grpc 1.30.0 → 1.46.3

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/include/openssl/ssl.h

@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *ssl);
 // |SSL_set0_rbio| and |SSL_set0_wbio| instead.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_bio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio);
 
-// SSL_set0_rbio configures |ssl| to write to |rbio|. It takes ownership of
+// SSL_set0_rbio configures |ssl| to read from |rbio|. It takes ownership of
 // |rbio|.
 //
 // Note that, although this function and |SSL_set0_wbio| may be called on the
@@ -362,10 +362,31 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num);
 // SSL_peek behaves like |SSL_read| but does not consume any bytes returned.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num);
 
-// SSL_pending returns the number of bytes available in |ssl|. It does not read
-// from the transport.
+// SSL_pending returns the number of buffered, decrypted bytes available for
+// read in |ssl|. It does not read from the transport.
+//
+// In DTLS, it is possible for this function to return zero while there is
+// buffered, undecrypted data from the transport in |ssl|. For example,
+// |SSL_read| may read a datagram with two records, decrypt the first, and leave
+// the second buffered for a subsequent call to |SSL_read|. Callers that wish to
+// detect this case can use |SSL_has_pending|.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_pending(const SSL *ssl);
 
+// SSL_has_pending returns one if |ssl| has buffered, decrypted bytes available
+// for read, or if |ssl| has buffered data from the transport that has not yet
+// been decrypted. If |ssl| has neither, this function returns zero.
+//
+// In TLS, BoringSSL does not implement read-ahead, so this function returns one
+// if and only if |SSL_pending| would return a non-zero value. In DTLS, it is
+// possible for this function to return one while |SSL_pending| returns zero.
+// For example, |SSL_read| may read a datagram with two records, decrypt the
+// first, and leave the second buffered for a subsequent call to |SSL_read|.
+//
+// As a result, if this function returns one, the next call to |SSL_read| may
+// still fail, read from the transport, or both. The buffered, undecrypted data
+// may be invalid or incomplete.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *ssl);
+
 // SSL_write writes up to |num| bytes from |buf| into |ssl|. It implicitly runs
 // any pending handshakes, including renegotiations when enabled. On success, it
 // returns the number of bytes written. Otherwise, it returns <= 0. The caller
@@ -508,12 +529,10 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_error(const SSL *ssl, int ret_code);
 // TODO(davidben): Remove this. It's used by accept BIOs which are bizarre.
 #define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT 8
 
-// SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP indicates the operation failed looking up
-// the Channel ID key. The caller may retry the operation when |channel_id_cb|
-// is ready to return a key or one has been configured with
-// |SSL_set1_tls_channel_id|.
+// SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP is never used.
 //
-// See also |SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb|.
+// TODO(davidben): Remove this. Some callers reference it when stringifying
+// errors. They should use |SSL_error_description| instead.
 #define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP 9
 
 // SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION indicates the operation failed because the session
@@ -567,6 +586,11 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_error(const SSL *ssl, int ret_code);
 // See also |ssl_renegotiate_explicit|.
 #define SSL_ERROR_WANT_RENEGOTIATE 19
 
+// SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_HINTS_READY indicates the handshake has progressed enough
+// for |SSL_serialize_handshake_hints| to be called. See also
+// |SSL_request_handshake_hints|.
+#define SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_HINTS_READY 20
+
 // SSL_error_description returns a string representation of |err|, where |err|
 // is one of the |SSL_ERROR_*| constants returned by |SSL_get_error|, or NULL
 // if the value is unrecognized.
@@ -953,6 +977,18 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get0_certificate_types(const SSL *ssl,
 OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t
 SSL_get0_peer_verify_algorithms(const SSL *ssl, const uint16_t **out_sigalgs);
 
+// SSL_get0_peer_delegation_algorithms sets |*out_sigalgs| to an array
+// containing the signature algorithms the peer is willing to use with delegated
+// credentials.  It returns the length of the array. If not sent, the empty
+// array is returned.
+//
+// The behavior of this function is undefined except during the callbacks set by
+// by |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb| and |SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb| or when the
+// handshake is paused because of them.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t
+SSL_get0_peer_delegation_algorithms(const SSL *ssl,
+                                    const uint16_t **out_sigalgs);
+
 // SSL_certs_clear resets the private key, leaf certificate, and certificate
 // chain of |ssl|.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *ssl);
@@ -1204,6 +1240,11 @@ enum ssl_private_key_result_t BORINGSSL_ENUM_INT {
 // key hooks. This is used to off-load signing operations to a custom,
 // potentially asynchronous, backend. Metadata about the key such as the type
 // and size are parsed out of the certificate.
+//
+// Callers that use this structure should additionally call
+// |SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs| or |SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs|
+// with the private key's capabilities. This ensures BoringSSL will select a
+// suitable signature algorithm for the private key.
 struct ssl_private_key_method_st {
   // sign signs the message |in| in using the specified signature algorithm. On
   // success, it returns |ssl_private_key_success| and writes at most |max_out|
@@ -1264,6 +1305,15 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_private_key_method(
 OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_private_key_method(
     SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method);
 
+// SSL_can_release_private_key returns one if |ssl| will no longer call into the
+// private key and zero otherwise. If the function returns one, the caller can
+// release state associated with the private key.
+//
+// NOTE: This function assumes the caller does not use |SSL_clear| to reuse
+// |ssl| for a second connection. If |SSL_clear| is used, BoringSSL may still
+// use the private key on the second connection.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_can_release_private_key(const SSL *ssl);
+
 
