grpc 1.53.1 → 1.54.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/policy.c

@@ -0,0 +1,786 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2022, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "../x509v3/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+// This file computes the X.509 policy tree, as described in RFC 5280, section
+// 6.1. It differs in that:
+//
+//  (1) It does not track "qualifier_set". This is not needed as it is not
+//      output by this implementation.
+//
+//  (2) It builds a directed acyclic graph, rather than a tree. When a given
+//      policy matches multiple parents, RFC 5280 makes a separate node for
+//      each parent. This representation condenses them into one node with
+//      multiple parents. Thus we refer to this structure as a "policy graph",
+//      rather than a "policy tree".
+//
+//  (3) "expected_policy_set" is not tracked explicitly and built temporarily
+//      as part of building the graph.
+//
+//  (4) anyPolicy nodes are not tracked explicitly.
+//
+//  (5) Some pruning steps are deferred to when policies are evaluated, as a
+//      reachability pass.
+
+// An X509_POLICY_NODE is a node in the policy graph. It corresponds to a node
+// from RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, step (a), but we store some fields differently.
+typedef struct x509_policy_node_st {
+  // policy is the "valid_policy" field from RFC 5280.
+  ASN1_OBJECT *policy;
+
+  // parent_policies, if non-empty, is the list of "valid_policy" values for all
+  // nodes which are a parent of this node. In this case, no entry in this list
+  // will be anyPolicy. This list is in no particular order and may contain
+  // duplicates if the corresponding certificate had duplicate mappings.
+  //
+  // If empty, this node has a single parent, anyPolicy. The node is then a root
+  // policies, and is in authorities-constrained-policy-set if it has a path to
+  // a leaf node.
+  //
+  // Note it is not possible for a policy to have both anyPolicy and a
+  // concrete policy as a parent. Section 6.1.3, step (d.1.ii) only runs if
+  // there was no match in step (d.1.i). We do not need to represent a parent
+  // list of, say, {anyPolicy, OID1, OID2}.
+  STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *parent_policies;
+
+  // mapped is one if this node matches a policy mapping in the certificate and
+  // zero otherwise.
+  int mapped;
+
+  // reachable is one if this node is reachable from some valid policy in the
+  // end-entity certificate. It is computed during |has_explicit_policy|.
+  int reachable;
+} X509_POLICY_NODE;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE)
+
+// An X509_POLICY_LEVEL is the collection of nodes at the same depth in the
+// policy graph. This structure can also be used to represent a level's
+// "expected_policy_set" values. See |process_policy_mappings|.
+typedef struct x509_policy_level_st {
+  // nodes is the list of nodes at this depth, except for the anyPolicy node, if
+  // any. This list is sorted by policy OID for efficient lookup.
+  STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
+
+  // has_any_policy is one if there is an anyPolicy node at this depth, and zero
+  // otherwise.
+  int has_any_policy;
+} X509_POLICY_LEVEL;
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL)
+
+static int is_any_policy(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) {
+  return OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_any_policy;
+}
+
+static void x509_policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) {
+  if (node != NULL) {
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(node->policy);
+    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(node->parent_policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(node);
+  }
+}
+
+static X509_POLICY_NODE *x509_policy_node_new(const ASN1_OBJECT *policy) {
+  assert(!is_any_policy(policy));
+  X509_POLICY_NODE *node = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_NODE));
+  if (node == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(node, 0, sizeof(X509_POLICY_NODE));
+  node->policy = OBJ_dup(policy);
+  node->parent_policies = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null();
+  if (node->policy == NULL || node->parent_policies == NULL) {
+    x509_policy_node_free(node);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return node;
+}
+
+static int x509_policy_node_cmp(const X509_POLICY_NODE **a,
+                                const X509_POLICY_NODE **b) {
+  return OBJ_cmp((*a)->policy, (*b)->policy);
+}
+
+static void x509_policy_level_free(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level) {
+  if (level != NULL) {
+    sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(level->nodes, x509_policy_node_free);
+    OPENSSL_free(level);
+  }
+}
+
+static X509_POLICY_LEVEL *x509_policy_level_new(void) {
+  X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
+  if (level == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(level, 0, sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
+  level->nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new(x509_policy_node_cmp);
+  if (level->nodes == NULL) {
+    x509_policy_level_free(level);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return level;
+}
+
+static int x509_policy_level_is_empty(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level) {
+  return !level->has_any_policy && sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes) == 0;
+}
+
+static void x509_policy_level_clear(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level) {
+  level->has_any_policy = 0;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
+    x509_policy_node_free(sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i));
+  }
+  sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_zero(level->nodes);
+}
+
+// x509_policy_level_find returns the node in |level| corresponding to |policy|,
+// or NULL if none exists.
