grpc 1.45.0-x86_64-linux → 1.47.0-x86_64-linux

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

@@ -0,0 +1,2456 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "../x509v3/internal.h"
+
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
+
+/* CRL score values */
+
+/* No unhandled critical extensions */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
+
+/* certificate is within CRL scope */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
+
+/* CRL times valid */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
+
+/* Issuer name matches certificate */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
+
+/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
+
+/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
+
+/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
+
+/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
+
+/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
+
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
+static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
+                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
+                         int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
+                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
+static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
+                           int *pcrl_score);
+static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
+                           unsigned int *preasons);
+static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
+
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
+{
+    return ok;
+}
+
+/* cert_self_signed checks if |x| is self-signed. If |x| is valid, it returns
+ * one and sets |*out_is_self_signed| to the result. If |x| is invalid, it
+ * returns zero. */
+static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x, int *out_is_self_signed)
+{
+    if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    *out_is_self_signed = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
+
+static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+    X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+    size_t i;
+    /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
+    certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
+    if (certs == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    /* Look for exact match */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+        xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
+            break;
+    }
+    if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
+        X509_up_ref(xtmp);
+    else
+        xtmp = NULL;
+    sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+    return xtmp;
+}
+
+int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
+    int bad_chain = 0;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
+    int depth, i, ok = 0;
+    int num, j, retry, trust;
+    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+    STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
+    if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
+         * cannot do another one.
+         */
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+    /*
+     * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
+     * the first entry is in place
+     */
+    ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+    if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
+    ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
+
+    /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it. */
+    if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
+        && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+    depth = param->depth;
+
+    for (;;) {
+        /* If we have enough, we break */
+        if (depth < num)
+            break;              /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
+                                 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
+                                 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
+                                 * later. */
+
+        int is_self_signed;
+        if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        /* If we are self signed, we break */
+        if (is_self_signed)
+            break;
+        /*
+         * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
+         */
+        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
+            ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+            if (ok < 0) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            /*
+             * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
+             * again later.
+             */
+            if (ok > 0) {
+                X509_free(xtmp);
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
+        if (sktmp != NULL) {
+            xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
+            if (xtmp != NULL) {
+                if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
+                    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+                    ok = 0;
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                X509_up_ref(xtmp);
+                (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
+                ctx->last_untrusted++;
+                x = xtmp;
+                num++;
+                /*
+                 * reparse the full chain for the next one
+                 */
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+
+    /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
+    j = num;
+    /*
+     * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
+     * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
+     * complain.
+     */
+
+    do {
+        /*
+         * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
+         */
+        i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
+
+        int is_self_signed;
+        if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (is_self_signed) {
+            /* we have a self signed certificate */
+            if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
+                /*
+                 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
+                 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
+                 * possible impersonation.
+                 */
+                ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+                if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
+                    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+                    ctx->current_cert = x;
+                    ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
+                    if (ok == 1)
+                        X509_free(xtmp);
+                    bad_chain = 1;
+                    ok = cb(0, ctx);
+                    if (!ok)
+                        goto end;
+                } else {
+                    /*
+                     * We have a match: replace certificate with store
+                     * version so we get any trust settings.
