puma-plus-core 0.1.0

data/go/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/packet_unpacker.go

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+package quic
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/handshake"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/monotime"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/qerr"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire"
+)
+
+type headerDecryptor interface {
+	DecryptHeader(sample []byte, firstByte *byte, pnBytes []byte)
+}
+
+type headerParseError struct {
+	err error
+}
+
+func (e *headerParseError) Unwrap() error {
+	return e.err
+}
+
+func (e *headerParseError) Error() string {
+	return e.err.Error()
+}
+
+type unpackedPacket struct {
+	hdr             *wire.ExtendedHeader
+	encryptionLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel
+	data            []byte
+}
+
+// The packetUnpacker unpacks QUIC packets.
+type packetUnpacker struct {
+	cs handshake.CryptoSetup
+
+	shortHdrConnIDLen int
+}
+
+var _ unpacker = &packetUnpacker{}
+
+func newPacketUnpacker(cs handshake.CryptoSetup, shortHdrConnIDLen int) *packetUnpacker {
+	return &packetUnpacker{
+		cs:                cs,
+		shortHdrConnIDLen: shortHdrConnIDLen,
+	}
+}
+
+// UnpackLongHeader unpacks a Long Header packet.
+// If the reserved bits are invalid, the error is wire.ErrInvalidReservedBits.
+// If any other error occurred when parsing the header, the error is of type headerParseError.
+// If decrypting the payload fails for any reason, the error is the error returned by the AEAD.
+func (u *packetUnpacker) UnpackLongHeader(hdr *wire.Header, data []byte) (*unpackedPacket, error) {
+	var encLevel protocol.EncryptionLevel
+	var extHdr *wire.ExtendedHeader
+	var decrypted []byte
+	//nolint:exhaustive // Retry packets can't be unpacked.
+	switch hdr.Type {
+	case protocol.PacketTypeInitial:
+		encLevel = protocol.EncryptionInitial
+		opener, err := u.cs.GetInitialOpener()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		extHdr, decrypted, err = u.unpackLongHeaderPacket(opener, hdr, data)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	case protocol.PacketTypeHandshake:
+		encLevel = protocol.EncryptionHandshake
+		opener, err := u.cs.GetHandshakeOpener()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		extHdr, decrypted, err = u.unpackLongHeaderPacket(opener, hdr, data)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	case protocol.PacketType0RTT:
+		encLevel = protocol.Encryption0RTT
+		opener, err := u.cs.Get0RTTOpener()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		extHdr, decrypted, err = u.unpackLongHeaderPacket(opener, hdr, data)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown packet type: %s", hdr.Type)
+	}
+
+	if len(decrypted) == 0 {
+		return nil, &qerr.TransportError{
+			ErrorCode:    qerr.ProtocolViolation,
+			ErrorMessage: "empty packet",
+		}
+	}
+
+	return &unpackedPacket{
+		hdr:             extHdr,
+		encryptionLevel: encLevel,
+		data:            decrypted,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func (u *packetUnpacker) UnpackShortHeader(rcvTime monotime.Time, data []byte) (protocol.PacketNumber, protocol.PacketNumberLen, protocol.KeyPhaseBit, []byte, error) {
+	opener, err := u.cs.Get1RTTOpener()
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, 0, 0, nil, err
+	}
+	pn, pnLen, kp, decrypted, err := u.unpackShortHeaderPacket(opener, rcvTime, data)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, 0, 0, nil, err
+	}
+	if len(decrypted) == 0 {
+		return 0, 0, 0, nil, &qerr.TransportError{
+			ErrorCode:    qerr.ProtocolViolation,
+			ErrorMessage: "empty packet",
+		}
+	}
+	return pn, pnLen, kp, decrypted, nil
+}
+
+func (u *packetUnpacker) unpackLongHeaderPacket(opener handshake.LongHeaderOpener, hdr *wire.Header, data []byte) (*wire.ExtendedHeader, []byte, error) {
+	extHdr, parseErr := u.unpackLongHeader(opener, hdr, data)
+	// If the reserved bits are set incorrectly, we still need to continue unpacking.
