npm - @devo-bmad-custom/agent-orchestration - Versions diffs - 1.0.2 → 1.0.4 - Mend

@devo-bmad-custom/agent-orchestration 1.0.2 → 1.0.4

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package/src/.agents/skills/security-review/references/file-security.md CHANGED Viewed

@@ -1,457 +1,457 @@
-# File Security Reference
-## Overview
-File operations present multiple security risks: path traversal attacks, malicious file uploads, XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, and insecure file permissions. This reference covers secure patterns for handling files.
----
-## Path Traversal Prevention
-### The Vulnerability
-```python
-# VULNERABLE: User-controlled path
-@app.route('/download')
-def download():
-    filename = request.args.get('file')
-    return send_file(f'/uploads/{filename}')
-# Attack: ?file=../../../etc/passwd
-# Results in: /uploads/../../../etc/passwd → /etc/passwd
-```
-### Prevention Techniques
-```python
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-# Method 1: Validate and canonicalize path
-def safe_join(base_directory, user_path):
-    """Safely join paths, preventing traversal."""
-    # Resolve to absolute path
-    base = Path(base_directory).resolve()
-    target = (base / user_path).resolve()
-    # Verify target is under base
-    if not str(target).startswith(str(base)):
-        raise ValueError("Path traversal detected")
-    return str(target)
-# Method 2: Use allowlist of files
-ALLOWED_FILES = {'report.pdf', 'manual.pdf', 'readme.txt'}
-def download_file(filename):
-    if filename not in ALLOWED_FILES:
-        raise ValueError("File not allowed")
-    return send_file(os.path.join(UPLOAD_DIR, filename))
-# Method 3: Use indirect references
-def get_file_by_id(file_id):
-    # Map ID to filename in database
-    file_record = File.query.get(file_id)
-    if not file_record or file_record.user_id != current_user.id:
-        raise PermissionError()
-    return send_file(file_record.storage_path)
-```
-### Characters to Block
-```python
-# Dangerous path patterns
-BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [
-    '..',           # Parent directory
-    '~',            # Home directory
-    '%2e%2e',       # URL-encoded ..
-    '%252e%252e',   # Double-encoded ..
-    '..\\',         # Windows backslash
-    '..%5c',        # URL-encoded Windows
-    '%00',          # Null byte (older systems)
-]
-def contains_traversal(path):
-    path_lower = path.lower()
-    return any(pattern in path_lower for pattern in BLOCKED_PATTERNS)
-```
----
-## File Upload Security
-### Defense in Depth Approach
-```python
-import magic
-import hashlib
-import uuid
-from pathlib import Path
-# Configuration
-ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS = {'pdf', 'png', 'jpg', 'jpeg', 'gif'}
-ALLOWED_MIMETYPES = {
-    'application/pdf',
-    'image/png',
-    'image/jpeg',
-    'image/gif'
-}
-MAX_FILE_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024  # 10MB
-UPLOAD_DIR = '/var/uploads'  # Outside webroot
-def secure_upload(file):
-    """Comprehensive file upload validation."""
-    # 1. Check file size
-    file.seek(0, 2)  # Seek to end
-    size = file.tell()
-    file.seek(0)  # Reset
-    if size > MAX_FILE_SIZE:
-        raise ValueError(f"File too large: {size} bytes")
-    # 2. Validate extension
-    original_filename = file.filename
-    extension = Path(original_filename).suffix.lower().lstrip('.')
-    if extension not in ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS:
-        raise ValueError(f"Extension not allowed: {extension}")
-    # 3. Validate MIME type (don't trust Content-Type header)
-    mime = magic.from_buffer(file.read(2048), mime=True)
-    file.seek(0)
-    if mime not in ALLOWED_MIMETYPES:
-        raise ValueError(f"MIME type not allowed: {mime}")
-    # 4. Validate extension matches content
-    expected_extensions = get_extensions_for_mime(mime)
-    if extension not in expected_extensions:
-        raise ValueError("Extension doesn't match content type")
-    # 5. Generate safe filename (ignore user input)
-    safe_filename = f"{uuid.uuid4().hex}.{extension}"
-    # 6. Store outside webroot
-    storage_path = os.path.join(UPLOAD_DIR, safe_filename)
-    file.save(storage_path)
-    # 7. Set restrictive permissions
-    os.chmod(storage_path, 0o640)
-    return {
-        'original_name': original_filename,
-        'stored_name': safe_filename,
-        'storage_path': storage_path,
-        'size': size,
-        'mime_type': mime
-    }
-```
-### Filename Sanitization
-```python
-import re
-import unicodedata
-def sanitize_filename(filename):
-    """Sanitize filename for safe storage."""
