@blamejs/core 0.7.4 → 0.7.18

package/lib/api-key.js

@@ -1,663 +1,660 @@
-"use strict";
-/**
- * b.apiKey — operator-facing API-key issuance, verification, revocation,
- * and rotation.
- *
- *   var keys = b.apiKey.create({
- *     namespace:        "live",
- *     audit:            b.audit,                  // optional
- *     trackLastUsedAt:  false,                    // default
- *   });
- *
- *   var issued = await keys.issue({
- *     ownerId:   "user-42",
- *     scopes:    ["read:users", "write:posts"],
- *     metadata:  { name: "Mobile app v3" },
- *     expiresAt: Date.now() + b.constants.TIME.days(90),
- *   });
- *   // issued.key  — "bk_live_<idHex>_<secretHex>"  (returned ONCE)
- *   // issued.id   — "<idHex>"
- *
- *   var record = await keys.verify(req.headers["x-api-key"]);
- *   // → { id, ownerId, scopes, metadata, ... } or null
- *
- *   await keys.revoke(id);
- *   var rotated = await keys.rotate(id);          // new secret; old stops working
- *   var owned   = await keys.listForOwner("user-42");
- *
- * Token format (Stripe-style, prefix-recognizable):
- *
- *     <prefix>_<namespace>_<idHex>_<secretHex>
- *
- * Example: `bk_live_5b9e7c8a4f2d1e3a_8a7b6c5d4e3f2a1b0c9d8e7f6a5b4c3d`
- *
- * - prefix    operator-supplied; default "bk". Visual marker.
- * - namespace operator-supplied; lets multiple key registries coexist
- *             (e.g. "live"/"test", "v1"/"v2") without collision.
- * - idHex     opaque random hex; PRIMARY KEY component (DB lookup).
- * - secretHex opaque random hex; never re-derivable. Stored as
- *             SHA3-512 hash, constant-time-compared on verify.
- *
- * Storage: framework table `_blamejs_api_keys` (sealed columns:
- * ownerId/scopes/metadata; ownerIdHash for indexed listForOwner).
- * Same dual-storage pattern as sessions — local SQLite in single-node
- * mode, external-db in cluster mode, dispatched via cluster-storage.
- *
- * Validation policy:
- *
- *   - apiKey.create opts                    → throw at config time
- *   - registry.issue opts                   → throw ApiKeyError at call site
- *   - registry.rotate(id) on missing/revoked → throw ApiKeyError at call site
- *   - registry.verify(token) on any failure → return null (tolerant read)
- *   - registry.revoke(id) on missing        → return false (tolerant read)
- *   - registry.getById(id) on missing       → return null (tolerant read)
- */
-
-var crypto = require("./crypto");
-var credentialHash = require("./credential-hash");
-var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
-var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
-var clusterStorage = require("./cluster-storage");
-var cluster = require("./cluster");
-var cryptoField = require("./crypto-field");
-var requestHelpers = require("./request-helpers");
-var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
-var C = require("./constants");
-var numericChecks = require("./numeric-checks");
-var { ApiKeyError } = require("./framework-error");
-
-var observability = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./observability"); });
-
-function _emitEvent(n, v, l) { observability().safeEvent(n, v, l || {}); }
-
-var _err = ApiKeyError.factory;
-
-var TABLE   = "_blamejs_api_keys";
-// Pre-quoted form for SQL interpolation. Defense-in-depth: even though
-// our constant is bare-identifier-shaped, every interpolation site uses
-// the wrapped form so a future rename to a reserved-word or
-// whitespace-bearing name would still resolve correctly.
-var Q_TABLE = '"' + TABLE + '"';
-
-// Column order used for INSERT — kept as a constant so the placeholders
-// list and the values list stay in sync. Must match _blamejs_api_keys'
-// schema in db.js (single-node) and framework-schema.js (cluster mode).
-var COLS = [
-  "id", "namespace", "ownerId", "ownerIdHash", "secretHash",
-  "secondarySecretHash", "secondaryExpiresAt",
-  "scopes", "metadata", "createdAt", "expiresAt", "revokedAt",
-  "lastUsedAt", "prefix",
-];
-
-// Default rotate grace period when caller passes { graceful: true }
-// without an explicit gracePeriodMs. 7 days is enough to migrate the
-// vast majority of clients without paging anyone, short enough that
-// a forgotten old secret stops working before it becomes a long-tail
-// liability.
-var DEFAULT_ROTATE_GRACE_MS = C.TIME.days(7);
-
-// Visibility defaults are ON. When an operator wires `audit: b.audit`,
-// they're declaring "I want to know what happens with these credentials"
-// — that includes verify success (every access to a credential), reads
-// (listForOwner/getById), and all state changes. The compliance trail
-// (HIPAA §164.312(b), PCI-DSS 10.2.1, GDPR Art. 32) needs WHO + WHAT +
-// WHEN on every access, not just on writes.
-//
-// Operators with extreme verify-rate volume opt OUT explicitly via
-// `auditSuccess: false`. Failures stay on regardless.
-var DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
-  prefix:           "bk",
-  idBytes:          C.BYTES.bytes(8),    // 16 hex chars
-  secretBytes:      C.BYTES.bytes(16),   // 32 hex chars
-  trackLastUsedAt:  true,     // visibility on dormant / leaked keys
-  auditFailures:    true,     // failure events are actionable signals
-  auditSuccess:     true,     // compliance trail — opt out at extreme volume
-  purgeAfterMs:     C.TIME.days(90),
-  // Credential hash algorithm for new issues. Falls through to
-  // credentialHash defaults; SHAKE256 is the active per-framework
-  // because api-key secrets are 128-bit random (memory-hard property
-  // buys nothing at that entropy) and SHAKE256 is an XOF — the
-  // envelope payload length itself drives the digest size, so a
-  // future operator can request 96-byte digests without an algorithm
-  // rotation. Operators with low-entropy or paranoia-mode storage
-  // pin "argon2id" per registry. The envelope ensures historical
-  // credentials always remain verifiable.