 // Cipher suites.
 //
@@ -1281,8 +1331,8 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_cipher_by_value(uint16_t value);
 // cast to a |uint16_t| to get it.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
 
-// SSL_CIPHER_get_value returns |cipher|'s IANA-assigned number.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_value(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+// SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id returns |cipher|'s IANA-assigned number.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
 
 // SSL_CIPHER_is_aead returns one if |cipher| uses an AEAD cipher.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
@@ -1620,6 +1670,11 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_export_keying_material(
 // abbreviated handshake. It is reference-counted and immutable. Once
 // established, an |SSL_SESSION| may be shared by multiple |SSL| objects on
 // different threads and must not be modified.
+//
+// Note the TLS notion of "session" is not suitable for application-level
+// session state. It is an optional caching mechanism for the handshake. Not all
+// connections within an application-level session will reuse TLS sessions. TLS
+// sessions may be dropped by the client or ignored by the server at any time.
 
 DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 
@@ -1674,6 +1729,19 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(SSL_SESSION *session,
 
 // SSL_SESSION_get_id returns a pointer to a buffer containing |session|'s
 // session ID and sets |*out_len| to its length.
+//
+// This function should only be used for implementing a TLS session cache. TLS
+// sessions are not suitable for application-level session state, and a session
+// ID is an implementation detail of the TLS resumption handshake mechanism. Not
+// all resumption flows use session IDs, and not all connections within an
+// application-level session will reuse TLS sessions.
+//
+// To determine if resumption occurred, use |SSL_session_reused| instead.
+// Comparing session IDs will not give the right result in all cases.
+//
+// As a workaround for some broken applications, BoringSSL sometimes synthesizes
+// arbitrary session IDs for non-ID-based sessions. This behavior may be
+// removed in the future.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *session,
                                                  unsigned *out_len);
 
@@ -1726,9 +1794,9 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_SESSION_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL_SESSION *session,
 // SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH is the maximum length of a master secret.
 #define SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 48
 
-// SSL_SESSION_get_master_key writes up to |max_out| bytes of |session|'s master
-// secret to |out| and returns the number of bytes written. If |max_out| is
-// zero, it returns the size of the master secret.
+// SSL_SESSION_get_master_key writes up to |max_out| bytes of |session|'s secret
+// to |out| and returns the number of bytes written. If |max_out| is zero, it
+// returns the size of the secret.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session,
                                                  uint8_t *out, size_t max_out);
 
@@ -1767,8 +1835,10 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *session,
 // used without leaking a correlator.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_should_be_single_use(const SSL_SESSION *session);
 
-// SSL_SESSION_is_resumable returns one if |session| is resumable and zero
-// otherwise.
+// SSL_SESSION_is_resumable returns one if |session| is complete and contains a
+// session ID or ticket. It returns zero otherwise. Note this function does not
+// ensure |session| will be resumed. It may be expired, dropped by the server,
+// or associated with incompatible parameters.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(const SSL_SESSION *session);
 
 // SSL_SESSION_has_ticket returns one if |session| has a ticket and zero
@@ -2197,6 +2267,20 @@ struct ssl_ticket_aead_method_st {
 OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_ticket_aead_method(
     SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD *aead_method);
 
+// SSL_process_tls13_new_session_ticket processes an unencrypted TLS 1.3
+// NewSessionTicket message from |buf| and returns a resumable |SSL_SESSION|,
+// or NULL on error. The caller takes ownership of the returned session and
+// must call |SSL_SESSION_free| to free it.
+//
+// |buf| contains |buf_len| bytes that represents a complete NewSessionTicket
+// message including its header, i.e., one byte for the type (0x04) and three
+// bytes for the length. |buf| must contain only one such message.
+//
+// This function may be used to process NewSessionTicket messages in TLS 1.3
+// clients that are handling the record layer externally.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *SSL_process_tls13_new_session_ticket(
+    SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *buf, size_t buf_len);
+
 
 // Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman.
 //
@@ -2697,8 +2781,9 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx);
 
 // SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the client ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to
 // |protos|. |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
-// length-prefixed strings). It returns zero on success and one on failure.
-// Configuring this list enables ALPN on a client.
+// length-prefixed strings), or the empty string to disable ALPN. It returns
+// zero on success and one on failure. Configuring a non-empty string enables
+// ALPN on a client.
 //
 // WARNING: this function is dangerous because it breaks the usual return value
 // convention.
@@ -2707,8 +2792,9 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *protos,
 
 // SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the client ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|.
 // |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
-// length-prefixed strings). It returns zero on success and one on failure.
-// Configuring this list enables ALPN on a client.
+// length-prefixed strings), or the empty string to disable ALPN. It returns
+// zero on success and one on failure. Configuring a non-empty string enables
+// ALPN on a client.
 //
 // WARNING: this function is dangerous because it breaks the usual return value
 // convention.
@@ -2717,18 +2803,34 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *protos,
 
 // SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is called
 // during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol from the
-// client's list of offered protocols. Configuring this callback enables ALPN on
-// a server.
+// client's list of offered protocols.
 //
 // The callback is passed a wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
-// length-prefixed strings) ALPN protocol list in |in|. It should set |*out| and
-// |*out_len| to the selected protocol and return |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK| on
-// success. It does not pass ownership of the buffer. Otherwise, it should
-// return |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK|. Other |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*| values are
-// unimplemented and will be treated as |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK|.
+// length-prefixed strings) ALPN protocol list in |in|. To select a protocol,
+// the callback should set |*out| and |*out_len| to the selected protocol and
+// return |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK| on success. It does not pass ownership of the
+// buffer, so |*out| should point to a static string, a buffer that outlives the
+// callback call, or the corresponding entry in |in|.
+//
+// If the server supports ALPN, but there are no protocols in common, the
+// callback should return |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL| to abort the connection
+// with a no_application_protocol alert.
+//
+// If the server does not support ALPN, it can return |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK| to
+// continue the handshake without negotiating a protocol. This may be useful if
+// multiple server configurations share an |SSL_CTX|, only some of which have
+// ALPN protocols configured.
+//
+// |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING| is ignored and will be treated as
+// |SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK|.
+//
+// The callback will only be called if the client supports ALPN. Callers that
+// wish to require ALPN for all clients must check |SSL_get0_alpn_selected|
+// after the handshake. In QUIC connections, this is done automatically.
 //
 // The cipher suite is selected before negotiating ALPN. The callback may use
-// |SSL_get_pending_cipher| to query the cipher suite.
+// |SSL_get_pending_cipher| to query the cipher suite. This may be used to
+// implement HTTP/2's cipher suite constraints.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(
     SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len,
                             const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, void *arg),
@@ -2750,15 +2852,58 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_allow_unknown_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx,
                                                           int enabled);
 
 
+// Application-layer protocol settings
+//
+// The ALPS extension (draft-vvv-tls-alps) allows exchanging application-layer
+// settings in the TLS handshake for applications negotiated with ALPN. Note
+// that, when ALPS is negotiated, the client and server each advertise their own
+// settings, so there are functions to both configure setting to send and query
+// received settings.
+
+// SSL_add_application_settings configures |ssl| to enable ALPS with ALPN
+// protocol |proto|, sending an ALPS value of |settings|. It returns one on
+// success and zero on error. If |proto| is negotiated via ALPN and the peer
+// supports ALPS, |settings| will be sent to the peer. The peer's ALPS value can
+// be retrieved with |SSL_get0_peer_application_settings|.
+//
+// On the client, this function should be called before the handshake, once for
+// each supported ALPN protocol which uses ALPS. |proto| must be included in the
+// client's ALPN configuration (see |SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos| and
+// |SSL_set_alpn_protos|). On the server, ALPS can be preconfigured for each
+// protocol as in the client, or configuration can be deferred to the ALPN
+// callback (see |SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb|), in which case only the selected
+// protocol needs to be configured.
+//
+// ALPS can be independently configured from 0-RTT, however changes in protocol
+// settings will fallback to 1-RTT to negotiate the new value, so it is
+// recommended for |settings| to be relatively stable.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_add_application_settings(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *proto,
+                                                size_t proto_len,
+                                                const uint8_t *settings,
+                                                size_t settings_len);
+
+// SSL_get0_peer_application_settings sets |*out_data| and |*out_len| to a
+// buffer containing the peer's ALPS value, or the empty string if ALPS was not
+// negotiated. Note an empty string could also indicate the peer sent an empty
+// settings value. Use |SSL_has_application_settings| to check if ALPS was
+// negotiated. The output buffer is owned by |ssl| and is valid until the next
+// time |ssl| is modified.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get0_peer_application_settings(const SSL *ssl,
+                                                       const uint8_t **out_data,
+                                                       size_t *out_len);
+
+// SSL_has_application_settings returns one if ALPS was negotiated on this
+// connection and zero otherwise.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_has_application_settings(const SSL *ssl);
+
+
 // Certificate compression.
 //
-// Certificates in TLS 1.3 can be compressed[1]. BoringSSL supports this as both
-// a client and a server, but does not link against any specific compression
-// libraries in order to keep dependencies to a minimum. Instead, hooks for
-// compression and decompression can be installed in an |SSL_CTX| to enable
-// support.
-//
-// [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-03.
+// Certificates in TLS 1.3 can be compressed (RFC 8879). BoringSSL supports this
+// as both a client and a server, but does not link against any specific
+// compression libraries in order to keep dependencies to a minimum. Instead,
+// hooks for compression and decompression can be installed in an |SSL_CTX| to
+// enable support.
 
 // ssl_cert_compression_func_t is a pointer to a function that performs
 // compression. It must write the compressed representation of |in| to |out|,
@@ -2871,15 +3016,16 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_select_next_proto(uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len,
 
 // Channel ID.
 //
-// See draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01.
+// See draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01. This is an old, experimental mechanism
+// and should not be used in new code.
 
 // SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled configures whether connections associated
-// with |ctx| should enable Channel ID.
+// with |ctx| should enable Channel ID as a server.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx,
                                                        int enabled);
 
 // SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled configures whether |ssl| should enable Channel
-// ID.
+// ID as a server.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_tls_channel_id_enabled(SSL *ssl, int enabled);
 
 // SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id configures a TLS client to send a TLS Channel ID
@@ -2893,55 +3039,15 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx,
 // success and zero on error.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *private_key);
 
-// SSL_get_tls_channel_id gets the client's TLS Channel ID from a server |SSL*|
+// SSL_get_tls_channel_id gets the client's TLS Channel ID from a server |SSL|
 // and copies up to the first |max_out| bytes into |out|. The Channel ID
 // consists of the client's P-256 public key as an (x,y) pair where each is a
 // 32-byte, big-endian field element. It returns 0 if the client didn't offer a
-// Channel ID and the length of the complete Channel ID otherwise.
+// Channel ID and the length of the complete Channel ID otherwise. This function
+// always returns zero if |ssl| is a client.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_tls_channel_id(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out,
                                              size_t max_out);
 
-// SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb sets a callback to be called when a TLS Channel ID
-// is requested. The callback may set |*out_pkey| to a key, passing a reference
-// to the caller. If none is returned, the handshake will pause and
-// |SSL_get_error| will return |SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP|.
-//
-// See also |SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP|.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(
-    SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*channel_id_cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey));
-
-// SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb returns the callback set by
-// |SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb|.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(
-    SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey);
-
-
-// Token Binding.
-//
-// See draft-ietf-tokbind-protocol-16.
-
-// SSL_set_token_binding_params sets |params| as the Token Binding Key
-// parameters (section 3 of draft-ietf-tokbind-protocol-16) to negotiate on the
-// connection. If this function is not called, or if |len| is 0, then this
-// endpoint will not attempt to negotiate Token Binding. |params| are provided
-// in preference order, with the more preferred parameters at the beginning of
-// the list. This function returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_token_binding_params(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *params,
-                                                size_t len);
-
-// SSL_is_token_binding_negotiated returns 1 if Token Binding was negotiated
-// on this connection and 0 otherwise. On a server, it is possible for this
-// function to return 1 when the client's view of the connection is that Token
-// Binding was not negotiated. This occurs when the server indicates a version
-// of Token Binding less than the client's minimum version.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_is_token_binding_negotiated(const SSL *ssl);
-
-// SSL_get_negotiated_token_binding_param returns the TokenBindingKeyParameters
-// enum value that was negotiated. It is only valid to call this function if
-// SSL_is_token_binding_negotiated returned 1, otherwise this function returns
-// an undefined value.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT uint8_t SSL_get_negotiated_token_binding_param(const SSL *ssl);
-
 
 // DTLS-SRTP.
 //
@@ -2978,8 +3084,8 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_srtp_profiles(SSL_CTX *ctx,
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_srtp_profiles(SSL *ssl, const char *profiles);
 
 // SSL_get_srtp_profiles returns the SRTP profiles supported by |ssl|.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(
-    SSL *ssl);
+OPENSSL_EXPORT const STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *SSL_get_srtp_profiles(
+    const SSL *ssl);
 
 // SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile returns the selected SRTP profile, or NULL if
 // SRTP was not negotiated.
@@ -3110,7 +3216,7 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_delegated_credential_used(const SSL *ssl);
 //
 // QUIC acts as an underlying transport for the TLS 1.3 handshake. The following
 // functions allow a QUIC implementation to serve as the underlying transport as
-// described in draft-ietf-quic-tls.
+// described in RFC 9001.
 //
 // When configured for QUIC, |SSL_do_handshake| will drive the handshake as
 // before, but it will not use the configured |BIO|. It will call functions on
@@ -3130,8 +3236,7 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_delegated_credential_used(const SSL *ssl);
 // confirm the handshake. As a client, |SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED| and
 // |SSL_reset_early_data_reject| behave as usual.
 //
-// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-tls-15#section-4.1 for more
-// details.
+// See https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9001.html#section-4.1 for more details.
 //
 // To avoid DoS attacks, the QUIC implementation must limit the amount of data
 // being queued up. The implementation can call
@@ -3142,7 +3247,8 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_delegated_credential_used(const SSL *ssl);
 // |SSL_set_quic_transport_params|. |SSL_get_peer_quic_transport_params| may be
 // used to query the value received from the peer. BoringSSL handles this
 // extension as an opaque byte string. The caller is responsible for serializing
-// and parsing them. See draft-ietf-quic-transport (section 7.3) for details.
+// and parsing them. See https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-7.4 for
+// details.
 //
 // QUIC additionally imposes restrictions on 0-RTT. In particular, the QUIC
 // transport layer requires that if a server accepts 0-RTT data, then the
@@ -3153,12 +3259,15 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_delegated_credential_used(const SSL *ssl);
 // QUIC may impose similar restrictions, for example HTTP/3's restrictions on
 // SETTINGS frames.
 //
-// BoringSSL imposes a stricter check on the server to enforce these
-// restrictions. BoringSSL requires that the transport parameters and
-// application protocol state be a byte-for-byte match between the connection
-// where the ticket was issued and the connection where it is used for 0-RTT. If
-// there is a mismatch, BoringSSL will reject early data (but not reject the
-// resumption attempt).
+// BoringSSL implements this check by doing a byte-for-byte comparison of an
+// opaque context passed in by the server. This context must be the same on the
+// connection where the ticket was issued and the connection where that ticket
+// is used for 0-RTT. If there is a mismatch, or the context was not set,
+// BoringSSL will reject early data (but not reject the resumption attempt).
+// This context is set via |SSL_set_quic_early_data_context| and should cover
+// both transport parameters and any application state.
+// |SSL_set_quic_early_data_context| must be called on the server with a
+// non-empty context if the server is to support 0-RTT in QUIC.
 //
 // BoringSSL does not perform any client-side checks on the transport
 // parameters received from a server that also accepted early data. It is up to
@@ -3166,12 +3275,6 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_delegated_credential_used(const SSL *ssl);
 // limits, and to close the QUIC connection if that is not the case. The same
 // holds for any application protocol state remembered for 0-RTT, e.g. HTTP/3
 // SETTINGS.
-//
-// The transport parameter check happens automatically with
-// |SSL_set_quic_transport_params|. QUIC servers must set application state via
-// |SSL_set_quic_early_data_context| to configure the application protocol
-// check. No other mechanisms are provided to have BoringSSL reject early data
-// because of QUIC transport or application protocol restrictions.
 