+                     */
+                    X509_free(x);
+                    x = xtmp;
+                    (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
+                    ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+                }
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
+                 */
+                chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+                ctx->last_untrusted--;
+                num--;
+                j--;
+                x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+            }
+        }
+        /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
+        for (;;) {
+            /* If we have enough, we break */
+            if (depth < num)
+                break;
+            if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            /* If we are self signed, we break */
+            if (is_self_signed)
+                break;
+            ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+
+            if (ok < 0) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            if (ok == 0)
+                break;
+            x = xtmp;
+            if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
+                X509_free(xtmp);
+                OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+                ok = 0;
+                goto end;
+            }
+            num++;
+        }
+
+        /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
+        trust = check_trust(ctx);
+
+        /* If explicitly rejected error */
+        if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
+            ok = 0;
+            goto end;
+        }
+        /*
+         * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
+         * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
+         * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
+         * chain checking
+         */
+        retry = 0;
+        if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
+            && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
+            && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
+            while (j-- > 1) {
+                xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
+                ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
+                if (ok < 0)
+                    goto end;
+                /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
+                if (ok > 0) {
+                    /*
+                     * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
+                     */
+                    X509_free(xtmp);
+
+                    /*
+                     * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
+                     * alternate chain
+                     */
+                    while (num > j) {
+                        xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+                        X509_free(xtmp);
+                        num--;
+                    }
+                    ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+                    retry = 1;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } while (retry);
+
+    /*
+     * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
+     * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
+     * and set bad_chain == 1
+     */
+    if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
+        if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
+            if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
+            else
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+        } else {
+
+            sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
+            num++;
+            ctx->last_untrusted = num;
+            ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
+            chain_ss = NULL;
+        }
+
+        ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
+        bad_chain = 1;
+        ok = cb(0, ctx);
+        if (!ok)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
+    ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
+
+    if (!ok)
+        goto end;
+
+    ok = check_id(ctx);
+
+    if (!ok)
+        goto end;
+
+    /*
+     * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
+     * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
+     */
+
+    ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
+    if (!ok)
+        goto end;
+
+    int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
+                                      ctx->param->flags);
+    if (err != X509_V_OK) {
+        ctx->error = err;
+        ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
+        ok = cb(0, ctx);
+        if (!ok)
+            goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
+    if (ctx->verify != NULL)
+        ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
+    else
+        ok = internal_verify(ctx);
+    if (!ok)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Check name constraints */
+
+    ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
+    if (!ok)
+        goto end;
+
+    /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
+    if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
+        ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
+
+ end:
+    if (sktmp != NULL)
+        sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+    if (chain_ss != NULL)
+        X509_free(chain_ss);
+
+    /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
+    if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+    return ok;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
+ */
+
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    X509 *issuer;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+        issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
+            return issuer;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
+
+static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
+{
+    int ret;
+    ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
+    if (ret == X509_V_OK)
+        return 1;
+    /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
+        return 0;
+
+    ctx->error = ret;
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+
+/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
+
+static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
+    if (*issuer) {
+        X509_up_ref(*issuer);
+        return 1;
+    } else
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
+ * purpose
+ */
+
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, ok = 0, plen = 0;
+    X509 *x;
+    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+    int proxy_path_length = 0;
+    int purpose;
+    int allow_proxy_certs;
+    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+    enum {
+        // ca_or_leaf allows either type of certificate so that direct use of
+        // self-signed certificates works.
+        ca_or_leaf,
+        must_be_ca,
+        must_not_be_ca,
+    } ca_requirement;
+
+    /* CRL path validation */
+    if (ctx->parent) {
+        allow_proxy_certs = 0;
+        purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
+    } else {
+        allow_proxy_certs =
+            ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+        purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
+    }
+
+    ca_requirement = ca_or_leaf;
+
+    /* Check all untrusted certificates */
+    for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
+        int ret;
+        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+        if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+            && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
+            ctx->error_depth = i;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            ok = cb(0, ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto end;
+        }
+        if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
+            ctx->error_depth = i;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            ok = cb(0, ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        switch (ca_requirement) {
+        case ca_or_leaf:
+            ret = 1;
+            break;
+        case must_not_be_ca:
+            if (X509_check_ca(x)) {
+                ret = 0;
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
+            } else
+                ret = 1;
+            break;
+        case must_be_ca:
+            if (!X509_check_ca(x)) {
+                ret = 0;
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+            } else
+                ret = 1;
+            break;
+        default:
+            // impossible.