-    # Normalize unicode
-    filename = unicodedata.normalize('NFKD', filename)
-    # Remove path components
-    filename = os.path.basename(filename)
-    # Remove null bytes
-    filename = filename.replace('\x00', '')
-    # Allow only safe characters
-    filename = re.sub(r'[^a-zA-Z0-9._-]', '_', filename)
-    # Prevent hidden files
-    filename = filename.lstrip('.')
-    # Limit length
-    if len(filename) > 255:
-        name, ext = os.path.splitext(filename)
-        filename = name[:255-len(ext)] + ext
-    return filename or 'unnamed'
-```
-### Image Validation
-```python
-from PIL import Image
-import io
-def validate_image(file_data):
-    """Validate and reprocess image to strip metadata/payloads."""
-    try:
-        # Verify it's a valid image
-        img = Image.open(io.BytesIO(file_data))
-        img.verify()
-        # Reopen for processing (verify closes the file)
-        img = Image.open(io.BytesIO(file_data))
-        # Convert to remove potential embedded content
-        output = io.BytesIO()
-        img.save(output, format=img.format)
-        output.seek(0)
-        return output.read()
-    except Exception as e:
-        raise ValueError(f"Invalid image: {e}")
-```
-### Dangerous File Types
-```python
-# Never allow execution
-DANGEROUS_EXTENSIONS = {
-    # Executables
-    'exe', 'dll', 'so', 'dylib', 'bin',
-    # Scripts
-    'php', 'php3', 'php4', 'php5', 'phtml',
-    'asp', 'aspx', 'ascx', 'ashx',
-    'jsp', 'jspx',
-    'cgi', 'pl', 'py', 'rb', 'sh', 'bash',
-    # Server config
-    'htaccess', 'htpasswd',
-    'config', 'ini',
-    # HTML (XSS risk)
-    'html', 'htm', 'xhtml', 'svg',
-    # Office macros
-    'docm', 'xlsm', 'pptm',
-}
-# Dangerous MIME types
-DANGEROUS_MIMETYPES = {
-    'application/x-executable',
-    'application/x-msdownload',
-    'application/x-php',
-    'text/html',
-    'image/svg+xml',  # Can contain scripts
-}
-```
----
-## XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention
-### The Vulnerability
-```xml
-<!-- Malicious XML -->
-<?xml version="1.0"?>
-<!DOCTYPE foo [
-  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
-]>
-<data>&xxe;</data>
-```
-### Python Prevention
-```python
-# VULNERABLE: Default lxml settings
-from lxml import etree
-doc = etree.parse(untrusted_file)  # XXE enabled by default
-# SAFE: Disable external entities
-from lxml import etree
-parser = etree.XMLParser(
-    resolve_entities=False,
-    no_network=True,
-    dtd_validation=False,
-    load_dtd=False
-)
-doc = etree.parse(untrusted_file, parser)
-# SAFE: defusedxml library (recommended)
-import defusedxml.ElementTree as ET
-doc = ET.parse(untrusted_file)  # XXE disabled by default
-```
-### Java Prevention
-```java
-// VULNERABLE: Default DocumentBuilder
-DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
-DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();
-Document doc = db.parse(untrustedFile);
-// SAFE: Disable dangerous features
-DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
-dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
-dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
-dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
-dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd", false);
-dbf.setXIncludeAware(false);
-dbf.setExpandEntityReferences(false);
-DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();
-```
-### .NET Prevention
-```csharp
-// SAFE in .NET 4.5.2+: XmlReader is safe by default
-XmlReader reader = XmlReader.Create(stream);
-// For older versions, explicitly disable
-XmlReaderSettings settings = new XmlReaderSettings();
-settings.DtdProcessing = DtdProcessing.Prohibit;
-settings.XmlResolver = null;
-XmlReader reader = XmlReader.Create(stream, settings);
-```
----
-## Archive (ZIP) Handling
-### Zip Slip Prevention
-```python
-import zipfile
-import os
-def safe_extract(zip_path, extract_dir):
-    """Safely extract ZIP, preventing path traversal."""