 // ssl_encryption_level_t represents a specific QUIC encryption level used to
 // transmit handshake messages.
@@ -3257,7 +3360,7 @@ struct ssl_quic_method_st {
 // that may be received at the given encryption level. This function should be
 // used to limit buffering in the QUIC implementation.
 //
-// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-16#section-4.4.
+// See https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-7.5
 OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_quic_max_handshake_flight_len(
     const SSL *ssl, enum ssl_encryption_level_t level);
 
@@ -3318,11 +3421,21 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_quic_transport_params(SSL *ssl,
 OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get_peer_quic_transport_params(
     const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_params, size_t *out_params_len);
 
+// SSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint configures whether to use the legacy QUIC
+// extension codepoint 0xffa5 as opposed to the official value 57. Call with
+// |use_legacy| set to 1 to use 0xffa5 and call with 0 to use 57. By default,
+// the standard code point is used.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint(SSL *ssl, int use_legacy);
+
 // SSL_set_quic_early_data_context configures a context string in QUIC servers
 // for accepting early data. If a resumption connection offers early data, the
 // server will check if the value matches that of the connection which minted
-// the ticket. If not, resumption still succeeds but early data is rejected. For
-// HTTP/3, this should be the serialized server SETTINGS frame.
+// the ticket. If not, resumption still succeeds but early data is rejected.
+// This should include all QUIC Transport Parameters except ones specified that
+// the client MUST NOT remember. This should also include any application
+// protocol-specific state. For HTTP/3, this should be the serialized server
+// SETTINGS frame and the QUIC Transport Parameters (except the stateless reset
+// token).
 //
 // This function may be called before |SSL_do_handshake| or during server
 // certificate selection. It returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
@@ -3460,14 +3573,15 @@ enum ssl_early_data_reason_t BORINGSSL_ENUM_INT {
   ssl_early_data_alpn_mismatch = 9,
   // The connection negotiated Channel ID, which is incompatible with 0-RTT.
   ssl_early_data_channel_id = 10,
-  // The connection negotiated token binding, which is incompatible with 0-RTT.
-  ssl_early_data_token_binding = 11,
+  // Value 11 is reserved. (It has historically |ssl_early_data_token_binding|.)
   // The client and server ticket age were too far apart.
   ssl_early_data_ticket_age_skew = 12,
   // QUIC parameters differ between this connection and the original.
   ssl_early_data_quic_parameter_mismatch = 13,
+  // The application settings did not match the session.
+  ssl_early_data_alps_mismatch = 14,
   // The value of the largest entry.
-  ssl_early_data_reason_max_value = ssl_early_data_quic_parameter_mismatch,
+  ssl_early_data_reason_max_value = ssl_early_data_alps_mismatch,
 };
 
 // SSL_get_early_data_reason returns details why 0-RTT was accepted or rejected
@@ -3475,6 +3589,189 @@ enum ssl_early_data_reason_t BORINGSSL_ENUM_INT {
 OPENSSL_EXPORT enum ssl_early_data_reason_t SSL_get_early_data_reason(
     const SSL *ssl);
 
