grpc 1.50.0.pre1-x86_64-linux → 1.52.0.pre2-x86_64-linux

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

@@ -1,2456 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
-#include <openssl/thread.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-#include "internal.h"
-#include "../internal.h"
-#include "../x509v3/internal.h"
-
-static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
-    CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
-
-/* CRL score values */
-
-/* No unhandled critical extensions */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
-
-/* certificate is within CRL scope */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
-
-/* CRL times valid */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
-
-/* Issuer name matches certificate */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
-
-/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
-
-/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
-
-/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
-
-/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
-
-/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
-
-static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
-static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
-static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
-static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-
-static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
-                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
-static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
-static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
-                         int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
-                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
-static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
-                           int *pcrl_score);
-static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
-                           unsigned int *preasons);
-static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
-static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
-                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
-
-static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-
-static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
-{
-    return ok;
-}
-
-/* cert_self_signed checks if |x| is self-signed. If |x| is valid, it returns
- * one and sets |*out_is_self_signed| to the result. If |x| is invalid, it
- * returns zero. */
-static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x, int *out_is_self_signed)
-{
-    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-    *out_is_self_signed = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0;
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
-
-static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
-    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
-    X509 *xtmp = NULL;
-    size_t i;
-    /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
-    certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
-    if (certs == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-    /* Look for exact match */
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
-        xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
-        if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
-            break;
-    }
-    if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
-        X509_up_ref(xtmp);
-    else
-        xtmp = NULL;
-    sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
-    return xtmp;
-}
-
-int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
-    int bad_chain = 0;
-    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
-    int depth, i, ok = 0;
-    int num, j, retry, trust;
-    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-    STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
-    if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
-        return -1;
-    }
-    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
-        /*
-         * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
-         * cannot do another one.
-         */
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-
-    /*
-     * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
-     * the first entry is in place
-     */
-    ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
-    if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-        goto end;
-    }
-    X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
-    ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
-
-    /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it. */
-    if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
-        && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-        goto end;
-    }
-
-    num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
-    depth = param->depth;
-
-    for (;;) {
-        /* If we have enough, we break */
-        if (depth < num)
-            break;              /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
-                                 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
-                                 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
-                                 * later. */
-
-        int is_self_signed;
-        if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-            goto end;
-        }
-
-        /* If we are self signed, we break */
-        if (is_self_signed)
-            break;
-        /*
-         * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
-         */
-        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
-            ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
-            if (ok < 0) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
-                goto end;
-            }
-            /*
-             * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
-             * again later.
-             */
-            if (ok > 0) {
-                X509_free(xtmp);
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-
-        /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
-        if (sktmp != NULL) {
-            xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
-            if (xtmp != NULL) {
-                if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
-                    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-                    ok = 0;
-                    goto end;
-                }
-                X509_up_ref(xtmp);
-                (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
-                ctx->last_untrusted++;
-                x = xtmp;
-                num++;
-                /*
-                 * reparse the full chain for the next one
-                 */
-                continue;
-            }
-        }
-        break;
-    }
-
-    /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
-    j = num;
-    /*
-     * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
-     * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
-     * complain.
-     */
-
-    do {
-        /*
-         * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
-         */
-        i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
-
-        int is_self_signed;
-        if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-            goto end;
-        }
-
-        if (is_self_signed) {
-            /* we have a self signed certificate */
-            if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
-                /*
-                 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
-                 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
-                 * possible impersonation.
-                 */
-                ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
-                if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
-                    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
-                    ctx->current_cert = x;
-                    ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
-                    if (ok == 1)
-                        X509_free(xtmp);
-                    bad_chain = 1;
-                    ok = cb(0, ctx);
-                    if (!ok)
-                        goto end;
-                } else {
-                    /*
-                     * We have a match: replace certificate with store
-                     * version so we get any trust settings.