+static X509_POLICY_NODE *x509_policy_level_find(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                                const ASN1_OBJECT *policy) {
+  assert(sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_is_sorted(level->nodes));
+  X509_POLICY_NODE node;
+  node.policy = (ASN1_OBJECT *)policy;
+  size_t idx;
+  if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(level->nodes, &idx, &node)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, idx);
+}
+
+// x509_policy_level_add_nodes adds the nodes in |nodes| to |level|. It returns
+// one on success and zero on error. No policy in |nodes| may already be present
+// in |level|. This function modifies |nodes| to avoid making a copy, but the
+// caller is still responsible for releasing |nodes| itself.
+//
+// This function is used to add nodes to |level| in bulk, and avoid resorting
+// |level| after each addition.
+static int x509_policy_level_add_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                       STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes) {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) {
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i);
+    if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(level->nodes, node)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_set(nodes, i, NULL);
+  }
+  sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(level->nodes);
+
+#if !defined(NDEBUG)
+  // There should be no duplicate nodes.
+  for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
+    assert(OBJ_cmp(sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i - 1)->policy,
+                   sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i)->policy) != 0);
+  }
+#endif
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int policyinfo_cmp(const POLICYINFO **a, const POLICYINFO **b) {
+  return OBJ_cmp((*a)->policyid, (*b)->policyid);
+}
+
+static int delete_if_not_in_policies(X509_POLICY_NODE *node, void *data) {
+  const CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *policies = data;
+  assert(sk_POLICYINFO_is_sorted(policies));
+  POLICYINFO info;
+  info.policyid = node->policy;
+  if (sk_POLICYINFO_find(policies, NULL, &info)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  x509_policy_node_free(node);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// process_certificate_policies updates |level| to incorporate |x509|'s
+// certificate policies extension. This implements steps (d) and (e) of RFC
+// 5280, section 6.1.3. |level| must contain the previous level's
+// "expected_policy_set" information. For all but the top-most level, this is
+// the output of |process_policy_mappings|. |any_policy_allowed| specifies
+// whether anyPolicy is allowed or inhibited, taking into account the exception
+// for self-issued certificates.
+static int process_certificate_policies(const X509 *x509,
+                                        X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                        int any_policy_allowed) {
+  int ret = 0;
+  int critical;
+  STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *new_nodes = NULL;
+  CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *policies =
+      X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_certificate_policies, &critical, NULL);
+  if (policies == NULL) {
+    if (critical != -1) {
+      return 0;  // Syntax error in the extension.
+    }
+
+    // RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (e).
+    x509_policy_level_clear(level);
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // certificatePolicies may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4.
+  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
+  if (sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  sk_POLICYINFO_set_cmp_func(policies, policyinfo_cmp);
+  sk_POLICYINFO_sort(policies);
+  int cert_has_any_policy = 0;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) {
+    const POLICYINFO *policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i);
+    if (is_any_policy(policy->policyid)) {
+      cert_has_any_policy = 1;
+    }
+    if (i > 0 && OBJ_cmp(sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i - 1)->policyid,
+                         policy->policyid) == 0) {
+      // Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.4, |policies| may not have duplicates.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // This does the same thing as RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (d), though in
+  // a slighty different order. |level| currently contains "expected_policy_set"
+  // values of the previous level. See |process_policy_mappings| for details.
+  const int previous_level_has_any_policy = level->has_any_policy;
+
+  // First, we handle steps (d.1.i) and (d.2). The net effect of these two steps
+  // is to intersect |level| with |policies|, ignoring anyPolicy if it is
+  // inhibited.
