grpc 1.50.0.pre1-x86_64-linux → 1.52.0.pre2-x86_64-linux

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/tls13_server.cc

@@ -1,1349 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
- * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
- * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
- * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <tuple>
-
-#include <openssl/aead.h>
-#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
-#include <openssl/digest.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/hpke.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/stack.h>
-
-#include "../crypto/internal.h"
-#include "internal.h"
-
-
-BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
-
-static const uint8_t kZeroes[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
-
-// Allow a minute of ticket age skew in either direction. This covers
-// transmission delays in ClientHello and NewSessionTicket, as well as
-// drift between client and server clock rate since the ticket was issued.
-// See RFC 8446, section 8.3.
-static const int32_t kMaxTicketAgeSkewSeconds = 60;
-
-static bool resolve_ecdhe_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
-                                 const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  const uint16_t group_id = hs->new_session->group_id;
-
-  bool found_key_share;
-  Span<const uint8_t> peer_key;
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  if (!ssl_ext_key_share_parse_clienthello(hs, &found_key_share, &peer_key,
-                                           &alert, client_hello)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  if (!found_key_share) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  Array<uint8_t> secret;
-  SSL_HANDSHAKE_HINTS *const hints = hs->hints.get();
-  if (hints && !hs->hints_requested && hints->key_share_group_id == group_id &&
-      !hints->key_share_secret.empty()) {
-    // Copy DH secret from hints.
-    if (!hs->ecdh_public_key.CopyFrom(hints->key_share_public_key) ||
-        !secret.CopyFrom(hints->key_share_secret)) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return false;
-    }
-  } else {
-    ScopedCBB public_key;
-    UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare> key_share = SSLKeyShare::Create(group_id);
-    if (!key_share ||  //
-        !CBB_init(public_key.get(), 32) ||
-        !key_share->Accept(public_key.get(), &secret, &alert, peer_key) ||
-        !CBBFinishArray(public_key.get(), &hs->ecdh_public_key)) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-      return false;
-    }
-    if (hints && hs->hints_requested) {
-      hints->key_share_group_id = group_id;
-      if (!hints->key_share_public_key.CopyFrom(hs->ecdh_public_key) ||
-          !hints->key_share_secret.CopyFrom(secret)) {
-        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return false;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, secret);
-}
-
-static int ssl_ext_supported_versions_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
-                                                      CBB *out) {
-  CBB contents;
-  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&contents, hs->ssl->version) ||
-      !CBB_flush(out)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static const SSL_CIPHER *choose_tls13_cipher(
-    const SSL *ssl, const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello, uint16_t group_id) {
-  CBS cipher_suites;
-  CBS_init(&cipher_suites, client_hello->cipher_suites,
-           client_hello->cipher_suites_len);
-
-  const uint16_t version = ssl_protocol_version(ssl);
-
-  return ssl_choose_tls13_cipher(cipher_suites, version, group_id);
-}
-
-static bool add_new_session_tickets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_sent_tickets) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (// If the client doesn't accept resumption with PSK_DHE_KE, don't send a
-      // session ticket.
-      !hs->accept_psk_mode ||
-      // We only implement stateless resumption in TLS 1.3, so skip sending
-      // tickets if disabled.
-      (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
-    *out_sent_tickets = false;
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  // TLS 1.3 recommends single-use tickets, so issue multiple tickets in case
-  // the client makes several connections before getting a renewal.
-  static const int kNumTickets = 2;
-
-  // Rebase the session timestamp so that it is measured from ticket
-  // issuance.
-  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, hs->new_session.get());
-
-  for (int i = 0; i < kNumTickets; i++) {
-    UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session(
-        SSL_SESSION_dup(hs->new_session.get(), SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH));
-    if (!session) {
-      return false;
-    }
-
-    if (!RAND_bytes((uint8_t *)&session->ticket_age_add, 4)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    session->ticket_age_add_valid = true;
-    bool enable_early_data =
-        ssl->enable_early_data &&
-        (!ssl->quic_method || !ssl->config->quic_early_data_context.empty());
-    if (enable_early_data) {
-      // QUIC does not use the max_early_data_size parameter and always sets it
-      // to a fixed value. See RFC 9001, section 4.6.1.