-  hashAlgo:         "shake256",
-});
-
-// ---- Config-time validation helpers (throw on bad input) ----
-
-var _isPositiveInt = numericChecks.isPositiveInt;
-
-function _validateIdentifier(name, value) {
-  if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0) {
-    throw _err("BAD_OPT", name + " must be a non-empty string, got " + typeof value);
-  }
-  if (/[_\s]/.test(value)) {
-    throw _err("BAD_OPT", name + " must not contain underscores or whitespace (collides with format separator), got " +
-      JSON.stringify(value));
-  }
-}
-
-function _validateCreateOpts(opts) {
-  validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "apiKey.create", ApiKeyError);
-  _validateIdentifier("apiKey.create: namespace", opts.namespace);
-  if (opts.prefix !== undefined) _validateIdentifier("apiKey.create: prefix", opts.prefix);
-  validateOpts.optionalPositiveInt(opts.idBytes, "apiKey.create: idBytes", ApiKeyError);
-  validateOpts.optionalPositiveInt(opts.secretBytes, "apiKey.create: secretBytes", ApiKeyError);
-  validateOpts.optionalBoolean(opts.trackLastUsedAt, "apiKey.create: trackLastUsedAt", ApiKeyError);
-  validateOpts.optionalBoolean(opts.auditFailures, "apiKey.create: auditFailures", ApiKeyError);
-  validateOpts.optionalBoolean(opts.auditSuccess, "apiKey.create: auditSuccess", ApiKeyError);
-  validateOpts.optionalFiniteNonNegative(opts.purgeAfterMs, "apiKey.create: purgeAfterMs", ApiKeyError);
-  if (opts.hashAlgo !== undefined) {
-    if (typeof opts.hashAlgo !== "string" ||
-        (opts.hashAlgo !== "shake256" && opts.hashAlgo !== "argon2id")) {
-      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "apiKey.create: hashAlgo must be 'shake256' or 'argon2id', got " +
-        JSON.stringify(opts.hashAlgo));
-    }
-  }
-  validateOpts.auditShape(opts.audit, "apiKey.create", ApiKeyError);
-  validateOpts.optionalFunction(opts.clock, "apiKey.create: clock", ApiKeyError);
-}
-
-function _validateIssueOpts(opts) {
-  validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "apiKey.issue", ApiKeyError);
-  validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(opts.ownerId, "apiKey.issue: ownerId", ApiKeyError, "MISSING_OWNER");
-  validateOpts.optionalNonEmptyStringArray(opts.scopes, "apiKey.issue: scopes", ApiKeyError, "BAD_SCOPES");
-  if (opts.metadata !== undefined && opts.metadata !== null) {
-    if (typeof opts.metadata !== "object" || Array.isArray(opts.metadata)) {
-      throw _err("BAD_METADATA", "apiKey.issue: metadata must be a plain object or null");
-    }
-  }
-  if (opts.expiresAt !== undefined && opts.expiresAt !== null) {
-    if (typeof opts.expiresAt !== "number" || !isFinite(opts.expiresAt) || opts.expiresAt < 0) {
-      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "apiKey.issue: expiresAt must be a non-negative finite number (unix ms) or null");
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-// ---- Token format ----
-
-// Format: <prefix>_<namespace>_<idHex>_<secretHex>
-// Each part is alphanumeric so split-by-underscore is unambiguous as long
-// as prefix/namespace are validated to contain no underscores. We verify
-// that during create.
-function parseFormat(token) {
-  if (typeof token !== "string" || token.length === 0) return null;
-  var parts = token.split("_");
-  if (parts.length !== 4) return null;
-  var prefix = parts[0], ns = parts[1], idHex = parts[2], secretHex = parts[3];
-  if (!prefix || !ns || !idHex || !secretHex) return null;
-  if (!/^[0-9a-f]+$/i.test(idHex) || !/^[0-9a-f]+$/i.test(secretHex)) return null;
-  return { prefix: prefix, namespace: ns, idHex: idHex, secretHex: secretHex };
-}
-
-function _composeKey(prefix, namespace, idHex, secretHex) {
-  return prefix + "_" + namespace + "_" + idHex + "_" + secretHex;
-}
-
-function _composedId(namespace, idHex) {
-  return namespace + ":" + idHex;
-}
-
-// ---- Sealed-row helpers ----
-
-function _sealForInsert(row) {
-  var sealed = cryptoField.sealRow(TABLE, row);
-  for (var i = 0; i < COLS.length; i++) {
-    if (!(COLS[i] in sealed)) sealed[COLS[i]] = null;
-  }
-  return sealed;
-}
-
-// ---- Registry factory ----
-
-function create(opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
-  validateOpts(opts, [
-    "namespace", "prefix", "idBytes", "secretBytes",
-    "trackLastUsedAt", "auditFailures", "auditSuccess",
-    "purgeAfterMs", "hashAlgo", "audit", "clock",
-  ], "apiKey");
-  _validateCreateOpts(opts);
-  var cfg = validateOpts.applyDefaults(opts, DEFAULTS);
-  var prefix          = cfg.prefix;
-  var namespace       = opts.namespace;
-  var idBytes         = cfg.idBytes;
-  var secretBytes     = cfg.secretBytes;
-  var trackLastUsedAt = cfg.trackLastUsedAt;
-  var auditFailures   = cfg.auditFailures;
-  var auditSuccess    = cfg.auditSuccess;
-  var purgeAfterMs    = cfg.purgeAfterMs;
-  var hashAlgo        = cfg.hashAlgo;
-  var audit           = opts.audit || null;
-  var clock           = opts.clock || function () { return Date.now(); };
-
-  var _emit = validateOpts.makeAuditEmitter(audit);
-
-  // Build the audit actor by extracting the 5 W's from the supplied
-  // request (WHO/WHERE/HOW), then layering caller-supplied context
-  // and an explicit userId on top so the most specific value wins.
-  // The audit chain treats null fields as "unknown", so partial
-  // context is always safe.
-  function _actor(callerOpts, userId) {
-    return requestHelpers.resolveActorWithOverride(
-      callerOpts,
-      userId ? { userId: userId } : null
-    );
-  }
-
-  function _selectAll() {
-    return "SELECT id, namespace, ownerId, ownerIdHash, secretHash, " +
-           "secondarySecretHash, secondaryExpiresAt, " +
-           "scopes, metadata, createdAt, expiresAt, revokedAt, lastUsedAt, prefix FROM " + Q_TABLE;
-  }
-
-  function _scrubRecord(row) {
-    if (!row) return null;
-    var unsealed = cryptoField.unsealRow(TABLE, row);
-    var scopes = null;
-    if (unsealed.scopes) {
-      try { scopes = safeJson.parse(unsealed.scopes); } catch (_e) { scopes = null; }
-    }
-    var metadata = null;
-    if (unsealed.metadata) {
-      try { metadata = safeJson.parse(unsealed.metadata); } catch (_e) { metadata = null; }
-    }
-    var idParts = String(unsealed.id).split(":");
-    var idHexOnly = idParts.length === 2 ? idParts[1] : unsealed.id;
-    return {
-      id:                  idHexOnly,
-      namespace:           unsealed.namespace,
-      ownerId:             unsealed.ownerId,
-      scopes:              scopes || [],
-      metadata:            metadata || null,
-      createdAt:           Number(unsealed.createdAt),
-      expiresAt:           unsealed.expiresAt == null ? null : Number(unsealed.expiresAt),
-      revokedAt:           unsealed.revokedAt == null ? null : Number(unsealed.revokedAt),
-      lastUsedAt:          unsealed.lastUsedAt == null ? null : Number(unsealed.lastUsedAt),
-      // secondaryExpiresAt is operator-visible signal that a graceful
-      // rotation is in flight; secondarySecretHash itself is NEVER
-      // exposed.
