get(url, allow_redirects=False)
+
+        if response.status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308):
+            url = response.headers.get('Location')
+            if not url:
+                raise ValueError("Redirect without Location")
+            continue
+
+        return response
+
+    raise ValueError("Too many redirects")
+```
+
+### 4. DNS Rebinding Protection
+
+```python
+import socket
+import time
+
+def safe_fetch_with_dns_pinning(url):
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    hostname = parsed.hostname
+
+    # Resolve DNS and pin the IP
+    ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
+
+    # Validate IP is not internal
+    if is_internal_ip(ip):
+        raise ValueError("Internal IP not allowed")
+
+    # Make request directly to IP with Host header
+    # This prevents DNS rebinding attacks
+    modified_url = url.replace(hostname, ip)
+    headers = {'Host': hostname}
+
+    response = requests.get(
+        modified_url,
+        headers=headers,
+        allow_redirects=False,
+        verify=True  # Still verify TLS with original hostname
+    )
+
+    return response
+```
+
+### 5. Cloud Metadata Protection
+
+#### AWS IMDSv2
+
+```bash
+# Require IMDSv2 (token-based) - mitigates SSRF
+aws ec2 modify-instance-metadata-options \
+    --instance-id i-1234567890abcdef0 \
+    --http-tokens required \
+    --http-endpoint enabled
+```
+
+```python
+# With IMDSv2, attacker would need two requests:
+# 1. PUT to get token (SSRF usually only does GET)
+# 2. GET with token in header
+
+# Block metadata IP regardless
+if '169.254.169.254' in url or '169.254.170.2' in url:
+    raise ValueError("Metadata endpoints not allowed")
+```
+
+#### GCP
+
+```python
+# Block GCP metadata
+BLOCKED_HOSTS = [
+    'metadata.google.internal',
+    'metadata.google.com',
+    '169.254.169.254'
+]
+```
+
+#### Azure
+
+```python
+# Block Azure metadata
+BLOCKED_HOSTS = [
+    '169.254.169.254',
+    'management.azure.com'
+]
+```
+
+---
+
+## Framework-Specific Mitigations
+
+### Python (requests)
+
+```python
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+import requests
+
+class SafeRequests:
+    @staticmethod
+    def get(url, **kwargs):
+        validate_url(url)
+        kwargs['allow_redirects'] = False
+        kwargs['timeout'] = (5, 30)  # Connect and read timeout
+        return requests.get(url, **kwargs)
+```
+
+### Node.js
+
+```javascript
+const axios = require('axios');
+const url = require('url');
+const dns = require('dns').promises;
+
+async function safeFetch(targetUrl) {
+    const parsed = new URL(targetUrl);
+
+    // Validate scheme
+    if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(parsed.protocol)) {
+        throw new Error('Invalid scheme');
+    }
+
+    // Resolve and check IP
+    const addresses = await dns.lookup(parsed.hostname);
+    if (isInternalIP(addresses.address)) {
+        throw new Error('Internal IP not allowed');
+    }
+
+    return axios.get(targetUrl, {
+        maxRedirects: 0,
+        timeout: 30000
+    });
+}
+```
+
+### Java
+
+```java
+public class SafeURLConnection {
+    private static final Set<String> ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS = Set.of("http", "https");
+
+    public static URLConnection openConnection(String urlString) throws IOException {
+        URL url = new URL(urlString);
+
+        if (!ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS.contains(url.getProtocol())) {
+            throw new SecurityException("Protocol not allowed");
+        }
+
+        InetAddress address = InetAddress.getByName(url.getHost());
+        if (isInternalIP(address)) {
+            throw new SecurityException("Internal IP not allowed");
+        }
+
+        HttpURLConnection connection = (HttpURLConnection) url.openConnection();
+        connection.setInstanceFollowRedirects(false);
+        connection.setConnectTimeout(5000);
+        connection.setReadTimeout(30000);
+
+        return connection;
+    }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Common Bypass Techniques to Block
+
+### URL Encoding
+
+```python
+# Bypasses:
+http://169.254.169.254/  # Normal
+http://169%2e254%2e169%2e254/  # URL encoded dots
+http://0251.0376.0251.0376/  # Octal
+http://0xa9fea9fe/  # Hex
+http://2852039166/  # Decimal
+
+# Defense: Normalize and decode URL before validation
+from urllib.parse import unquote
+
+def normalize_url(url):
+    return unquote(url)
+```
+
+### DNS Rebinding
+
+```python
+# Attack: Domain initially resolves to public IP, then internal IP
+# First request: attacker.com -> 1.2.3.4 (passes validation)
+# DNS changes: attacker.com -> 192.168.1.1
+# Second request goes to internal IP
+
+# Defense: Pin DNS resolution and re-validate
+```
+
+### IPv6
+
+```python
+# Bypasses:
+http://[::1]/  # localhost
+http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/  # IPv4-mapped IPv6
+http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:169.254.169.254]/
+
+# Defense: Check both IPv4 and IPv6 ranges
+BLOCKED_RANGES.extend([
+    ipaddress.ip_network('::1/128'),        # IPv6 loopback
+    ipaddress.ip_network('fc00::/7'),       # IPv6 private
+    ipaddress.ip_network('fe80::/10'),      # IPv6 link-local
+])
+```
+
+### Alternate Representations
+
+```python
+# localhost alternatives:
+localhost
+127.0.0.1
+127.0.0.2  # Any 127.x.x.x is loopback
+2130706433  # Decimal for 127.0.0.1
+0x7f000001  # Hex
+0177.0.0.1  # Octal
+127.1       # Short form
+```
+
+---
+
+## Grep Patterns for Detection
+
+```bash
+# URL fetching functions
+grep -rn "requests\.get\|requests\.post\|urllib\.request\|urlopen\|fetch\|axios" --include="*.py" --include="*.js"
+
+# URL from user input
+grep -rn "request\.args\|request\.form\|request\.json\|req\.query\|req\.body" --include="*.py" --include="*.js" | grep -i "url"
+
+# Potential SSRF sinks
+grep -rn "curl_exec\|file_get_contents\|fopen\|readfile" --include="*.php"
+
+# Missing validation
+grep -rn "requests\.get(url\|fetch(url" --include="*.py" --include="*.js"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Testing Checklist
+
+- [ ] User-controlled URLs validated against allowlist
+- [ ] Internal IP ranges blocked (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
+- [ ] Cloud metadata IPs blocked (169.254.169.254)
+- [ ] IPv6 internal addresses blocked
+- [ ] URL redirects not followed blindly
+- [ ] DNS rebinding protected against
+- [ ] URL encoding/alternate representations handled
+- [ ] IMDSv2 required (AWS environments)
+- [ ] Timeouts configured to prevent DoS
+
+---
+
+## References
+
+- [OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)
+- [CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html)
+- [AWS IMDSv2 Documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/configuring-instance-metadata-service.html)
+- [PortSwigger SSRF Guide](https://portswigger.net/web-security/ssrf)