-      session->ticket_max_early_data =
-          ssl->quic_method != nullptr ? 0xffffffff : kMaxEarlyDataAccepted;
-    }
-
-    static_assert(kNumTickets < 256, "Too many tickets");
-    uint8_t nonce[] = {static_cast<uint8_t>(i)};
-
-    ScopedCBB cbb;
-    CBB body, nonce_cbb, ticket, extensions;
-    if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
-                                   SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) ||
-        !CBB_add_u32(&body, session->timeout) ||
-        !CBB_add_u32(&body, session->ticket_age_add) ||
-        !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &nonce_cbb) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&nonce_cbb, nonce, sizeof(nonce)) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &ticket) ||
-        !tls13_derive_session_psk(session.get(), nonce) ||
-        !ssl_encrypt_ticket(hs, &ticket, session.get()) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-
-    if (enable_early_data) {
-      CBB early_data;
-      if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) ||
-          !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &early_data) ||
-          !CBB_add_u32(&early_data, session->ticket_max_early_data) ||
-          !CBB_flush(&extensions)) {
-        return false;
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Add a fake extension. See RFC 8701.
-    if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions,
-                     ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_ticket_extension)) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 0 /* empty */)) {
-      return false;
-    }
-
-    if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-
-  *out_sent_tickets = true;
-  return true;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  // At this point, most ClientHello extensions have already been processed by
-  // the common handshake logic. Resolve the remaining non-PSK parameters.
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
-  if (!hs->GetClientHello(&msg, &client_hello)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->quic_method != nullptr && client_hello.session_id_len > 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_COMPATIBILITY_MODE);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->session_id, client_hello.session_id,
-                 client_hello.session_id_len);
-  hs->session_id_len = client_hello.session_id_len;
-
-  uint16_t group_id;
-  if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_GROUP);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Negotiate the cipher suite.
-  hs->new_cipher = choose_tls13_cipher(ssl, &client_hello, group_id);
-  if (hs->new_cipher == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // HTTP/2 negotiation depends on the cipher suite, so ALPN negotiation was
-  // deferred. Complete it now.
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  if (!ssl_negotiate_alpn(hs, &alert, &client_hello)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // The PRF hash is now known.
-  if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(ssl_protocol_version(ssl), hs->new_cipher)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_select_session;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t select_session(
-    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert, UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> *out_session,
-    int32_t *out_ticket_age_skew, bool *out_offered_ticket,
-    const SSLMessage &msg, const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  *out_session = nullptr;
-
-  CBS pre_shared_key;
-  *out_offered_ticket = ssl_client_hello_get_extension(
-      client_hello, &pre_shared_key, TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key);
-  if (!*out_offered_ticket) {
-    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
-  }
-
-  // Per RFC 8446, section 4.2.9, servers MUST abort the handshake if the client
-  // sends pre_shared_key without psk_key_exchange_modes.
-  CBS unused;
-  if (!ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &unused,
-                                      TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_key_exchange_modes)) {
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
-    return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
-  }
-
-  CBS ticket, binders;
-  uint32_t client_ticket_age;
-  if (!ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_clienthello(
-          hs, &ticket, &binders, &client_ticket_age, out_alert, client_hello,
-          &pre_shared_key)) {
-    return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
-  }
-
-  // If the peer did not offer psk_dhe, ignore the resumption.
-  if (!hs->accept_psk_mode) {
-    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
-  }
-
-  // TLS 1.3 session tickets are renewed separately as part of the
-  // NewSessionTicket.
-  bool unused_renew;
-  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
-  enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ret =
-      ssl_process_ticket(hs, &session, &unused_renew, ticket, {});
-  switch (ret) {
-    case ssl_ticket_aead_success:
-      break;
-    case ssl_ticket_aead_error:
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-      return ret;
-    default:
-      return ret;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_session_is_resumable(hs, session.get()) ||
-      // Historically, some TLS 1.3 tickets were missing ticket_age_add.
-      !session->ticket_age_add_valid) {
-    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
-  }
-
-  // Recover the client ticket age and convert to seconds.
-  client_ticket_age -= session->ticket_age_add;
-  client_ticket_age /= 1000;
-
-  struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
-  ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
-
-  // Compute the server ticket age in seconds.