+            ret = 0;
+        }
+
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            ctx->error_depth = i;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            ok = cb(0, ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto end;
+        }
+        if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
+            ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, ca_requirement == must_be_ca);
+            if (ret != 1) {
+                ret = 0;
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+                ctx->error_depth = i;
+                ctx->current_cert = x;
+                ok = cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto end;
+            }
+        }
+        /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
+        if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
+            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
+            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+            ctx->error_depth = i;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            ok = cb(0, ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto end;
+        }
+        /* Increment path length if not self issued */
+        if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+            plen++;
+        /*
+         * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
+         * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate.  If not,
+         * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
+         */
+        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+            if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+                ctx->error_depth = i;
+                ctx->current_cert = x;
+                ok = cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto end;
+            }
+            proxy_path_length++;
+            ca_requirement = must_not_be_ca;
+        } else {
+            ca_requirement = must_be_ca;
+        }
+    }
+    ok = 1;
+ end:
+    return ok;
+}
+
+static int reject_dns_name_in_common_name(X509 *x509)
+{
+    X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
+    int i = -1;
+    for (;;) {
+        i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i);
+        if (i == -1) {
+            return X509_V_OK;
+        }
+
+        X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
+        ASN1_STRING *common_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
+        unsigned char *idval;
+        int idlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&idval, common_name);
+        if (idlen < 0) {
+            return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+        }
+        /* Only process attributes that look like host names. Note it is
+         * important that this check be mirrored in |X509_check_host|. */
+        int looks_like_dns = x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(idval, (size_t)idlen);
+        OPENSSL_free(idval);
+        if (looks_like_dns) {
+            return X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, j, rv;
+    int has_name_constraints = 0;
+    /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
+    for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+        /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
+        if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+            continue;
+        /*
+         * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
+         * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
+         * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
+         * to be obeyed.
+         */
+        for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
+            NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
+            if (nc) {
+                has_name_constraints = 1;
+                rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
+                switch (rv) {
+                case X509_V_OK:
+                    continue;
+                case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+                    ctx->error = rv;
+                    return 0;
+                default:
+                    ctx->error = rv;
+                    ctx->error_depth = i;
+                    ctx->current_cert = x;
+                    if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+                        return 0;
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Name constraints do not match against the common name, but
+     * |X509_check_host| still implements the legacy behavior where, on
+     * certificates lacking a SAN list, DNS-like names in the common name are
+     * checked instead.
+     *
+     * While we could apply the name constraints to the common name, name
+     * constraints are rare enough that can hold such certificates to a higher
+     * standard. Note this does not make "DNS-like" heuristic failures any
+     * worse. A decorative common-name misidentified as a DNS name would fail
+     * the name constraint anyway. */
+    X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
+    if (has_name_constraints && leaf->altname == NULL) {
+        rv = reject_dns_name_in_common_name(leaf);
+        switch (rv) {
+        case X509_V_OK:
+            break;
+        case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+            ctx->error = rv;
+            return 0;
+        default:
+            ctx->error = rv;
+            ctx->error_depth = i;
+            ctx->current_cert = leaf;
+            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+                return 0;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
+{
+    ctx->error = errcode;
+    ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
+    ctx->error_depth = 0;
+    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+
+static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param->hosts);
+    char *name;
+
+    if (param->peername != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(param->peername);
+        param->peername = NULL;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+        name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(param->hosts, i);
+        if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), param->hostflags,
+                            &param->peername) > 0)
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return n == 0;
+}
+
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
+    X509 *x = ctx->cert;
+    if (vpm->poison) {
+        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
+        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
+        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
+        if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    int ok;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+    /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
+    for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+        ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+        /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
+        if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+            return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+        /*
+         * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
+         * overridden.
+         */
+        if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
+            ctx->error_depth = i;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+            ok = cb(0, ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+        }
+    }
+    /*
+     * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
+     * return success.