+  if (!cert_has_any_policy || !any_policy_allowed) {
+    sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(level->nodes, delete_if_not_in_policies,
+                                  policies);
+    level->has_any_policy = 0;
+  }
+
+  // Step (d.1.ii) may attach new nodes to the previous level's anyPolicy node.
+  if (previous_level_has_any_policy) {
+    new_nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
+    if (new_nodes == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(policies); i++) {
+      const POLICYINFO *policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(policies, i);
+      // Though we've reordered the steps slightly, |policy| is in |level| if
+      // and only if it would have been a match in step (d.1.ii).
+      if (!is_any_policy(policy->policyid) &&
+          x509_policy_level_find(level, policy->policyid) == NULL) {
+        X509_POLICY_NODE *node = x509_policy_node_new(policy->policyid);
+        if (node == NULL ||  //
+            !sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(new_nodes, node)) {
+          x509_policy_node_free(node);
+          goto err;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (!x509_policy_level_add_nodes(level, new_nodes)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(new_nodes, x509_policy_node_free);
+  CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_free(policies);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int compare_issuer_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING **a,
+                                 const POLICY_MAPPING **b) {
+  return OBJ_cmp((*a)->issuerDomainPolicy, (*b)->issuerDomainPolicy);
+}
+
+static int compare_subject_policy(const POLICY_MAPPING **a,
+                                  const POLICY_MAPPING **b) {
+  return OBJ_cmp((*a)->subjectDomainPolicy, (*b)->subjectDomainPolicy);
+}
+
+static int delete_if_mapped(X509_POLICY_NODE *node, void *data) {
+  const POLICY_MAPPINGS *mappings = data;
+  // |mappings| must have been sorted by |compare_issuer_policy|.
+  assert(sk_POLICY_MAPPING_is_sorted(mappings));
+  POLICY_MAPPING mapping;
+  mapping.issuerDomainPolicy = node->policy;
+  if (!sk_POLICY_MAPPING_find(mappings, /*out_index=*/NULL, &mapping)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  x509_policy_node_free(node);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// process_policy_mappings processes the policy mappings extension of |cert|,
+// whose corresponding graph level is |level|. |mapping_allowed| specifies
+// whether policy mapping is inhibited at this point. On success, it returns an
+// |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| containing the "expected_policy_set" for |level|. On
+// error, it returns NULL. This implements steps (a) and (b) of RFC 5280,
+// section 6.1.4.
+//
+// We represent the "expected_policy_set" as an |X509_POLICY_LEVEL|.
+// |has_any_policy| indicates whether there is an anyPolicy node with
+// "expected_policy_set" of {anyPolicy}. If a node with policy oid P1 contains
+// P2 in its "expected_policy_set", the level will contain a node of policy P2
+// with P1 in |parent_policies|.
+//
+// This is equivalent to the |X509_POLICY_LEVEL| that would result if the next
+// certificats contained anyPolicy. |process_certificate_policies| will filter
+// this result down to compute the actual level.
+static X509_POLICY_LEVEL *process_policy_mappings(const X509 *cert,
+                                                  X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
+                                                  int mapping_allowed) {
+  int ok = 0;
+  STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *new_nodes = NULL;
+  X509_POLICY_LEVEL *next = NULL;
+  int critical;
+  POLICY_MAPPINGS *mappings =
+      X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_policy_mappings, &critical, NULL);
+  if (mappings == NULL && critical != -1) {
+    // Syntax error in the policy mappings extension.
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (mappings != NULL) {
+    // PolicyMappings may not be empty. See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.5.
+    // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
+    if (sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings) == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (a).
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) {
+      POLICY_MAPPING *mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i);
+      if (is_any_policy(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) ||
+          is_any_policy(mapping->subjectDomainPolicy)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Sort to group by issuerDomainPolicy.
+    sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings, compare_issuer_policy);
+    sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings);
+
+    if (mapping_allowed) {
+      // Mark nodes as mapped, and add any nodes to |level| which may be needed
+      // as part of RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (b.1).