-  assert(now.tv_sec >= session->time);
-  uint64_t server_ticket_age = now.tv_sec - session->time;
-
-  // To avoid overflowing |hs->ticket_age_skew|, we will not resume
-  // 68-year-old sessions.
-  if (server_ticket_age > INT32_MAX) {
-    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
-  }
-
-  *out_ticket_age_skew = static_cast<int32_t>(client_ticket_age) -
-                         static_cast<int32_t>(server_ticket_age);
-
-  // Check the PSK binder.
-  if (!tls13_verify_psk_binder(hs, session.get(), msg, &binders)) {
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-    return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
-  }
-
-  *out_session = std::move(session);
-  return ssl_ticket_aead_success;
-}
-
-static bool quic_ticket_compatible(const SSL_SESSION *session,
-                                   const SSL_CONFIG *config) {
-  if (!session->is_quic) {
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  if (session->quic_early_data_context.empty() ||
-      config->quic_early_data_context.size() !=
-          session->quic_early_data_context.size() ||
-      CRYPTO_memcmp(config->quic_early_data_context.data(),
-                    session->quic_early_data_context.data(),
-                    session->quic_early_data_context.size()) != 0) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
-  if (!hs->GetClientHello(&msg, &client_hello)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
-  bool offered_ticket = false;
-  switch (select_session(hs, &alert, &session, &ssl->s3->ticket_age_skew,
-                         &offered_ticket, msg, &client_hello)) {
-    case ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket:
-      assert(!session);
-      if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs)) {
-        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return ssl_hs_error;
-      }
-      break;
-
-    case ssl_ticket_aead_success:
-      // Carry over authentication information from the previous handshake into
-      // a fresh session.
-      hs->new_session =
-          SSL_SESSION_dup(session.get(), SSL_SESSION_DUP_AUTH_ONLY);
-      if (hs->new_session == nullptr) {
-        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return ssl_hs_error;
-      }
-
-      ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
-      hs->can_release_private_key = true;
-
-      // Resumption incorporates fresh key material, so refresh the timeout.
-      ssl_session_renew_timeout(ssl, hs->new_session.get(),
-                                ssl->session_ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout);
-      break;
-
-    case ssl_ticket_aead_error:
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-
-    case ssl_ticket_aead_retry:
-      hs->tls13_state = state13_select_session;
-      return ssl_hs_pending_ticket;
-  }
-
-  // Negotiate ALPS now, after ALPN is negotiated and |hs->new_session| is
-  // initialized.
-  if (!ssl_negotiate_alps(hs, &alert, &client_hello)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Record connection properties in the new session.
-  hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
-  if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &hs->new_session->group_id)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_GROUP);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Determine if we need HelloRetryRequest.
-  bool found_key_share;
-  if (!ssl_ext_key_share_parse_clienthello(hs, &found_key_share,
-                                           /*out_key_share=*/nullptr, &alert,
-                                           &client_hello)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Determine if we're negotiating 0-RTT.
-  if (!ssl->enable_early_data) {
-    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_disabled;
-  } else if (!offered_ticket) {
-    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_no_session_offered;
-  } else if (!session) {
-    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_session_not_resumed;
-  } else if (session->ticket_max_early_data == 0) {
-    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_unsupported_for_session;
-  } else if (!hs->early_data_offered) {
-    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_peer_declined;
-  } else if (hs->channel_id_negotiated) {
-    // Channel ID is incompatible with 0-RTT.
-    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_channel_id;
-  } else if (MakeConstSpan(ssl->s3->alpn_selected) != session->early_alpn) {
-    // The negotiated ALPN must match the one in the ticket.
-    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_alpn_mismatch;
-  } else if (hs->new_session->has_application_settings !=
-                 session->has_application_settings ||
-             MakeConstSpan(hs->new_session->local_application_settings) !=
-                 session->local_application_settings) {
-    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_alps_mismatch;
-  } else if (ssl->s3->ticket_age_skew < -kMaxTicketAgeSkewSeconds ||
-             kMaxTicketAgeSkewSeconds < ssl->s3->ticket_age_skew) {
-    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_ticket_age_skew;
-  } else if (!quic_ticket_compatible(session.get(), hs->config)) {
-    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_quic_parameter_mismatch;
-  } else if (!found_key_share) {
-    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_hello_retry_request;
-  } else {
-    // |ssl_session_is_resumable| forbids cross-cipher resumptions even if the
-    // PRF hashes match.