+     */
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+        X509 *mx;
+        if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
+            return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
+        mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
+        if (mx) {
+            (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+            X509_free(x);
+            ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+            return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
+     * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
+     */
+    return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
+
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i, last, ok;
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
+        return 1;
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
+        last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+    else {
+        /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
+        if (ctx->parent)
+            return 1;
+        last = 0;
+    }
+    for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
+        ctx->error_depth = i;
+        ok = check_cert(ctx);
+        if (!ok)
+            return ok;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+    X509 *x;
+    int ok = 0, cnum;
+    unsigned int last_reasons;
+    cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+    ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+    ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+    while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
+        last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+        /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
+        if (ctx->get_crl)
+            ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+        else
+            ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
+        /*
+         * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
+         */
+        if (!ok) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        ctx->current_crl = crl;
+        ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
+        if (!ok)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (dcrl) {
+            ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto err;
+            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto err;
+        } else
+            ok = 1;
+
+        /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
+        if (ok != 2) {
+            ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        X509_CRL_free(crl);
+        X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+        crl = NULL;
+        dcrl = NULL;
+        /*
+         * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
+         * so exit loop.
+         */
+        if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+ err:
+    X509_CRL_free(crl);
+    X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+
+    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+    return ok;
+
+}
+
+/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
+
+static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
+{
+    time_t *ptime;
+    int i;
+    if (notify)
+        ctx->current_crl = crl;
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+    else
+        ptime = NULL;
+
+    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
+    if (i == 0) {
+        if (!notify)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (i > 0) {
+        if (!notify)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
+        i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
+
+        if (i == 0) {
+            if (!notify)
+                return 0;
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
+            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
+        if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
+            if (!notify)
+                return 0;
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
+            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (notify)
+        ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
+                      X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
+                      STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+    int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
+    size_t i;
+    unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
+    X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
+    X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
+    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+        crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+        reasons = *preasons;
+        crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
+        if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
+            continue;
+        /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
+        if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
+            int day, sec;
+            if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
+                               X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
+                continue;
+            /*
+             * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
+             * and |sec|.
+             */
+            if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
+                continue;
+        }
+        best_crl = crl;
+        best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
+        best_score = crl_score;
+        best_reasons = reasons;
+    }
+
+    if (best_crl) {
+        if (*pcrl)
+            X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
+        *pcrl = best_crl;
+        *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
+        *pscore = best_score;
+        *preasons = best_reasons;
+        X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
+        if (*pdcrl) {
+            X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
+            *pdcrl = NULL;
+        }
+        get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
+    }
+
+    if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
+        return 1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
+ * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
+ */
+
+static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
+{
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
+    int i;
+    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
+    if (i >= 0) {
+        /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
+        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
+            return 0;
+        exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
+    } else
+        exta = NULL;
+
+    i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
+
+    if (i >= 0) {
+
+        if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
+            return 0;
+        extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
+    } else
+        extb = NULL;
+
+    if (!exta && !extb)
+        return 1;
+
+    if (!exta || !extb)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
+
+static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
+{
+    /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
+    if (!delta->base_crl_number)
+        return 0;
+    /* Base must have a CRL number */
+    if (!base->crl_number)
+        return 0;
+    /* Issuer names must match */
+    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
+        return 0;
+    /* AKID and IDP must match */
+    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
+        return 0;
+    if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
+        return 0;
+    /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+        return 0;
+    /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
+ * retrieve a chain of deltas...