+      new_nodes = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
+      if (new_nodes == NULL) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      const ASN1_OBJECT *last_policy = NULL;
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) {
+        const POLICY_MAPPING *mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i);
+        // There may be multiple mappings with the same |issuerDomainPolicy|.
+        if (last_policy != NULL &&
+            OBJ_cmp(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy, last_policy) == 0) {
+          continue;
+        }
+        last_policy = mapping->issuerDomainPolicy;
+
+        X509_POLICY_NODE *node =
+            x509_policy_level_find(level, mapping->issuerDomainPolicy);
+        if (node == NULL) {
+          if (!level->has_any_policy) {
+            continue;
+          }
+          node = x509_policy_node_new(mapping->issuerDomainPolicy);
+          if (node == NULL ||  //
+              !sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(new_nodes, node)) {
+            x509_policy_node_free(node);
+            goto err;
+          }
+        }
+        node->mapped = 1;
+      }
+      if (!x509_policy_level_add_nodes(level, new_nodes)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    } else {
+      // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (b.2). If mapping is inhibited, delete
+      // all mapped nodes.
+      sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete_if(level->nodes, delete_if_mapped, mappings);
+      sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(mappings, POLICY_MAPPING_free);
+      mappings = NULL;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If a node was not mapped, it retains the original "explicit_policy_set"
+  // value, itself. Add those to |mappings|.
+  if (mappings == NULL) {
+    mappings = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_new_null();
+    if (mappings == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i);
+    if (!node->mapped) {
+      POLICY_MAPPING *mapping = POLICY_MAPPING_new();
+      if (mapping == NULL) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      mapping->issuerDomainPolicy = OBJ_dup(node->policy);
+      mapping->subjectDomainPolicy = OBJ_dup(node->policy);
+      if (mapping->issuerDomainPolicy == NULL ||
+          mapping->subjectDomainPolicy == NULL ||
+          !sk_POLICY_MAPPING_push(mappings, mapping)) {
+        POLICY_MAPPING_free(mapping);
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Sort to group by subjectDomainPolicy.
+  sk_POLICY_MAPPING_set_cmp_func(mappings, compare_subject_policy);
+  sk_POLICY_MAPPING_sort(mappings);
+
+  // Convert |mappings| to our "expected_policy_set" representation.
+  next = x509_policy_level_new();
+  if (next == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  next->has_any_policy = level->has_any_policy;
+
+  X509_POLICY_NODE *last_node = NULL;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_POLICY_MAPPING_num(mappings); i++) {
+    POLICY_MAPPING *mapping = sk_POLICY_MAPPING_value(mappings, i);
+    // Skip mappings where |issuerDomainPolicy| does not appear in the graph.
+    if (!level->has_any_policy &&
+        x509_policy_level_find(level, mapping->issuerDomainPolicy) == NULL) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (last_node == NULL ||
+        OBJ_cmp(last_node->policy, mapping->subjectDomainPolicy) != 0) {
+      last_node = x509_policy_node_new(mapping->subjectDomainPolicy);
+      if (last_node == NULL ||
+          !sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(next->nodes, last_node)) {
+        x509_policy_node_free(last_node);
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(last_node->parent_policies,
+                             mapping->issuerDomainPolicy)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    mapping->issuerDomainPolicy = NULL;
+  }
+
+  sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(next->nodes);
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (!ok) {
+    x509_policy_level_free(next);
+    next = NULL;
+  }
+
+  sk_POLICY_MAPPING_pop_free(mappings, POLICY_MAPPING_free);
+  sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(new_nodes, x509_policy_node_free);
+  return next;
+}
+
+// apply_skip_certs, if |skip_certs| is non-NULL, sets |*value| to the minimum
+// of its current value and |skip_certs|. It returns one on success and zero if
+// |skip_certs| is negative.
+static int apply_skip_certs(const ASN1_INTEGER *skip_certs, size_t *value) {
+  if (skip_certs == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check into the parser.
+  if (skip_certs->type & V_ASN1_NEG) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // If |skip_certs| does not fit in |uint64_t|, it must exceed |*value|.