-    assert(hs->new_cipher == session->cipher);
-
-    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_accepted;
-    ssl->s3->early_data_accepted = true;
-  }
-
-  // Store the ALPN and ALPS values in the session for 0-RTT. Note the peer
-  // applications settings are not generally known until client
-  // EncryptedExtensions.
-  if (!hs->new_session->early_alpn.CopyFrom(ssl->s3->alpn_selected)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // The peer applications settings are usually received later, in
-  // EncryptedExtensions. But, in 0-RTT handshakes, we carry over the
-  // values from |session|. Do this now, before |session| is discarded.
-  if (ssl->s3->early_data_accepted &&
-      hs->new_session->has_application_settings &&
-      !hs->new_session->peer_application_settings.CopyFrom(
-          session->peer_application_settings)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Copy the QUIC early data context to the session.
-  if (ssl->enable_early_data && ssl->quic_method) {
-    if (!hs->new_session->quic_early_data_context.CopyFrom(
-            hs->config->quic_early_data_context)) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL &&
-      ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&client_hello) == 0) {
-    // Connection rejected for DOS reasons.
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(
-      ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_protocol_version(ssl), hs->new_cipher));
-
-  // Set up the key schedule and incorporate the PSK into the running secret.
-  if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(
-          hs, ssl->s3->session_reused
-                  ? MakeConstSpan(hs->new_session->secret,
-                                  hs->new_session->secret_length)
-                  : MakeConstSpan(kZeroes, hash_len)) ||
-      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
-    if (!tls13_derive_early_secret(hs)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  } else if (hs->early_data_offered) {
-    ssl->s3->skip_early_data = true;
-  }
-
-  if (!found_key_share) {
-    ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-    if (!hs->transcript.UpdateForHelloRetryRequest()) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    hs->tls13_state = state13_send_hello_retry_request;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  if (!resolve_ecdhe_secret(hs, &client_hello)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  hs->ech_client_hello_buf.Reset();
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_send_server_hello;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_hello_retry_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (hs->hints_requested) {
-    return ssl_hs_hints_ready;
-  }
-
-  ScopedCBB cbb;
-  CBB body, session_id, extensions;
-  uint16_t group_id;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&body, TLS1_2_VERSION) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, kHelloRetryRequest, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &session_id) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&body, SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(hs->new_cipher)) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* no compression */) ||
-      !tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 2 /* length */) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, ssl->version) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 2 /* length */) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, group_id)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-  if (hs->ech_is_inner) {
-    // Fill a placeholder for the ECH confirmation value.
-    if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN) ||
-        !CBB_add_zeros(&extensions, ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-  Array<uint8_t> hrr;
-  if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &hrr)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-  if (hs->ech_is_inner) {
-    // Now that the message is encoded, fill in the whole value.
-    size_t offset = hrr.size() - ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN;
-    if (!ssl_ech_accept_confirmation(
-            hs, MakeSpan(hrr).last(ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN),
-            ssl->s3->client_random, hs->transcript, /*is_hrr=*/true, hrr,
-            offset)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(hrr)) ||
-      !ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  ssl->s3->used_hello_retry_request = true;
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_read_second_client_hello;
-  return ssl_hs_flush;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_second_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-  SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
-  if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg.body)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_accepted) {
-    // If we previously accepted the ClientHelloInner, the second ClientHello
-    // must contain an outer encrypted_client_hello extension.