-                     */
-                    X509_free(x);
-                    x = xtmp;
-                    (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
-                    ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
-                }
-            } else {
-                /*
-                 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
-                 */
-                chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
-                ctx->last_untrusted--;
-                num--;
-                j--;
-                x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
-            }
-        }
-        /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
-        for (;;) {
-            /* If we have enough, we break */
-            if (depth < num)
-                break;
-            if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-                goto end;
-            }
-            /* If we are self signed, we break */
-            if (is_self_signed)
-                break;
-            ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
-
-            if (ok < 0) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
-                goto end;
-            }
-            if (ok == 0)
-                break;
-            x = xtmp;
-            if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
-                X509_free(xtmp);
-                OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-                ok = 0;
-                goto end;
-            }
-            num++;
-        }
-
-        /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
-        trust = check_trust(ctx);
-
-        /* If explicitly rejected error */
-        if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
-            ok = 0;
-            goto end;
-        }
-        /*
-         * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
-         * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
-         * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
-         * chain checking
-         */
-        retry = 0;
-        if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
-            && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
-            && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
-            while (j-- > 1) {
-                xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
-                ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
-                if (ok < 0)
-                    goto end;
-                /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
-                if (ok > 0) {
-                    /*
-                     * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
-                     */
-                    X509_free(xtmp);
-
-                    /*
-                     * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
-                     * alternate chain
-                     */
-                    while (num > j) {
-                        xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
-                        X509_free(xtmp);
-                        num--;
-                    }
-                    ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-                    retry = 1;
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    } while (retry);
-
-    /*
-     * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
-     * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
-     * and set bad_chain == 1
-     */
-    if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
-        if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
-            if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
-            else
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-        } else {
-
-            sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
-            num++;
-            ctx->last_untrusted = num;
-            ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
-            chain_ss = NULL;
-        }
-
-        ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
-        bad_chain = 1;
-        ok = cb(0, ctx);
-        if (!ok)
-            goto end;
-    }
-
-    /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
-    ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
-
-    if (!ok)
-        goto end;
-
-    ok = check_id(ctx);
-
-    if (!ok)
-        goto end;
-
-    /*
-     * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
-     * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
-     */
-
-    ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
-    if (!ok)
-        goto end;
-
-    int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
-                                      ctx->param->flags);
-    if (err != X509_V_OK) {
-        ctx->error = err;
-        ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
-        ok = cb(0, ctx);
-        if (!ok)
-            goto end;
-    }
-
-    /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
-    if (ctx->verify != NULL)
-        ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
-    else
-        ok = internal_verify(ctx);
-    if (!ok)
-        goto end;
-
-    /* Check name constraints */
-
-    ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
-    if (!ok)
-        goto end;
-
-    /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
-    if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
-        ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
-
- end:
-    if (sktmp != NULL)
-        sk_X509_free(sktmp);
-    if (chain_ss != NULL)
-        X509_free(chain_ss);
-
-    /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
-    if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
-    return ok;
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
- */
-
-static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    X509 *issuer;
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
-        issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
-        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
-            return issuer;
-    }
-    return NULL;
-}
-
-/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
-
-static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
-{
-    int ret;
-    ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
-    if (ret == X509_V_OK)
-        return 1;
-    /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
-    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
-        return 0;
-
-    ctx->error = ret;
-    ctx->current_cert = x;
-    ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
-    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-}
-
-/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
-
-static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
-    *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
-    if (*issuer) {
-        X509_up_ref(*issuer);
-        return 1;
-    } else
-        return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
- * purpose
- */
-
-static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    int i, ok = 0, plen = 0;
-    X509 *x;
-    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-    int proxy_path_length = 0;
-    int purpose;
-    int allow_proxy_certs;
-    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-
-    enum {
-        // ca_or_leaf allows either type of certificate so that direct use of
-        // self-signed certificates works.