-      secondaryExpiresAt:  unsealed.secondaryExpiresAt == null ? null : Number(unsealed.secondaryExpiresAt),
-      prefix:              unsealed.prefix,
-    };
-  }
-
-  async function issue(issueOpts) {
-    cluster.requireLeader();
-    _validateIssueOpts(issueOpts);
-    var idHex     = crypto.generateToken(idBytes);
-    var secretHex = crypto.generateToken(secretBytes);
-    var compositeId = _composedId(namespace, idHex);
-    var nowMs     = clock();
-    var scopes    = issueOpts.scopes || [];
-    var metadata  = issueOpts.metadata || null;
-    var expiresAt = (issueOpts.expiresAt === undefined) ? null : issueOpts.expiresAt;
-
-    var secretEnvelope = await credentialHash.hash(secretHex, { algo: hashAlgo });
-    var sealed = _sealForInsert({
-      id:                  compositeId,
-      namespace:           namespace,
-      ownerId:             issueOpts.ownerId,
-      secretHash:          secretEnvelope,
-      secondarySecretHash: null,
-      secondaryExpiresAt:  null,
-      scopes:              JSON.stringify(scopes),
-      metadata:            metadata ? JSON.stringify(metadata) : null,
-      createdAt:           nowMs,
-      expiresAt:           expiresAt,
-      revokedAt:           null,
-      lastUsedAt:          null,
-      prefix:              prefix,
-    });
-    var values = COLS.map(function (c) { return sealed[c]; });
-    var placeholders = COLS.map(function () { return "?"; }).join(", ");
-    var quoted = COLS.map(function (c) { return '"' + c + '"'; }).join(", ");
-
-    await clusterStorage.execute(
-      "INSERT INTO " + Q_TABLE + " (" + quoted + ") VALUES (" + placeholders + ")",
-      values
-    );
-
-    _emit("apikey.issue", {
-      actor:    _actor(issueOpts, issueOpts.ownerId),
-      resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
-      metadata: { namespace: namespace, scopes: scopes, expiresAt: expiresAt },
-    });
-    _emitEvent("apikey.issue", 1, { namespace: namespace });
-
-    return {
-      id:        idHex,
-      secret:    secretHex,
-      key:       _composeKey(prefix, namespace, idHex, secretHex),
-      scopes:    scopes,
-      metadata:  metadata,
-      createdAt: nowMs,
-      expiresAt: expiresAt,
-    };
-  }
-
-  async function verify(token, verifyOpts) {
-    var parsed = parseFormat(token);
-    if (!parsed) return null;
-    if (parsed.prefix !== prefix || parsed.namespace !== namespace) return null;
-
-    var compositeId = _composedId(namespace, parsed.idHex);
-    var row = await clusterStorage.executeOne(
-      _selectAll() + " WHERE id = ?",
-      [compositeId]
-    );
-    if (!row) {
-      if (auditFailures) {
-        _emit("apikey.verify", {
-          actor:    _actor(verifyOpts),
-          resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
-          outcome:  "failure",
-          reason:   "not-found",
-        });
-      }
-      _emitEvent("apikey.verify", 1, { namespace: namespace, outcome: "failure", reason: "not-found" });
-      return null;
-    }
-
-    var nowMs = clock();
-    var rowOwnerId = null;
-    try {
-      var unsealedOwner = cryptoField.unsealRow(TABLE, row);
-      rowOwnerId = unsealedOwner.ownerId;
-    } catch (_e) { rowOwnerId = null; }
-
-    if (row.revokedAt != null) {
-      if (auditFailures) {
-        _emit("apikey.verify", {
-          actor:    _actor(verifyOpts, rowOwnerId),
-          resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
-          outcome:  "failure", reason: "revoked",
-        });
-      }
-      _emitEvent("apikey.verify", 1, { namespace: namespace, outcome: "failure", reason: "revoked" });
-      return null;
-    }
-    if (row.expiresAt != null && Number(row.expiresAt) < nowMs) {
-      if (auditFailures) {
-        _emit("apikey.verify", {
-          actor:    _actor(verifyOpts, rowOwnerId),
-          resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
-          outcome:  "failure", reason: "expired",
-        });
-      }
-      _emitEvent("apikey.verify", 1, { namespace: namespace, outcome: "failure", reason: "expired" });
-      return null;
-    }
-
-    // Hash dispatch goes through credentialHash so the persisted byte
-    // controls the verification algorithm. Both primary and secondary
-    // (graceful-rotation) slots are envelope-encoded.
-    var primaryMatch = await credentialHash.verify(parsed.secretHex, row.secretHash);
-    var secondaryMatch = false;
-    var secondaryActive = row.secondarySecretHash != null &&
-                          row.secondaryExpiresAt != null &&
-                          Number(row.secondaryExpiresAt) >= nowMs;
-    if (!primaryMatch && secondaryActive) {
-      secondaryMatch = await credentialHash.verify(parsed.secretHex, row.secondarySecretHash);
-    }
-    if (!primaryMatch && !secondaryMatch) {
-      if (auditFailures) {
-        _emit("apikey.verify", {
-          actor:    _actor(verifyOpts, rowOwnerId),
-          resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
-          outcome:  "failure", reason: "bad-secret",
-        });
-      }
-      _emitEvent("apikey.verify", 1, { namespace: namespace, outcome: "failure", reason: "bad-secret" });
-      return null;
-    }
-
-    if (trackLastUsedAt && cluster.isLeader()) {
-      try {
-        await clusterStorage.execute(
-          "UPDATE " + Q_TABLE + " SET lastUsedAt = ? WHERE id = ?",
-          [nowMs, compositeId]
-        );
-      } catch (_e) { /* best-effort; verify success not blocked by lastUsed update */ }
-    }
-
-    if (auditSuccess) {
-      _emit("apikey.verify", {
-        actor:    _actor(verifyOpts, rowOwnerId),
-        resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
-        outcome:  "success",
-        metadata: { secondary: secondaryMatch },
-      });
-    }
-    _emitEvent("apikey.verify", 1,
-      { namespace: namespace, outcome: "success", secondary: secondaryMatch });
-    var record = _scrubRecord(row);
-    record.usedSecondary = secondaryMatch;       // operator can detect grace-period usage
-    return record;
-  }
-
-  async function revoke(idHex, revokeOpts) {
-    cluster.requireLeader();
-    if (typeof idHex !== "string" || idHex.length === 0) return false;
-    var compositeId = _composedId(namespace, idHex);
-    var nowMs = clock();
-    var result = await clusterStorage.execute(
-      "UPDATE " + Q_TABLE + " SET revokedAt = ? WHERE id = ? AND revokedAt IS NULL",
-      [nowMs, compositeId]
-    );
-    var changed = (result.rowCount || 0) > 0;
-    if (changed) {
-      _emit("apikey.revoke", {
-        actor:    _actor(revokeOpts),
-        resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
-      });
-      _emitEvent("apikey.revoke", 1, { namespace: namespace });
-    }
-    return changed;
-  }
-
-  async function rotate(idHex, rotateOpts) {
-    cluster.requireLeader();
-    if (typeof idHex !== "string" || idHex.length === 0) {
-      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "apiKey.rotate: id must be a non-empty string");
-    }
-    rotateOpts = rotateOpts || {};
-    // Graceful rotation: the previous hash stays valid in the
-    // secondarySecretHash slot until secondaryExpiresAt. Operators
-    // pass either { graceful: true } (default DEFAULT_ROTATE_GRACE_MS)
-    // or { gracePeriodMs: <ms> } for an explicit window. Without
-    // either, rotation is immediate (old secret invalidated) — this
-    // preserves the original semantics for callers that explicitly
-    // want a hard cutover.
