grpc 1.30.0 → 1.46.3

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/handshake_client.cc

@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@
 #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hpke.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
@@ -201,7 +202,8 @@ enum ssl_client_hs_state_t {
 
 // ssl_get_client_disabled sets |*out_mask_a| and |*out_mask_k| to masks of
 // disabled algorithms.
-static void ssl_get_client_disabled(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint32_t *out_mask_a,
+static void ssl_get_client_disabled(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                    uint32_t *out_mask_a,
                                     uint32_t *out_mask_k) {
   *out_mask_a = 0;
   *out_mask_k = 0;
@@ -213,8 +215,9 @@ static void ssl_get_client_disabled(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint32_t *out_mask_a,
   }
 }
 
-static bool ssl_write_client_cipher_list(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+static bool ssl_write_client_cipher_list(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
+                                         ssl_client_hello_type_t type) {
+  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
   uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
   ssl_get_client_disabled(hs, &mask_a, &mask_k);
 
@@ -223,7 +226,7 @@ static bool ssl_write_client_cipher_list(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
     return false;
   }
 
-  // Add a fake cipher suite. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
+  // Add a fake cipher suite. See RFC 8701.
   if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
       !CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_cipher))) {
     return false;
@@ -246,7 +249,7 @@ static bool ssl_write_client_cipher_list(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
     }
   }
 
-  if (hs->min_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+  if (hs->min_version < TLS1_3_VERSION && type != ssl_client_hello_inner) {
     bool any_enabled = false;
     for (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher : SSL_get_ciphers(ssl)) {
       // Skip disabled ciphers
@@ -259,7 +262,7 @@ static bool ssl_write_client_cipher_list(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
         continue;
       }
       any_enabled = true;
-      if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_cipher_get_value(cipher))) {
+      if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(cipher))) {
         return false;
       }
     }
@@ -280,101 +283,161 @@ static bool ssl_write_client_cipher_list(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
   return CBB_flush(out);
 }
 
-bool ssl_write_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  ScopedCBB cbb;
-  CBB body;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
+bool ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                               CBB *cbb,
+                                               ssl_client_hello_type_t type,
+                                               bool empty_session_id) {
+  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
   CBB child;
-  if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, hs->client_version) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) {
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, hs->client_version) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(cbb,
+                     type == ssl_client_hello_inner ? hs->inner_client_random
+                                                    : ssl->s3->client_random,
+                     SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) {
     return false;
   }
 
   // Do not send a session ID on renegotiation.
   if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
+      !empty_session_id &&
       !CBB_add_bytes(&child, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
     return false;
   }
 
   if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
-    if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+    if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) ||
         !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->d1->cookie, ssl->d1->cookie_len)) {
       return false;
     }
   }
 
-  size_t header_len =
-      SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ? DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-  if (!ssl_write_client_cipher_list(hs, &body) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(&body, 1 /* one compression method */) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* null compression */) ||
-      !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &body, header_len + CBB_len(&body))) {
+  if (!ssl_write_client_cipher_list(hs, cbb, type) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, 1 /* one compression method */) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, 0 /* null compression */)) {
     return false;
   }
+  return true;
+}
 
+bool ssl_add_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body;
+  ssl_client_hello_type_t type = hs->selected_ech_config
+                                     ? ssl_client_hello_outer
+                                     : ssl_client_hello_unencrypted;
+  bool needs_psk_binder;
   Array<uint8_t> msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &msg)) {
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
+      !ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(hs, &body, type,
+                                                 /*empty_session_id*/ false) ||
+      !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &body, /*out_encoded=*/nullptr,
+                                  &needs_psk_binder, type, CBB_len(&body)) ||
+      !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &msg)) {
     return false;
   }
 