-        ca_or_leaf,
-        must_be_ca,
-        must_not_be_ca,
-    } ca_requirement;
-
-    /* CRL path validation */
-    if (ctx->parent) {
-        allow_proxy_certs = 0;
-        purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
-    } else {
-        allow_proxy_certs =
-            ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
-        purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
-    }
-
-    ca_requirement = ca_or_leaf;
-
-    /* Check all untrusted certificates */
-    for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
-        int ret;
-        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-        if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
-            && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
-            ctx->error_depth = i;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-            ok = cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto end;
-        }
-        if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
-            ctx->error_depth = i;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-            ok = cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto end;
-        }
-
-        switch (ca_requirement) {
-        case ca_or_leaf:
-            ret = 1;
-            break;
-        case must_not_be_ca:
-            if (X509_check_ca(x)) {
-                ret = 0;
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
-            } else
-                ret = 1;
-            break;
-        case must_be_ca:
-            if (!X509_check_ca(x)) {
-                ret = 0;
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
-            } else
-                ret = 1;
-            break;
-        default:
-            // impossible.
-            ret = 0;
-        }
-
-        if (ret == 0) {
-            ctx->error_depth = i;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-            ok = cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto end;
-        }
-        if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
-            ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, ca_requirement == must_be_ca);
-            if (ret != 1) {
-                ret = 0;
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
-                ctx->error_depth = i;
-                ctx->current_cert = x;
-                ok = cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto end;
-            }
-        }
-        /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
-        if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
-            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
-            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
-            ctx->error_depth = i;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-            ok = cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto end;
-        }
-        /* Increment path length if not self issued */
-        if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
-            plen++;
-        /*
-         * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
-         * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate.  If not,
-         * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
-         */
-        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
-            if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
-                ctx->error_depth = i;
-                ctx->current_cert = x;
-                ok = cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto end;
-            }
-            proxy_path_length++;
-            ca_requirement = must_not_be_ca;
-        } else {
-            ca_requirement = must_be_ca;
-        }
-    }
-    ok = 1;
- end:
-    return ok;
-}
-
-static int reject_dns_name_in_common_name(X509 *x509)
-{
-    X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
-    int i = -1;
-    for (;;) {
-        i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i);
-        if (i == -1) {
-            return X509_V_OK;
-        }
-
-        X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
-        ASN1_STRING *common_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
-        unsigned char *idval;
-        int idlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&idval, common_name);
-        if (idlen < 0) {
-            return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-        }
-        /* Only process attributes that look like host names. Note it is
-         * important that this check be mirrored in |X509_check_host|. */
-        int looks_like_dns = x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(idval, (size_t)idlen);
-        OPENSSL_free(idval);
-        if (looks_like_dns) {
-            return X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS;
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    int i, j, rv;
-    int has_name_constraints = 0;
-    /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
-    for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-        /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
-        if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
-            continue;
-        /*
-         * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
-         * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
-         * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
-         * to be obeyed.
-         */
-        for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
-            NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
-            if (nc) {
-                has_name_constraints = 1;
-                rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
-                switch (rv) {
-                case X509_V_OK:
-                    continue;
-                case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
-                    ctx->error = rv;
-                    return 0;
-                default:
-                    ctx->error = rv;
-                    ctx->error_depth = i;
-                    ctx->current_cert = x;
-                    if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-                        return 0;
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* Name constraints do not match against the common name, but
-     * |X509_check_host| still implements the legacy behavior where, on
-     * certificates lacking a SAN list, DNS-like names in the common name are
-     * checked instead.