-    CBS ech_body;
-    if (!ssl_client_hello_get_extension(&client_hello, &ech_body,
-                                        TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    uint16_t kdf_id, aead_id;
-    uint8_t type, config_id;
-    CBS enc, payload;
-    if (!CBS_get_u8(&ech_body, &type) ||     //
-        type != ECH_CLIENT_OUTER ||          //
-        !CBS_get_u16(&ech_body, &kdf_id) ||  //
-        !CBS_get_u16(&ech_body, &aead_id) ||
-        !CBS_get_u8(&ech_body, &config_id) ||
-        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&ech_body, &enc) ||
-        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&ech_body, &payload) ||
-        CBS_len(&ech_body) != 0) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    if (kdf_id != EVP_HPKE_KDF_id(EVP_HPKE_CTX_kdf(hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get())) ||
-        aead_id !=
-            EVP_HPKE_AEAD_id(EVP_HPKE_CTX_aead(hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get())) ||
-        config_id != hs->ech_config_id || CBS_len(&enc) > 0) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // Decrypt the payload with the HPKE context from the first ClientHello.
-    Array<uint8_t> encoded_client_hello_inner;
-    bool unused;
-    if (!ssl_client_hello_decrypt(hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get(),
-                                  &encoded_client_hello_inner, &unused,
-                                  &client_hello, payload)) {
-      // Decryption failure is fatal in the second ClientHello.
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // Recover the ClientHelloInner from the EncodedClientHelloInner.
-    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    bssl::Array<uint8_t> client_hello_inner;
-    if (!ssl_decode_client_hello_inner(ssl, &alert, &client_hello_inner,
-                                       encoded_client_hello_inner,
-                                       &client_hello)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    hs->ech_client_hello_buf = std::move(client_hello_inner);
-
-    // Reparse |client_hello| from the buffer owned by |hs|.
-    if (!hs->GetClientHello(&msg, &client_hello)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // We perform all our negotiation based on the first ClientHello (for
-  // consistency with what |select_certificate_cb| observed), which is in the
-  // transcript, so we can ignore most of this second one.
-  //
-  // We do, however, check the second PSK binder. This covers the client key
-  // share, in case we ever send half-RTT data (we currently do not). It is also
-  // a tricky computation, so we enforce the peer handled it correctly.
-  if (ssl->s3->session_reused) {
-    CBS pre_shared_key;
-    if (!ssl_client_hello_get_extension(&client_hello, &pre_shared_key,
-                                        TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_CLIENT_HELLO);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    CBS ticket, binders;
-    uint32_t client_ticket_age;
-    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    if (!ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_clienthello(
-            hs, &ticket, &binders, &client_ticket_age, &alert, &client_hello,
-            &pre_shared_key)) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // Note it is important that we do not obtain a new |SSL_SESSION| from
-    // |ticket|. We have already selected parameters based on the first
-    // ClientHello (in the transcript) and must not switch partway through.
-    if (!tls13_verify_psk_binder(hs, hs->new_session.get(), msg, &binders)) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!resolve_ecdhe_secret(hs, &client_hello)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // ClientHello should be the end of the flight.
-  if (ssl->method->has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  hs->ech_client_hello_buf.Reset();
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_send_server_hello;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  Span<uint8_t> random(ssl->s3->server_random);
-
-  SSL_HANDSHAKE_HINTS *const hints = hs->hints.get();
-  if (hints && !hs->hints_requested &&
-      hints->server_random.size() == random.size()) {
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(random.data(), hints->server_random.data(), random.size());
-  } else {
-    RAND_bytes(random.data(), random.size());
-    if (hints && hs->hints_requested &&
-        !hints->server_random.CopyFrom(random)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  Array<uint8_t> server_hello;
-  ScopedCBB cbb;
-  CBB body, extensions, session_id;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&body, TLS1_2_VERSION) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->server_random,
-                     sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random)) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &session_id) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&body, SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(hs->new_cipher)) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions) ||
-      !ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_add_serverhello(hs, &extensions) ||
-      !ssl_ext_key_share_add_serverhello(hs, &extensions) ||
-      !ssl_ext_supported_versions_add_serverhello(hs, &extensions) ||
-      !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &server_hello)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  assert(ssl->s3->ech_status != ssl_ech_accepted || hs->ech_is_inner);
-  if (hs->ech_is_inner) {
-    // Fill in the ECH confirmation signal.
-    const size_t offset = ssl_ech_confirmation_signal_hello_offset(ssl);
-    Span<uint8_t> random_suffix = random.last(ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN);
-    if (!ssl_ech_accept_confirmation(hs, random_suffix, ssl->s3->client_random,
-                                     hs->transcript,
-                                     /*is_hrr=*/false, server_hello, offset)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // Update |server_hello|.