-    var gracePeriodMs = 0;
-    if (typeof rotateOpts.gracePeriodMs === "number") {
-      if (!isFinite(rotateOpts.gracePeriodMs) || rotateOpts.gracePeriodMs < 0) {
-        throw _err("BAD_OPT", "apiKey.rotate: gracePeriodMs must be a non-negative finite number");
-      }
-      gracePeriodMs = rotateOpts.gracePeriodMs;
-    } else if (rotateOpts.graceful === true) {
-      gracePeriodMs = DEFAULT_ROTATE_GRACE_MS;
-    } else if (rotateOpts.graceful !== undefined && rotateOpts.graceful !== false) {
-      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "apiKey.rotate: graceful must be a boolean");
-    }
-
-    var compositeId = _composedId(namespace, idHex);
-    var existing = await clusterStorage.executeOne(
-      _selectAll() + " WHERE id = ?",
-      [compositeId]
-    );
-    if (!existing) {
-      throw _err("NOT_FOUND", "apiKey.rotate: id '" + idHex + "' not found in namespace '" + namespace + "'");
-    }
-    if (existing.revokedAt != null) {
-      throw _err("REVOKED", "apiKey.rotate: id '" + idHex + "' is revoked");
-    }
-    var newSecretHex = crypto.generateToken(secretBytes);
-    var newHash = await credentialHash.hash(newSecretHex, { algo: hashAlgo });
-    var nowMs = clock();
-
-    if (gracePeriodMs > 0) {
-      // Move current hash → secondary slot, install new hash as primary.
-      await clusterStorage.execute(
-        "UPDATE " + Q_TABLE + " SET secretHash = ?, " +
-        "secondarySecretHash = ?, secondaryExpiresAt = ? WHERE id = ?",
-        [newHash, existing.secretHash, nowMs + gracePeriodMs, compositeId]
-      );
-    } else {
-      // Hard cutover — old secret stops working immediately. Clears
-      // any prior secondary slot too.
-      await clusterStorage.execute(
-        "UPDATE " + Q_TABLE + " SET secretHash = ?, " +
-        "secondarySecretHash = NULL, secondaryExpiresAt = NULL WHERE id = ?",
-        [newHash, compositeId]
-      );
-    }
-
-    _emit("apikey.rotate", {
-      actor:    _actor(rotateOpts),
-      resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
-      metadata: { gracePeriodMs: gracePeriodMs },
-    });
-    _emitEvent("apikey.rotate", 1, { namespace: namespace, graceful: gracePeriodMs > 0 });
-    return {
-      key:                _composeKey(prefix, namespace, idHex, newSecretHex),
-      secret:             newSecretHex,
-      secretHash:         newHash,
-      gracePeriodMs:      gracePeriodMs,
-      secondaryExpiresAt: gracePeriodMs > 0 ? (nowMs + gracePeriodMs) : null,
-    };
-  }
-
-  async function listForOwner(ownerId, listOpts) {
-    if (typeof ownerId !== "string" || ownerId.length === 0) {
-      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "apiKey.listForOwner: ownerId must be a non-empty string");
-    }
-    listOpts = listOpts || {};
-    var includeRevoked = !!listOpts.includeRevoked;
-    var includeExpired = !!listOpts.includeExpired;
-    var lookup = cryptoField.lookupHash(TABLE, "ownerId", ownerId);
-    if (!lookup) {
-      throw _err("MISCONFIGURED",
-        "_blamejs_api_keys schema is missing the ownerIdHash derived hash — framework misconfigured");
-    }
-    var sql = _selectAll() + " WHERE namespace = ? AND ownerIdHash = ?";
-    var params = [namespace, lookup.value];
-    if (!includeRevoked) sql += " AND revokedAt IS NULL";
-    if (!includeExpired) {
-      sql += " AND (expiresAt IS NULL OR expiresAt >= ?)";
-      params.push(clock());
-    }
-    sql += " ORDER BY createdAt DESC";
-    var rows = await clusterStorage.execute(sql, params);
-    var list = (rows.rows || []).map(_scrubRecord);
-    _emitEvent("apikey.list", 1, { namespace: namespace, count: list.length });
-    // Read-access audit: "who listed whose keys at time T" — gated by
-    // auditSuccess so operators with admin tooling that polls heavily
-    // can opt out. ownerId is the audit subject; the listed IDs are
-    // included in metadata so a compliance auditor can reconstruct
-    // exactly which records were observed.
-    if (auditSuccess) {
-      _emit("apikey.list", {
-        actor:    _actor(listOpts),
-        resource: { kind: "apikey-namespace", id: namespace },
-        metadata: {
-          ownerId:    ownerId,
-          count:      list.length,
-          observedIds: list.map(function (r) { return r.id; }),
-          includeRevoked: includeRevoked,
-          includeExpired: includeExpired,
-        },
-      });
-    }
-    return list;
-  }
-
-  async function getById(idHex, getOpts) {
-    if (typeof idHex !== "string" || idHex.length === 0) return null;
-    var compositeId = _composedId(namespace, idHex);
-    var row = await clusterStorage.executeOne(
-      _selectAll() + " WHERE id = ?",
-      [compositeId]
-    );
-    var record = _scrubRecord(row);
-    _emitEvent("apikey.get", 1,
-      { namespace: namespace, found: record !== null });
-    if (auditSuccess) {
-      _emit("apikey.get", {
-        actor:    _actor(getOpts),
-        resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
-        metadata: { found: record !== null },
-      });
-    }
-    return record;
-  }
-
-  async function purgeExpired(purgeOpts) {
-    cluster.requireLeader();
-    var threshold = clock() - purgeAfterMs;
-    // SELECT-then-DELETE so we can audit the specific IDs being purged.
-    // Compliance auditors expect "key X was purged at time T" — a count-
-    // only audit is too coarse for forensic reconstruction. Cost is one
-    // extra round-trip per purge call which runs on a schedule (not
-    // request-rate), so the cost is irrelevant.
-    var idRows = await clusterStorage.execute(
-      "SELECT id FROM " + Q_TABLE + " WHERE namespace = ? AND " +
-      "((revokedAt IS NOT NULL AND revokedAt < ?) OR " +
-      " (expiresAt IS NOT NULL AND expiresAt < ?))",
-      [namespace, threshold, threshold]
-    );
-    var purgedCompositeIds = (idRows.rows || []).map(function (r) { return r.id; });
-
-    if (purgedCompositeIds.length === 0) {
-      _emitEvent("apikey.purge", 1, { namespace: namespace, count: 0 });
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    var result = await clusterStorage.execute(
-      "DELETE FROM " + Q_TABLE + " WHERE namespace = ? AND " +
-      "((revokedAt IS NOT NULL AND revokedAt < ?) OR " +
-      " (expiresAt IS NOT NULL AND expiresAt < ?))",
-      [namespace, threshold, threshold]
-    );
-    var count = result.rowCount || purgedCompositeIds.length;
-
-    _emit("apikey.purge", {
-      actor:    _actor(purgeOpts),
-      resource: { kind: "apikey-namespace", id: namespace },
-      metadata: {
-        count: count,
-        // Strip the namespace prefix so the audit payload contains
-        // bare idHex values consistent with what callers receive
-        // from issue/verify/getById.
-        purgedIds: purgedCompositeIds.map(function (cid) {
-          var parts = cid.split(":");
-          return parts.length === 2 ? parts[1] : cid;
-        }),
-        thresholdMs: threshold,
-      },
-    });
-    _emitEvent("apikey.purge", 1, { namespace: namespace, count: count });
-    return count;
-  }
-
-  return {
-    issue:         issue,
-    verify:        verify,
-    revoke:        revoke,
-    rotate:        rotate,
-    listForOwner:  listForOwner,
-    getById:       getById,
-    purgeExpired:  purgeExpired,
-    namespace:     namespace,
-    prefix:        prefix,
-  };
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  create:       create,
-  parseFormat:  parseFormat,
-  ApiKeyError:  ApiKeyError,
-  DEFAULTS:     DEFAULTS,
-};
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * b.apiKey — operator-facing API-key issuance, verification, revocation,
+ * and rotation.