-     *
-     * While we could apply the name constraints to the common name, name
-     * constraints are rare enough that can hold such certificates to a higher
-     * standard. Note this does not make "DNS-like" heuristic failures any
-     * worse. A decorative common-name misidentified as a DNS name would fail
-     * the name constraint anyway. */
-    X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
-    if (has_name_constraints && leaf->altname == NULL) {
-        rv = reject_dns_name_in_common_name(leaf);
-        switch (rv) {
-        case X509_V_OK:
-            break;
-        case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
-            ctx->error = rv;
-            return 0;
-        default:
-            ctx->error = rv;
-            ctx->error_depth = i;
-            ctx->current_cert = leaf;
-            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-                return 0;
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
-{
-    ctx->error = errcode;
-    ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
-    ctx->error_depth = 0;
-    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-}
-
-static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param->hosts);
-    char *name;
-
-    if (param->peername != NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_free(param->peername);
-        param->peername = NULL;
-    }
-    for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
-        name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(param->hosts, i);
-        if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), param->hostflags,
-                            &param->peername) > 0)
-            return 1;
-    }
-    return n == 0;
-}
-
-static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
-    X509 *x = ctx->cert;
-    if (vpm->poison) {
-        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL))
-            return 0;
-    }
-    if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
-        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
-            return 0;
-    }
-    if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
-        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
-            return 0;
-    }
-    if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
-        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
-            return 0;
-    }
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    int ok;
-    X509 *x = NULL;
-    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-    /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
-    for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
-        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-        ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
-        /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
-        if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
-            return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
-        /*
-         * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
-         * overridden.
-         */
-        if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
-            ctx->error_depth = i;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
-            ok = cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
-        }
-    }
-    /*
-     * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
-     * return success.
-     */
-    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
-        X509 *mx;
-        if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
-            return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
-        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
-        mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
-        if (mx) {
-            (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
-            X509_free(x);
-            ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
-            return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
-     * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
-     */
-    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
-}
-
-static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    int i, last, ok;
-    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
-        return 1;
-    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
-        last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
-    else {
-        /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
-        if (ctx->parent)
-            return 1;
-        last = 0;
-    }
-    for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
-        ctx->error_depth = i;
-        ok = check_cert(ctx);
-        if (!ok)
-            return ok;
-    }
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
-    X509 *x;
-    int ok = 0, cnum;
-    unsigned int last_reasons;
-    cnum = ctx->error_depth;
-    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
-    ctx->current_cert = x;
-    ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
-    ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
-    ctx->current_reasons = 0;
-    while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
-        last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
-        /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
-        if (ctx->get_crl)
-            ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
-        else
-            ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
-        /*
-         * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
-         */
-        if (!ok) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
-            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        ctx->current_crl = crl;
-        ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
-        if (!ok)
-            goto err;
-
-        if (dcrl) {
-            ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto err;
-            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto err;
-        } else
-            ok = 1;
-
-        /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
-        if (ok != 2) {
-            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        X509_CRL_free(crl);
-        X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
-        crl = NULL;
-        dcrl = NULL;
-        /*
-         * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
-         * so exit loop.
-         */
-        if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
-            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
- err:
-    X509_CRL_free(crl);
-    X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
-
-    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
-    return ok;
-
-}
-
-/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
-
-static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
-{
-    time_t *ptime;
-    int i;
-    if (notify)
-        ctx->current_crl = crl;
-    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
-        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
-    else
-        ptime = NULL;
-
-    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
-    if (i == 0) {
-        if (!notify)
-            return 0;
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-            return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (i > 0) {
-        if (!notify)
-            return 0;
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-            return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
-        i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
-
-        if (i == 0) {
-            if (!notify)
-                return 0;
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
-            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-                return 0;
-        }
-        /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
-        if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
-            if (!notify)
-                return 0;
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
-            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-                return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (notify)
-        ctx->current_crl = NULL;
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
-                      X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
-                      STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
-{
-    int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
-    size_t i;
-    unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
-    X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
-    X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
-    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
-        crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
-        reasons = *preasons;
-        crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
-        if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
-            continue;
-        /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
-        if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
-            int day, sec;
-            if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
-                               X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
-                continue;
-            /*
-             * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
-             * and |sec|.