-    Span<uint8_t> server_hello_out =
-        MakeSpan(server_hello).subspan(offset, ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN);
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(server_hello_out.data(), random_suffix.data(),
-                   ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN);
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(server_hello))) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->ecdh_public_key.Reset();  // No longer needed.
-  if (!ssl->s3->used_hello_retry_request &&
-      !ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Derive and enable the handshake traffic secrets.
-  if (!tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(hs) ||
-      !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_seal,
-                             hs->new_session.get(),
-                             hs->server_handshake_secret())) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Send EncryptedExtensions.
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
-                                 SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) ||
-      !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &body) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) {
-    // Determine whether to request a client certificate.
-    hs->cert_request = !!(hs->config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER);
-    // Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated.
-    if ((hs->config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
-        hs->channel_id_negotiated) {
-      hs->cert_request = false;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Send a CertificateRequest, if necessary.
-  if (hs->cert_request) {
-    CBB cert_request_extensions, sigalg_contents, sigalgs_cbb;
-    if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
-                                   SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ||
-        !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* no certificate_request_context. */) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &cert_request_extensions) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16(&cert_request_extensions,
-                     TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request_extensions,
-                                     &sigalg_contents) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&sigalg_contents, &sigalgs_cbb) ||
-        !tls12_add_verify_sigalgs(hs, &sigalgs_cbb)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    if (ssl_has_client_CAs(hs->config)) {
-      CBB ca_contents;
-      if (!CBB_add_u16(&cert_request_extensions,
-                       TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities) ||
-          !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request_extensions,
-                                       &ca_contents) ||
-          !ssl_add_client_CA_list(hs, &ca_contents) ||
-          !CBB_flush(&cert_request_extensions)) {
-        return ssl_hs_error;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Send the server Certificate message, if necessary.
-  if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) {
-    if (!ssl_has_certificate(hs)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    if (!tls13_add_certificate(hs)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    hs->tls13_state = state13_send_server_certificate_verify;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_send_server_finished;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  switch (tls13_add_certificate_verify(hs)) {
-    case ssl_private_key_success:
-      hs->tls13_state = state13_send_server_finished;
-      return ssl_hs_ok;
-
-    case ssl_private_key_retry:
-      hs->tls13_state = state13_send_server_certificate_verify;
-      return ssl_hs_private_key_operation;
-
-    case ssl_private_key_failure:
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  assert(0);
-  return ssl_hs_error;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (hs->hints_requested) {
-    return ssl_hs_hints_ready;
-  }
-
-  hs->can_release_private_key = true;
-  if (!tls13_add_finished(hs) ||
-      // Update the secret to the master secret and derive traffic keys.
-      !tls13_advance_key_schedule(
-          hs, MakeConstSpan(kZeroes, hs->transcript.DigestLen())) ||
-      !tls13_derive_application_secrets(hs) ||
-      !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_application, evp_aead_seal,
-                             hs->new_session.get(),
-                             hs->server_traffic_secret_0())) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_send_half_rtt_ticket;
-  return hs->handback ? ssl_hs_handback : ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_half_rtt_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  if (ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
-    // If accepting 0-RTT, we send tickets half-RTT. This gets the tickets on
-    // the wire sooner and also avoids triggering a write on |SSL_read| when
-    // processing the client Finished. This requires computing the client
-    // Finished early. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.1.
-    static const uint8_t kEndOfEarlyData[4] = {SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 0,
-                                               0, 0};
-    if (ssl->quic_method == nullptr &&
-        !hs->transcript.Update(kEndOfEarlyData)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    size_t finished_len;
-    if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, hs->expected_client_finished().data(),
-                            &finished_len, false /* client */)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    if (finished_len != hs->expected_client_finished().size()) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // Feed the predicted Finished into the transcript. This allows us to derive
-    // the resumption secret early and send half-RTT tickets.
-    //
-    // TODO(davidben): This will need to be updated for DTLS 1.3.