+ *
+ *   var keys = b.apiKey.create({
+ *     namespace:        "live",
+ *     audit:            b.audit,                  // optional
+ *     trackLastUsedAt:  false,                    // default
+ *   });
+ *
+ *   var issued = await keys.issue({
+ *     ownerId:   "user-42",
+ *     scopes:    ["read:users", "write:posts"],
+ *     metadata:  { name: "Mobile app v3" },
+ *     expiresAt: Date.now() + b.constants.TIME.days(90),
+ *   });
+ *   // issued.key  — "bk_live_<idHex>_<secretHex>"  (returned ONCE)
+ *   // issued.id   — "<idHex>"
+ *
+ *   var record = await keys.verify(req.headers["x-api-key"]);
+ *   // → { id, ownerId, scopes, metadata, ... } or null
+ *
+ *   await keys.revoke(id);
+ *   var rotated = await keys.rotate(id);          // new secret; old stops working
+ *   var owned   = await keys.listForOwner("user-42");
+ *
+ * Token format (Stripe-style, prefix-recognizable):
+ *
+ *     <prefix>_<namespace>_<idHex>_<secretHex>
+ *
+ * Example: `bk_live_5b9e7c8a4f2d1e3a_8a7b6c5d4e3f2a1b0c9d8e7f6a5b4c3d`
+ *
+ * - prefix    operator-supplied; default "bk". Visual marker.
+ * - namespace operator-supplied; lets multiple key registries coexist
+ *             (e.g. "live"/"test", "v1"/"v2") without collision.
+ * - idHex     opaque random hex; PRIMARY KEY component (DB lookup).
+ * - secretHex opaque random hex; never re-derivable. Stored as
+ *             SHA3-512 hash, constant-time-compared on verify.
+ *
+ * Storage: framework table `_blamejs_api_keys` (sealed columns:
+ * ownerId/scopes/metadata; ownerIdHash for indexed listForOwner).
+ * Same dual-storage pattern as sessions — local SQLite in single-node
+ * mode, external-db in cluster mode, dispatched via cluster-storage.
+ *
+ * Validation policy:
+ *
+ *   - apiKey.create opts                    → throw at config time
+ *   - registry.issue opts                   → throw ApiKeyError at call site
+ *   - registry.rotate(id) on missing/revoked → throw ApiKeyError at call site
+ *   - registry.verify(token) on any failure → return null (tolerant read)
+ *   - registry.revoke(id) on missing        → return false (tolerant read)
+ *   - registry.getById(id) on missing       → return null (tolerant read)
+ */
+
+var crypto = require("./crypto");
+var credentialHash = require("./credential-hash");
+var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
+var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
+var clusterStorage = require("./cluster-storage");
+var cluster = require("./cluster");
+var cryptoField = require("./crypto-field");
+var requestHelpers = require("./request-helpers");
+var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
+var C = require("./constants");
+var numericChecks = require("./numeric-checks");
+var { ApiKeyError } = require("./framework-error");
+
+var observability = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./observability"); });
+
+function _emitEvent(n, v, l) { observability().safeEvent(n, v, l || {}); }
+
+var _err = ApiKeyError.factory;
+
+var TABLE   = "_blamejs_api_keys";
+// Pre-quoted form for SQL interpolation. Defense-in-depth: even though
+// our constant is bare-identifier-shaped, every interpolation site uses
+// the wrapped form so a future rename to a reserved-word or
+// whitespace-bearing name would still resolve correctly.
+var Q_TABLE = '"' + TABLE + '"';
+
+// Column order used for INSERT — kept as a constant so the placeholders
+// list and the values list stay in sync. Must match _blamejs_api_keys'
+// schema in db.js (single-node) and framework-schema.js (cluster mode).
+var COLS = [
+  "id", "namespace", "ownerId", "ownerIdHash", "secretHash",
+  "secondarySecretHash", "secondaryExpiresAt",
+  "scopes", "metadata", "createdAt", "expiresAt", "revokedAt",
+  "lastUsedAt", "prefix",
+];
+
+// Default rotate grace period when caller passes { graceful: true }
+// without an explicit gracePeriodMs. 7 days is enough to migrate the
+// vast majority of clients without paging anyone, short enough that
+// a forgotten old secret stops working before it becomes a long-tail
+// liability.
+var DEFAULT_ROTATE_GRACE_MS = C.TIME.days(7);
+
+// Visibility defaults are ON. When an operator wires `audit: b.audit`,
+// they're declaring "I want to know what happens with these credentials"
+// — that includes verify success (every access to a credential), reads
+// (listForOwner/getById), and all state changes. The compliance trail
+// (HIPAA §164.312(b), PCI-DSS 10.2.1, GDPR Art. 32) needs WHO + WHAT +
+// WHEN on every access, not just on writes.
+//
+// Operators with extreme verify-rate volume opt OUT explicitly via
+// `auditSuccess: false`. Failures stay on regardless.
+var DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
+  prefix:           "bk",
+  idBytes:          C.BYTES.bytes(8),    // 16 hex chars
+  secretBytes:      C.BYTES.bytes(16),   // 32 hex chars
+  trackLastUsedAt:  true,     // visibility on dormant / leaked keys
+  auditFailures:    true,     // failure events are actionable signals
+  auditSuccess:     true,     // compliance trail — opt out at extreme volume
+  purgeAfterMs:     C.TIME.days(90),
+  // Credential hash algorithm for new issues. Falls through to
+  // credentialHash defaults; SHAKE256 is the active per-framework
+  // because api-key secrets are 128-bit random (memory-hard property
+  // buys nothing at that entropy) and SHAKE256 is an XOF — the
+  // envelope payload length itself drives the digest size, so a
+  // future operator can request 96-byte digests without an algorithm
+  // rotation. Operators with low-entropy or paranoia-mode storage
+  // pin "argon2id" per registry. The envelope ensures historical
+  // credentials always remain verifiable.