-             */
-            if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
-                continue;
-        }
-        best_crl = crl;
-        best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
-        best_score = crl_score;
-        best_reasons = reasons;
-    }
-
-    if (best_crl) {
-        if (*pcrl)
-            X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
-        *pcrl = best_crl;
-        *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
-        *pscore = best_score;
-        *preasons = best_reasons;
-        X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
-        if (*pdcrl) {
-            X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
-            *pdcrl = NULL;
-        }
-        get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
-    }
-
-    if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
-        return 1;
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
- * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
- */
-
-static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
-{
-    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
-    int i;
-    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
-    if (i >= 0) {
-        /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
-        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
-            return 0;
-        exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
-    } else
-        exta = NULL;
-
-    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
-
-    if (i >= 0) {
-
-        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
-            return 0;
-        extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
-    } else
-        extb = NULL;
-
-    if (!exta && !extb)
-        return 1;
-
-    if (!exta || !extb)
-        return 0;
-
-    if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
-        return 0;
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
-
-static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
-{
-    /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
-    if (!delta->base_crl_number)
-        return 0;
-    /* Base must have a CRL number */
-    if (!base->crl_number)
-        return 0;
-    /* Issuer names must match */
-    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
-        return 0;
-    /* AKID and IDP must match */
-    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
-        return 0;
-    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
-        return 0;
-    /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
-    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
-        return 0;
-    /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
-    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
-        return 1;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
- * retrieve a chain of deltas...
- */
-
-static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
-                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
-{
-    X509_CRL *delta;
-    size_t i;
-    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
-        return;
-    if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
-        return;
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
-        delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
-        if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
-            if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
-                *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
-            X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
-            *dcrl = delta;
-            return;
-        }
-    }
-    *dcrl = NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
- * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
- * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
- * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
- * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
- */
-
-static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
-                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
-{
-
-    int crl_score = 0;
-    unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
-
-    /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
-
-    /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
-    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
-        return 0;
-    /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
-    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
-        if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
-            return 0;
-    } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
-        /* If no new reasons reject */
-        if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
-            return 0;
-    }
-    /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
-    else if (crl->base_crl_number)
-        return 0;
-    /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
-    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
-        if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
-            return 0;
-    } else
-        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
-
-    if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
-        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
-
-    /* Check expiry */
-    if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
-        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
-
-    /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
-    crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
-
-    /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
-
-    if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
-        return 0;
-
-    /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
-
-    if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
-        /* If no new reasons reject */
-        if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
-            return 0;
-        tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
-        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
-    }
-
-    *preasons = tmp_reasons;
-
-    return crl_score;
-
-}
-
-static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
-                           X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
-{
-    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
-    X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
-    int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
-    size_t i;
-
-    if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
-        cidx++;
-
-    crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
-
-    if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
-        if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
-            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
-            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
-            return;
-        }
-    }
-
-    for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
-        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
-        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
-            continue;
-        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
-            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
-            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
-            return;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
-
-    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
-        return;
-
-    /*
-     * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
-     * untrusted certificates.