+ */
+
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
+                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+    X509_CRL *delta;
+    size_t i;
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
+        return;
+    if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
+        return;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+        delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+        if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
+            if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
+                *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
+            X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
+            *dcrl = delta;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+    *dcrl = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
+ * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
+ * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
+ * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
+ * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
+ */
+
+static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
+                         unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+{
+
+    int crl_score = 0;
+    unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
+
+    /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
+
+    /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
+    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+        return 0;
+    /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
+        if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
+            return 0;
+    } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
+        /* If no new reasons reject */
+        if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
+    else if (crl->base_crl_number)
+        return 0;
+    /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
+    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
+        if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
+
+    if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
+        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
+
+    /* Check expiry */
+    if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
+        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+
+    /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
+    crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
+
+    /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
+
+    if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
+
+    if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
+        /* If no new reasons reject */
+        if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+            return 0;
+        tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
+        crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+    }
+
+    *preasons = tmp_reasons;
+
+    return crl_score;
+
+}
+
+static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
+                           X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
+{
+    X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+    int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
+    size_t i;
+
+    if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
+        cidx++;
+
+    crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+
+    if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+        if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
+            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
+            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
+        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+            continue;
+        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
+            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
+
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
+        return;
+
+    /*
+     * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
+     * untrusted certificates.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
+        crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
+        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+            continue;
+        if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+            *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+            *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
+ * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
+ * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
+ * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
+ */
+
+static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
+    int ret;
+    /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
+    if (ctx->parent)
+        return 0;
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
+        return -1;
+
+    crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
+    /* Copy verify params across */
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
+
+    crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
+    crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+    /* Verify CRL issuer */
+    ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
+
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Check chain is acceptable */
+
+    ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
+ err:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC 3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
+ * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
+ * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC 5280 is more
+ * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
+ * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
+ * RFC 5280 version
+ */
+
+static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+                           STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
+{
+    X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
+    cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
+    crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
+    if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
+ * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
+ * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
+ * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
+ */
+
+static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
+{
+    X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
+    size_t i, j;
+    if (!a || !b)
+        return 1;
+    if (a->type == 1) {
+        if (!a->dpname)
+            return 0;
+        /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
+        if (b->type == 1) {
+            if (!b->dpname)
+                return 0;
+            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
+                return 1;
+            else
+                return 0;
+        }
+        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+        nm = a->dpname;
+        gens = b->name.fullname;
+    } else if (b->type == 1) {
+        if (!b->dpname)
+            return 0;
+        /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+        gens = a->name.fullname;
+        nm = b->dpname;
+    }
+
+    /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
+    if (nm) {
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+            gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+            if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+                continue;
+            if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
+                return 1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
+        gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
+            genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
+            if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
+                return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+    /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
+    if (!dp->CRLissuer)
+        return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
+        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+        if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+            continue;
+        if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
+            return 1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
+
+static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
+                           unsigned int *preasons)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+        return 0;
+    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
+        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+            return 0;
+    } else {
+        if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
+        DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
+        if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
+            if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
+                *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
+                return 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
+        && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
+ * to find a delta CRL too
+ */
+
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                         X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
+{
+    int ok;
+    X509 *issuer = NULL;
+    int crl_score = 0;
+    unsigned int reasons;
+    X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
+    X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+    reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+    ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
+                    &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
+
+    if (ok)
+        goto done;
+
+    /* Lookup CRLs from store */
+
+    skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
+
+    /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
+    if (!skcrl && crl)
+        goto done;
+
+    get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
+
+    sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
+
+ done:
+
+    /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
+    if (crl) {
+        ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+        ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
+        ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
+        *pcrl = crl;
+        *pdcrl = dcrl;
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check CRL validity */
+static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+    X509 *issuer = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
+    int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
+    cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+    chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+    /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
+    if (ctx->current_issuer)
+        issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
+
+    /*
+     * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
+     * certificate in chain.
+     */
+    else if (cnum < chnum)
+        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
+    else {
+        issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
+        /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
+        if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
+            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (issuer) {
+        /*
+         * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
+         */
+        if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
+            /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
+            if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+                !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
+                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
+                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
+                if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
+                    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
+                    ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                    if (!ok)
+                        goto err;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+
+        }
+
+        if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
+            ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
+        ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
+
+        if (!ikey) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+            ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            int rv;
+            rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
+            if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+                ctx->error = rv;
+                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+            /* Verify CRL signature */
+            if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+/* Check certificate against CRL */
+static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+{
+    int ok;
+    X509_REVOKED *rev;
+    /*
+     * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
+     * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
+     * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
+     * change the meaning of CRL entries.