+	// This avoids a timing side-channel, which otherwise might allow an attacker
+	// to gain information about the header encryption.
+	if parseErr != nil && parseErr != wire.ErrInvalidReservedBits {
+		return nil, nil, parseErr
+	}
+	extHdrLen := extHdr.ParsedLen()
+	extHdr.PacketNumber = opener.DecodePacketNumber(extHdr.PacketNumber, extHdr.PacketNumberLen)
+	decrypted, err := opener.Open(data[extHdrLen:extHdrLen], data[extHdrLen:], extHdr.PacketNumber, data[:extHdrLen])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+	if parseErr != nil {
+		return nil, nil, parseErr
+	}
+	return extHdr, decrypted, nil
+}
+
+func (u *packetUnpacker) unpackShortHeaderPacket(opener handshake.ShortHeaderOpener, rcvTime monotime.Time, data []byte) (protocol.PacketNumber, protocol.PacketNumberLen, protocol.KeyPhaseBit, []byte, error) {
+	l, pn, pnLen, kp, parseErr := u.unpackShortHeader(opener, data)
+	// If the reserved bits are set incorrectly, we still need to continue unpacking.
+	// This avoids a timing side-channel, which otherwise might allow an attacker
+	// to gain information about the header encryption.
+	if parseErr != nil && parseErr != wire.ErrInvalidReservedBits {
+		return 0, 0, 0, nil, &headerParseError{parseErr}
+	}
+	pn = opener.DecodePacketNumber(pn, pnLen)
+	decrypted, err := opener.Open(data[l:l], data[l:], rcvTime, pn, kp, data[:l])
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, 0, 0, nil, err
+	}
+	return pn, pnLen, kp, decrypted, parseErr
+}
+
+func (u *packetUnpacker) unpackShortHeader(hd headerDecryptor, data []byte) (int, protocol.PacketNumber, protocol.PacketNumberLen, protocol.KeyPhaseBit, error) {
+	hdrLen := 1 /* first header byte */ + u.shortHdrConnIDLen
+	if len(data) < hdrLen+4+16 {
+		return 0, 0, 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("packet too small, expected at least 20 bytes after the header, got %d", len(data)-hdrLen)
+	}
+	origPNBytes := make([]byte, 4)
+	copy(origPNBytes, data[hdrLen:hdrLen+4])
+	// 2. decrypt the header, assuming a 4 byte packet number
+	hd.DecryptHeader(
+		data[hdrLen+4:hdrLen+4+16],
+		&data[0],
+		data[hdrLen:hdrLen+4],
+	)
+	// 3. parse the header (and learn the actual length of the packet number)
+	l, pn, pnLen, kp, parseErr := wire.ParseShortHeader(data, u.shortHdrConnIDLen)
+	if parseErr != nil && parseErr != wire.ErrInvalidReservedBits {
+		return l, pn, pnLen, kp, parseErr
+	}
+	// 4. if the packet number is shorter than 4 bytes, replace the remaining bytes with the copy we saved earlier
+	if pnLen != protocol.PacketNumberLen4 {
+		copy(data[hdrLen+int(pnLen):hdrLen+4], origPNBytes[int(pnLen):])
+	}
+	return l, pn, pnLen, kp, parseErr
+}
+
+// The error is either nil, a wire.ErrInvalidReservedBits or of type headerParseError.
+func (u *packetUnpacker) unpackLongHeader(hd headerDecryptor, hdr *wire.Header, data []byte) (*wire.ExtendedHeader, error) {
+	extHdr, err := unpackLongHeader(hd, hdr, data)
+	if err != nil && err != wire.ErrInvalidReservedBits {
+		return nil, &headerParseError{err: err}
+	}
+	return extHdr, err
+}
+
+func unpackLongHeader(hd headerDecryptor, hdr *wire.Header, data []byte) (*wire.ExtendedHeader, error) {
+	hdrLen := hdr.ParsedLen()
+	if protocol.ByteCount(len(data)) < hdrLen+4+16 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("packet too small, expected at least 20 bytes after the header, got %d", protocol.ByteCount(len(data))-hdrLen)
+	}
+	// The packet number can be up to 4 bytes long, but we won't know the length until we decrypt it.