+  hashAlgo:         "shake256",
+});
+
+// ---- Config-time validation helpers (throw on bad input) ----
+
+var _isPositiveInt = numericChecks.isPositiveInt;
+
+function _validateIdentifier(name, value) {
+  if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0) {
+    throw _err("BAD_OPT", name + " must be a non-empty string, got " + typeof value);
+  }
+  if (/[_\s]/.test(value)) {
+    throw _err("BAD_OPT", name + " must not contain underscores or whitespace (collides with format separator), got " +
+      JSON.stringify(value));
+  }
+}
+
+function _validateCreateOpts(opts) {
+  validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "apiKey.create", ApiKeyError);
+  _validateIdentifier("apiKey.create: namespace", opts.namespace);
+  if (opts.prefix !== undefined) _validateIdentifier("apiKey.create: prefix", opts.prefix);
+  validateOpts.optionalPositiveInt(opts.idBytes, "apiKey.create: idBytes", ApiKeyError);
+  validateOpts.optionalPositiveInt(opts.secretBytes, "apiKey.create: secretBytes", ApiKeyError);
+  validateOpts.optionalBoolean(opts.trackLastUsedAt, "apiKey.create: trackLastUsedAt", ApiKeyError);
+  validateOpts.optionalBoolean(opts.auditFailures, "apiKey.create: auditFailures", ApiKeyError);
+  validateOpts.optionalBoolean(opts.auditSuccess, "apiKey.create: auditSuccess", ApiKeyError);
+  validateOpts.optionalFiniteNonNegative(opts.purgeAfterMs, "apiKey.create: purgeAfterMs", ApiKeyError);
+  if (opts.hashAlgo !== undefined) {
+    if (typeof opts.hashAlgo !== "string" ||
+        (opts.hashAlgo !== "shake256" && opts.hashAlgo !== "argon2id")) {
+      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "apiKey.create: hashAlgo must be 'shake256' or 'argon2id', got " +
+        JSON.stringify(opts.hashAlgo));
+    }
+  }
+  validateOpts.auditShape(opts.audit, "apiKey.create", ApiKeyError);
+  validateOpts.optionalFunction(opts.clock, "apiKey.create: clock", ApiKeyError);
+}
+
+function _validateIssueOpts(opts) {
+  validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "apiKey.issue", ApiKeyError);
+  validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(opts.ownerId, "apiKey.issue: ownerId", ApiKeyError, "MISSING_OWNER");
+  validateOpts.optionalNonEmptyStringArray(opts.scopes, "apiKey.issue: scopes", ApiKeyError, "BAD_SCOPES");
+  validateOpts.optionalPlainObject(opts.metadata, "apiKey.issue: metadata",
+    ApiKeyError, "BAD_METADATA");
+  if (opts.expiresAt !== undefined && opts.expiresAt !== null) {
+    if (typeof opts.expiresAt !== "number" || !isFinite(opts.expiresAt) || opts.expiresAt < 0) {
+      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "apiKey.issue: expiresAt must be a non-negative finite number (unix ms) or null");
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// ---- Token format ----
+
+// Format: <prefix>_<namespace>_<idHex>_<secretHex>
+// Each part is alphanumeric so split-by-underscore is unambiguous as long
+// as prefix/namespace are validated to contain no underscores. We verify
+// that during create.
+function parseFormat(token) {
+  if (typeof token !== "string" || token.length === 0) return null;
+  var parts = token.split("_");
+  if (parts.length !== 4) return null;
+  var prefix = parts[0], ns = parts[1], idHex = parts[2], secretHex = parts[3];
+  if (!prefix || !ns || !idHex || !secretHex) return null;
+  if (!/^[0-9a-f]+$/i.test(idHex) || !/^[0-9a-f]+$/i.test(secretHex)) return null;
+  return { prefix: prefix, namespace: ns, idHex: idHex, secretHex: secretHex };
+}
+
+function _composeKey(prefix, namespace, idHex, secretHex) {
+  return prefix + "_" + namespace + "_" + idHex + "_" + secretHex;
+}
+
+function _composedId(namespace, idHex) {
+  return namespace + ":" + idHex;
+}
+
+// ---- Sealed-row helpers ----
+
+function _sealForInsert(row) {
+  var sealed = cryptoField.sealRow(TABLE, row);
+  for (var i = 0; i < COLS.length; i++) {
+    if (!(COLS[i] in sealed)) sealed[COLS[i]] = null;
+  }
+  return sealed;
+}
+
+// ---- Registry factory ----
+
+function create(opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  validateOpts(opts, [
+    "namespace", "prefix", "idBytes", "secretBytes",
+    "trackLastUsedAt", "auditFailures", "auditSuccess",
+    "purgeAfterMs", "hashAlgo", "audit", "clock",
+  ], "apiKey");
+  _validateCreateOpts(opts);
+  var cfg = validateOpts.applyDefaults(opts, DEFAULTS);
+  var prefix          = cfg.prefix;
+  var namespace       = opts.namespace;
+  var idBytes         = cfg.idBytes;
+  var secretBytes     = cfg.secretBytes;
+  var trackLastUsedAt = cfg.trackLastUsedAt;
+  var auditFailures   = cfg.auditFailures;
+  var auditSuccess    = cfg.auditSuccess;
+  var purgeAfterMs    = cfg.purgeAfterMs;
+  var hashAlgo        = cfg.hashAlgo;
+  var audit           = opts.audit || null;
+  var clock           = opts.clock || function () { return Date.now(); };
+
+  var _emit = validateOpts.makeAuditEmitter(audit);
+
+  // Build the audit actor by extracting the 5 W's from the supplied
+  // request (WHO/WHERE/HOW), then layering caller-supplied context
+  // and an explicit userId on top so the most specific value wins.
+  // The audit chain treats null fields as "unknown", so partial
+  // context is always safe.
+  function _actor(callerOpts, userId) {
+    return requestHelpers.resolveActorWithOverride(
+      callerOpts,
+      userId ? { userId: userId } : null
+    );
+  }
+
+  function _selectAll() {
+    return "SELECT id, namespace, ownerId, ownerIdHash, secretHash, " +
+           "secondarySecretHash, secondaryExpiresAt, " +
+           "scopes, metadata, createdAt, expiresAt, revokedAt, lastUsedAt, prefix FROM " + Q_TABLE;
+  }
+
+  function _scrubRecord(row) {
+    if (!row) return null;
+    var unsealed = cryptoField.unsealRow(TABLE, row);
+    var scopes = null;
+    if (unsealed.scopes) {
+      try { scopes = safeJson.parse(unsealed.scopes); } catch (_e) { scopes = null; }
+    }
+    var metadata = null;
+    if (unsealed.metadata) {
+      try { metadata = safeJson.parse(unsealed.metadata); } catch (_e) { metadata = null; }
+    }
+    var idParts = String(unsealed.id).split(":");
+    var idHexOnly = idParts.length === 2 ? idParts[1] : unsealed.id;
+    return {
+      id:                  idHexOnly,
+      namespace:           unsealed.namespace,
+      ownerId:             unsealed.ownerId,
+      scopes:              scopes || [],
+      metadata:            metadata || null,
+      createdAt:           Number(unsealed.createdAt),
+      expiresAt:           unsealed.expiresAt == null ? null : Number(unsealed.expiresAt),
+      revokedAt:           unsealed.revokedAt == null ? null : Number(unsealed.revokedAt),
+      lastUsedAt:          unsealed.lastUsedAt == null ? null : Number(unsealed.lastUsedAt),
+      // secondaryExpiresAt is operator-visible signal that a graceful
+      // rotation is in flight; secondarySecretHash itself is NEVER
+      // exposed.