   // Now that the length prefixes have been computed, fill in the placeholder
   // PSK binder.
-  if (hs->needs_psk_binder &&
-      !tls13_write_psk_binder(hs, MakeSpan(msg))) {
-    return false;
+  if (needs_psk_binder) {
+    // ClientHelloOuter cannot have a PSK binder. Otherwise the
+    // ClientHellOuterAAD computation would break.
+    assert(type != ssl_client_hello_outer);
+    if (!tls13_write_psk_binder(hs, hs->transcript, MakeSpan(msg),
+                                /*out_binder_len=*/0)) {
+      return false;
+    }
   }
 
   return ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(msg));
 }
 
-static bool parse_supported_versions(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *version,
-                                     const CBS *in) {
-  // If the outer version is not TLS 1.2, or there is no extensions block, use
-  // the outer version.
-  if (*version != TLS1_2_VERSION || CBS_len(in) == 0) {
+static bool parse_server_version(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out_version,
+                                 uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                 const ParsedServerHello &server_hello) {
+  // If the outer version is not TLS 1.2, use it.
+  // TODO(davidben): This function doesn't quite match the RFC8446 formulation.
+  if (server_hello.legacy_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    *out_version = server_hello.legacy_version;
     return true;
   }
 
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  CBS copy = *in, extensions;
-  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&copy, &extensions) ||
-      CBS_len(&copy) != 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+  SSLExtension supported_versions(TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions);
+  CBS extensions = server_hello.extensions;
+  if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, out_alert, {&supported_versions},
+                            /*ignore_unknown=*/true)) {
     return false;
   }
 
-  bool have_supported_versions;
-  CBS supported_versions;
-  const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = {
-    {TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions, &have_supported_versions,
-     &supported_versions},
-  };
-
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types,
-                            OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ext_types),
-                            1 /* ignore unknown */)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return false;
+  if (!supported_versions.present) {
+    *out_version = server_hello.legacy_version;
+    return true;
   }
 
-  // Override the outer version with the extension, if present.
-  if (have_supported_versions &&
-      (!CBS_get_u16(&supported_versions, version) ||
-       CBS_len(&supported_versions) != 0)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(&supported_versions.data, out_version) ||
+       CBS_len(&supported_versions.data) != 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
     return false;
   }
 
   return true;
 }
 
+// should_offer_early_data returns |ssl_early_data_accepted| if |hs| should
+// offer early data, and some other reason code otherwise.
+static ssl_early_data_reason_t should_offer_early_data(
+    const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  assert(!ssl->server);
+  if (!ssl->enable_early_data) {
+    return ssl_early_data_disabled;
+  }
+
+  if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // We discard inapplicable sessions, so this is redundant with the session
+    // checks below, but reporting that TLS 1.3 was disabled is more useful.
+    return ssl_early_data_protocol_version;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->session == nullptr) {
+    return ssl_early_data_no_session_offered;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+      ssl->session->ticket_max_early_data == 0) {
+    return ssl_early_data_unsupported_for_session;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl->session->early_alpn.empty()) {
+    if (!ssl_is_alpn_protocol_allowed(hs, ssl->session->early_alpn)) {
+      // Avoid reporting a confusing value in |SSL_get0_alpn_selected|.
+      return ssl_early_data_alpn_mismatch;
+    }
+
+    // If the previous connection negotiated ALPS, only offer 0-RTT when the
+    // local are settings are consistent with what we'd offer for this
+    // connection.
+    if (ssl->session->has_application_settings) {
+      Span<const uint8_t> settings;
+      if (!ssl_get_local_application_settings(hs, &settings,
+                                              ssl->session->early_alpn) ||
+          settings != ssl->session->local_application_settings) {
+        return ssl_early_data_alps_mismatch;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Early data has not yet been accepted, but we use it as a success code.
+  return ssl_early_data_accepted;
+}
+
+void ssl_done_writing_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  hs->ech_client_outer.Reset();
+  hs->cookie.Reset();
+  hs->key_share_bytes.Reset();
+}
+
 static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_start_connect(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
 
@@ -387,6 +450,12 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_start_connect(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
+  uint8_t ech_enc[EVP_HPKE_MAX_ENC_LENGTH];
+  size_t ech_enc_len;
+  if (!ssl_select_ech_config(hs, ech_enc, &ech_enc_len)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
   // Always advertise the ClientHello version from the original maximum version,
   // even on renegotiation. The static RSA key exchange uses this field, and
   // some servers fail when it changes across handshakes.
@@ -398,34 +467,47 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_start_connect(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
         hs->max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? TLS1_2_VERSION : hs->max_version;
   }
 
