puma-plus-core 0.1.0

data/go/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go

@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package chacha20 implements the ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 encryption algorithms
+// as specified in RFC 8439 and draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01.
+package chacha20
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"math/bits"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias"
+)
+
+const (
+	// KeySize is the size of the key used by this cipher, in bytes.
+	KeySize = 32
+
+	// NonceSize is the size of the nonce used with the standard variant of this
+	// cipher, in bytes.
+	//
+	// Note that this is too short to be safely generated at random if the same
+	// key is reused more than 2³² times.
+	NonceSize = 12
+
+	// NonceSizeX is the size of the nonce used with the XChaCha20 variant of
+	// this cipher, in bytes.
+	NonceSizeX = 24
+)
+
+// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 or XChaCha20 using a particular key
+// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface.
+type Cipher struct {
+	// The ChaCha20 state is 16 words: 4 constant, 8 of key, 1 of counter
+	// (incremented after each block), and 3 of nonce.
+	key     [8]uint32
+	counter uint32
+	nonce   [3]uint32
+
+	// The last len bytes of buf are leftover key stream bytes from the previous
+	// XORKeyStream invocation. The size of buf depends on how many blocks are
+	// computed at a time by xorKeyStreamBlocks.
+	buf [bufSize]byte
+	len int
+
+	// overflow is set when the counter overflowed, no more blocks can be
+	// generated, and the next XORKeyStream call should panic.
+	overflow bool
+
+	// The counter-independent results of the first round are cached after they
+	// are computed the first time.
+	precompDone      bool
+	p1, p5, p9, p13  uint32
+	p2, p6, p10, p14 uint32
+	p3, p7, p11, p15 uint32
+}
+
+var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil)
+
+// NewUnauthenticatedCipher creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given
+// 32 bytes key and a 12 or 24 bytes nonce. If a nonce of 24 bytes is provided,
+// the XChaCha20 construction will be used. It returns an error if key or nonce
+// have any other length.
+//
+// Note that ChaCha20, like all stream ciphers, is not authenticated and allows
+// attackers to silently tamper with the plaintext. For this reason, it is more
+// appropriate as a building block than as a standalone encryption mechanism.
+// Instead, consider using package golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305.
+func NewUnauthenticatedCipher(key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) {
+	// This function is split into a wrapper so that the Cipher allocation will
+	// be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't
+	// escape to the heap.
+	c := &Cipher{}
+	return newUnauthenticatedCipher(c, key, nonce)
+}
+
+func newUnauthenticatedCipher(c *Cipher, key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) {
+	if len(key) != KeySize {
+		return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong key size")
+	}
+	if len(nonce) == NonceSizeX {
+		// XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to mix 16 bytes of the nonce into a
+		// derived key, allowing it to operate on a nonce of 24 bytes. See
+		// draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01, Section 2.3.
+		key, _ = HChaCha20(key, nonce[0:16])
+		cNonce := make([]byte, NonceSize)
+		copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24])
+		nonce = cNonce
+	} else if len(nonce) != NonceSize {
+		return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong nonce size")
+	}
+
+	key, nonce = key[:KeySize], nonce[:NonceSize] // bounds check elimination hint
+	c.key = [8]uint32{
+		binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]),
+		binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]),
+		binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]),
+		binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]),
+		binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]),
+		binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]),
+		binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]),
+		binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]),
+	}
+	c.nonce = [3]uint32{
+		binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]),
+		binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]),
+		binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]),
+	}
+	return c, nil
+}
+
+// The constant first 4 words of the ChaCha20 state.
+const (
+	j0 uint32 = 0x61707865 // expa
+	j1 uint32 = 0x3320646e // nd 3
+	j2 uint32 = 0x79622d32 // 2-by
+	j3 uint32 = 0x6b206574 // te k
+)
+
+const blockSize = 64
+
+// quarterRound is the core of ChaCha20. It shuffles the bits of 4 state words.
+// It's executed 4 times for each of the 20 ChaCha20 rounds, operating on all 16
+// words each round, in columnar or diagonal groups of 4 at a time.
+func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) {
+	a += b
+	d ^= a
+	d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 16)
+	c += d
+	b ^= c
+	b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 12)
+	a += b
+	d ^= a
+	d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 8)
+	c += d
+	b ^= c
+	b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 7)
+	return a, b, c, d
+}
+
+// SetCounter sets the Cipher counter. The next invocation of XORKeyStream will
+// behave as if (64 * counter) bytes had been encrypted so far.
+//
+// To prevent accidental counter reuse, SetCounter panics if counter is less