+      secondaryExpiresAt:  unsealed.secondaryExpiresAt == null ? null : Number(unsealed.secondaryExpiresAt),
+      prefix:              unsealed.prefix,
+    };
+  }
+
+  async function issue(issueOpts) {
+    cluster.requireLeader();
+    _validateIssueOpts(issueOpts);
+    var idHex     = crypto.generateToken(idBytes);
+    var secretHex = crypto.generateToken(secretBytes);
+    var compositeId = _composedId(namespace, idHex);
+    var nowMs     = clock();
+    var scopes    = issueOpts.scopes || [];
+    var metadata  = issueOpts.metadata || null;
+    var expiresAt = (issueOpts.expiresAt === undefined) ? null : issueOpts.expiresAt;
+
+    var secretEnvelope = await credentialHash.hash(secretHex, { algo: hashAlgo });
+    var sealed = _sealForInsert({
+      id:                  compositeId,
+      namespace:           namespace,
+      ownerId:             issueOpts.ownerId,
+      secretHash:          secretEnvelope,
+      secondarySecretHash: null,
+      secondaryExpiresAt:  null,
+      scopes:              JSON.stringify(scopes),
+      metadata:            metadata ? JSON.stringify(metadata) : null,
+      createdAt:           nowMs,
+      expiresAt:           expiresAt,
+      revokedAt:           null,
+      lastUsedAt:          null,
+      prefix:              prefix,
+    });
+    var values = COLS.map(function (c) { return sealed[c]; });
+    var placeholders = COLS.map(function () { return "?"; }).join(", ");
+    var quoted = COLS.map(function (c) { return '"' + c + '"'; }).join(", ");
+
+    await clusterStorage.execute(
+      "INSERT INTO " + Q_TABLE + " (" + quoted + ") VALUES (" + placeholders + ")",
+      values
+    );
+
+    _emit("apikey.issue", {
+      actor:    _actor(issueOpts, issueOpts.ownerId),
+      resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
+      metadata: { namespace: namespace, scopes: scopes, expiresAt: expiresAt },
+    });
+    _emitEvent("apikey.issue", 1, { namespace: namespace });
+
+    return {
+      id:        idHex,
+      secret:    secretHex,
+      key:       _composeKey(prefix, namespace, idHex, secretHex),
+      scopes:    scopes,
+      metadata:  metadata,
+      createdAt: nowMs,
+      expiresAt: expiresAt,
+    };
+  }
+
+  async function verify(token, verifyOpts) {
+    var parsed = parseFormat(token);
+    if (!parsed) return null;
+    if (parsed.prefix !== prefix || parsed.namespace !== namespace) return null;
+
+    var compositeId = _composedId(namespace, parsed.idHex);
+    var row = await clusterStorage.executeOne(
+      _selectAll() + " WHERE id = ?",
+      [compositeId]
+    );
+    if (!row) {
+      if (auditFailures) {
+        _emit("apikey.verify", {
+          actor:    _actor(verifyOpts),
+          resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
+          outcome:  "failure",
+          reason:   "not-found",
+        });
+      }
+      _emitEvent("apikey.verify", 1, { namespace: namespace, outcome: "failure", reason: "not-found" });
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    var nowMs = clock();
+    var rowOwnerId = null;
+    try {
+      var unsealedOwner = cryptoField.unsealRow(TABLE, row);
+      rowOwnerId = unsealedOwner.ownerId;
+    } catch (_e) { rowOwnerId = null; }
+
+    if (row.revokedAt != null) {
+      if (auditFailures) {
+        _emit("apikey.verify", {
+          actor:    _actor(verifyOpts, rowOwnerId),
+          resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
+          outcome:  "failure", reason: "revoked",
+        });
+      }
+      _emitEvent("apikey.verify", 1, { namespace: namespace, outcome: "failure", reason: "revoked" });
+      return null;
+    }
+    if (row.expiresAt != null && Number(row.expiresAt) < nowMs) {
+      if (auditFailures) {
+        _emit("apikey.verify", {
+          actor:    _actor(verifyOpts, rowOwnerId),
+          resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
+          outcome:  "failure", reason: "expired",
+        });
+      }
+      _emitEvent("apikey.verify", 1, { namespace: namespace, outcome: "failure", reason: "expired" });
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    // Hash dispatch goes through credentialHash so the persisted byte
+    // controls the verification algorithm. Both primary and secondary
+    // (graceful-rotation) slots are envelope-encoded.
+    var primaryMatch = await credentialHash.verify(parsed.secretHex, row.secretHash);
+    var secondaryMatch = false;
+    var secondaryActive = row.secondarySecretHash != null &&
+                          row.secondaryExpiresAt != null &&
+                          Number(row.secondaryExpiresAt) >= nowMs;
+    if (!primaryMatch && secondaryActive) {
+      secondaryMatch = await credentialHash.verify(parsed.secretHex, row.secondarySecretHash);
+    }
+    if (!primaryMatch && !secondaryMatch) {
+      if (auditFailures) {
+        _emit("apikey.verify", {
+          actor:    _actor(verifyOpts, rowOwnerId),
+          resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
+          outcome:  "failure", reason: "bad-secret",
+        });
+      }
+      _emitEvent("apikey.verify", 1, { namespace: namespace, outcome: "failure", reason: "bad-secret" });
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    if (trackLastUsedAt && cluster.isLeader()) {
+      try {
+        await clusterStorage.execute(
+          "UPDATE " + Q_TABLE + " SET lastUsedAt = ? WHERE id = ?",
+          [nowMs, compositeId]
+        );
+      } catch (_e) { /* best-effort; verify success not blocked by lastUsed update */ }
+    }
+
+    if (auditSuccess) {
+      _emit("apikey.verify", {
+        actor:    _actor(verifyOpts, rowOwnerId),
+        resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
+        outcome:  "success",
+        metadata: { secondary: secondaryMatch },
+      });
+    }
+    _emitEvent("apikey.verify", 1,
+      { namespace: namespace, outcome: "success", secondary: secondaryMatch });
+    var record = _scrubRecord(row);
+    record.usedSecondary = secondaryMatch;       // operator can detect grace-period usage
+    return record;
+  }
+
+  async function revoke(idHex, revokeOpts) {
+    cluster.requireLeader();
+    if (typeof idHex !== "string" || idHex.length === 0) return false;
+    var compositeId = _composedId(namespace, idHex);
+    var nowMs = clock();
+    var result = await clusterStorage.execute(
+      "UPDATE " + Q_TABLE + " SET revokedAt = ? WHERE id = ? AND revokedAt IS NULL",
+      [nowMs, compositeId]
+    );
+    var changed = (result.rowCount || 0) > 0;
+    if (changed) {
+      _emit("apikey.revoke", {
+        actor:    _actor(revokeOpts),
+        resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
+      });
+      _emitEvent("apikey.revoke", 1, { namespace: namespace });
+    }
+    return changed;
+  }
+
+  async function rotate(idHex, rotateOpts) {
+    cluster.requireLeader();
+    if (typeof idHex !== "string" || idHex.length === 0) {
+      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "apiKey.rotate: id must be a non-empty string");
+    }
+    rotateOpts = rotateOpts || {};
+    // Graceful rotation: the previous hash stays valid in the
+    // secondarySecretHash slot until secondaryExpiresAt. Operators
+    // pass either { graceful: true } (default DEFAULT_ROTATE_GRACE_MS)
+    // or { gracePeriodMs: <ms> } for an explicit window. Without
+    // either, rotation is immediate (old secret invalidated) — this
+    // preserves the original semantics for callers that explicitly
+    // want a hard cutover.
