@blamejs/core 0.7.4 → 0.7.18

package/lib/permissions.js

@@ -1,708 +1,708 @@
-"use strict";
-/**
- * b.permissions — RBAC primitive.
- *
- *   var perms = b.permissions.create({
- *     roles: {
- *       admin:  { extends: ["editor"], permissions: ["users:delete"] },
- *       editor: ["users:read", "users:write", "posts:*"],
- *       viewer: ["*:read"],
- *     },
- *     audit: b.audit,                  // optional
- *   });
- *
- *   router.delete("/users/:id",
- *     authMiddleware,                  // populates req.user / req.apiKey
- *     perms.require("users:delete"),
- *     deleteUserHandler);
- *
- * The default resolver chain reads the actor from the request:
- *
- *   req.apiKey.scopes  → { scopes: [...] }   (b.apiKey.verify output)
- *   req.user.scopes    → { scopes: [...] }   (operator-set)
- *   req.user.roles     → { roles:  [...] }   (operator-set)
- *
- * Operators with non-default request shapes pass `resolver` to create().
- *
- * Wildcard semantics (b.permissions.match):
- *   "*"             matches any scope (greedy)
- *   "users:*"       matches "users:read", "users:read:detail", etc. (trailing * is greedy)
- *   "*:read"        matches "users:read", "posts:read"
- *   "users:*:read"  matches "users:foo:read" (per-segment *)
- *   "users:read"    matches "users:read" only — no implicit sub-resource grant
- *
- * Validation policy:
- *
- *   - create() role table / scope formats → throw at app init
- *   - require(scope) registration arg     → throw at route declaration
- *   - check(actor, scope) bad actor       → return false (tolerant read)
- *   - resolver returns null in middleware → 401 (missingActorStatus)
- *   - actor lacks scope in middleware     → 403 (denyStatus)
- *   - audit/observability emit failures   → drop silent (hot-path sink)
- *
- * Audit defaults follow the framework's security-defaults stance
- * default: `auditFailures: true`
- * (deny is a security signal), `auditSuccess: false` (per-request noise).
- */
-
-var C = require("./constants");
-var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
-var requestHelpers = require("./request-helpers");
-var safeSql = require("./safe-sql");
-var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
-var { PermissionsError } = require("./framework-error");
-
-var _err = PermissionsError.factory;
-
-var observability = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./observability"); });
-
-function _emitEvent(n, v, l) { observability().safeEvent(n, v, l || {}); }
-
-// Lowercase tokens, digits, dash, underscore, and `*` allowed per
-// segment. Scope format is segments separated by `:`.
-var SCOPE_RE = /^[a-z0-9_*-]+(:[a-z0-9_*-]+)*$/;
-// Bound the regex engine on operator-supplied scope strings. 256 chars
-// holds any realistic real-world scope (typical scopes run 8-32 chars);
-// rejecting longer keeps the regex linear regardless of input shape.
-var SCOPE_MAX_LENGTH = C.BYTES.bytes(256);
-
-// Audit defaults: BOTH success and failure default ON for permissions.
-// Unlike api-key.verify (which is gate-keeping for a downstream action
-// the application separately audits), a permissions.check IS the
-// authorization decision — there's no further-downstream audit event.
-// "user X granted users:delete at time T" is exactly what compliance
-// auditors ask for. Operators with extreme volume opt out via
-// auditSuccess: false; failures remain on regardless.
-var DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
-  auditFailures:       true,
-  auditSuccess:        true,
-  denyStatus:          403,
-  missingActorStatus:  401,
-});
-
-// ---- Wildcard matcher ----
-
-function match(granted, required) {
-  if (typeof granted !== "string" || typeof required !== "string") return false;
-  if (granted.length === 0 || required.length === 0) return false;
-  var gParts = granted.split(":");
-  var rParts = required.split(":");
-  for (var i = 0; i < gParts.length; i++) {
-    var g = gParts[i];
-    if (g === "*") {
-      // Trailing * is greedy — matches the rest of required.
-      if (i === gParts.length - 1) return true;
-      // Per-segment * — matches THIS segment of required (any value),
-      // continue to next segment. Required must have a segment here.
-      if (i >= rParts.length) return false;
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (i >= rParts.length) return false;     // granted is more specific than required
-    if (g !== rParts[i]) return false;
-  }
-  // Reached end of granted without wildcard. Lengths must match exactly
-  // (no implicit sub-resource grant).
-  return rParts.length === gParts.length;
-}
-
-// ---- Role table validation + expansion ----
-
-function _validateScopePattern(scope, ctx) {
-  if (typeof scope !== "string" || scope.length === 0) {
-    throw _err("BAD_SCOPE", ctx + ": scope must be a non-empty string, got " + typeof scope);
-  }
-  // Length cap before the regex test — bound the engine on hostile
-  // input lengths even though SCOPE_RE is anchored.
-  if (scope.length > SCOPE_MAX_LENGTH || !SCOPE_RE.test(scope)) {
-    throw _err("BAD_SCOPE", ctx + ": scope '" + scope +
-      "' is empty, too long, or doesn't match " + SCOPE_RE +
-      " (lowercase tokens with optional `*`)");
-  }
-}
-
-function _normalizeRoleEntry(name, entry) {
-  if (Array.isArray(entry)) {
-    return { extends: [], permissions: entry.slice(), dbRole: null,
-      requireMfa: false, mfaWindowMs: null };
-  }
-  if (entry && typeof entry === "object") {
-    var ext = entry.extends || [];
-    var perms = entry.permissions || [];
-    if (!Array.isArray(ext)) {
-      throw _err("BAD_ROLE", "role '" + name + "': extends must be an array of role names");
-    }
-    if (!Array.isArray(perms)) {
-      throw _err("BAD_ROLE", "role '" + name + "': permissions must be an array of scope strings");
-    }
-    var dbRole = null;
-    if (entry.dbRole !== undefined && entry.dbRole !== null) {
-      if (typeof entry.dbRole !== "string" || entry.dbRole.length === 0) {
-        throw _err("BAD_ROLE",
-          "role '" + name + "': dbRole must be a non-empty string");
-      }
-      // dbRole feeds straight into externalDb backend pick + the
-      // dbRoleFor middleware's identifier check; validate at create()
-      // time so a typo surfaces at boot, not on the first request.