-    assert(!SSL_is_dtls(hs->ssl));
-    assert(hs->expected_client_finished().size() <= 0xff);
-    uint8_t header[4] = {
-        SSL3_MT_FINISHED, 0, 0,
-        static_cast<uint8_t>(hs->expected_client_finished().size())};
-    bool unused_sent_tickets;
-    if (!hs->transcript.Update(header) ||
-        !hs->transcript.Update(hs->expected_client_finished()) ||
-        !tls13_derive_resumption_secret(hs) ||
-        !add_new_session_tickets(hs, &unused_sent_tickets)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_read_second_client_flight;
-  return ssl_hs_flush;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_second_client_flight(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
-    if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_early_data, evp_aead_open,
-                               hs->new_session.get(),
-                               hs->early_traffic_secret())) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    hs->can_early_write = true;
-    hs->can_early_read = true;
-    hs->in_early_data = true;
-  }
-
-  // QUIC doesn't use an EndOfEarlyData message (RFC 9001, section 8.3), so we
-  // switch to client_handshake_secret before the early return.
-  if (ssl->quic_method != nullptr) {
-    if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_open,
-                               hs->new_session.get(),
-                               hs->client_handshake_secret())) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    hs->tls13_state = state13_process_end_of_early_data;
-    return ssl->s3->early_data_accepted ? ssl_hs_early_return : ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_process_end_of_early_data;
-  return ssl->s3->early_data_accepted ? ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data
-                                      : ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  // In protocols that use EndOfEarlyData, we must consume the extra message and
-  // switch to client_handshake_secret after the early return.
-  if (ssl->quic_method == nullptr) {
-    // If early data was not accepted, the EndOfEarlyData will be in the
-    // discarded early data.
-    if (hs->ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
-      SSLMessage msg;
-      if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-        return ssl_hs_read_message;
-      }
-      if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA)) {
-        return ssl_hs_error;
-      }
-      if (CBS_len(&msg.body) != 0) {
-        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-        return ssl_hs_error;
-      }
-      ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-    }
-    if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_open,
-                               hs->new_session.get(),
-                               hs->client_handshake_secret())) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-  }
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_read_client_encrypted_extensions;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_encrypted_extensions(
-    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  // For now, only one extension uses client EncryptedExtensions. This function
-  // may be generalized if others use it in the future.
-  if (hs->new_session->has_application_settings &&
-      !ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
-    SSLMessage msg;
-    if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-      return ssl_hs_read_message;
-    }
-    if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    CBS body = msg.body, extensions;
-    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions) ||
-        CBS_len(&body) != 0) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    SSLExtension application_settings(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_settings);
-    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, {&application_settings},
-                              /*ignore_unknown=*/false)) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    if (!application_settings.present) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // Note that, if 0-RTT was accepted, these values will already have been
-    // initialized earlier.
-    if (!hs->new_session->peer_application_settings.CopyFrom(
-            application_settings.data) ||
-        !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  }
-
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_read_client_certificate;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (!hs->cert_request) {
-    if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) {
-      // OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is
-      // classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. (Only do
-      // this in full handshakes as resumptions should carry over the previous
-      // |verify_result|, though this is a no-op because servers do not
-      // implement the client's odd soft-fail mode.)
-      hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
-    }
-
-    // Skip this state.
-    hs->tls13_state = state13_read_channel_id;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  const bool allow_anonymous =
-      (hs->config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) == 0;
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
-      !tls13_process_certificate(hs, msg, allow_anonymous) ||
-      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_read_client_certificate_verify;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get()) == 0) {
-    // Skip this state.
-    hs->tls13_state = state13_read_channel_id;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
-
-  switch (ssl_verify_peer_cert(hs)) {
-    case ssl_verify_ok:
-      break;
-    case ssl_verify_invalid:
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    case ssl_verify_retry:
-      hs->tls13_state = state13_read_client_certificate_verify;
-      return ssl_hs_certificate_verify;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) ||
-      !tls13_process_certificate_verify(hs, msg) ||
-      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_read_channel_id;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (!hs->channel_id_negotiated) {
-    hs->tls13_state = state13_read_client_finished;
-    return ssl_hs_ok;
-  }
-
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
-      !tls1_verify_channel_id(hs, msg) ||
-      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_read_client_finished;
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
-      // If early data was accepted, we've already computed the client Finished
-      // and derived the resumption secret.