-    extract_dir = os.path.abspath(extract_dir)
-    with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, 'r') as zf:
-        for member in zf.namelist():
-            # Get absolute path of extracted file
-            member_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(extract_dir, member))
-            # Verify it's under extract directory
-            if not member_path.startswith(extract_dir + os.sep):
-                raise ValueError(f"Path traversal in ZIP: {member}")
-            # Check for symlinks (additional safety)
-            if member.endswith('/'):
-                os.makedirs(member_path, exist_ok=True)
-            else:
-                os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(member_path), exist_ok=True)
-                with zf.open(member) as source, open(member_path, 'wb') as target:
-                    target.write(source.read())
-```
-### Zip Bomb Prevention
-```python
-MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE = 100 * 1024 * 1024  # 100MB
-MAX_COMPRESSION_RATIO = 100
-def check_zip_bomb(zip_path):
-    """Detect potential zip bombs."""
-    compressed_size = os.path.getsize(zip_path)
-    with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, 'r') as zf:
-        uncompressed_size = sum(info.file_size for info in zf.infolist())
-        # Check total size
-        if uncompressed_size > MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE:
-            raise ValueError(f"Uncompressed size too large: {uncompressed_size}")
-        # Check compression ratio
-        if compressed_size > 0:
-            ratio = uncompressed_size / compressed_size
-            if ratio > MAX_COMPRESSION_RATIO:
-                raise ValueError(f"Suspicious compression ratio: {ratio}")
-    return True
-```
----
-## File Permissions
-### Secure Defaults
-```python
-import os
-import stat
-# Uploaded files: readable by app, not executable
-def secure_file_permissions(path):
-    os.chmod(path, stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR | stat.S_IRGRP)  # 640
-# Directories: accessible by app
-def secure_directory_permissions(path):
-    os.chmod(path, stat.S_IRWXU | stat.S_IRGRP | stat.S_IXGRP)  # 750
-# Sensitive files: only owner
-def sensitive_file_permissions(path):
-    os.chmod(path, stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR)  # 600
-```
-### Temporary Files
-```python
-import tempfile
-import os
-# VULNERABLE: Predictable temp file
-with open('/tmp/myapp_temp.txt', 'w') as f:
-    f.write(sensitive_data)
-# SAFE: Secure temp file
-with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode='w', delete=False) as f:
-    f.write(sensitive_data)
-    temp_path = f.name
-    # File has restrictive permissions automatically
-# SAFE: Temp directory
-with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
-    # Directory and contents deleted on exit
-    pass
-```
----
-## Grep Patterns for Detection
-```bash
-# Path traversal risks
-grep -rn "open(.*request\|send_file(.*request" --include="*.py"
-grep -rn "fs\.readFile.*req\|fs\.writeFile.*req" --include="*.js"
-# Dangerous file operations
-grep -rn "os\.system.*file\|subprocess.*file" --include="*.py"
-# XML parsing (XXE risk)
-grep -rn "etree\.parse\|xml\.parse\|DOM\.parse" --include="*.py" --include="*.java"
-grep -rn "XMLReader\|DocumentBuilder" --include="*.java"
-# ZIP handling
-grep -rn "zipfile\|ZipFile\|extractall" --include="*.py" --include="*.java"
-# File permissions
-grep -rn "chmod 777\|chmod 666\|chmod 755" --include="*.py" --include="*.sh"
-```
----
-## Testing Checklist
-- [ ] Path traversal prevented (canonicalization + validation)
-- [ ] File extensions validated against allowlist
-- [ ] MIME types validated (not just Content-Type header)
-- [ ] Filenames sanitized (don't use user input directly)
-- [ ] Files stored outside webroot
-- [ ] Restrictive file permissions set
-- [ ] Upload size limits enforced
-- [ ] Dangerous file types blocked
-- [ ] XML parsing has XXE disabled
-- [ ] ZIP extraction validates paths
-- [ ] ZIP bomb detection in place
-- [ ] Temporary files handled securely
----
-## References
-- [OWASP File Upload Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/File_Upload_Cheat_Sheet.html)
-- [OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XML_External_Entity_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)
-- [CWE-22: Path Traversal](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html)
-- [CWE-434: Unrestricted File Upload](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/434.html)
-- [CWE-611: XXE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/611.html)
+# File Security Reference
+## Overview
+File operations present multiple security risks: path traversal attacks, malicious file uploads, XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, and insecure file permissions. This reference covers secure patterns for handling files.