-  // If the configured session has expired or was created at a disabled
-  // version, drop it.
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+  // If the configured session has expired or is not usable, drop it. We also do
+  // not offer sessions on renegotiation.
+  if (ssl->session != nullptr) {
     if (ssl->session->is_server ||
         !ssl_supports_version(hs, ssl->session->ssl_version) ||
-        (ssl->session->session_id_length == 0 &&
-         ssl->session->ticket.empty()) ||
-        ssl->session->not_resumable ||
+        // Do not offer TLS 1.2 sessions with ECH. ClientHelloInner does not
+        // offer TLS 1.2, and the cleartext session ID may leak the server
+        // identity.
+        (hs->selected_ech_config &&
+         ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION) ||
+        !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(ssl->session.get()) ||
         !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, ssl->session.get()) ||
-        (ssl->quic_method != nullptr) != ssl->session->is_quic) {
-      ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
+        (ssl->quic_method != nullptr) != ssl->session->is_quic ||
+        ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+      ssl_set_session(ssl, nullptr);
     }
   }
 
   if (!RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->client_random, sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random))) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
+  if (hs->selected_ech_config &&
+      !RAND_bytes(hs->inner_client_random, sizeof(hs->inner_client_random))) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
 
   // Never send a session ID in QUIC. QUIC uses TLS 1.3 at a minimum and
   // disables TLS 1.3 middlebox compatibility mode.
   if (ssl->quic_method == nullptr) {
-    if (ssl->session != nullptr && !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
-        ssl->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+    const bool has_id_session = ssl->session != nullptr &&
+                                ssl->session->session_id_length > 0 &&
+                                ssl->session->ticket.empty();
+    const bool has_ticket_session =
+        ssl->session != nullptr && !ssl->session->ticket.empty();
+    if (has_id_session) {
       hs->session_id_len = ssl->session->session_id_length;
       OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->session_id, ssl->session->session_id,
                      hs->session_id_len);
-    } else if (hs->max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-      // Initialize a random session ID.
+    } else if (has_ticket_session || hs->max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+      // Send a random session ID. TLS 1.3 always sends one, and TLS 1.2 session
+      // tickets require a placeholder value to signal resumption.
       hs->session_id_len = sizeof(hs->session_id);
       if (!RAND_bytes(hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
         return ssl_hs_error;
@@ -433,7 +515,17 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_start_connect(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     }
   }
 
-  if (!ssl_write_client_hello(hs)) {
+  ssl_early_data_reason_t reason = should_offer_early_data(hs);
+  if (reason != ssl_early_data_accepted) {
+    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = reason;
+  } else {
+    hs->early_data_offered = true;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_setup_key_shares(hs, /*override_group_id=*/0) ||
+      !ssl_setup_extension_permutation(hs) ||
+      !ssl_encrypt_client_hello(hs, MakeConstSpan(ech_enc, ech_enc_len)) ||
+      !ssl_add_client_hello(hs)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
@@ -459,9 +551,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_enter_early_data(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
-  if (!tls13_init_early_key_schedule(
-          hs, MakeConstSpan(ssl->session->master_key,
-                            ssl->session->master_key_length)) ||
+  if (!tls13_init_early_key_schedule(hs, ssl->session.get()) ||
       !tls13_derive_early_secret(hs)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
@@ -512,6 +602,10 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_hello_verify_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
 
   assert(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
 
+  // When implementing DTLS 1.3, we need to handle the interactions between
+  // HelloVerifyRequest, DTLS 1.3's HelloVerifyRequest removal, and ECH.
+  assert(hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION);
+
   SSLMessage msg;
   if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
     return ssl_hs_read_message;
@@ -543,7 +637,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_hello_verify_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
-  if (!ssl_write_client_hello(hs)) {
+  if (!ssl_add_client_hello(hs)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
@@ -551,6 +645,38 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_hello_verify_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   return ssl_hs_flush;
 }
 