+	// 1. save a copy of the 4 bytes
+	origPNBytes := make([]byte, 4)
+	copy(origPNBytes, data[hdrLen:hdrLen+4])
+	// 2. decrypt the header, assuming a 4 byte packet number
+	hd.DecryptHeader(
+		data[hdrLen+4:hdrLen+4+16],
+		&data[0],
+		data[hdrLen:hdrLen+4],
+	)
+	// 3. parse the header (and learn the actual length of the packet number)
+	extHdr, parseErr := hdr.ParseExtended(data)
+	if parseErr != nil && parseErr != wire.ErrInvalidReservedBits {
+		return nil, parseErr
+	}
+	// 4. if the packet number is shorter than 4 bytes, replace the remaining bytes with the copy we saved earlier
+	if extHdr.PacketNumberLen != protocol.PacketNumberLen4 {
+		copy(data[extHdr.ParsedLen():hdrLen+4], origPNBytes[int(extHdr.PacketNumberLen):])
+	}
+	return extHdr, parseErr
+}

data/go/vendor/github.com/quic-go/quic-go/path_manager.go

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+package quic
+
+import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"net"
+	"slices"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/ackhandler"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/monotime"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/protocol"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/utils"
+	"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/internal/wire"
+)
+
+type pathID int64
+
+const invalidPathID pathID = -1
+
+// Maximum number of paths to keep track of.
+// If the peer probes another path (before the pathTimeout of an existing path expires),
+// this probing attempt is ignored.
+const maxPaths = 3
+
+// If no packet is received for a path for pathTimeout,
+// the path can be evicted when the peer probes another path.
+// This prevents an attacker from churning through paths by duplicating packets and
+// sending them with spoofed source addresses.
+const pathTimeout = 5 * time.Second
+
+type path struct {
+	id             pathID
+	addr           net.Addr
+	lastPacketTime monotime.Time
+	pathChallenge  [8]byte
+	validated      bool
+	rcvdNonProbing bool
+}
+
+type pathManager struct {
+	nextPathID pathID
+	// ordered by lastPacketTime, with the most recently used path at the end
+	paths []*path
+
+	getConnID    func(pathID) (_ protocol.ConnectionID, ok bool)
+	retireConnID func(pathID)
+
+	logger utils.Logger
+}
+
+func newPathManager(
+	getConnID func(pathID) (_ protocol.ConnectionID, ok bool),
+	retireConnID func(pathID),
+	logger utils.Logger,
+) *pathManager {
+	return &pathManager{
+		paths:        make([]*path, 0, maxPaths+1),
+		getConnID:    getConnID,
+		retireConnID: retireConnID,
+		logger:       logger,
+	}
+}
+
+// Returns a path challenge frame if one should be sent.
+// May return nil.