-      try {
-        safeSql.validateIdentifier(entry.dbRole, { allowReserved: false });
-      } catch (e) {
-        throw _err("BAD_ROLE",
-          "role '" + name + "': dbRole '" + entry.dbRole +
-          "' is not a valid SQL identifier: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
-      }
-      dbRole = entry.dbRole;
-    }
-    var requireMfa = entry.requireMfa === true;
-    var mfaWindowMs = null;
-    if (entry.mfaWindowMs !== undefined && entry.mfaWindowMs !== null) {
-      if (typeof entry.mfaWindowMs !== "number" || !isFinite(entry.mfaWindowMs) || entry.mfaWindowMs <= 0) {
-        throw _err("BAD_ROLE",
-          "role '" + name + "': mfaWindowMs must be a positive finite number");
-      }
-      mfaWindowMs = entry.mfaWindowMs;
-    }
-    return { extends: ext.slice(), permissions: perms.slice(), dbRole: dbRole,
-      requireMfa: requireMfa, mfaWindowMs: mfaWindowMs };
-  }
-  throw _err("BAD_ROLE", "role '" + name + "' must be an array of scopes or { extends?, permissions, dbRole?, requireMfa?, mfaWindowMs? }");
-}
-
-function _validateRoles(roles) {
-  if (!roles || typeof roles !== "object" || Array.isArray(roles)) {
-    throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions.create: roles must be an object map of name → spec");
-  }
-  var names = Object.keys(roles);
-  if (names.length === 0) {
-    throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions.create: roles map must have at least one role");
-  }
-  var normalized = {};
-  for (var i = 0; i < names.length; i++) {
-    var name = names[i];
-    if (typeof name !== "string" || name.length === 0) {
-      throw _err("BAD_ROLE", "role name must be a non-empty string");
-    }
-    var spec = _normalizeRoleEntry(name, roles[name]);
-    for (var j = 0; j < spec.permissions.length; j++) {
-      _validateScopePattern(spec.permissions[j], "role '" + name + "'");
-    }
-    for (var k = 0; k < spec.extends.length; k++) {
-      if (typeof spec.extends[k] !== "string" || spec.extends[k].length === 0) {
-        throw _err("BAD_ROLE", "role '" + name + "': extends entry must be a non-empty string");
-      }
-    }
-    normalized[name] = spec;
-  }
-  // Check extends references resolve to known roles
-  for (var n = 0; n < names.length; n++) {
-    var spec2 = normalized[names[n]];
-    for (var m = 0; m < spec2.extends.length; m++) {
-      if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(normalized, spec2.extends[m])) {
-        throw _err("UNKNOWN_ROLE", "role '" + names[n] + "': extends references unknown role '" +
-          spec2.extends[m] + "'");
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  // Cycle detection via DFS
-  for (var p = 0; p < names.length; p++) {
-    _detectCycle(names[p], normalized, []);
-  }
-  return normalized;
-}
-
-function _detectCycle(roleName, table, stack) {
-  if (stack.indexOf(roleName) !== -1) {
-    throw _err("CYCLE", "permissions.create: cycle in extends chain: " +
-      stack.concat([roleName]).join(" → "));
-  }
-  var spec = table[roleName];
-  for (var i = 0; i < spec.extends.length; i++) {
-    _detectCycle(spec.extends[i], table, stack.concat([roleName]));
-  }
-}
-
-function _expandOne(roleName, table, visited, out) {
-  if (visited.has(roleName)) return;
-  visited.add(roleName);
-  var spec = table[roleName];
-  if (!spec) return;
-  for (var i = 0; i < spec.extends.length; i++) {
-    _expandOne(spec.extends[i], table, visited, out);
-  }
-  for (var j = 0; j < spec.permissions.length; j++) {
-    if (out.indexOf(spec.permissions[j]) === -1) out.push(spec.permissions[j]);
-  }
-}
-
-// ---- Default resolver ----
-
-function _defaultResolver(req) {
-  if (!req || typeof req !== "object") return null;
-  if (req.apiKey && Array.isArray(req.apiKey.scopes)) return { scopes: req.apiKey.scopes };
-  if (req.user && Array.isArray(req.user.scopes))     return { scopes: req.user.scopes };
-  if (req.user && Array.isArray(req.user.roles))      return { roles:  req.user.roles };
-  return null;
-}
-
-// ---- Validation: create opts ----
-
-function _validateCreateOpts(opts) {
-  validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "permissions.create", PermissionsError);
-  validateOpts.optionalFunction(opts.resolver, "permissions.create: resolver", PermissionsError);
-  validateOpts.auditShape(opts.audit, "permissions.create", PermissionsError);
-  validateOpts.optionalBoolean(opts.auditFailures, "permissions.create: auditFailures", PermissionsError);
-  validateOpts.optionalBoolean(opts.auditSuccess, "permissions.create: auditSuccess", PermissionsError);
-  if (opts.denyStatus !== undefined &&
-      (typeof opts.denyStatus !== "number" || !isFinite(opts.denyStatus) || opts.denyStatus < 100 || opts.denyStatus > 599)) {
-    throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions.create: denyStatus must be an HTTP status code (100-599)");
-  }
-  if (opts.missingActorStatus !== undefined &&
-      (typeof opts.missingActorStatus !== "number" || !isFinite(opts.missingActorStatus) ||
-       opts.missingActorStatus < 100 || opts.missingActorStatus > 599)) {
-    throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions.create: missingActorStatus must be an HTTP status code (100-599)");
-  }
-  validateOpts.optionalFunction(opts.responder, "permissions.create: responder", PermissionsError);
-}
-
-// ---- Registry ----
-
-function create(opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
-  validateOpts(opts, [
-    "roles", "resolver", "audit", "auditFailures", "auditSuccess",
-    "denyStatus", "missingActorStatus", "responder",
-  ], "permissions");
-  _validateCreateOpts(opts);
-  var cfg = validateOpts.applyDefaults(opts, DEFAULTS);
-  var roleTable = _validateRoles(opts.roles);
-  var resolver  = opts.resolver || _defaultResolver;
-  var audit     = opts.audit || null;
-  var auditFailures = cfg.auditFailures;
-  var auditSuccess  = cfg.auditSuccess;
-  var denyStatus    = cfg.denyStatus;
-  var missingActorStatus = cfg.missingActorStatus;
-  var responder = opts.responder || _defaultResponder;
-
-  // ABAC predicate registry. Each entry: scope-string → async predicate
-  // function (actor, context) → boolean. The middleware evaluates the
-  // predicate AFTER the RBAC scope check passes — so a route protected
-  // by `perms.require("orders.read")` first checks the actor has the
-  // orders:read scope, then (if the scope has a policy registered)
-  // evaluates the predicate with the actor + a per-request context
-  // built by the route's `context` middleware opt. ABAC + RBAC stack
-  // — a route needs to pass BOTH layers when both are configured.
-  var policies = {};
-
-  function policy(scope, predicate) {
-    _validateScopePattern(scope, "permissions.policy");
-    if (typeof predicate !== "function") {
-      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions.policy: predicate must be a function (actor, context) -> bool");
-    }
-    if (policies[scope]) {
-      throw _err("DUPLICATE_POLICY", "permissions.policy: '" + scope + "' is already registered");
-    }
-    policies[scope] = predicate;
-  }
-
-  function _findPolicy(requestedScope) {
-    // Exact match wins; no wildcard expansion (a wildcard policy
-    // gating arbitrary scopes is too easy to misconfigure).
-    return policies[requestedScope] || null;
-  }
-
-  var _emitRaw = validateOpts.makeAuditEmitter(audit);
-  function _auditEmit(action, info) {
-    if (info && info.outcome === "success" && !auditSuccess) return;
-    if (info && info.outcome !== "success" && !auditFailures) return;
-    _emitRaw(action, info);
-  }
-
-  function expand(roleNames) {
-    if (!Array.isArray(roleNames)) return [];
-    var visited = new Set();
-    var out = [];
-    for (var i = 0; i < roleNames.length; i++) {
-      if (typeof roleNames[i] === "string" && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(roleTable, roleNames[i])) {
-        _expandOne(roleNames[i], roleTable, visited, out);
-      }
-    }
-    return out;
-  }
-
-  function _actorScopes(actor) {
-    if (!actor || typeof actor !== "object") return [];
-    if (Array.isArray(actor.scopes)) return actor.scopes;
-    if (Array.isArray(actor.roles))  return expand(actor.roles);
-    return [];
-  }
-
-  function check(actor, requiredScope) {
-    var scopes = _actorScopes(actor);
-    for (var i = 0; i < scopes.length; i++) {
-      if (typeof scopes[i] === "string" && match(scopes[i], requiredScope)) return true;
-    }
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  function checkAll(actor, requiredScopes) {
-    if (!Array.isArray(requiredScopes)) return false;
-    for (var i = 0; i < requiredScopes.length; i++) {
-      if (!check(actor, requiredScopes[i])) return false;
-    }
-    return requiredScopes.length > 0;
-  }
-
-  function checkAny(actor, requiredScopes) {
-    if (!Array.isArray(requiredScopes)) return false;
-    for (var i = 0; i < requiredScopes.length; i++) {
-      if (check(actor, requiredScopes[i])) return true;
-    }
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  // Middleware factory. `mode` is "single" | "all" | "any"; `requested`
-  // is the scope or scope list. Throw at registration time on bad shape.