+bool ssl_parse_server_hello(ParsedServerHello *out, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                            const SSLMessage &msg) {
+  if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    return false;
+  }
+  out->raw = msg.raw;
+  CBS body = msg.body;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(&body, &out->legacy_version) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&body, &out->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &out->session_id) ||
+      CBS_len(&out->session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&body, &out->cipher_suite) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8(&body, &out->compression_method)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+  // In TLS 1.2 and below, empty extensions blocks may be omitted. In TLS 1.3,
+  // ServerHellos always have extensions, so this can be applied generically.
+  CBS_init(&out->extensions, nullptr, 0);
+  if ((CBS_len(&body) != 0 &&
+       !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &out->extensions)) ||
+      CBS_len(&body) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
 static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
   SSLMessage msg;
@@ -558,26 +684,12 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_read_server_hello;
   }
 
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  CBS server_hello = msg.body, server_random, session_id;
-  uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite;
-  uint8_t compression_method;
-  if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_version) ||
-      !CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) ||
-      CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
-      !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) ||
-      !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Use the supported_versions extension if applicable.
-  if (!parse_supported_versions(hs, &server_version, &server_hello)) {
+  ParsedServerHello server_hello;
+  uint16_t server_version;
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (!ssl_parse_server_hello(&server_hello, &alert, msg) ||
+      !parse_server_version(hs, &server_version, &alert, server_hello)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
@@ -608,19 +720,30 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   // Clear some TLS 1.3 state that no longer needs to be retained.
   hs->key_shares[0].reset();
   hs->key_shares[1].reset();
-  hs->key_share_bytes.Reset();
+  ssl_done_writing_client_hello(hs);
 
   // A TLS 1.2 server would not know to skip the early data we offered. Report
   // an error code sooner. The caller may use this error code to implement the
   // fallback described in RFC 8446 appendix D.3.
   if (hs->early_data_offered) {
+    // Disconnect early writes. This ensures subsequent |SSL_write| calls query
+    // the handshake which, in turn, will replay the error code rather than fail
+    // at the |write_shutdown| check. See https://crbug.com/1078515.
+    // TODO(davidben): Should all handshake errors do this? What about record
+    // decryption failures?
+    hs->can_early_write = false;
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA);
     ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
+  // TLS 1.2 handshakes cannot accept ECH.
+  if (hs->selected_ech_config) {
+    ssl->s3->ech_status = ssl_ech_rejected;
+  }
+
   // Copy over the server random.
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random),
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_hello.random),
                  SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 
   // Enforce the TLS 1.3 anti-downgrade feature.
@@ -637,73 +760,50 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
             .subspan(SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - sizeof(kTLS13DowngradeRandom));
     if (suffix == kTLS12DowngradeRandom || suffix == kTLS13DowngradeRandom ||
         suffix == kJDK11DowngradeRandom) {
-      ssl->s3->tls13_downgrade = true;
-      if (!hs->config->ignore_tls13_downgrade) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TLS13_DOWNGRADE);
-        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-        return ssl_hs_error;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && ssl->session != nullptr &&
-      ssl->session->session_id_length != 0 &&
-      CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id,
-                    ssl->session->session_id_length)) {
-    ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
-  } else {
-    // The server may also have echoed back the TLS 1.3 compatibility mode
-    // session ID. As we know this is not a session the server knows about, any
-    // server resuming it is in error. Reject the first connection
-    // deterministicly, rather than installing an invalid session into the
-    // session cache. https://crbug.com/796910
-    if (hs->session_id_len != 0 &&
-        CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_ECHOED_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TLS13_DOWNGRADE);
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
-
-    // The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to
-    // fill out.
-    ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
-    if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 0 /* client */)) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    // Note: session_id could be empty.
-    hs->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->new_session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id),
-                   CBS_len(&session_id));
-  }
-
-  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
-  if (cipher == NULL) {
-    // unknown cipher
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
   // The cipher must be allowed in the selected version and enabled.
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(server_hello.cipher_suite);
   uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
   ssl_get_client_disabled(hs, &mask_a, &mask_k);
-  if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) || (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a) ||
+  if (cipher == nullptr ||
+      (cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) ||
+      (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a) ||
       SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > ssl_protocol_version(ssl) ||
       SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < ssl_protocol_version(ssl) ||
-      !sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(ssl), NULL, cipher)) {
+      !sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(ssl), nullptr, cipher)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
     ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+  hs->new_cipher = cipher;
+
+  if (hs->session_id_len != 0 &&
+      CBS_mem_equal(&server_hello.session_id, hs->session_id,
+                    hs->session_id_len)) {
+    // Echoing the ClientHello session ID in TLS 1.2, whether from the session
+    // or a synthetic one, indicates resumption. If there was no session (or if
+    // the session was only offered in ECH ClientHelloInner), this was the
+    // TLS 1.3 compatibility mode session ID. As we know this is not a session
+    // the server knows about, any server resuming it is in error. Reject the
+    // first connection deterministicly, rather than installing an invalid
+    // session into the session cache. https://crbug.com/796910
+    if (ssl->session == nullptr || ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_ECHOED_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
     if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED);
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
-    if (ssl->session->cipher != cipher) {
+    if (ssl->session->cipher != hs->new_cipher) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
       return ssl_hs_error;
@@ -715,10 +815,23 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
+    // We never offer sessions on renegotiation.
+    assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+    ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
   } else {
-    hs->new_session->cipher = cipher;
+    // The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to fill out.
+    ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
+    if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    // Note: session_id could be empty.
+    hs->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&server_hello.session_id);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->new_session->session_id,
+                   CBS_data(&server_hello.session_id),
+                   CBS_len(&server_hello.session_id));
+    hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
   }
-  hs->new_cipher = cipher;
 
   // Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash and hash the
   // ServerHello.
@@ -737,26 +850,17 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   }
 
   // Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported.
-  if (compression_method != 0) {
+  if (server_hello.compression_method != 0) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
     ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
-  // TLS extensions
-  if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &server_hello)) {
+  if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &server_hello.extensions)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
-  // There should be nothing left over in the record.
-  if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) {
-    // wrong packet length
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
   if (ssl->session != NULL &&
       hs->extended_master_secret != ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
     if (ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
@@ -768,13 +872,6 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
-  if (ssl->s3->token_binding_negotiated &&
-      (!hs->extended_master_secret || !ssl->s3->send_connection_binding)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_TB_WITHOUT_EMS_OR_RI);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
   ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
 
   if (ssl->session != NULL) {
@@ -1223,8 +1320,12 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_ok;
   }
 
-  // Call cert_cb to update the certificate.
-  if (hs->config->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+    // Do not send client certificates on ECH reject. We have not authenticated
+    // the server for the name that can learn the certificate.
+    SSL_certs_clear(ssl);
+  } else if (hs->config->cert->cert_cb != nullptr) {
+    // Call cert_cb to update the certificate.
     int rv = hs->config->cert->cert_cb(ssl, hs->config->cert->cert_cb_arg);
     if (rv == 0) {
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -1268,10 +1369,10 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
   uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
   if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-    CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf =
+    const CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf =
         sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs.get(), 0);
     CBS leaf_cbs;
-    CBS_init(&leaf_cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(leaf), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(leaf));
+    CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(leaf, &leaf_cbs);
 
     // Check the key usage matches the cipher suite. We do this unconditionally
     // for non-RSA certificates. In particular, it's needed to distinguish ECDH
@@ -1411,9 +1512,9 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
-  hs->new_session->master_key_length =
-      tls1_generate_master_secret(hs, hs->new_session->master_key, pms);
-  if (hs->new_session->master_key_length == 0) {
+  hs->new_session->secret_length =
+      tls1_generate_master_secret(hs, hs->new_session->secret, pms);
+  if (hs->new_session->secret_length == 0) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
   hs->new_session->extended_master_secret = hs->extended_master_secret;
@@ -1486,18 +1587,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
 
 static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  // Resolve Channel ID first, before any non-idempotent operations.
-  if (ssl->s3->channel_id_valid) {
-    if (!ssl_do_channel_id_callback(hs)) {
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-
-    if (hs->config->channel_id_private == NULL) {
-      hs->state = state_send_client_finished;
-      return ssl_hs_channel_id_lookup;
-    }
-  }
-
+  hs->can_release_private_key = true;
   if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl) ||
       !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, evp_aead_seal)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
@@ -1522,7 +1612,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     }
   }
 
-  if (ssl->s3->channel_id_valid) {
+  if (hs->channel_id_negotiated) {
     ScopedCBB cbb;
     CBB body;
     if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
@@ -1542,7 +1632,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
 }
 
 static bool can_false_start(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
 