+func (pm *pathManager) HandlePacket(
+	remoteAddr net.Addr,
+	t monotime.Time,
+	pathChallenge *wire.PathChallengeFrame, // may be nil if the packet didn't contain a PATH_CHALLENGE
+	isNonProbing bool,
+) (_ protocol.ConnectionID, _ []ackhandler.Frame, shouldSwitch bool) {
+	var p *path
+	for i, path := range pm.paths {
+		if addrsEqual(path.addr, remoteAddr) {
+			p = path
+			p.lastPacketTime = t
+			// already sent a PATH_CHALLENGE for this path
+			if isNonProbing {
+				path.rcvdNonProbing = true
+			}
+			if pm.logger.Debug() {
+				pm.logger.Debugf("received packet for path %s that was already probed, validated: %t", remoteAddr, path.validated)
+			}
+			shouldSwitch = path.validated && path.rcvdNonProbing
+			if i != len(pm.paths)-1 {
+				// move the path to the end of the list
+				pm.paths = slices.Delete(pm.paths, i, i+1)
+				pm.paths = append(pm.paths, p)
+			}
+			if pathChallenge == nil {
+				return protocol.ConnectionID{}, nil, shouldSwitch
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(pm.paths) >= maxPaths {
+		if pm.paths[0].lastPacketTime.Add(pathTimeout).After(t) {
+			if pm.logger.Debug() {
+				pm.logger.Debugf("received packet for previously unseen path %s, but already have %d paths", remoteAddr, len(pm.paths))
+			}
+			return protocol.ConnectionID{}, nil, shouldSwitch
+		}
+		// evict the oldest path, if the last packet was received more than pathTimeout ago
+		pm.retireConnID(pm.paths[0].id)
+		pm.paths = pm.paths[1:]
+	}
+
+	var pathID pathID
+	if p != nil {
+		pathID = p.id
+	} else {
+		pathID = pm.nextPathID
+	}
+
+	// previously unseen path, initiate path validation by sending a PATH_CHALLENGE
+	connID, ok := pm.getConnID(pathID)
+	if !ok {
+		pm.logger.Debugf("skipping validation of new path %s since no connection ID is available", remoteAddr)
+		return protocol.ConnectionID{}, nil, shouldSwitch
+	}
+
+	frames := make([]ackhandler.Frame, 0, 2)
+	if p == nil {
+		var pathChallengeData [8]byte
+		rand.Read(pathChallengeData[:])
+		p = &path{
+			id:             pm.nextPathID,
+			addr:           remoteAddr,
+			lastPacketTime: t,
+			rcvdNonProbing: isNonProbing,
+			pathChallenge:  pathChallengeData,
+		}
+		pm.nextPathID++
+		pm.paths = append(pm.paths, p)
+		frames = append(frames, ackhandler.Frame{
+			Frame:   &wire.PathChallengeFrame{Data: p.pathChallenge},
+			Handler: (*pathManagerAckHandler)(pm),
+		})
+		pm.logger.Debugf("enqueueing PATH_CHALLENGE for new path %s", remoteAddr)
+	}
+	if pathChallenge != nil {
+		frames = append(frames, ackhandler.Frame{
+			Frame:   &wire.PathResponseFrame{Data: pathChallenge.Data},
+			Handler: (*pathManagerAckHandler)(pm),
+		})
+	}
+	return connID, frames, shouldSwitch
+}
+
+func (pm *pathManager) HandlePathResponseFrame(f *wire.PathResponseFrame) {
+	for _, p := range pm.paths {
+		if f.Data == p.pathChallenge {
+			// path validated
+			p.validated = true
+			pm.logger.Debugf("path %s validated", p.addr)
+			break
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// SwitchToPath is called when the connection switches to a new path
+func (pm *pathManager) SwitchToPath(addr net.Addr) {
+	// retire all other paths
+	for _, path := range pm.paths {
+		if addrsEqual(path.addr, addr) {
+			pm.logger.Debugf("switching to path %d (%s)", path.id, addr)
+			continue
+		}
+		pm.retireConnID(path.id)
+	}
+	clear(pm.paths)
+	pm.paths = pm.paths[:0]
+}
+
+type pathManagerAckHandler pathManager
+
+var _ ackhandler.FrameHandler = &pathManagerAckHandler{}
+
+// Acknowledging the frame doesn't validate the path, only receiving the PATH_RESPONSE does.
+func (pm *pathManagerAckHandler) OnAcked(f wire.Frame) {}
+
+func (pm *pathManagerAckHandler) OnLost(f wire.Frame) {
+	pc, ok := f.(*wire.PathChallengeFrame)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	for i, path := range pm.paths {
+		if path.pathChallenge == pc.Data {
+			pm.paths = slices.Delete(pm.paths, i, i+1)
+			pm.retireConnID(path.id)
+			break
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func addrsEqual(addr1, addr2 net.Addr) bool {
+	if addr1 == nil || addr2 == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	a1, ok1 := addr1.(*net.UDPAddr)
+	a2, ok2 := addr2.(*net.UDPAddr)
+	if ok1 && ok2 {
+		return a1.IP.Equal(a2.IP) && a1.Port == a2.Port
+	}
+	return addr1.String() == addr2.String()
+}