-  function _middleware(mode, requested, mwOpts) {
-    if (mode === "single") {
-      _validateScopePattern(requested, "permissions.require");
-    } else {
-      if (!Array.isArray(requested) || requested.length === 0) {
-        throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions." + (mode === "all" ? "requireAll" : "requireAny") +
-          ": scopes must be a non-empty array");
-      }
-      for (var i = 0; i < requested.length; i++) {
-        _validateScopePattern(requested[i], "permissions." + (mode === "all" ? "requireAll" : "requireAny"));
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Per-route MFA enforcement opts: { requireMfa, mfaWindowMs }.
-    // When set, the middleware blocks unless the actor's mfaAuthenticated
-    // flag is truthy AND (when mfaWindowMs is set) actor.mfaAt is fresher
-    // than (now - mfaWindowMs). The actor signal is operator-set: after
-    // a successful TOTP / passkey step-up, the route handler stamps
-    // req.user.mfaAuthenticated = true and req.user.mfaAt = Date.now().
-    mwOpts = mwOpts || {};
-    var routeRequireMfa  = mwOpts.requireMfa === true;
-    var routeMfaWindowMs = null;
-    if (mwOpts.mfaWindowMs !== undefined && mwOpts.mfaWindowMs !== null) {
-      if (typeof mwOpts.mfaWindowMs !== "number" || !isFinite(mwOpts.mfaWindowMs) || mwOpts.mfaWindowMs <= 0) {
-        throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions middleware: mfaWindowMs must be a positive finite number");
-      }
-      routeMfaWindowMs = mwOpts.mfaWindowMs;
-    }
-    // ABAC context provider — operator-supplied function (req)→object.
-    // The function runs once per request, AFTER scope/MFA pass, BEFORE
-    // the policy predicate. Whatever it returns is passed to the
-    // policy as `context`. Async functions are awaited.
-    var contextProvider = mwOpts.context;
-    if (contextProvider !== undefined && typeof contextProvider !== "function") {
-      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions middleware: context must be a function (req) -> object");
-    }
-
-    return async function permissionsMiddleware(req, res, next) {
-      var actor = resolver(req);
-      if (!actor) {
-        // Diagnostic: the most common cause of a null actor is that
-        // attachUser/auth wasn't mounted before this middleware, so
-        // req.user / req.apiKey are still undefined. Emit a hint —
-        // operators tracing a 401 here see exactly what to check first.
-        var hint = (req && (req.user || req.apiKey))
-          ? "actor present on req but resolver returned null — check resolver implementation"
-          : "no req.user or req.apiKey — confirm attachUser / apiKey-verify middleware is mounted before perms.require()";
-        _emitEvent("permissions.missing_actor", 1,
-          { requested: _labelize(requested) });
-        _auditEmit("permissions.missing_actor", {
-          actor:    _actorAuditShape(null, req),
-          resource: { kind: "permission", id: _labelize(requested) },
-          outcome:  "failure",
-          reason:   "no-actor",
-          metadata: { hint: hint },
-        });
-        return responder(req, res, missingActorStatus, {
-          error:  "missing_actor",
-          status: missingActorStatus,
-        });
-      }
-
-      var ok;
-      if (mode === "single")  ok = check(actor, requested);
-      else if (mode === "all") ok = checkAll(actor, requested);
-      else                     ok = checkAny(actor, requested);
-
-      if (!ok) {
-        _emitEvent("permissions.check", 1,
-          { outcome: "deny", requested: _labelize(requested), mode: mode });
-        _auditEmit("permissions.check.deny", {
-          actor:    _actorAuditShape(actor, req),
-          resource: { kind: "permission", id: _labelize(requested) },
-          outcome:  "failure",
-          reason:   "forbidden",
-          metadata: { mode: mode },
-        });
-        return responder(req, res, denyStatus, {
-          error:     "forbidden",
-          status:    denyStatus,
-          requested: _labelize(requested),
-        });
-      }
-
-      // MFA enforcement gate. Two sources of "this needs MFA":
-      //   1. Per-route opt: perms.require("scope", { requireMfa: true })
-      //   2. Per-role flag: a role spec with requireMfa:true that
-      //      contributes to satisfying the requested scope
-      // Either source enabling MFA forces the gate. mfaWindowMs (per-route
-      // OR per-role, route wins on conflict) bounds freshness — without
-      // it, ANY past MFA stamp counts (which is too permissive for high-
-      // value routes; operators set a window like C.TIME.minutes(15)).
-      var enforceMfa = routeRequireMfa;
-      var enforceWindowMs = routeMfaWindowMs;
-      if (!enforceMfa) {
-        // Walk the actor's roles and check whether any role with
-        // requireMfa=true contributes a permission that matches the
-        // requested scope. If so, MFA is required regardless of the
-        // route-level opt.
-        var actorRoles = Array.isArray(actor.roles) ? actor.roles : [];
-        for (var ri = 0; ri < actorRoles.length; ri++) {
-          var rname = actorRoles[ri];
-          if (typeof rname !== "string") continue;
-          var rspec = roleTable[rname];
-          if (!rspec || !rspec.requireMfa) continue;
-          // Cheap match: if the role grants any scope that satisfies the
-          // requested scope (single mode) or any of the requested
-          // (all/any modes), MFA is required for this route.
-          var visited = new Set();
-          var roleScopes = [];
-          _expandOne(rname, roleTable, visited, roleScopes);
-          var roleMatches = false;
-          var requestedList = mode === "single" ? [requested] : requested;
-          outer: for (var rj = 0; rj < roleScopes.length; rj++) {
-            for (var rk = 0; rk < requestedList.length; rk++) {
-              if (match(roleScopes[rj], requestedList[rk])) {
-                roleMatches = true; break outer;
-              }
-            }
-          }
-          if (roleMatches) {
-            enforceMfa = true;
-            if (enforceWindowMs === null && rspec.mfaWindowMs !== null) {
-              enforceWindowMs = rspec.mfaWindowMs;
-            }
-          }
-        }
-      }
-
-      if (enforceMfa) {
-        var mfaOk = actor.mfaAuthenticated === true;
-        if (mfaOk && enforceWindowMs !== null) {
-          var mfaAt = typeof actor.mfaAt === "number" ? actor.mfaAt : 0;
-          if (Date.now() - mfaAt > enforceWindowMs) {
-            mfaOk = false;
-          }
-        }
-        if (!mfaOk) {
-          _emitEvent("permissions.mfa_required", 1,
-            { requested: _labelize(requested), mode: mode });
-          _auditEmit("permissions.mfa.required", {
-            actor:    _actorAuditShape(actor, req),
-            resource: { kind: "permission", id: _labelize(requested) },
-            outcome:  "denied",
-            reason:   "mfa-required",
-            metadata: { mode: mode, windowMs: enforceWindowMs },
-          });
-          return responder(req, res, denyStatus, {
-            error:     "mfa_required",
-            status:    denyStatus,
-            requested: _labelize(requested),
-          });
-        }
-      }
-
-      // ABAC layer fires for every requested scope that has a
-      // registered policy predicate. Single-mode evaluates the one
-      // scope; requireAll evaluates each scope's policy (every must
-      // pass); requireAny evaluates only the policies on scopes the
-      // actor's RBAC layer satisfied (so a failing policy on a scope
-      // the actor doesn't even hold doesn't leak the policy's
-      // existence). Each predicate failure short-circuits with a
-      // policy.deny audit row naming the failing scope.