+// than the current value.
+//
+// Note that the execution time of XORKeyStream is not independent of the
+// counter value.
+func (s *Cipher) SetCounter(counter uint32) {
+	// Internally, s may buffer multiple blocks, which complicates this
+	// implementation slightly. When checking whether the counter has rolled
+	// back, we must use both s.counter and s.len to determine how many blocks
+	// we have already output.
+	outputCounter := s.counter - uint32(s.len)/blockSize
+	if s.overflow || counter < outputCounter {
+		panic("chacha20: SetCounter attempted to rollback counter")
+	}
+
+	// In the general case, we set the new counter value and reset s.len to 0,
+	// causing the next call to XORKeyStream to refill the buffer. However, if
+	// we're advancing within the existing buffer, we can save work by simply
+	// setting s.len.
+	if counter < s.counter {
+		s.len = int(s.counter-counter) * blockSize
+	} else {
+		s.counter = counter
+		s.len = 0
+	}
+}
+
+// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the
+// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all.
+//
+// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable
+// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will
+// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst.
+//
+// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of
+// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher
+// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call.
+func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(src) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	if len(dst) < len(src) {
+		panic("chacha20: output smaller than input")
+	}
+	dst = dst[:len(src)]
+	if alias.InexactOverlap(dst, src) {
+		panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap")
+	}
+
+	// First, drain any remaining key stream from a previous XORKeyStream.
+	if s.len != 0 {
+		keyStream := s.buf[bufSize-s.len:]
+		if len(src) < len(keyStream) {
+			keyStream = keyStream[:len(src)]
+		}
+		_ = src[len(keyStream)-1] // bounds check elimination hint
+		for i, b := range keyStream {
+			dst[i] = src[i] ^ b
+		}
+		s.len -= len(keyStream)
+		dst, src = dst[len(keyStream):], src[len(keyStream):]
+	}
+	if len(src) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+
+	// If we'd need to let the counter overflow and keep generating output,
+	// panic immediately. If instead we'd only reach the last block, remember
+	// not to generate any more output after the buffer is drained.
+	numBlocks := (uint64(len(src)) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize
+	if s.overflow || uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks > 1<<32 {
+		panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
+	} else if uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks == 1<<32 {
+		s.overflow = true
+	}
+
+	// xorKeyStreamBlocks implementations expect input lengths that are a
+	// multiple of bufSize. Platform-specific ones process multiple blocks at a
+	// time, so have bufSizes that are a multiple of blockSize.
+
+	full := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize
+	if full > 0 {
+		s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst[:full], src[:full])
+	}
+	dst, src = dst[full:], src[full:]
+
+	// If using a multi-block xorKeyStreamBlocks would overflow, use the generic
+	// one that does one block at a time.
+	const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize
+	if uint64(s.counter)+blocksPerBuf > 1<<32 {
+		s.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
+		numBlocks := (len(src) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize
+		buf := s.buf[bufSize-numBlocks*blockSize:]
+		copy(buf, src)
+		s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(buf, buf)
+		s.len = len(buf) - copy(dst, buf)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// If we have a partial (multi-)block, pad it for xorKeyStreamBlocks, and
+	// keep the leftover keystream for the next XORKeyStream invocation.
+	if len(src) > 0 {
+		s.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
+		copy(s.buf[:], src)
+		s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(s.buf[:], s.buf[:])
+		s.len = bufSize - copy(dst, s.buf[:])
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) {
+	if len(dst) != len(src) || len(dst)%blockSize != 0 {
+		panic("chacha20: internal error: wrong dst and/or src length")
+	}
+
+	// To generate each block of key stream, the initial cipher state
+	// (represented below) is passed through 20 rounds of shuffling,
+	// alternatively applying quarterRounds by columns (like 1, 5, 9, 13)
+	// or by diagonals (like 1, 6, 11, 12).
+	//
+	//      0:cccccccc   1:cccccccc   2:cccccccc   3:cccccccc
+	//      4:kkkkkkkk   5:kkkkkkkk   6:kkkkkkkk   7:kkkkkkkk
+	//      8:kkkkkkkk   9:kkkkkkkk  10:kkkkkkkk  11:kkkkkkkk
+	//     12:bbbbbbbb  13:nnnnnnnn  14:nnnnnnnn  15:nnnnnnnn
+	//
+	//            c=constant k=key b=blockcount n=nonce
+	var (
+		c0, c1, c2, c3   = j0, j1, j2, j3
+		c4, c5, c6, c7   = s.key[0], s.key[1], s.key[2], s.key[3]
+		c8, c9, c10, c11 = s.key[4], s.key[5], s.key[6], s.key[7]
+		_, c13, c14, c15 = s.counter, s.nonce[0], s.nonce[1], s.nonce[2]
+	)
+
+	// Three quarters of the first round don't depend on the counter, so we can
+	// calculate them here, and reuse them for multiple blocks in the loop, and
+	// for future XORKeyStream invocations.
+	if !s.precompDone {
+		s.p1, s.p5, s.p9, s.p13 = quarterRound(c1, c5, c9, c13)
+		s.p2, s.p6, s.p10, s.p14 = quarterRound(c2, c6, c10, c14)
+		s.p3, s.p7, s.p11, s.p15 = quarterRound(c3, c7, c11, c15)
+		s.precompDone = true
+	}
+