+     */
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+        && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
+        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+        if (!ok)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
+     * is not removeFromCRL.
+     */
+    if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
+        if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
+            return 2;
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+        if (!ok)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ret;
+    if (ctx->parent)
+        return 1;
+    ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
+                            ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
+    if (ret == -1) {
+        /*
+         * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
+         */
+        X509 *x;
+        size_t i;
+        for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+            x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
+                continue;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+            if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+                return 0;
+        }
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (ret == -2) {
+        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+        return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
+        ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+        /*
+         * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
+         * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
+         * remain in an error state.  Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
+         * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
+         */
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    time_t *ptime;
+    int i;
+
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+        ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+    else
+        ptime = NULL;
+
+    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
+    if (i == 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
+        ctx->current_cert = x;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (i > 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
+        ctx->current_cert = x;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
+    if (i == 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
+        ctx->current_cert = x;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (i < 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
+        ctx->current_cert = x;
+        if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int ok = 0, n;
+    X509 *xs, *xi;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+
+    cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+    n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+    ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
+    n--;
+    xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+
+    if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
+        xs = xi;
+    else {
+        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+            xs = xi;
+            goto check_cert;
+        }
+        if (n <= 0) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
+            ctx->current_cert = xi;
+            ok = cb(0, ctx);
+            goto end;
+        } else {
+            n--;
+            ctx->error_depth = n;
+            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+        }
+    }
+
+/*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
+    while (n >= 0) {
+        ctx->error_depth = n;
+
+        /*
+         * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
+         * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
+         * time.
+         */
+        if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
+            if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+                ctx->current_cert = xi;
+                ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    goto end;
+            } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
+                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+                ctx->current_cert = xs;
+                ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
+                if (!ok) {
+                    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+            EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+            pkey = NULL;
+        }
+
+ check_cert:
+        ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
+        if (!ok)
+            goto end;
+
+        /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
+        ctx->current_issuer = xi;
+        ctx->current_cert = xs;
+        ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
+        if (!ok)
+            goto end;
+
+        n--;
+        if (n >= 0) {
+            xi = xs;
+            xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+        }
+    }
+    ok = 1;
+ end:
+    return ok;
+}
+
+int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
+{
+    return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
+{
+    static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
+    static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
+    ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
+    int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC 5280.
+     * In RFC 5280, the representation is fixed:
+     * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+     * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+     *
+     * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
+     * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
+     *  validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
+     *  dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
+     */
+    switch (ctm->type) {
+    case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
+        if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+    case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
+        if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
+            return 0;
+        break;
+    default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
+     * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
+     * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
+        if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
+            return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
+        return 0;
+
+    /*
+     * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
+     * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
+     * so we go through ASN.1
+     */
+    asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
+    if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
+     * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
+     */
+    ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
+
+ err:
+    ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec)
+{
+    return X509_time_adj(s, offset_sec, NULL);
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
+{
+    return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
+                            int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
+{
+    time_t t = 0;
+
+    if (in_tm) {
+        t = *in_tm;
+    } else {
+        time(&t);
+    }
+
+    return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+}
+
+/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
+
+X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
+                        EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+    int i;
+    size_t j;
+    STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
+    /* CRLs can't be delta already */
+    if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
+    if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* Issuer names must match */
+    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* AKID and IDP must match */
+    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* CRLs must verify */
+    if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
+                 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* Create new CRL */
+    crl = X509_CRL_new();
+    if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, X509_CRL_VERSION_2))
+        goto memerr;
+    /* Set issuer name */
+    if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
+        goto memerr;
+
+    if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
+        goto memerr;
+    if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
+        goto memerr;
+
+    /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
+
+    if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
+        goto memerr;
+
+    /*
+     * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
+     * number to correct value too.