-      var policyTargets = [];
-      if (mode === "single" && _findPolicy(requested)) {
-        policyTargets.push(requested);
-      } else if (mode === "all" || mode === "any") {
-        for (var pi = 0; pi < requested.length; pi++) {
-          if (_findPolicy(requested[pi])) {
-            if (mode === "any" && !check(actor, requested[pi])) continue;
-            policyTargets.push(requested[pi]);
-          }
-        }
-      }
-      if (policyTargets.length > 0) {
-        var policyContext = null;
-        if (contextProvider) {
-          try {
-            policyContext = await contextProvider(req);
-          } catch (e) {
-            _emitEvent("permissions.policy_context_error", 1,
-              { requested: _labelize(requested) });
-            _auditEmit("permissions.policy.error", {
-              actor:    _actorAuditShape(actor, req),
-              resource: { kind: "permission", id: _labelize(requested) },
-              outcome:  "failure",
-              reason:   "context-provider-threw",
-              metadata: { error: (e && e.message) || String(e), mode: mode },
-            });
-            return responder(req, res, denyStatus, {
-              error:     "policy_context_error",
-              status:    denyStatus,
-              requested: _labelize(requested),
-            });
-          }
-        }
-        for (var pti = 0; pti < policyTargets.length; pti++) {
-          var thisScope = policyTargets[pti];
-          var pred = _findPolicy(thisScope);
-          var verdict;
-          try {
-            verdict = await pred(actor, policyContext);
-          } catch (e2) {
-            _emitEvent("permissions.policy_error", 1, { requested: thisScope });
-            _auditEmit("permissions.policy.error", {
-              actor:    _actorAuditShape(actor, req),
-              resource: { kind: "permission", id: thisScope },
-              outcome:  "failure",
-              reason:   "predicate-threw",
-              metadata: { error: (e2 && e2.message) || String(e2), mode: mode },
-            });
-            return responder(req, res, denyStatus, {
-              error:     "policy_error",
-              status:    denyStatus,
-              requested: thisScope,
-            });
-          }
-          if (verdict !== true) {
-            _emitEvent("permissions.policy_denied", 1, { requested: thisScope });
-            _auditEmit("permissions.policy.deny", {
-              actor:    _actorAuditShape(actor, req),
-              resource: { kind: "permission", id: thisScope },
-              outcome:  "failure",
-              reason:   "policy-predicate-returned-falsy",
-              metadata: { mode: mode, scopeIndex: pti },
-            });
-            return responder(req, res, denyStatus, {
-              error:     "policy_denied",
-              status:    denyStatus,
-              requested: thisScope,
-            });
-          }
-        }
-      }
-
-      _emitEvent("permissions.check", 1,
-        { outcome: "success", mode: mode });
-      _auditEmit("permissions.check.success", {
-        actor:    _actorAuditShape(actor, req),
-        resource: { kind: "permission", id: _labelize(requested) },
-        outcome:  "success",
-        metadata: { mode: mode, mfaEnforced: enforceMfa },
-      });
-      next();
-    };
-  }
-
-  // dbRoleFor — walk the actor's roles in order and return the first
-  // declared dbRole. Composes with b.middleware.dbRoleFor so a single
-  // RBAC table drives both authorization scopes and request-time DB
-  // role binding.
-  //
-  // The arg can be the request (default resolver pulls actor from
-  // req.user / req.apiKey) OR an actor object directly. Returns null if
-  // no actor is found OR the actor's roles don't include any with a
-  // declared dbRole.
-  //
-  // Lookup order: extends are walked depth-first so a child role that
-  // overrides dbRole takes precedence over its parent. When multiple
-  // top-level roles are listed, the first wins (operators wanting a
-  // priority order should list more-specific roles first).
-  function dbRoleFor(reqOrActor) {
-    var actor = reqOrActor;
-    // Heuristic: a request shape carries headers / url; resolve through
-    // the configured resolver. An actor shape has roles / scopes
-    // directly.
-    if (actor && (actor.headers || actor.url || actor.method)) {
-      actor = resolver(actor);
-    }
-    if (!actor || typeof actor !== "object") return null;
-    var roleNames = Array.isArray(actor.roles) ? actor.roles : null;
-    if (!roleNames || roleNames.length === 0) return null;
-    // Walk the same DFS order expand() uses so the first-seen dbRole
-    // is consistent with how scopes are inherited.
-    var visited = new Set();
-    for (var i = 0; i < roleNames.length; i++) {
-      var name = roleNames[i];
-      if (typeof name !== "string") continue;
-      if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(roleTable, name)) continue;
-      var found = _findDbRole(name, roleTable, visited);
-      if (found) return found;
-    }
-    return null;
-  }
-
-  return {
-    require:    function (scope, mwOpts)  { return _middleware("single", scope,  mwOpts); },
-    requireAll: function (scopes, mwOpts) { return _middleware("all",    scopes, mwOpts); },
-    requireAny: function (scopes, mwOpts) { return _middleware("any",    scopes, mwOpts); },
-    policy:     policy,
-    check:      check,
-    checkAll:   checkAll,
-    checkAny:   checkAny,
-    expand:     expand,
-    dbRoleFor:  dbRoleFor,
-    has:        function (name) { return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(roleTable, name); },
-    roles:      Object.freeze(Object.keys(roleTable)),
-  };
-}
-
-function _findDbRole(roleName, table, visited) {
-  if (visited.has(roleName)) return null;
-  visited.add(roleName);
-  var spec = table[roleName];
-  if (!spec) return null;
-  // Child overrides parent — check this role's own dbRole first, then
-  // recurse into extends.
-  if (spec.dbRole) return spec.dbRole;
-  for (var i = 0; i < spec.extends.length; i++) {
-    var found = _findDbRole(spec.extends[i], table, visited);
-    if (found) return found;
-  }
-  return null;
-}
-
-// ---- Helpers ----
-
-function _labelize(requested) {
-  return Array.isArray(requested) ? requested.join(",") : String(requested);
-}
-
-function _actorAuditShape(actor, req) {
-  // Pull the 5 W's (WHO/WHERE/HOW) from the request, then layer the
-  // resolver-supplied actor identity on top so userId/roles/scopes
-  // aren't lost when the request itself doesn't carry them.
-  var base = requestHelpers.extractActorContext(req);
-  if (actor) {
-    if (actor.userId)               base.userId = actor.userId;
-    if (Array.isArray(actor.roles)) base.roles  = actor.roles.slice();
-    if (Array.isArray(actor.scopes)) base.scopes = actor.scopes.slice();
-  }
-  return base;
-}
-
-function _defaultResponder(req, res, status, info) {
-  res.writeHead(status, { "Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8" });
-  res.end(JSON.stringify(info));
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  create:           create,
-  match:            match,
-  PermissionsError: PermissionsError,
-  DEFAULTS:         DEFAULTS,
-};
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * b.permissions — RBAC primitive.