+---
+## Path Traversal Prevention
+### The Vulnerability
+```python
+# VULNERABLE: User-controlled path
+@app.route('/download')
+def download():
+    filename = request.args.get('file')
+    return send_file(f'/uploads/{filename}')
+# Attack: ?file=../../../etc/passwd
+# Results in: /uploads/../../../etc/passwd → /etc/passwd
+```
+### Prevention Techniques
+```python
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+# Method 1: Validate and canonicalize path
+def safe_join(base_directory, user_path):
+    """Safely join paths, preventing traversal."""
+    # Resolve to absolute path
+    base = Path(base_directory).resolve()
+    target = (base / user_path).resolve()
+    # Verify target is under base
+    if not str(target).startswith(str(base)):
+        raise ValueError("Path traversal detected")
+    return str(target)
+# Method 2: Use allowlist of files
+ALLOWED_FILES = {'report.pdf', 'manual.pdf', 'readme.txt'}
+def download_file(filename):
+    if filename not in ALLOWED_FILES:
+        raise ValueError("File not allowed")
+    return send_file(os.path.join(UPLOAD_DIR, filename))
+# Method 3: Use indirect references
+def get_file_by_id(file_id):
+    # Map ID to filename in database
+    file_record = File.query.get(file_id)
+    if not file_record or file_record.user_id != current_user.id:
+        raise PermissionError()
+    return send_file(file_record.storage_path)
+```
+### Characters to Block
+```python
+# Dangerous path patterns
+BLOCKED_PATTERNS = [
+    '..',           # Parent directory
+    '~',            # Home directory
+    '%2e%2e',       # URL-encoded ..
+    '%252e%252e',   # Double-encoded ..
+    '..\\',         # Windows backslash
+    '..%5c',        # URL-encoded Windows
+    '%00',          # Null byte (older systems)
+]
+def contains_traversal(path):
+    path_lower = path.lower()
+    return any(pattern in path_lower for pattern in BLOCKED_PATTERNS)
+```
+---
+## File Upload Security
+### Defense in Depth Approach
+```python
+import magic
+import hashlib
+import uuid
+from pathlib import Path
+# Configuration
+ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS = {'pdf', 'png', 'jpg', 'jpeg', 'gif'}
+ALLOWED_MIMETYPES = {
+    'application/pdf',
+    'image/png',
+    'image/jpeg',
+    'image/gif'
+}
+MAX_FILE_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024  # 10MB
+UPLOAD_DIR = '/var/uploads'  # Outside webroot
+def secure_upload(file):
+    """Comprehensive file upload validation."""
+    # 1. Check file size
+    file.seek(0, 2)  # Seek to end
+    size = file.tell()
+    file.seek(0)  # Reset
+    if size > MAX_FILE_SIZE:
+        raise ValueError(f"File too large: {size} bytes")
+    # 2. Validate extension
+    original_filename = file.filename
+    extension = Path(original_filename).suffix.lower().lstrip('.')
+    if extension not in ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS:
+        raise ValueError(f"Extension not allowed: {extension}")
+    # 3. Validate MIME type (don't trust Content-Type header)
+    mime = magic.from_buffer(file.read(2048), mime=True)
+    file.seek(0)
+    if mime not in ALLOWED_MIMETYPES:
+        raise ValueError(f"MIME type not allowed: {mime}")
+    # 4. Validate extension matches content
+    expected_extensions = get_extensions_for_mime(mime)
+    if extension not in expected_extensions:
+        raise ValueError("Extension doesn't match content type")
+    # 5. Generate safe filename (ignore user input)
+    safe_filename = f"{uuid.uuid4().hex}.{extension}"
+    # 6. Store outside webroot
+    storage_path = os.path.join(UPLOAD_DIR, safe_filename)
+    file.save(storage_path)
+    # 7. Set restrictive permissions
+    os.chmod(storage_path, 0o640)
+    return {
+        'original_name': original_filename,
+        'stored_name': safe_filename,
+        'storage_path': storage_path,
+        'size': size,
+        'mime_type': mime
+    }
+```
+### Filename Sanitization
+```python
+import re
+import unicodedata
+def sanitize_filename(filename):
+    """Sanitize filename for safe storage."""