+// SSL_early_data_reason_string returns a string representation for |reason|, or
+// NULL if |reason| is unknown. This function may be used for logging.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_early_data_reason_string(
+    enum ssl_early_data_reason_t reason);
+
+
+// Encrypted ClientHello.
+//
+// ECH is a mechanism for encrypting the entire ClientHello message in TLS 1.3.
+// This can prevent observers from seeing cleartext information about the
+// connection, such as the server_name extension.
+//
+// By default, BoringSSL will treat the server name, session ticket, and client
+// certificate as secret, but most other parameters, such as the ALPN protocol
+// list will be treated as public and sent in the cleartext ClientHello. Other
+// APIs may be added for applications with different secrecy requirements.
+//
+// ECH support in BoringSSL is still experimental and under development.
+//
+// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-13.
+
+// SSL_set_enable_ech_grease configures whether the client will send a GREASE
+// ECH extension when no supported ECHConfig is available.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_enable_ech_grease(SSL *ssl, int enable);
+
+// SSL_set1_ech_config_list configures |ssl| to, as a client, offer ECH with the
+// specified configuration. |ech_config_list| should contain a serialized
+// ECHConfigList structure. It returns one on success and zero on error.
+//
+// This function returns an error if the input is malformed. If the input is
+// valid but none of the ECHConfigs implement supported parameters, it will
+// return success and proceed without ECH.
+//
+// If a supported ECHConfig is found, |ssl| will encrypt the true ClientHello
+// parameters. If the server cannot decrypt it, e.g. due to a key mismatch, ECH
+// has a recovery flow. |ssl| will handshake using the cleartext parameters,
+// including a public name in the ECHConfig. If using
+// |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify|, callers should use |SSL_get0_ech_name_override|
+// to verify the certificate with the public name. If using the built-in
+// verifier, the |X509_STORE_CTX| will be configured automatically.
+//
+// If no other errors are found in this handshake, it will fail with
+// |SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED|. Since it didn't use the true parameters, the connection
+// cannot be used for application data. Instead, callers should handle this
+// error by calling |SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs| and retrying the connection
+// with updated ECH parameters. If the retry also fails with
+// |SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED|, the caller should report a connection failure.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_ech_config_list(SSL *ssl,
+                                            const uint8_t *ech_config_list,
+                                            size_t ech_config_list_len);
+
+// SSL_get0_ech_name_override, if |ssl| is a client and the server rejected ECH,
+// sets |*out_name| and |*out_name_len| to point to a buffer containing the ECH
+// public name. Otherwise, the buffer will be empty.
+//
+// When offering ECH as a client, this function should be called during the
+// certificate verification callback (see |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify|). If
+// |*out_name_len| is non-zero, the caller should verify the certificate against
+// the result, interpreted as a DNS name, rather than the true server name. In
+// this case, the handshake will never succeed and is only used to authenticate
+// retry configs. See also |SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs|.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get0_ech_name_override(const SSL *ssl,
+                                               const char **out_name,
+                                               size_t *out_name_len);
+
+// SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs sets |*out_retry_configs| and
+// |*out_retry_configs_len| to a buffer containing a serialized ECHConfigList.
+// If the server did not provide an ECHConfigList, |*out_retry_configs_len| will
+// be zero.
+//
+// When handling an |SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED| error code as a client, callers should
+// use this function to recover from potential key mismatches. If the result is
+// non-empty, the caller should retry the connection, passing this buffer to
+// |SSL_set1_ech_config_list|. If the result is empty, the server has rolled
+// back ECH support, and the caller should retry without ECH.
+//
+// This function must only be called in response to an |SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED|
+// error code. Calling this function on |ssl|s that have not authenticated the
+// rejection handshake will assert in debug builds and otherwise return an
+// unparsable list.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs(
+    const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_retry_configs,
+    size_t *out_retry_configs_len);
+
+// SSL_marshal_ech_config constructs a new serialized ECHConfig. On success, it
+// sets |*out| to a newly-allocated buffer containing the result and |*out_len|
+// to the size of the buffer. The caller must call |OPENSSL_free| on |*out| to
+// release the memory. On failure, it returns zero.
+//
+// The |config_id| field is a single byte identifer for the ECHConfig. Reusing
+// config IDs is allowed, but if multiple ECHConfigs with the same config ID are
+// active at a time, server load may increase. See
+// |SSL_ECH_KEYS_has_duplicate_config_id|.
+//
+// The public key and KEM algorithm are taken from |key|. |public_name| is the
+// DNS name used to authenticate the recovery flow. |max_name_len| should be the
+// length of the longest name in the ECHConfig's anonymity set and influences
+// client padding decisions.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_marshal_ech_config(uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len,
+                                          uint8_t config_id,
+                                          const EVP_HPKE_KEY *key,
+                                          const char *public_name,
+                                          size_t max_name_len);
+
+// SSL_ECH_KEYS_new returns a newly-allocated |SSL_ECH_KEYS| or NULL on error.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_ECH_KEYS *SSL_ECH_KEYS_new(void);
+
+// SSL_ECH_KEYS_up_ref increments the reference count of |keys|.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_ECH_KEYS_up_ref(SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys);
+
+// SSL_ECH_KEYS_free releases memory associated with |keys|.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_ECH_KEYS_free(SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys);
+
+// SSL_ECH_KEYS_add decodes |ech_config| as an ECHConfig and appends it with
+// |key| to |keys|. If |is_retry_config| is non-zero, this config will be
+// returned to the client on configuration mismatch. It returns one on success
+// and zero on error.
+//
+// This function should be called successively to register each ECHConfig in
+// decreasing order of preference. This configuration must be completed before
+// setting |keys| on an |SSL_CTX| with |SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys|. After that
+// point, |keys| is immutable; no more ECHConfig values may be added.
+//
+// See also |SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys|.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_ECH_KEYS_add(SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys, int is_retry_config,
+                                    const uint8_t *ech_config,
+                                    size_t ech_config_len,
+                                    const EVP_HPKE_KEY *key);
+
+// SSL_ECH_KEYS_has_duplicate_config_id returns one if |keys| has duplicate
+// config IDs or zero otherwise. Duplicate config IDs still work, but may
+// increase server load due to trial decryption.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_ECH_KEYS_has_duplicate_config_id(
+    const SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys);
+
+// SSL_ECH_KEYS_marshal_retry_configs serializes the retry configs in |keys| as
+// an ECHConfigList. On success, it sets |*out| to a newly-allocated buffer
+// containing the result and |*out_len| to the size of the buffer. The caller
+// must call |OPENSSL_free| on |*out| to release the memory. On failure, it
+// returns zero.
+//
+// This output may be advertised to clients in DNS.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_ECH_KEYS_marshal_retry_configs(const SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys,
+                                                      uint8_t **out,
+                                                      size_t *out_len);
+
+// SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys configures |ctx| to use |keys| to decrypt encrypted
+// ClientHellos. It returns one on success, and zero on failure. If |keys| does
+// not contain any retry configs, this function will fail. Retry configs are
+// marked as such when they are added to |keys| with |SSL_ECH_KEYS_add|.
+//
+// Once |keys| has been passed to this function, it is immutable. Unlike most
+// |SSL_CTX| configuration functions, this function may be called even if |ctx|
+// already has associated connections on multiple threads. This may be used to
+// rotate keys in a long-lived server process.
+//
+// The configured ECHConfig values should also be advertised out-of-band via DNS
+// (see draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https). Before advertising an ECHConfig in DNS,
+// deployments should ensure all instances of the service are configured with
+// the ECHConfig and corresponding private key.
+//
+// Only the most recent fully-deployed ECHConfigs should be advertised in DNS.
+// |keys| may contain a newer set if those ECHConfigs are mid-deployment. It
+// should also contain older sets, until the DNS change has rolled out and the
+// old records have expired from caches.
+//
+// If there is a mismatch, |SSL| objects associated with |ctx| will complete the
+// handshake using the cleartext ClientHello and send updated ECHConfig values
+// to the client. The client will then retry to recover, but with a latency
+// penalty. This recovery flow depends on the public name in the ECHConfig.
+// Before advertising an ECHConfig in DNS, deployments must ensure all instances
+// of the service can present a valid certificate for the public name.
+//
+// BoringSSL negotiates ECH before certificate selection callbacks are called,
+// including |SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb|. If ECH is negotiated, the
+// reported |SSL_CLIENT_HELLO| structure and |SSL_get_servername| function will
+// transparently reflect the inner ClientHello. Callers should select parameters
+// based on these values to correctly handle ECH as well as the recovery flow.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys);
+
+// SSL_ech_accepted returns one if |ssl| negotiated ECH and zero otherwise.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_ech_accepted(const SSL *ssl);
+
 