+ *
+ *   var perms = b.permissions.create({
+ *     roles: {
+ *       admin:  { extends: ["editor"], permissions: ["users:delete"] },
+ *       editor: ["users:read", "users:write", "posts:*"],
+ *       viewer: ["*:read"],
+ *     },
+ *     audit: b.audit,                  // optional
+ *   });
+ *
+ *   router.delete("/users/:id",
+ *     authMiddleware,                  // populates req.user / req.apiKey
+ *     perms.require("users:delete"),
+ *     deleteUserHandler);
+ *
+ * The default resolver chain reads the actor from the request:
+ *
+ *   req.apiKey.scopes  → { scopes: [...] }   (b.apiKey.verify output)
+ *   req.user.scopes    → { scopes: [...] }   (operator-set)
+ *   req.user.roles     → { roles:  [...] }   (operator-set)
+ *
+ * Operators with non-default request shapes pass `resolver` to create().
+ *
+ * Wildcard semantics (b.permissions.match):
+ *   "*"             matches any scope (greedy)
+ *   "users:*"       matches "users:read", "users:read:detail", etc. (trailing * is greedy)
+ *   "*:read"        matches "users:read", "posts:read"
+ *   "users:*:read"  matches "users:foo:read" (per-segment *)
+ *   "users:read"    matches "users:read" only — no implicit sub-resource grant
+ *
+ * Validation policy:
+ *
+ *   - create() role table / scope formats → throw at app init
+ *   - require(scope) registration arg     → throw at route declaration
+ *   - check(actor, scope) bad actor       → return false (tolerant read)
+ *   - resolver returns null in middleware → 401 (missingActorStatus)
+ *   - actor lacks scope in middleware     → 403 (denyStatus)
+ *   - audit/observability emit failures   → drop silent (hot-path sink)
+ *
+ * Audit defaults follow the framework's security-defaults stance
+ * default: `auditFailures: true`
+ * (deny is a security signal), `auditSuccess: false` (per-request noise).
+ */
+
+var C = require("./constants");
+var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
+var requestHelpers = require("./request-helpers");
+var safeSql = require("./safe-sql");
+var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
+var { PermissionsError } = require("./framework-error");
+
+var _err = PermissionsError.factory;
+
+var observability = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./observability"); });
+
+function _emitEvent(n, v, l) { observability().safeEvent(n, v, l || {}); }
+
+// Lowercase tokens, digits, dash, underscore, and `*` allowed per
+// segment. Scope format is segments separated by `:`.
+var SCOPE_RE = /^[a-z0-9_*-]+(:[a-z0-9_*-]+)*$/;
+// Bound the regex engine on operator-supplied scope strings. 256 chars
+// holds any realistic real-world scope (typical scopes run 8-32 chars);
+// rejecting longer keeps the regex linear regardless of input shape.
+var SCOPE_MAX_LENGTH = C.BYTES.bytes(256);
+
+// Audit defaults: BOTH success and failure default ON for permissions.
+// Unlike api-key.verify (which is gate-keeping for a downstream action
+// the application separately audits), a permissions.check IS the
+// authorization decision — there's no further-downstream audit event.
+// "user X granted users:delete at time T" is exactly what compliance
+// auditors ask for. Operators with extreme volume opt out via
+// auditSuccess: false; failures remain on regardless.
+var DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({
+  auditFailures:       true,
+  auditSuccess:        true,
+  denyStatus:          403,
+  missingActorStatus:  401,
+});
+
+// ---- Wildcard matcher ----
+
+function match(granted, required) {
+  if (typeof granted !== "string" || typeof required !== "string") return false;
+  if (granted.length === 0 || required.length === 0) return false;
+  var gParts = granted.split(":");
+  var rParts = required.split(":");
+  for (var i = 0; i < gParts.length; i++) {
+    var g = gParts[i];
+    if (g === "*") {
+      // Trailing * is greedy — matches the rest of required.
+      if (i === gParts.length - 1) return true;
+      // Per-segment * — matches THIS segment of required (any value),
+      // continue to next segment. Required must have a segment here.
+      if (i >= rParts.length) return false;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (i >= rParts.length) return false;     // granted is more specific than required
+    if (g !== rParts[i]) return false;
+  }
+  // Reached end of granted without wildcard. Lengths must match exactly
+  // (no implicit sub-resource grant).
+  return rParts.length === gParts.length;
+}
+
+// ---- Role table validation + expansion ----
+
+function _validateScopePattern(scope, ctx) {
+  if (typeof scope !== "string" || scope.length === 0) {
+    throw _err("BAD_SCOPE", ctx + ": scope must be a non-empty string, got " + typeof scope);
+  }
+  // Length cap before the regex test — bound the engine on hostile
+  // input lengths even though SCOPE_RE is anchored.
+  if (scope.length > SCOPE_MAX_LENGTH || !SCOPE_RE.test(scope)) {
+    throw _err("BAD_SCOPE", ctx + ": scope '" + scope +
+      "' is empty, too long, or doesn't match " + SCOPE_RE +
+      " (lowercase tokens with optional `*`)");
+  }
+}
+
+function _normalizeRoleEntry(name, entry) {
+  if (Array.isArray(entry)) {
+    return { extends: [], permissions: entry.slice(), dbRole: null,
+      requireMfa: false, mfaWindowMs: null };
+  }
+  if (entry && typeof entry === "object") {
+    var ext = entry.extends || [];
+    var perms = entry.permissions || [];
+    if (!Array.isArray(ext)) {
+      throw _err("BAD_ROLE", "role '" + name + "': extends must be an array of role names");
+    }
+    if (!Array.isArray(perms)) {
+      throw _err("BAD_ROLE", "role '" + name + "': permissions must be an array of scope strings");
+    }
+    var dbRole = null;
+    if (entry.dbRole !== undefined && entry.dbRole !== null) {
+      if (typeof entry.dbRole !== "string" || entry.dbRole.length === 0) {
+        throw _err("BAD_ROLE",
+          "role '" + name + "': dbRole must be a non-empty string");
+      }
+      // dbRole feeds straight into externalDb backend pick + the
+      // dbRoleFor middleware's identifier check; validate at create()
+      // time so a typo surfaces at boot, not on the first request.