+    var gracePeriodMs = 0;
+    if (typeof rotateOpts.gracePeriodMs === "number") {
+      if (!isFinite(rotateOpts.gracePeriodMs) || rotateOpts.gracePeriodMs < 0) {
+        throw _err("BAD_OPT", "apiKey.rotate: gracePeriodMs must be a non-negative finite number");
+      }
+      gracePeriodMs = rotateOpts.gracePeriodMs;
+    } else if (rotateOpts.graceful === true) {
+      gracePeriodMs = DEFAULT_ROTATE_GRACE_MS;
+    } else if (rotateOpts.graceful !== undefined && rotateOpts.graceful !== false) {
+      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "apiKey.rotate: graceful must be a boolean");
+    }
+
+    var compositeId = _composedId(namespace, idHex);
+    var existing = await clusterStorage.executeOne(
+      _selectAll() + " WHERE id = ?",
+      [compositeId]
+    );
+    if (!existing) {
+      throw _err("NOT_FOUND", "apiKey.rotate: id '" + idHex + "' not found in namespace '" + namespace + "'");
+    }
+    if (existing.revokedAt != null) {
+      throw _err("REVOKED", "apiKey.rotate: id '" + idHex + "' is revoked");
+    }
+    var newSecretHex = crypto.generateToken(secretBytes);
+    var newHash = await credentialHash.hash(newSecretHex, { algo: hashAlgo });
+    var nowMs = clock();
+
+    if (gracePeriodMs > 0) {
+      // Move current hash → secondary slot, install new hash as primary.
+      await clusterStorage.execute(
+        "UPDATE " + Q_TABLE + " SET secretHash = ?, " +
+        "secondarySecretHash = ?, secondaryExpiresAt = ? WHERE id = ?",
+        [newHash, existing.secretHash, nowMs + gracePeriodMs, compositeId]
+      );
+    } else {
+      // Hard cutover — old secret stops working immediately. Clears
+      // any prior secondary slot too.
+      await clusterStorage.execute(
+        "UPDATE " + Q_TABLE + " SET secretHash = ?, " +
+        "secondarySecretHash = NULL, secondaryExpiresAt = NULL WHERE id = ?",
+        [newHash, compositeId]
+      );
+    }
+
+    _emit("apikey.rotate", {
+      actor:    _actor(rotateOpts),
+      resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
+      metadata: { gracePeriodMs: gracePeriodMs },
+    });
+    _emitEvent("apikey.rotate", 1, { namespace: namespace, graceful: gracePeriodMs > 0 });
+    return {
+      key:                _composeKey(prefix, namespace, idHex, newSecretHex),
+      secret:             newSecretHex,
+      secretHash:         newHash,
+      gracePeriodMs:      gracePeriodMs,
+      secondaryExpiresAt: gracePeriodMs > 0 ? (nowMs + gracePeriodMs) : null,
+    };
+  }
+
+  async function listForOwner(ownerId, listOpts) {
+    if (typeof ownerId !== "string" || ownerId.length === 0) {
+      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "apiKey.listForOwner: ownerId must be a non-empty string");
+    }
+    listOpts = listOpts || {};
+    var includeRevoked = !!listOpts.includeRevoked;
+    var includeExpired = !!listOpts.includeExpired;
+    var lookup = cryptoField.lookupHash(TABLE, "ownerId", ownerId);
+    if (!lookup) {
+      throw _err("MISCONFIGURED",
+        "_blamejs_api_keys schema is missing the ownerIdHash derived hash — framework misconfigured");
+    }
+    var sql = _selectAll() + " WHERE namespace = ? AND ownerIdHash = ?";
+    var params = [namespace, lookup.value];
+    if (!includeRevoked) sql += " AND revokedAt IS NULL";
+    if (!includeExpired) {
+      sql += " AND (expiresAt IS NULL OR expiresAt >= ?)";
+      params.push(clock());
+    }
+    sql += " ORDER BY createdAt DESC";
+    var rows = await clusterStorage.execute(sql, params);
+    var list = (rows.rows || []).map(_scrubRecord);
+    _emitEvent("apikey.list", 1, { namespace: namespace, count: list.length });
+    // Read-access audit: "who listed whose keys at time T" — gated by
+    // auditSuccess so operators with admin tooling that polls heavily
+    // can opt out. ownerId is the audit subject; the listed IDs are
+    // included in metadata so a compliance auditor can reconstruct
+    // exactly which records were observed.
+    if (auditSuccess) {
+      _emit("apikey.list", {
+        actor:    _actor(listOpts),
+        resource: { kind: "apikey-namespace", id: namespace },
+        metadata: {
+          ownerId:    ownerId,
+          count:      list.length,
+          observedIds: list.map(function (r) { return r.id; }),
+          includeRevoked: includeRevoked,
+          includeExpired: includeExpired,
+        },
+      });
+    }
+    return list;
+  }
+
+  async function getById(idHex, getOpts) {
+    if (typeof idHex !== "string" || idHex.length === 0) return null;
+    var compositeId = _composedId(namespace, idHex);
+    var row = await clusterStorage.executeOne(
+      _selectAll() + " WHERE id = ?",
+      [compositeId]
+    );
+    var record = _scrubRecord(row);
+    _emitEvent("apikey.get", 1,
+      { namespace: namespace, found: record !== null });
+    if (auditSuccess) {
+      _emit("apikey.get", {
+        actor:    _actor(getOpts),
+        resource: { kind: "apikey", id: compositeId },
+        metadata: { found: record !== null },
+      });
+    }
+    return record;
+  }
+
+  async function purgeExpired(purgeOpts) {
+    cluster.requireLeader();
+    var threshold = clock() - purgeAfterMs;
+    // SELECT-then-DELETE so we can audit the specific IDs being purged.
+    // Compliance auditors expect "key X was purged at time T" — a count-
+    // only audit is too coarse for forensic reconstruction. Cost is one
+    // extra round-trip per purge call which runs on a schedule (not
+    // request-rate), so the cost is irrelevant.
+    var idRows = await clusterStorage.execute(
+      "SELECT id FROM " + Q_TABLE + " WHERE namespace = ? AND " +
+      "((revokedAt IS NOT NULL AND revokedAt < ?) OR " +
+      " (expiresAt IS NOT NULL AND expiresAt < ?))",
+      [namespace, threshold, threshold]
+    );
+    var purgedCompositeIds = (idRows.rows || []).map(function (r) { return r.id; });
+
+    if (purgedCompositeIds.length === 0) {
+      _emitEvent("apikey.purge", 1, { namespace: namespace, count: 0 });
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    var result = await clusterStorage.execute(
+      "DELETE FROM " + Q_TABLE + " WHERE namespace = ? AND " +
+      "((revokedAt IS NOT NULL AND revokedAt < ?) OR " +
+      " (expiresAt IS NOT NULL AND expiresAt < ?))",
+      [namespace, threshold, threshold]
+    );
+    var count = result.rowCount || purgedCompositeIds.length;
+
+    _emit("apikey.purge", {
+      actor:    _actor(purgeOpts),
+      resource: { kind: "apikey-namespace", id: namespace },
+      metadata: {
+        count: count,
+        // Strip the namespace prefix so the audit payload contains
+        // bare idHex values consistent with what callers receive
+        // from issue/verify/getById.
+        purgedIds: purgedCompositeIds.map(function (cid) {
+          var parts = cid.split(":");
+          return parts.length === 2 ? parts[1] : cid;
+        }),
+        thresholdMs: threshold,
+      },
+    });
+    _emitEvent("apikey.purge", 1, { namespace: namespace, count: count });
+    return count;
+  }
+
+  return {
+    issue:         issue,
+    verify:        verify,
+    revoke:        revoke,
+    rotate:        rotate,
+    listForOwner:  listForOwner,
+    getById:       getById,
+    purgeExpired:  purgeExpired,
+    namespace:     namespace,
+    prefix:        prefix,
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  create:       create,
+  parseFormat:  parseFormat,
+  ApiKeyError:  ApiKeyError,
+  DEFAULTS:     DEFAULTS,
+};