 // Alerts.
 //
@@ -3529,6 +3826,7 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT enum ssl_early_data_reason_t SSL_get_early_data_reason(
 #define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
 #define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
 #define SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
+#define SSL_AD_ECH_REQUIRED TLS1_AD_ECH_REQUIRED
 
 // SSL_alert_type_string_long returns a string description of |value| as an
 // alert type (warning or fatal).
@@ -3589,11 +3887,13 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_ivs(const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_read_iv,
                                const uint8_t **out_write_iv,
                                size_t *out_iv_len);
 
-// SSL_get_key_block_len returns the length of |ssl|'s key block.
+// SSL_get_key_block_len returns the length of |ssl|'s key block. It is an error
+// to call this function during a handshake.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_get_key_block_len(const SSL *ssl);
 
 // SSL_generate_key_block generates |out_len| bytes of key material for |ssl|'s
-// current connection state.
+// current connection state. It is an error to call this function during a
+// handshake.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_generate_key_block(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out,
                                           size_t out_len);
 
@@ -3608,6 +3908,105 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT uint64_t SSL_get_read_sequence(const SSL *ssl);
 // two most significant bytes.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT uint64_t SSL_get_write_sequence(const SSL *ssl);
 
+// SSL_CTX_set_record_protocol_version returns whether |version| is zero.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                                       int version);
+
+
+// Handshake hints.
+//
+// *** EXPERIMENTAL — DO NOT USE WITHOUT CHECKING ***
+//
+// Some server deployments make asynchronous RPC calls in both ClientHello
+// dispatch and private key operations. In TLS handshakes where the private key
+// operation occurs in the first round-trip, this results in two consecutive RPC
+// round-trips. Handshake hints allow the RPC service to predicte a signature.
+// If correctly predicted, this can skip the second RPC call.
+//
+// First, the server installs a certificate selection callback (see
+// |SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb|). When that is called, it performs the
+// RPC as before, but includes the ClientHello and a capabilities string from
+// |SSL_serialize_capabilities|.
+//
+// Next, the RPC service creates its own |SSL| object, applies the results of
+// certificate selection, calls |SSL_request_handshake_hints|, and runs the
+// handshake. If this successfully computes handshake hints (see
+// |SSL_serialize_handshake_hints|), the RPC server should send the hints
+// alongside any certificate selection results.
+//
+// Finally, the server calls |SSL_set_handshake_hints| and applies any
+// configuration from the RPC server. It then completes the handshake as before.
+// If the hints apply, BoringSSL will use the predicted signature and skip the
+// private key callbacks. Otherwise, BoringSSL will call private key callbacks
+// to generate a signature as before.
+//
+// Callers should synchronize configuration across the two services.
+// Configuration mismatches and some cases of version skew are not fatal, but
+// may result in the hints not applying. Additionally, some handshake flows use
+// the private key in later round-trips, such as TLS 1.3 HelloRetryRequest. In
+// those cases, BoringSSL will not predict a signature as there is no benefit.
+// Callers must allow for handshakes to complete without a predicted signature.
+//
+// For now, only TLS 1.3 is hinted. TLS 1.2 will work, but the hints will be
+// empty.
+
+// SSL_serialize_capabilities writes an opaque byte string to |out| describing
+// some of |ssl|'s capabilities. It returns one on success and zero on error.
+//
+// This string is used by BoringSSL internally to reduce the impact of version
+// skew.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_serialize_capabilities(const SSL *ssl, CBB *out);
+
+// SSL_request_handshake_hints configures |ssl| to generate a handshake hint for
+// |client_hello|. It returns one on success and zero on error. |client_hello|
+// should contain a serialized ClientHello structure, from the |client_hello|
+// and |client_hello_len| fields of the |SSL_CLIENT_HELLO| structure.
+// |capabilities| should contain the output of |SSL_serialize_capabilities|.
+//
+// When configured, |ssl| will perform no I/O (so there is no need to configure
+// |BIO|s). For QUIC, the caller should still configure an |SSL_QUIC_METHOD|,
+// but the callbacks themselves will never be called and may be left NULL or
+// report failure. |SSL_provide_quic_data| also should not be called.
+//
+// If hint generation is successful, |SSL_do_handshake| will stop the handshake
+// early with |SSL_get_error| returning |SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_HINTS_READY|. At
+// this point, the caller should run |SSL_serialize_handshake_hints| to extract
+// the resulting hints.
+//
+// Hint generation may fail if, e.g., |ssl| was unable to process the
+// ClientHello. Callers should then complete the certificate selection RPC and
+// continue the original handshake with no hint. It will likely fail, but this
+// reports the correct alert to the client and is more robust in case of
+// mismatch.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_request_handshake_hints(SSL *ssl,
+                                               const uint8_t *client_hello,
+                                               size_t client_hello_len,
+                                               const uint8_t *capabilities,
+                                               size_t capabilities_len);
+
+// SSL_serialize_handshake_hints writes an opaque byte string to |out|
+// containing the handshake hints computed by |out|. It returns one on success
+// and zero on error. This function should only be called if
+// |SSL_request_handshake_hints| was configured and the handshake terminated
+// with |SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_HINTS_READY|.
+//
+// This string may be passed to |SSL_set_handshake_hints| on another |SSL| to
+// avoid an extra signature call.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_serialize_handshake_hints(const SSL *ssl, CBB *out);
+
+// SSL_set_handshake_hints configures |ssl| to use |hints| as handshake hints.
+// It returns one on success and zero on error. The handshake will then continue
+// as before, but apply predicted values from |hints| where applicable.
+//
+// Hints may contain connection and session secrets, so they must not leak and
+// must come from a source trusted to terminate the connection. However, they
+// will not change |ssl|'s configuration. The caller is responsible for
+// serializing and applying options from the RPC server as needed. This ensures
+// |ssl|'s behavior is self-consistent and consistent with the caller's local
+// decisions.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_handshake_hints(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *hints,
+                                           size_t hints_len);
+
 