+      try {
+        safeSql.validateIdentifier(entry.dbRole, { allowReserved: false });
+      } catch (e) {
+        throw _err("BAD_ROLE",
+          "role '" + name + "': dbRole '" + entry.dbRole +
+          "' is not a valid SQL identifier: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+      }
+      dbRole = entry.dbRole;
+    }
+    var requireMfa = entry.requireMfa === true;
+    var mfaWindowMs = null;
+    if (entry.mfaWindowMs !== undefined && entry.mfaWindowMs !== null) {
+      if (typeof entry.mfaWindowMs !== "number" || !isFinite(entry.mfaWindowMs) || entry.mfaWindowMs <= 0) {
+        throw _err("BAD_ROLE",
+          "role '" + name + "': mfaWindowMs must be a positive finite number");
+      }
+      mfaWindowMs = entry.mfaWindowMs;
+    }
+    return { extends: ext.slice(), permissions: perms.slice(), dbRole: dbRole,
+      requireMfa: requireMfa, mfaWindowMs: mfaWindowMs };
+  }
+  throw _err("BAD_ROLE", "role '" + name + "' must be an array of scopes or { extends?, permissions, dbRole?, requireMfa?, mfaWindowMs? }");
+}
+
+function _validateRoles(roles) {
+  if (!roles || typeof roles !== "object" || Array.isArray(roles)) {
+    throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions.create: roles must be an object map of name → spec");
+  }
+  var names = Object.keys(roles);
+  if (names.length === 0) {
+    throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions.create: roles map must have at least one role");
+  }
+  var normalized = {};
+  for (var i = 0; i < names.length; i++) {
+    var name = names[i];
+    if (typeof name !== "string" || name.length === 0) {
+      throw _err("BAD_ROLE", "role name must be a non-empty string");
+    }
+    var spec = _normalizeRoleEntry(name, roles[name]);
+    for (var j = 0; j < spec.permissions.length; j++) {
+      _validateScopePattern(spec.permissions[j], "role '" + name + "'");
+    }
+    for (var k = 0; k < spec.extends.length; k++) {
+      if (typeof spec.extends[k] !== "string" || spec.extends[k].length === 0) {
+        throw _err("BAD_ROLE", "role '" + name + "': extends entry must be a non-empty string");
+      }
+    }
+    normalized[name] = spec;
+  }
+  // Check extends references resolve to known roles
+  for (var n = 0; n < names.length; n++) {
+    var spec2 = normalized[names[n]];
+    for (var m = 0; m < spec2.extends.length; m++) {
+      if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(normalized, spec2.extends[m])) {
+        throw _err("UNKNOWN_ROLE", "role '" + names[n] + "': extends references unknown role '" +
+          spec2.extends[m] + "'");
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  // Cycle detection via DFS
+  for (var p = 0; p < names.length; p++) {
+    _detectCycle(names[p], normalized, []);
+  }
+  return normalized;
+}
+
+function _detectCycle(roleName, table, stack) {
+  if (stack.indexOf(roleName) !== -1) {
+    throw _err("CYCLE", "permissions.create: cycle in extends chain: " +
+      stack.concat([roleName]).join(" → "));
+  }
+  var spec = table[roleName];
+  for (var i = 0; i < spec.extends.length; i++) {
+    _detectCycle(spec.extends[i], table, stack.concat([roleName]));
+  }
+}
+
+function _expandOne(roleName, table, visited, out) {
+  if (visited.has(roleName)) return;
+  visited.add(roleName);
+  var spec = table[roleName];
+  if (!spec) return;
+  for (var i = 0; i < spec.extends.length; i++) {
+    _expandOne(spec.extends[i], table, visited, out);
+  }
+  for (var j = 0; j < spec.permissions.length; j++) {
+    if (out.indexOf(spec.permissions[j]) === -1) out.push(spec.permissions[j]);
+  }
+}
+
+// ---- Default resolver ----
+
+function _defaultResolver(req) {
+  if (!req || typeof req !== "object") return null;
+  if (req.apiKey && Array.isArray(req.apiKey.scopes)) return { scopes: req.apiKey.scopes };
+  if (req.user && Array.isArray(req.user.scopes))     return { scopes: req.user.scopes };
+  if (req.user && Array.isArray(req.user.roles))      return { roles:  req.user.roles };
+  return null;
+}
+
+// ---- Validation: create opts ----
+
+function _validateCreateOpts(opts) {
+  validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "permissions.create", PermissionsError);
+  validateOpts.optionalFunction(opts.resolver, "permissions.create: resolver", PermissionsError);
+  validateOpts.auditShape(opts.audit, "permissions.create", PermissionsError);
+  validateOpts.optionalBoolean(opts.auditFailures, "permissions.create: auditFailures", PermissionsError);
+  validateOpts.optionalBoolean(opts.auditSuccess, "permissions.create: auditSuccess", PermissionsError);
+  if (opts.denyStatus !== undefined &&
+      (typeof opts.denyStatus !== "number" || !isFinite(opts.denyStatus) || opts.denyStatus < 100 || opts.denyStatus > 599)) {
+    throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions.create: denyStatus must be an HTTP status code (100-599)");
+  }
+  if (opts.missingActorStatus !== undefined &&
+      (typeof opts.missingActorStatus !== "number" || !isFinite(opts.missingActorStatus) ||
+       opts.missingActorStatus < 100 || opts.missingActorStatus > 599)) {
+    throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions.create: missingActorStatus must be an HTTP status code (100-599)");
+  }
+  validateOpts.optionalFunction(opts.responder, "permissions.create: responder", PermissionsError);
+}
+
+// ---- Registry ----
+
+function create(opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  validateOpts(opts, [
+    "roles", "resolver", "audit", "auditFailures", "auditSuccess",
+    "denyStatus", "missingActorStatus", "responder",
+  ], "permissions");
+  _validateCreateOpts(opts);
+  var cfg = validateOpts.applyDefaults(opts, DEFAULTS);
+  var roleTable = _validateRoles(opts.roles);
+  var resolver  = opts.resolver || _defaultResolver;
+  var audit     = opts.audit || null;
+  var auditFailures = cfg.auditFailures;
+  var auditSuccess  = cfg.auditSuccess;
+  var denyStatus    = cfg.denyStatus;
+  var missingActorStatus = cfg.missingActorStatus;
+  var responder = opts.responder || _defaultResponder;
+
+  // ABAC predicate registry. Each entry: scope-string → async predicate
+  // function (actor, context) → boolean. The middleware evaluates the
+  // predicate AFTER the RBAC scope check passes — so a route protected
+  // by `perms.require("orders.read")` first checks the actor has the
+  // orders:read scope, then (if the scope has a policy registered)
+  // evaluates the predicate with the actor + a per-request context
+  // built by the route's `context` middleware opt. ABAC + RBAC stack
+  // — a route needs to pass BOTH layers when both are configured.
+  var policies = {};
+
+  function policy(scope, predicate) {
+    _validateScopePattern(scope, "permissions.policy");
+    if (typeof predicate !== "function") {
+      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions.policy: predicate must be a function (actor, context) -> bool");
+    }
+    if (policies[scope]) {
+      throw _err("DUPLICATE_POLICY", "permissions.policy: '" + scope + "' is already registered");
+    }
+    policies[scope] = predicate;
+  }
+
+  function _findPolicy(requestedScope) {
+    // Exact match wins; no wildcard expansion (a wildcard policy
+    // gating arbitrary scopes is too easy to misconfigure).
+    return policies[requestedScope] || null;
+  }
+
+  var _emitRaw = validateOpts.makeAuditEmitter(audit);
+  function _auditEmit(action, info) {
+    if (info && info.outcome === "success" && !auditSuccess) return;
+    if (info && info.outcome !== "success" && !auditFailures) return;
+    _emitRaw(action, info);
+  }
+
+  function expand(roleNames) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(roleNames)) return [];
+    var visited = new Set();
+    var out = [];
+    for (var i = 0; i < roleNames.length; i++) {
+      if (typeof roleNames[i] === "string" && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(roleTable, roleNames[i])) {
+        _expandOne(roleNames[i], roleTable, visited, out);
+      }
+    }
+    return out;
+  }
+
+  function _actorScopes(actor) {
+    if (!actor || typeof actor !== "object") return [];
+    if (Array.isArray(actor.scopes)) return actor.scopes;
+    if (Array.isArray(actor.roles))  return expand(actor.roles);
+    return [];
+  }
+
+  function check(actor, requiredScope) {
+    var scopes = _actorScopes(actor);
+    for (var i = 0; i < scopes.length; i++) {
+      if (typeof scopes[i] === "string" && match(scopes[i], requiredScope)) return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  function checkAll(actor, requiredScopes) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(requiredScopes)) return false;
+    for (var i = 0; i < requiredScopes.length; i++) {
+      if (!check(actor, requiredScopes[i])) return false;
+    }
+    return requiredScopes.length > 0;
+  }
+
+  function checkAny(actor, requiredScopes) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(requiredScopes)) return false;
+    for (var i = 0; i < requiredScopes.length; i++) {
+      if (check(actor, requiredScopes[i])) return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Middleware factory. `mode` is "single" | "all" | "any"; `requested`
+  // is the scope or scope list. Throw at registration time on bad shape.