+  uint64_t u64;
+  if (ASN1_INTEGER_get_uint64(&u64, skip_certs) && u64 < *value) {
+    *value = (size_t)u64;
+  }
+  ERR_clear_error();
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// process_policy_constraints updates |*explicit_policy|, |*policy_mapping|, and
+// |*inhibit_any_policy| according to |x509|'s policy constraints and inhibit
+// anyPolicy extensions. It returns one on success and zero on error. This
+// implements steps (i) and (j) of RFC 5280, section 6.1.4.
+static int process_policy_constraints(const X509 *x509, size_t *explicit_policy,
+                                      size_t *policy_mapping,
+                                      size_t *inhibit_any_policy) {
+  int critical;
+  POLICY_CONSTRAINTS *constraints =
+      X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_policy_constraints, &critical, NULL);
+  if (constraints == NULL && critical != -1) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (constraints != NULL) {
+    if (constraints->requireExplicitPolicy == NULL &&
+        constraints->inhibitPolicyMapping == NULL) {
+      // Per RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.11, at least one of the fields must be
+      // present.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+      POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(constraints);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    int ok =
+        apply_skip_certs(constraints->requireExplicitPolicy, explicit_policy) &&
+        apply_skip_certs(constraints->inhibitPolicyMapping, policy_mapping);
+    POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free(constraints);
+    if (!ok) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ASN1_INTEGER *inhibit_any_policy_ext =
+      X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_inhibit_any_policy, &critical, NULL);
+  if (inhibit_any_policy_ext == NULL && critical != -1) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  int ok = apply_skip_certs(inhibit_any_policy_ext, inhibit_any_policy);
+  ASN1_INTEGER_free(inhibit_any_policy_ext);
+  return ok;
+}
+
+// has_explicit_policy returns one if the set of authority-space policy OIDs
+// |levels| has some non-empty intersection with |user_policies|, and zero
+// otherwise. This mirrors the logic in RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). This
+// function modifies |levels| and should only be called at the end of policy
+// evaluation.
+static int has_explicit_policy(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels,
+                               const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies) {
+  assert(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_is_sorted(user_policies));
+
+  // Step (g.i). If the policy graph is empty, the intersection is empty.
+  size_t num_levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_num(levels);
+  X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, num_levels - 1);
+  if (x509_policy_level_is_empty(level)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // If |user_policies| is empty, we interpret it as having a single anyPolicy
+  // value. The caller may also have supplied anyPolicy explicitly.
+  int user_has_any_policy = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies) == 0;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(user_policies); i++) {
+    if (is_any_policy(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(user_policies, i))) {
+      user_has_any_policy = 1;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Step (g.ii). If the policy graph is not empty and the user set contains
+  // anyPolicy, the intersection is the entire (non-empty) graph.
+  if (user_has_any_policy) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // Step (g.iii) does not delete anyPolicy nodes, so if the graph has
+  // anyPolicy, some explicit policy will survive. The actual intersection may
+  // synthesize some nodes in step (g.iii.3), but we do not return the policy
+  // list itself, so we skip actually computing this.
+  if (level->has_any_policy) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // We defer pruning the tree, so as we look for nodes with parent anyPolicy,
+  // step (g.iii.1), we must limit to nodes reachable from the bottommost level.
+  // Start by marking each of those nodes as reachable.
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); i++) {
+    sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, i)->reachable = 1;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = num_levels - 1; i < num_levels; i--) {
+    level = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, i);
+    for (size_t j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(level->nodes); j++) {
+      X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(level->nodes, j);
+      if (!node->reachable) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(node->parent_policies) == 0) {
+        // |node|'s parent is anyPolicy and is part of "valid_policy_node_set".
+        // If it exists in |user_policies|, the intersection is non-empty and we
+        // can return immediately.
+        if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_find(user_policies, /*out_index=*/NULL,
+                                node->policy)) {
+          return 1;
+        }
+      } else if (i > 0) {
+        // |node|'s parents are concrete policies. Mark the parents reachable,
+        // to be inspected by the next loop iteration.