+     */
+
+    for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
+        X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+        ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
+        if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
+            goto memerr;
+    }
+
+    /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
+
+    revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
+
+    for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) {
+        X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
+        rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j);
+        /*
+         * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
+         * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
+         */
+        if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
+            rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
+            if (!rvtmp)
+                goto memerr;
+            if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
+                X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
+                goto memerr;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
+
+    if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
+        goto memerr;
+
+    return crl;
+
+ memerr:
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    if (crl)
+        X509_CRL_free(crl);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
+                                    CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused,
+                                    CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
+                                    CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+    /*
+     * This function is (usually) called only once, by
+     * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
+     */
+    int index;
+    if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
+                                 free_func)) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+    return index;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
+}
+
+void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->error;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
+{
+    ctx->error = err;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->error_depth;
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->current_cert;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->chain;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->chain;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->chain)
+        return NULL;
+    return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->current_issuer;
+}
+
+X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->current_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->parent;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+    ctx->cert = x;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+    ctx->untrusted = sk;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->untrusted;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
+{
+    ctx->crls = sk;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
+{
+    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
+{
+    return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
+ * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
+ * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
+ * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
+ * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
+ * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
+ * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
+ * client/server.
+ */
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
+                                   int purpose, int trust)
+{
+    int idx;
+    /* If purpose not set use default */
+    if (!purpose)
+        purpose = def_purpose;
+    /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
+    if (purpose) {
+        X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+        idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
+        if (idx == -1) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+        if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
+            idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
+            if (idx == -1) {
+                OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+        }
+        /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
+        if (!trust)
+            trust = ptmp->trust;
+    }
+    if (trust) {
+        idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
+        if (idx == -1) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
+        ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
+    if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
+        ctx->param->trust = trust;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
+{
+    X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+    ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+    if (!ctx) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
+    return ctx;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_zero(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        return;
+    }
+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
+                        STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx);
+    ctx->ctx = store;
+    ctx->cert = x509;
+    ctx->untrusted = chain;
+
+    CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);
+
+    if (store == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+    if (!ctx->param)
+        goto err;
+
+    /*
+     * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE.
+     */
+
+    ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+    ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
+
+    if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param) ||
+        !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
+                                   X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"))) {
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (store->check_issued)
+        ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
+    else
+        ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+
+    if (store->get_issuer)
+        ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
+    else
+        ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
+
+    if (store->verify_cb)
+        ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+    else
+        ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
+
+    if (store->verify)
+        ctx->verify = store->verify;
+    else
+        ctx->verify = internal_verify;
+
+    if (store->check_revocation)
+        ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
+    else
+        ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+
+    if (store->get_crl)
+        ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
+    else
+        ctx->get_crl = NULL;
+
+    if (store->check_crl)
+        ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
+    else
+        ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+
+    if (store->cert_crl)
+        ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
+    else
+        ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+
+    if (store->lookup_certs)
+        ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
+    else
+        ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
+
+    if (store->lookup_crls)
+        ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
+    else
+        ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
+
+    ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
+    if (ctx->param != NULL) {
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
+ * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
+ */
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+    ctx->other_ctx = sk;
+    ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free|
+     * also calls this function. */
+    if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
+        ctx->cleanup(ctx);
+        ctx->cleanup = NULL;
+    }
+    if (ctx->param != NULL) {
+        if (ctx->parent == NULL)
+            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+        ctx->param = NULL;
+    }
+    if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
+        X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
+        ctx->tree = NULL;
+    }
+    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+        sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
+        ctx->chain = NULL;
+    }
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
+    OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
+                             time_t t)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->cert;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                  int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+{
+    ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
+}
+
+X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->tree;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->explicit_policy;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
+{
+    const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+    param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
+    if (!param)
+        return 0;
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->param;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+    if (ctx->param)
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+    ctx->param = param;
+}