-     */
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
-        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
-        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
-            continue;
-        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
-            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
-            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
-            return;
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
- * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
- * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
- * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
- */
-
-static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
-    X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
-    int ret;
-    /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
-    if (ctx->parent)
-        return 0;
-    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
-        return -1;
-
-    crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
-    /* Copy verify params across */
-    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
-
-    crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
-    crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-
-    /* Verify CRL issuer */
-    ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
-
-    if (ret <= 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    /* Check chain is acceptable */
-
-    ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
- err:
-    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * RFC 3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
- * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
- * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC 5280 is more
- * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
- * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
- * RFC 5280 version
- */
-
-static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
-                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
-{
-    X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
-    cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
-    crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
-    if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
-        return 1;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
- * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
- * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
- * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
- */
-
-static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
-{
-    X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
-    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
-    GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
-    size_t i, j;
-    if (!a || !b)
-        return 1;
-    if (a->type == 1) {
-        if (!a->dpname)
-            return 0;
-        /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
-        if (b->type == 1) {
-            if (!b->dpname)
-                return 0;
-            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
-                return 1;
-            else
-                return 0;
-        }
-        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
-        nm = a->dpname;
-        gens = b->name.fullname;
-    } else if (b->type == 1) {
-        if (!b->dpname)
-            return 0;
-        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
-        gens = a->name.fullname;
-        nm = b->dpname;
-    }
-
-    /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
-    if (nm) {
-        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
-            gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
-            if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
-                continue;
-            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
-                return 1;
-        }
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
-
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
-        gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
-        for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
-            genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
-            if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
-                return 1;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-
-}
-
-static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
-    /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
-    if (!dp->CRLissuer)
-        return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
-        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
-        if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
-            continue;
-        if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
-            return 1;
-    }
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
-
-static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
-                           unsigned int *preasons)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
-        return 0;
-    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
-        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
-            return 0;
-    } else {
-        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
-            return 0;
-    }
-    *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
-        DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
-        if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
-            if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
-                *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
-                return 1;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
-        && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
-        return 1;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
- * to find a delta CRL too
- */
-
-static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
-{
-    int ok;
-    X509 *issuer = NULL;
-    int crl_score = 0;
-    unsigned int reasons;
-    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
-    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
-    X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
-    reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
-    ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
-                    &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
-
-    if (ok)
-        goto done;
-
-    /* Lookup CRLs from store */
-
-    skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
-
-    /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
-    if (!skcrl && crl)
-        goto done;
-
-    get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
-
-    sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
-
- done:
-
-    /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
-    if (crl) {
-        ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
-        ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
-        ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
-        *pcrl = crl;
-        *pdcrl = dcrl;
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/* Check CRL validity */
-static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
-{
-    X509 *issuer = NULL;
-    EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
-    int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
-    cnum = ctx->error_depth;
-    chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
-    /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
-    if (ctx->current_issuer)
-        issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
-
-    /*
-     * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
-     * certificate in chain.
-     */
-    else if (cnum < chnum)
-        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
-    else {
-        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
-        /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
-        if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
-            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto err;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (issuer) {
-        /*
-         * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
-         */
-        if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
-            /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
-            if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
-                !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
-                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto err;
-            }
-
-            if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
-                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto err;
-            }
-
-            if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
-                if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
-                    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
-                    ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-                    if (!ok)
-                        goto err;
-                }
-            }
-
-            if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto err;
-            }
-
-        }
-
-        if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
-            ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto err;
-        }
-
-        /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
-        ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
-
-        if (!ikey) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
-            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-            if (!ok)
-                goto err;
-        } else {
-            int rv;
-            rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
-            if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
-                ctx->error = rv;
-                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto err;
-            }
-            /* Verify CRL signature */
-            if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
-                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto err;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    ok = 1;
-
- err:
-    EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
-    return ok;
-}
-
-/* Check certificate against CRL */
-static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
-{
-    int ok;
-    X509_REVOKED *rev;
-    /*
-     * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
-     * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
-     * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
-     * change the meaning of CRL entries.
-     */
-    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
-        && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
-        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-        if (!ok)
-            return 0;
-    }
-    /*
-     * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
-     * is not removeFromCRL.