   // False Start bypasses the Finished check's downgrade protection. This can
   // enable attacks where we send data under weaker settings than supported
@@ -1551,18 +1641,19 @@ static bool can_false_start(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   //
   // Now that TLS 1.3 exists, we would like to avoid similar attacks between
   // TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, but there are too many TLS 1.2 deployments to
-  // sacrifice False Start on them. TLS 1.3's downgrade signal fixes this, but
-  // |SSL_CTX_set_ignore_tls13_downgrade| can disable it due to compatibility
-  // issues.
-  //
-  // |SSL_CTX_set_ignore_tls13_downgrade| normally still retains Finished-based
-  // downgrade protection, but False Start bypasses that. Thus, we disable False
-  // Start based on the TLS 1.3 downgrade signal, even if otherwise unenforced.
+  // sacrifice False Start on them. Instead, we rely on the ServerHello.random
+  // downgrade signal, which we unconditionally enforce.
   if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ||
       SSL_version(ssl) != TLS1_2_VERSION ||
       hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kECDHE ||
-      hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD ||
-      ssl->s3->tls13_downgrade) {
+      hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // If ECH was rejected, disable False Start. We run the handshake to
+  // completion, including the Finished downgrade check, to authenticate the
+  // recovery flow.
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
     return false;
   }
 
@@ -1645,40 +1736,30 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
   }
 
-  SSL_SESSION *session = hs->new_session.get();
-  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> renewed_session;
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+  if (ssl->session != nullptr) {
     // The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are
     // immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the
     // existing session.
-    renewed_session =
+    assert(!hs->new_session);
+    hs->new_session =
         SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session.get(), SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
-    if (!renewed_session) {
-      // This should never happen.
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    if (!hs->new_session) {
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
-    session = renewed_session.get();
   }
 
   // |ticket_lifetime_hint| is measured from when the ticket was issued.
-  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session);
+  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, hs->new_session.get());
 
-  if (!session->ticket.CopyFrom(ticket)) {
+  if (!hs->new_session->ticket.CopyFrom(ticket)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
-  session->ticket_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
+  hs->new_session->ticket_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
 
-  // Generate a session ID for this session. Some callers expect all sessions to
-  // have a session ID. Additionally, it acts as the session ID to signal
-  // resumption.
-  SHA256(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), session->session_id);
-  session->session_id_length = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-
-  if (renewed_session) {
-    session->not_resumable = false;
-    ssl->session = std::move(renewed_session);
-  }
+  // Historically, OpenSSL filled in fake session IDs for ticket-based sessions.
+  // TODO(davidben): Are external callers relying on this? Try removing this.
+  SHA256(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), hs->new_session->session_id);
+  hs->new_session->session_id_length = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
 
   ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
   hs->state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
@@ -1712,15 +1793,25 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
 
 static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+    // Release the retry configs.
+    hs->ech_authenticated_reject = true;
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ECH_REQUIRED);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
 
   ssl->method->on_handshake_complete(ssl);
 
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-    ssl->s3->established_session = UpRef(ssl->session);
-  } else {
-    // We make a copy of the session in order to maintain the immutability
-    // of the new established_session due to False Start. The caller may
-    // have taken a reference to the temporary session.
+  // Note TLS 1.2 resumptions with ticket renewal have both |ssl->session| (the
+  // resumed session) and |hs->new_session| (the session with the new ticket).
+  bool has_new_session = hs->new_session != nullptr;
+  if (has_new_session) {
+    // When False Start is enabled, the handshake reports completion early. The
+    // caller may then have passed the (then unresuable) |hs->new_session| to
+    // another thread via |SSL_get0_session| for resumption. To avoid potential
+    // race conditions in such callers, we duplicate the session before
+    // clearing |not_resumable|.
     ssl->s3->established_session =
         SSL_SESSION_dup(hs->new_session.get(), SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL);
     if (!ssl->s3->established_session) {
@@ -1732,11 +1823,16 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     }
 
     hs->new_session.reset();
+  } else {
+    assert(ssl->session != nullptr);
+    ssl->s3->established_session = UpRef(ssl->session);
   }
 
   hs->handshake_finalized = true;
   ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = true;
-  ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+  if (has_new_session) {
+    ssl_update_cache(ssl);
+  }
 
   hs->state = state_done;
   return ssl_hs_ok;