-      !tls13_process_finished(hs, msg, ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) ||
-      // evp_aead_seal keys have already been switched.
-      !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_application, evp_aead_open,
-                             hs->new_session.get(),
-                             hs->client_traffic_secret_0())) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
-    if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg) ||
-        !tls13_derive_resumption_secret(hs)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    // We send post-handshake tickets as part of the handshake in 1-RTT.
-    hs->tls13_state = state13_send_new_session_ticket;
-  } else {
-    // We already sent half-RTT tickets.
-    hs->tls13_state = state13_done;
-  }
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  bool sent_tickets;
-  if (!add_new_session_tickets(hs, &sent_tickets)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  hs->tls13_state = state13_done;
-  // In TLS 1.3, the NewSessionTicket isn't flushed until the server performs a
-  // write, to prevent a non-reading client from causing the server to hang in
-  // the case of a small server write buffer. Consumers which don't write data
-  // to the client will need to do a zero-byte write if they wish to flush the
-  // tickets.
-  if (hs->ssl->quic_method != nullptr && sent_tickets) {
-    return ssl_hs_flush;
-  }
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-enum ssl_hs_wait_t tls13_server_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  while (hs->tls13_state != state13_done) {
-    enum ssl_hs_wait_t ret = ssl_hs_error;
-    enum tls13_server_hs_state_t state =
-        static_cast<enum tls13_server_hs_state_t>(hs->tls13_state);
-    switch (state) {
-      case state13_select_parameters:
-        ret = do_select_parameters(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_select_session:
-        ret = do_select_session(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_send_hello_retry_request:
-        ret = do_send_hello_retry_request(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_read_second_client_hello:
-        ret = do_read_second_client_hello(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_send_server_hello:
-        ret = do_send_server_hello(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_send_server_certificate_verify:
-        ret = do_send_server_certificate_verify(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_send_server_finished:
-        ret = do_send_server_finished(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_send_half_rtt_ticket:
-        ret = do_send_half_rtt_ticket(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_read_second_client_flight:
-        ret = do_read_second_client_flight(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_process_end_of_early_data:
-        ret = do_process_end_of_early_data(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_read_client_encrypted_extensions:
-        ret = do_read_client_encrypted_extensions(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_read_client_certificate:
-        ret = do_read_client_certificate(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_read_client_certificate_verify:
-        ret = do_read_client_certificate_verify(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_read_channel_id:
-        ret = do_read_channel_id(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_read_client_finished:
-        ret = do_read_client_finished(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_send_new_session_ticket:
-        ret = do_send_new_session_ticket(hs);
-        break;
-      case state13_done:
-        ret = ssl_hs_ok;
-        break;
-    }
-
-    if (hs->tls13_state != state) {
-      ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
-    }
-
-    if (ret != ssl_hs_ok) {
-      return ret;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-const char *tls13_server_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  enum tls13_server_hs_state_t state =
-      static_cast<enum tls13_server_hs_state_t>(hs->tls13_state);
-  switch (state) {
-    case state13_select_parameters:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server select_parameters";
-    case state13_select_session:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server select_session";
-    case state13_send_hello_retry_request:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server send_hello_retry_request";
-    case state13_read_second_client_hello:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server read_second_client_hello";
-    case state13_send_server_hello:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server send_server_hello";
-    case state13_send_server_certificate_verify:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server send_server_certificate_verify";
-    case state13_send_half_rtt_ticket:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server send_half_rtt_ticket";
-    case state13_send_server_finished:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server send_server_finished";
-    case state13_read_second_client_flight:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server read_second_client_flight";
-    case state13_process_end_of_early_data:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server process_end_of_early_data";
-    case state13_read_client_encrypted_extensions:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server read_client_encrypted_extensions";
-    case state13_read_client_certificate:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server read_client_certificate";
-    case state13_read_client_certificate_verify:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server read_client_certificate_verify";
-    case state13_read_channel_id:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server read_channel_id";
-    case state13_read_client_finished:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server read_client_finished";
-    case state13_send_new_session_ticket:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server send_new_session_ticket";
-    case state13_done:
-      return "TLS 1.3 server done";
-  }
-
-  return "TLS 1.3 server unknown";
-}
-
-BSSL_NAMESPACE_END