+    # Normalize unicode
+    filename = unicodedata.normalize('NFKD', filename)
+    # Remove path components
+    filename = os.path.basename(filename)
+    # Remove null bytes
+    filename = filename.replace('\x00', '')
+    # Allow only safe characters
+    filename = re.sub(r'[^a-zA-Z0-9._-]', '_', filename)
+    # Prevent hidden files
+    filename = filename.lstrip('.')
+    # Limit length
+    if len(filename) > 255:
+        name, ext = os.path.splitext(filename)
+        filename = name[:255-len(ext)] + ext
+    return filename or 'unnamed'
+```
+### Image Validation
+```python
+from PIL import Image
+import io
+def validate_image(file_data):
+    """Validate and reprocess image to strip metadata/payloads."""
+    try:
+        # Verify it's a valid image
+        img = Image.open(io.BytesIO(file_data))
+        img.verify()
+        # Reopen for processing (verify closes the file)
+        img = Image.open(io.BytesIO(file_data))
+        # Convert to remove potential embedded content
+        output = io.BytesIO()
+        img.save(output, format=img.format)
+        output.seek(0)
+        return output.read()
+    except Exception as e:
+        raise ValueError(f"Invalid image: {e}")
+```
+### Dangerous File Types
+```python
+# Never allow execution
+DANGEROUS_EXTENSIONS = {
+    # Executables
+    'exe', 'dll', 'so', 'dylib', 'bin',
+    # Scripts
+    'php', 'php3', 'php4', 'php5', 'phtml',
+    'asp', 'aspx', 'ascx', 'ashx',
+    'jsp', 'jspx',
+    'cgi', 'pl', 'py', 'rb', 'sh', 'bash',
+    # Server config
+    'htaccess', 'htpasswd',
+    'config', 'ini',
+    # HTML (XSS risk)
+    'html', 'htm', 'xhtml', 'svg',
+    # Office macros
+    'docm', 'xlsm', 'pptm',
+}
+# Dangerous MIME types
+DANGEROUS_MIMETYPES = {
+    'application/x-executable',
+    'application/x-msdownload',
+    'application/x-php',
+    'text/html',
+    'image/svg+xml',  # Can contain scripts
+}
+```
+---
+## XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention
+### The Vulnerability
+```xml
+<!-- Malicious XML -->
+<?xml version="1.0"?>
+<!DOCTYPE foo [
+  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
+]>
+<data>&xxe;</data>
+```
+### Python Prevention
+```python
+# VULNERABLE: Default lxml settings
+from lxml import etree
+doc = etree.parse(untrusted_file)  # XXE enabled by default
+# SAFE: Disable external entities
+from lxml import etree
+parser = etree.XMLParser(
+    resolve_entities=False,
+    no_network=True,
+    dtd_validation=False,
+    load_dtd=False
+)
+doc = etree.parse(untrusted_file, parser)
+# SAFE: defusedxml library (recommended)
+import defusedxml.ElementTree as ET
+doc = ET.parse(untrusted_file)  # XXE disabled by default
+```
+### Java Prevention
+```java
+// VULNERABLE: Default DocumentBuilder
+DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
+DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();
+Document doc = db.parse(untrustedFile);
+// SAFE: Disable dangerous features
+DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
+dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
+dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
+dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
+dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/nonvalidating/load-external-dtd", false);
+dbf.setXIncludeAware(false);
+dbf.setExpandEntityReferences(false);
+DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();
+```
+### .NET Prevention
+```csharp
+// SAFE in .NET 4.5.2+: XmlReader is safe by default
+XmlReader reader = XmlReader.Create(stream);
+// For older versions, explicitly disable
+XmlReaderSettings settings = new XmlReaderSettings();
+settings.DtdProcessing = DtdProcessing.Prohibit;
+settings.XmlResolver = null;
+XmlReader reader = XmlReader.Create(stream, settings);
+```
+---
+## Archive (ZIP) Handling
+### Zip Slip Prevention
+```python
+import zipfile
+import os
+def safe_extract(zip_path, extract_dir):
+    """Safely extract ZIP, preventing path traversal."""