+	// A condition of len(src) > 0 would be sufficient, but this also
+	// acts as a bounds check elimination hint.
+	for len(src) >= 64 && len(dst) >= 64 {
+		// The remainder of the first column round.
+		fcr0, fcr4, fcr8, fcr12 := quarterRound(c0, c4, c8, s.counter)
+
+		// The second diagonal round.
+		x0, x5, x10, x15 := quarterRound(fcr0, s.p5, s.p10, s.p15)
+		x1, x6, x11, x12 := quarterRound(s.p1, s.p6, s.p11, fcr12)
+		x2, x7, x8, x13 := quarterRound(s.p2, s.p7, fcr8, s.p13)
+		x3, x4, x9, x14 := quarterRound(s.p3, fcr4, s.p9, s.p14)
+
+		// The remaining 18 rounds.
+		for i := 0; i < 9; i++ {
+			// Column round.
+			x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12)
+			x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13)
+			x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14)
+			x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15)
+
+			// Diagonal round.
+			x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15)
+			x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12)
+			x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13)
+			x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
+		}
+
+		// Add back the initial state to generate the key stream, then
+		// XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result.
+		addXor(dst[0:4], src[0:4], x0, c0)
+		addXor(dst[4:8], src[4:8], x1, c1)
+		addXor(dst[8:12], src[8:12], x2, c2)
+		addXor(dst[12:16], src[12:16], x3, c3)
+		addXor(dst[16:20], src[16:20], x4, c4)
+		addXor(dst[20:24], src[20:24], x5, c5)
+		addXor(dst[24:28], src[24:28], x6, c6)
+		addXor(dst[28:32], src[28:32], x7, c7)
+		addXor(dst[32:36], src[32:36], x8, c8)
+		addXor(dst[36:40], src[36:40], x9, c9)
+		addXor(dst[40:44], src[40:44], x10, c10)
+		addXor(dst[44:48], src[44:48], x11, c11)
+		addXor(dst[48:52], src[48:52], x12, s.counter)
+		addXor(dst[52:56], src[52:56], x13, c13)
+		addXor(dst[56:60], src[56:60], x14, c14)
+		addXor(dst[60:64], src[60:64], x15, c15)
+
+		s.counter += 1
+
+		src, dst = src[blockSize:], dst[blockSize:]
+	}
+}
+
+// HChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to generate a derived key from a 32 bytes
+// key and a 16 bytes nonce. It returns an error if key or nonce have any other
+// length. It is used as part of the XChaCha20 construction.
+func HChaCha20(key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	// This function is split into a wrapper so that the slice allocation will
+	// be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't
+	// escape to the heap.
+	out := make([]byte, 32)
+	return hChaCha20(out, key, nonce)
+}
+
+func hChaCha20(out, key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(key) != KeySize {
+		return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 key size")
+	}
+	if len(nonce) != 16 {
+		return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 nonce size")
+	}
+
+	x0, x1, x2, x3 := j0, j1, j2, j3
+	x4 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4])
+	x5 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8])
+	x6 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12])
+	x7 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16])
+	x8 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20])
+	x9 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24])
+	x10 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28])
+	x11 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32])
+	x12 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4])
+	x13 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8])
+	x14 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12])
+	x15 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[12:16])
+
+	for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+		// Diagonal round.
+		x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12)
+		x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13)
+		x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14)
+		x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15)
+
+		// Column round.
+		x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15)
+		x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12)
+		x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13)
+		x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
+	}
+
+	_ = out[31] // bounds check elimination hint
+	binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:4], x0)
+	binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:8], x1)
+	binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:12], x2)
+	binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:16], x3)
+	binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[16:20], x12)
+	binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[20:24], x13)
+	binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[24:28], x14)
+	binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[28:32], x15)
+	return out, nil
+}

data/go/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build (!arm64 && !s390x && !ppc64 && !ppc64le) || !gc || purego
+
+package chacha20
+
+const bufSize = blockSize
+
+func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) {
+	s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src)
+}

data/go/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64x.go

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+//go:build gc && !purego && (ppc64 || ppc64le)
+
+package chacha20
+
+const bufSize = 256
+
+//go:noescape
+func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32)
+
+func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) {
+	chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(&dst[0], &src[0], len(src), &c.key, &c.counter)
+}