-     */
-    if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
-        if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
-            return 2;
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
-        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-        if (!ok)
-            return 0;
-    }
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    int ret;
-    if (ctx->parent)
-        return 1;
-    ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
-                            ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
-    if (ret == 0) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-        return 0;
-    }
-    /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
-    if (ret == -1) {
-        /*
-         * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
-         */
-        X509 *x;
-        size_t i;
-        for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
-            x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
-                continue;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
-            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-                return 0;
-        }
-        return 1;
-    }
-    if (ret == -2) {
-        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
-        return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
-    }
-
-    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
-        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
-        /*
-         * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
-         * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
-         * remain in an error state.  Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
-         * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
-         */
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
-            return 0;
-    }
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
-    time_t *ptime;
-    int i;
-
-    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
-        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
-    else
-        ptime = NULL;
-
-    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
-    if (i == 0) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
-        ctx->current_cert = x;
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-            return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (i > 0) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
-        ctx->current_cert = x;
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-            return 0;
-    }
-
-    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
-    if (i == 0) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
-        ctx->current_cert = x;
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-            return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (i < 0) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
-        ctx->current_cert = x;
-        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
-            return 0;
-    }
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    int ok = 0, n;
-    X509 *xs, *xi;
-    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-
-    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-
-    n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-    ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
-    n--;
-    xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
-
-    if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
-        xs = xi;
-    else {
-        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
-            xs = xi;
-            goto check_cert;
-        }
-        if (n <= 0) {
-            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
-            ctx->current_cert = xi;
-            ok = cb(0, ctx);
-            goto end;
-        } else {
-            n--;
-            ctx->error_depth = n;
-            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
-        }
-    }
-
-/*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
-    while (n >= 0) {
-        ctx->error_depth = n;
-
-        /*
-         * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
-         * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
-         * time.
-         */
-        if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
-            if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
-                ctx->current_cert = xi;
-                ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
-                if (!ok)
-                    goto end;
-            } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
-                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
-                ctx->current_cert = xs;
-                ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
-                if (!ok) {
-                    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-                    goto end;
-                }
-            }
-            EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-            pkey = NULL;
-        }
-
- check_cert:
-        ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
-        if (!ok)
-            goto end;
-
-        /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
-        ctx->current_issuer = xi;
-        ctx->current_cert = xs;
-        ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
-        if (!ok)
-            goto end;
-
-        n--;
-        if (n >= 0) {
-            xi = xs;
-            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
-        }
-    }
-    ok = 1;
- end:
-    return ok;
-}
-
-int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
-{
-    return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
-}
-
-int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
-{
-    static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
-    static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
-    ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
-    int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
-
-    /*
-     * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC 5280.
-     * In RFC 5280, the representation is fixed:
-     * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
-     * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
-     *
-     * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
-     * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
-     *  validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
-     *  dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
-     */
-    switch (ctm->type) {
-    case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
-        if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
-            return 0;
-        break;
-    case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
-        if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
-            return 0;
-        break;
-    default:
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
-     * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
-     * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
-     */
-    for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
-        if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
-            return 0;
-    }
-    if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
-        return 0;
-
-    /*
-     * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
-     * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
-     * so we go through ASN.1
-     */
-    asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
-    if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
-        goto err;
-
-    /*
-     * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
-     * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
-     */
-    ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
-
- err:
-    ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec)
-{
-    return X509_time_adj(s, offset_sec, NULL);
-}
-
-ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
-{
-    return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
-}
-
-ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
-                            int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
-{
-    time_t t = 0;
-
-    if (in_tm) {
-        t = *in_tm;
-    } else {
-        time(&t);
-    }
-
-    return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
-}
-
-/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
-
-X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
-                        EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
-{
-    X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
-    int i;
-    size_t j;
-    STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
-    /* CRLs can't be delta already */
-    if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
-    if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    /* Issuer names must match */
-    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    /* AKID and IDP must match */
-    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
-    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    /* CRLs must verify */
-    if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
-                 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    /* Create new CRL */
-    crl = X509_CRL_new();
-    if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, X509_CRL_VERSION_2))
-        goto memerr;
-    /* Set issuer name */
-    if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
-        goto memerr;
-
-    if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
-        goto memerr;
-    if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
-        goto memerr;
-
-    /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
-
-    if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
-        goto memerr;
-
-    /*
-     * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
-     * number to correct value too.