+    extract_dir = os.path.abspath(extract_dir)
+    with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, 'r') as zf:
+        for member in zf.namelist():
+            # Get absolute path of extracted file
+            member_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(extract_dir, member))
+            # Verify it's under extract directory
+            if not member_path.startswith(extract_dir + os.sep):
+                raise ValueError(f"Path traversal in ZIP: {member}")
+            # Check for symlinks (additional safety)
+            if member.endswith('/'):
+                os.makedirs(member_path, exist_ok=True)
+            else:
+                os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(member_path), exist_ok=True)
+                with zf.open(member) as source, open(member_path, 'wb') as target:
+                    target.write(source.read())
+```
+### Zip Bomb Prevention
+```python
+MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE = 100 * 1024 * 1024  # 100MB
+MAX_COMPRESSION_RATIO = 100
+def check_zip_bomb(zip_path):
+    """Detect potential zip bombs."""
+    compressed_size = os.path.getsize(zip_path)
+    with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, 'r') as zf:
+        uncompressed_size = sum(info.file_size for info in zf.infolist())
+        # Check total size
+        if uncompressed_size > MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE:
+            raise ValueError(f"Uncompressed size too large: {uncompressed_size}")
+        # Check compression ratio
+        if compressed_size > 0:
+            ratio = uncompressed_size / compressed_size
+            if ratio > MAX_COMPRESSION_RATIO:
+                raise ValueError(f"Suspicious compression ratio: {ratio}")
+    return True
+```
+---
+## File Permissions
+### Secure Defaults
+```python
+import os
+import stat
+# Uploaded files: readable by app, not executable
+def secure_file_permissions(path):
+    os.chmod(path, stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR | stat.S_IRGRP)  # 640
+# Directories: accessible by app
+def secure_directory_permissions(path):
+    os.chmod(path, stat.S_IRWXU | stat.S_IRGRP | stat.S_IXGRP)  # 750
+# Sensitive files: only owner
+def sensitive_file_permissions(path):
+    os.chmod(path, stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR)  # 600
+```
+### Temporary Files
+```python
+import tempfile
+import os
+# VULNERABLE: Predictable temp file
+with open('/tmp/myapp_temp.txt', 'w') as f:
+    f.write(sensitive_data)
+# SAFE: Secure temp file
+with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode='w', delete=False) as f:
+    f.write(sensitive_data)
+    temp_path = f.name
+    # File has restrictive permissions automatically
+# SAFE: Temp directory
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
+    # Directory and contents deleted on exit
+    pass
+```
+---
+## Grep Patterns for Detection
+```bash
+# Path traversal risks
+grep -rn "open(.*request\|send_file(.*request" --include="*.py"
+grep -rn "fs\.readFile.*req\|fs\.writeFile.*req" --include="*.js"
+# Dangerous file operations
+grep -rn "os\.system.*file\|subprocess.*file" --include="*.py"
+# XML parsing (XXE risk)
+grep -rn "etree\.parse\|xml\.parse\|DOM\.parse" --include="*.py" --include="*.java"
+grep -rn "XMLReader\|DocumentBuilder" --include="*.java"
+# ZIP handling
+grep -rn "zipfile\|ZipFile\|extractall" --include="*.py" --include="*.java"
+# File permissions
+grep -rn "chmod 777\|chmod 666\|chmod 755" --include="*.py" --include="*.sh"
+```
+---
+## Testing Checklist
+- [ ] Path traversal prevented (canonicalization + validation)
+- [ ] File extensions validated against allowlist
+- [ ] MIME types validated (not just Content-Type header)
+- [ ] Filenames sanitized (don't use user input directly)
+- [ ] Files stored outside webroot
+- [ ] Restrictive file permissions set
+- [ ] Upload size limits enforced
+- [ ] Dangerous file types blocked
+- [ ] XML parsing has XXE disabled
+- [ ] ZIP extraction validates paths
+- [ ] ZIP bomb detection in place
+- [ ] Temporary files handled securely
+---
+## References
+- [OWASP File Upload Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/File_Upload_Cheat_Sheet.html)
+- [OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XML_External_Entity_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)
+- [CWE-22: Path Traversal](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html)
+- [CWE-434: Unrestricted File Upload](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/434.html)
+- [CWE-611: XXE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/611.html)