+  function _middleware(mode, requested, mwOpts) {
+    if (mode === "single") {
+      _validateScopePattern(requested, "permissions.require");
+    } else {
+      if (!Array.isArray(requested) || requested.length === 0) {
+        throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions." + (mode === "all" ? "requireAll" : "requireAny") +
+          ": scopes must be a non-empty array");
+      }
+      for (var i = 0; i < requested.length; i++) {
+        _validateScopePattern(requested[i], "permissions." + (mode === "all" ? "requireAll" : "requireAny"));
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Per-route MFA enforcement opts: { requireMfa, mfaWindowMs }.
+    // When set, the middleware blocks unless the actor's mfaAuthenticated
+    // flag is truthy AND (when mfaWindowMs is set) actor.mfaAt is fresher
+    // than (now - mfaWindowMs). The actor signal is operator-set: after
+    // a successful TOTP / passkey step-up, the route handler stamps
+    // req.user.mfaAuthenticated = true and req.user.mfaAt = Date.now().
+    mwOpts = mwOpts || {};
+    var routeRequireMfa  = mwOpts.requireMfa === true;
+    var routeMfaWindowMs = null;
+    if (mwOpts.mfaWindowMs !== undefined && mwOpts.mfaWindowMs !== null) {
+      if (typeof mwOpts.mfaWindowMs !== "number" || !isFinite(mwOpts.mfaWindowMs) || mwOpts.mfaWindowMs <= 0) {
+        throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions middleware: mfaWindowMs must be a positive finite number");
+      }
+      routeMfaWindowMs = mwOpts.mfaWindowMs;
+    }
+    // ABAC context provider — operator-supplied function (req)→object.
+    // The function runs once per request, AFTER scope/MFA pass, BEFORE
+    // the policy predicate. Whatever it returns is passed to the
+    // policy as `context`. Async functions are awaited.
+    var contextProvider = mwOpts.context;
+    if (contextProvider !== undefined && typeof contextProvider !== "function") {
+      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "permissions middleware: context must be a function (req) -> object");
+    }
+
+    return async function permissionsMiddleware(req, res, next) {
+      var actor = resolver(req);
+      if (!actor) {
+        // Diagnostic: the most common cause of a null actor is that
+        // attachUser/auth wasn't mounted before this middleware, so
+        // req.user / req.apiKey are still undefined. Emit a hint —
+        // operators tracing a 401 here see exactly what to check first.
+        var hint = (req && (req.user || req.apiKey))
+          ? "actor present on req but resolver returned null — check resolver implementation"
+          : "no req.user or req.apiKey — confirm attachUser / apiKey-verify middleware is mounted before perms.require()";
+        _emitEvent("permissions.missing_actor", 1,
+          { requested: _labelize(requested) });
+        _auditEmit("permissions.missing_actor", {
+          actor:    _actorAuditShape(null, req),
+          resource: { kind: "permission", id: _labelize(requested) },
+          outcome:  "failure",
+          reason:   "no-actor",
+          metadata: { hint: hint },
+        });
+        return responder(req, res, missingActorStatus, {
+          error:  "missing_actor",
+          status: missingActorStatus,
+        });
+      }
+
+      var ok;
+      if (mode === "single")  ok = check(actor, requested);
+      else if (mode === "all") ok = checkAll(actor, requested);
+      else                     ok = checkAny(actor, requested);
+
+      if (!ok) {
+        _emitEvent("permissions.check", 1,
+          { outcome: "deny", requested: _labelize(requested), mode: mode });
+        _auditEmit("permissions.check.deny", {
+          actor:    _actorAuditShape(actor, req),
+          resource: { kind: "permission", id: _labelize(requested) },
+          outcome:  "failure",
+          reason:   "forbidden",
+          metadata: { mode: mode },
+        });
+        return responder(req, res, denyStatus, {
+          error:     "forbidden",
+          status:    denyStatus,
+          requested: _labelize(requested),
+        });
+      }
+
+      // MFA enforcement gate. Two sources of "this needs MFA":
+      //   1. Per-route opt: perms.require("scope", { requireMfa: true })
+      //   2. Per-role flag: a role spec with requireMfa:true that
+      //      contributes to satisfying the requested scope
+      // Either source enabling MFA forces the gate. mfaWindowMs (per-route
+      // OR per-role, route wins on conflict) bounds freshness — without
+      // it, ANY past MFA stamp counts (which is too permissive for high-
+      // value routes; operators set a window like C.TIME.minutes(15)).
+      var enforceMfa = routeRequireMfa;
+      var enforceWindowMs = routeMfaWindowMs;
+      if (!enforceMfa) {
+        // Walk the actor's roles and check whether any role with
+        // requireMfa=true contributes a permission that matches the
+        // requested scope. If so, MFA is required regardless of the
+        // route-level opt.
+        var actorRoles = Array.isArray(actor.roles) ? actor.roles : [];
+        for (var ri = 0; ri < actorRoles.length; ri++) {
+          var rname = actorRoles[ri];
+          if (typeof rname !== "string") continue;
+          var rspec = roleTable[rname];
+          if (!rspec || !rspec.requireMfa) continue;
+          // Cheap match: if the role grants any scope that satisfies the
+          // requested scope (single mode) or any of the requested
+          // (all/any modes), MFA is required for this route.
+          var visited = new Set();
+          var roleScopes = [];
+          _expandOne(rname, roleTable, visited, roleScopes);
+          var roleMatches = false;
+          var requestedList = mode === "single" ? [requested] : requested;
+          outer: for (var rj = 0; rj < roleScopes.length; rj++) {
+            for (var rk = 0; rk < requestedList.length; rk++) {
+              if (match(roleScopes[rj], requestedList[rk])) {
+                roleMatches = true; break outer;
+              }
+            }
+          }
+          if (roleMatches) {
+            enforceMfa = true;
+            if (enforceWindowMs === null && rspec.mfaWindowMs !== null) {
+              enforceWindowMs = rspec.mfaWindowMs;
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+      if (enforceMfa) {
+        var mfaOk = actor.mfaAuthenticated === true;
+        if (mfaOk && enforceWindowMs !== null) {
+          var mfaAt = typeof actor.mfaAt === "number" ? actor.mfaAt : 0;
+          if (Date.now() - mfaAt > enforceWindowMs) {
+            mfaOk = false;
+          }
+        }
+        if (!mfaOk) {
+          _emitEvent("permissions.mfa_required", 1,
+            { requested: _labelize(requested), mode: mode });
+          _auditEmit("permissions.mfa.required", {
+            actor:    _actorAuditShape(actor, req),
+            resource: { kind: "permission", id: _labelize(requested) },
+            outcome:  "denied",
+            reason:   "mfa-required",
+            metadata: { mode: mode, windowMs: enforceWindowMs },
+          });
+          return responder(req, res, denyStatus, {
+            error:     "mfa_required",
+            status:    denyStatus,
+            requested: _labelize(requested),
+          });
+        }
+      }
+
+      // ABAC layer fires for every requested scope that has a
+      // registered policy predicate. Single-mode evaluates the one
+      // scope; requireAll evaluates each scope's policy (every must
+      // pass); requireAny evaluates only the policies on scopes the
+      // actor's RBAC layer satisfied (so a failing policy on a scope
+      // the actor doesn't even hold doesn't leak the policy's
+      // existence). Each predicate failure short-circuits with a
+      // policy.deny audit row naming the failing scope.