-     */
-
-    for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
-        X509_EXTENSION *ext;
-        ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
-        if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
-            goto memerr;
-    }
-
-    /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
-
-    revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
-
-    for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) {
-        X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
-        rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j);
-        /*
-         * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
-         * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
-         */
-        if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
-            rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
-            if (!rvtmp)
-                goto memerr;
-            if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
-                X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
-                goto memerr;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
-
-    if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
-        goto memerr;
-
-    return crl;
-
- memerr:
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    if (crl)
-        X509_CRL_free(crl);
-    return NULL;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
-                                    CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,
-                                    CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
-                                    CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-{
-    /*
-     * This function is (usually) called only once, by
-     * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
-     */
-    int index;
-    if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
-                                 free_func)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-    return index;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
-{
-    return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
-}
-
-void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
-{
-    return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->error;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
-{
-    ctx->error = err;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->error_depth;
-}
-
-X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->current_cert;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->chain;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->chain;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    if (!ctx->chain)
-        return NULL;
-    return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
-}
-
-X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->current_issuer;
-}
-
-X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->current_crl;
-}
-
-X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->parent;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
-{
-    ctx->cert = x;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
-{
-    ctx->untrusted = sk;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->untrusted;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
-{
-    ctx->crls = sk;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
-{
-    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
-{
-    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
-}
-
-/*
- * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
- * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
- * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
- * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
- * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
- * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
- * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
- * client/server.
- */
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
-                                   int purpose, int trust)
-{
-    int idx;
-    /* If purpose not set use default */
-    if (!purpose)
-        purpose = def_purpose;
-    /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
-    if (purpose) {
-        X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
-        idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
-        if (idx == -1) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-        if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
-            idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
-            if (idx == -1) {
-                OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
-                return 0;
-            }
-            ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-        }
-        /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
-        if (!trust)
-            trust = ptmp->trust;
-    }
-    if (trust) {
-        idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
-        if (idx == -1) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
-        ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
-    if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
-        ctx->param->trust = trust;
-    return 1;
-}
-
-X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
-{
-    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
-    ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
-    if (!ctx) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
-    return ctx;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_zero(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    if (ctx == NULL) {
-        return;
-    }
-    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
-                        STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
-{
-    X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
-    ctx->ctx = store;
-    ctx->cert = x509;
-    ctx->untrusted = chain;
-
-    CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);
-
-    if (store == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
-    if (!ctx->param)
-        goto err;
-
-    /*
-     * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE.
-     */
-
-    ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
-    ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
-
-    if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param) ||
-        !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
-                                   X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"))) {
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (store->check_issued)
-        ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
-    else
-        ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
-
-    if (store->get_issuer)
-        ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
-    else
-        ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
-
-    if (store->verify_cb)
-        ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
-    else
-        ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
-
-    if (store->verify)
-        ctx->verify = store->verify;
-    else
-        ctx->verify = internal_verify;
-
-    if (store->check_revocation)
-        ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
-    else
-        ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
-
-    if (store->get_crl)
-        ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
-    else
-        ctx->get_crl = NULL;
-
-    if (store->check_crl)
-        ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
-    else
-        ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
-
-    if (store->cert_crl)
-        ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
-    else
-        ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
-
-    if (store->lookup_certs)
-        ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
-    else
-        ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
-
-    if (store->lookup_crls)
-        ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
-    else
-        ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
-
-    ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
-
-    return 1;
-
- err:
-    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
-    if (ctx->param != NULL) {
-        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
-    }
-
-    OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
- * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
- */
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
-{
-    ctx->other_ctx = sk;
-    ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free|
-     * also calls this function. */
-    if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
-        ctx->cleanup(ctx);
-        ctx->cleanup = NULL;
-    }
-    if (ctx->param != NULL) {
-        if (ctx->parent == NULL)
-            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
-        ctx->param = NULL;
-    }
-    if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
-        X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
-        ctx->tree = NULL;
-    }
-    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
-        sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
-        ctx->chain = NULL;
-    }
-    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
-    OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
-{
-    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
-{
-    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
-                             time_t t)
-{
-    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
-}
-
-X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->cert;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-                                  int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
-{
-    ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
-}
-
-X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->tree;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->explicit_policy;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
-{
-    const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
-    param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
-    if (!param)
-        return 0;
-    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
-}
-
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    return ctx->param;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
-{
-    if (ctx->param)
-        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
-    ctx->param = param;
-}