+        X509_POLICY_LEVEL *prev = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_value(levels, i - 1);
+        for (size_t k = 0; k < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(node->parent_policies); k++) {
+          X509_POLICY_NODE *parent = x509_policy_level_find(
+              prev, sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(node->parent_policies, k));
+          if (parent != NULL) {
+            parent->reachable = 1;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int asn1_object_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT **a, const ASN1_OBJECT **b) {
+  return OBJ_cmp(*a, *b);
+}
+
+int X509_policy_check(const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+                      const STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies,
+                      unsigned long flags, X509 **out_current_cert) {
+  *out_current_cert = NULL;
+  int ret = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+  X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level = NULL;
+  STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) *levels = NULL;
+  STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *user_policies_sorted = NULL;
+  size_t num_certs = sk_X509_num(certs);
+
+  // Skip policy checking if the chain is just the trust anchor.
+  if (num_certs <= 1) {
+    return X509_V_OK;
+  }
+
+  // See RFC 5280, section 6.1.2, steps (d) through (f).
+  size_t explicit_policy =
+      (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : num_certs + 1;
+  size_t inhibit_any_policy =
+      (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : num_certs + 1;
+  size_t policy_mapping =
+      (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : num_certs + 1;
+
+  levels = sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_new_null();
+  if (levels == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = num_certs - 2; i < num_certs; i--) {
+    X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    const int is_self_issued = (cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0;
+
+    if (level == NULL) {
+      assert(i == num_certs - 2);
+      level = x509_policy_level_new();
+      if (level == NULL) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      level->has_any_policy = 1;
+    }
+
+    // RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, steps (d) and (e). |any_policy_allowed| is
+    // computed as in step (d.2).
+    const int any_policy_allowed =
+        inhibit_any_policy > 0 || (i > 0 && is_self_issued);
+    if (!process_certificate_policies(cert, level, any_policy_allowed)) {
+      ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+      *out_current_cert = cert;
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    // RFC 5280, section 6.1.3, step (f).
+    if (explicit_policy == 0 && x509_policy_level_is_empty(level)) {
+      ret = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    // Insert into the list.
+    if (!sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_push(levels, level)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    X509_POLICY_LEVEL *current_level = level;
+    level = NULL;
+
+    // If this is not the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.4. If it
+    // is the leaf certificate, we go to section 6.1.5 instead.
+    if (i != 0) {
+      // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, steps (a) and (b).
+      level = process_policy_mappings(cert, current_level, policy_mapping > 0);
+      if (level == NULL) {
+        ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+        *out_current_cert = cert;
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // RFC 5280, section 6.1.4, step (h-j) for non-leaves, and section 6.1.5,
+    // step (a-b) for leaves. In the leaf case, RFC 5280 says only to update
+    // |explicit_policy|, but |policy_mapping| and |inhibit_any_policy| are no
+    // longer read at this point, so we use the same process.
+    if (i == 0 || !is_self_issued) {
+      if (explicit_policy > 0) {
+        explicit_policy--;
+      }
+      if (policy_mapping > 0) {
+        policy_mapping--;
+      }
+      if (inhibit_any_policy > 0) {
+        inhibit_any_policy--;
+      }
+    }
+    if (!process_policy_constraints(cert, &explicit_policy, &policy_mapping,
+                                    &inhibit_any_policy)) {
+      ret = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+      *out_current_cert = cert;
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // RFC 5280, section 6.1.5, step (g). We do not output the policy set, so it
+  // is only necessary to check if the user-constrained-policy-set is not empty.
+  if (explicit_policy == 0) {
+    // Build a sorted copy of |user_policies| for more efficient lookup.
+    user_policies_sorted = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_dup(user_policies);
+    if (user_policies_sorted == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_set_cmp_func(user_policies_sorted, asn1_object_cmp);
+    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_sort(user_policies_sorted);
+
+    if (!has_explicit_policy(levels, user_policies_sorted)) {
+      ret = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ret = X509_V_OK;
+
+err:
+  x509_policy_level_free(level);
+  // |user_policies_sorted|'s contents are owned by |user_policies|, so we do
+  // not use |sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free|.
+  sk_ASN1_OBJECT_free(user_policies_sorted);
+  sk_X509_POLICY_LEVEL_pop_free(levels, x509_policy_level_free);
+  return ret;
+}