+      var policyTargets = [];
+      if (mode === "single" && _findPolicy(requested)) {
+        policyTargets.push(requested);
+      } else if (mode === "all" || mode === "any") {
+        for (var pi = 0; pi < requested.length; pi++) {
+          if (_findPolicy(requested[pi])) {
+            if (mode === "any" && !check(actor, requested[pi])) continue;
+            policyTargets.push(requested[pi]);
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      if (policyTargets.length > 0) {
+        var policyContext = null;
+        if (contextProvider) {
+          try {
+            policyContext = await contextProvider(req);
+          } catch (e) {
+            _emitEvent("permissions.policy_context_error", 1,
+              { requested: _labelize(requested) });
+            _auditEmit("permissions.policy.error", {
+              actor:    _actorAuditShape(actor, req),
+              resource: { kind: "permission", id: _labelize(requested) },
+              outcome:  "failure",
+              reason:   "context-provider-threw",
+              metadata: { error: (e && e.message) || String(e), mode: mode },
+            });
+            return responder(req, res, denyStatus, {
+              error:     "policy_context_error",
+              status:    denyStatus,
+              requested: _labelize(requested),
+            });
+          }
+        }
+        for (var pti = 0; pti < policyTargets.length; pti++) {
+          var thisScope = policyTargets[pti];
+          var pred = _findPolicy(thisScope);
+          var verdict;
+          try {
+            verdict = await pred(actor, policyContext);
+          } catch (e2) {
+            _emitEvent("permissions.policy_error", 1, { requested: thisScope });
+            _auditEmit("permissions.policy.error", {
+              actor:    _actorAuditShape(actor, req),
+              resource: { kind: "permission", id: thisScope },
+              outcome:  "failure",
+              reason:   "predicate-threw",
+              metadata: { error: (e2 && e2.message) || String(e2), mode: mode },
+            });
+            return responder(req, res, denyStatus, {
+              error:     "policy_error",
+              status:    denyStatus,
+              requested: thisScope,
+            });
+          }
+          if (verdict !== true) {
+            _emitEvent("permissions.policy_denied", 1, { requested: thisScope });
+            _auditEmit("permissions.policy.deny", {
+              actor:    _actorAuditShape(actor, req),
+              resource: { kind: "permission", id: thisScope },
+              outcome:  "failure",
+              reason:   "policy-predicate-returned-falsy",
+              metadata: { mode: mode, scopeIndex: pti },
+            });
+            return responder(req, res, denyStatus, {
+              error:     "policy_denied",
+              status:    denyStatus,
+              requested: thisScope,
+            });
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+      _emitEvent("permissions.check", 1,
+        { outcome: "success", mode: mode });
+      _auditEmit("permissions.check.success", {
+        actor:    _actorAuditShape(actor, req),
+        resource: { kind: "permission", id: _labelize(requested) },
+        outcome:  "success",
+        metadata: { mode: mode, mfaEnforced: enforceMfa },
+      });
+      next();
+    };
+  }
+
+  // dbRoleFor — walk the actor's roles in order and return the first
+  // declared dbRole. Composes with b.middleware.dbRoleFor so a single
+  // RBAC table drives both authorization scopes and request-time DB
+  // role binding.
+  //
+  // The arg can be the request (default resolver pulls actor from
+  // req.user / req.apiKey) OR an actor object directly. Returns null if
+  // no actor is found OR the actor's roles don't include any with a
+  // declared dbRole.
+  //
+  // Lookup order: extends are walked depth-first so a child role that
+  // overrides dbRole takes precedence over its parent. When multiple
+  // top-level roles are listed, the first wins (operators wanting a
+  // priority order should list more-specific roles first).
+  function dbRoleFor(reqOrActor) {
+    var actor = reqOrActor;
+    // Heuristic: a request shape carries headers / url; resolve through
+    // the configured resolver. An actor shape has roles / scopes
+    // directly.
+    if (actor && (actor.headers || actor.url || actor.method)) {
+      actor = resolver(actor);
+    }
+    if (!actor || typeof actor !== "object") return null;
+    var roleNames = Array.isArray(actor.roles) ? actor.roles : null;
+    if (!roleNames || roleNames.length === 0) return null;
+    // Walk the same DFS order expand() uses so the first-seen dbRole
+    // is consistent with how scopes are inherited.
+    var visited = new Set();
+    for (var i = 0; i < roleNames.length; i++) {
+      var name = roleNames[i];
+      if (typeof name !== "string") continue;
+      if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(roleTable, name)) continue;
+      var found = _findDbRole(name, roleTable, visited);
+      if (found) return found;
+    }
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  return {
+    require:    function (scope, mwOpts)  { return _middleware("single", scope,  mwOpts); },
+    requireAll: function (scopes, mwOpts) { return _middleware("all",    scopes, mwOpts); },
+    requireAny: function (scopes, mwOpts) { return _middleware("any",    scopes, mwOpts); },
+    policy:     policy,
+    check:      check,
+    checkAll:   checkAll,
+    checkAny:   checkAny,
+    expand:     expand,
+    dbRoleFor:  dbRoleFor,
+    has:        function (name) { return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(roleTable, name); },
+    roles:      Object.freeze(Object.keys(roleTable)),
+  };
+}
+
+function _findDbRole(roleName, table, visited) {
+  if (visited.has(roleName)) return null;
+  visited.add(roleName);
+  var spec = table[roleName];
+  if (!spec) return null;
+  // Child overrides parent — check this role's own dbRole first, then
+  // recurse into extends.
+  if (spec.dbRole) return spec.dbRole;
+  for (var i = 0; i < spec.extends.length; i++) {
+    var found = _findDbRole(spec.extends[i], table, visited);
+    if (found) return found;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+// ---- Helpers ----
+
+function _labelize(requested) {
+  return Array.isArray(requested) ? requested.join(",") : String(requested);
+}
+
+function _actorAuditShape(actor, req) {
+  // Pull the 5 W's (WHO/WHERE/HOW) from the request, then layer the
+  // resolver-supplied actor identity on top so userId/roles/scopes
+  // aren't lost when the request itself doesn't carry them.
+  var base = requestHelpers.extractActorContext(req);
+  if (actor) {
+    if (actor.userId)               base.userId = actor.userId;
+    if (Array.isArray(actor.roles)) base.roles  = actor.roles.slice();
+    if (Array.isArray(actor.scopes)) base.scopes = actor.scopes.slice();
+  }
+  return base;
+}
+
+function _defaultResponder(req, res, status, info) {
+  res.writeHead(status, { "Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8" });
+  res.end(JSON.stringify(info));
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  create:           create,
+  match:            match,
+  PermissionsError: PermissionsError,
+  DEFAULTS:         DEFAULTS,
+};