 // Obscure functions.
 
@@ -3784,7 +4183,7 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_max_send_fragment(SSL *ssl,
 // callbacks that are called very early on during the server handshake. At this
 // point, much of the SSL* hasn't been filled out and only the ClientHello can
 // be depended on.
-typedef struct ssl_early_callback_ctx {
+struct ssl_early_callback_ctx {
   SSL *ssl;
   const uint8_t *client_hello;
   size_t client_hello_len;
@@ -3799,7 +4198,7 @@ typedef struct ssl_early_callback_ctx {
   size_t compression_methods_len;
   const uint8_t *extensions;
   size_t extensions_len;
-} SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
+} /* SSL_CLIENT_HELLO */;
 
 // ssl_select_cert_result_t enumerates the possible results from selecting a
 // certificate with |select_certificate_cb|.
@@ -3993,9 +4392,17 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx,
                                                                    int enable);
 
 // SSL_CTX_set_grease_enabled configures whether sockets on |ctx| should enable
-// GREASE. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
+// GREASE. See RFC 8701.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_grease_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled);
 
+// SSL_CTX_set_permute_extensions configures whether sockets on |ctx| should
+// permute extensions. For now, this is only implemented for the ClientHello.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_permute_extensions(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled);
+
+// SSL_set_permute_extensions configures whether sockets on |ssl| should
+// permute extensions. For now, this is only implemented for the ClientHello.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_permute_extensions(SSL *ssl, int enabled);
+
 // SSL_max_seal_overhead returns the maximum overhead, in bytes, of sealing a
 // record with |ssl|.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_max_seal_overhead(const SSL *ssl);
@@ -4006,19 +4413,6 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT size_t SSL_max_seal_overhead(const SSL *ssl);
 OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_false_start_allowed_without_alpn(SSL_CTX *ctx,
                                                                  int allowed);
 
-// SSL_CTX_set_ignore_tls13_downgrade configures whether connections on |ctx|
-// ignore the downgrade signal in the server's random value.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_ignore_tls13_downgrade(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-                                                       int ignore);
-
-// SSL_set_ignore_tls13_downgrade configures whether |ssl| ignores the downgrade
-// signal in the server's random value.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_ignore_tls13_downgrade(SSL *ssl, int ignore);
-
-// SSL_is_tls13_downgrade returns one if the TLS 1.3 anti-downgrade
-// mechanism would have aborted |ssl|'s handshake and zero otherwise.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_is_tls13_downgrade(const SSL *ssl);
-
 // SSL_used_hello_retry_request returns one if the TLS 1.3 HelloRetryRequest
 // message has been either sent by the server or received by the client. It
 // returns zero otherwise.
@@ -4206,20 +4600,13 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, int idx, int *psign,
 // SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH is the same as SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START.
 #define SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START
 
-// i2d_SSL_SESSION serializes |in| to the bytes pointed to by |*pp|. On success,
-// it returns the number of bytes written and advances |*pp| by that many bytes.
-// On failure, it returns -1. If |pp| is NULL, no bytes are written and only the
-// length is returned.
+// i2d_SSL_SESSION serializes |in|, as described in |i2d_SAMPLE|.
 //
 // Use |SSL_SESSION_to_bytes| instead.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **pp);
 
 // d2i_SSL_SESSION parses a serialized session from the |length| bytes pointed
-// to by |*pp|. It returns the new |SSL_SESSION| and advances |*pp| by the
-// number of bytes consumed on success and NULL on failure. The caller takes
-// ownership of the new session and must call |SSL_SESSION_free| when done.
-//
-// If |a| is non-NULL, |*a| is released and set the new |SSL_SESSION|.
+// to by |*pp|, as described in |d2i_SAMPLE|.
 //
 // Use |SSL_SESSION_from_bytes| instead.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp,
@@ -4543,12 +4930,6 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL *ssl, const EC_KEY *ec_key);
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *out,
                                                       const char *dir);
 
-// SSL_set_verify_result calls |abort| unless |result| is |X509_V_OK|.
-//
-// TODO(davidben): Remove this function once it has been removed from
-// netty-tcnative.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long result);
-
 // SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id calls |SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled|.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx);
 
@@ -4671,6 +5052,30 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
 // |SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb|'s callback and returns one.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
 
+// The following symbols are compatibility aliases for reason codes used when
+// receiving an alert from the peer. Use the other names instead, which fit the
+// naming convention.
+//
+// TODO(davidben): Fix references to |SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED| and
+// remove the compatibility value. The others come from OpenSSL.
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION \
+  SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE \
+  SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE \
+  SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE \
+  SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
+
+// SSL_CIPHER_get_value calls |SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id|.
+//
+// TODO(davidben): |SSL_CIPHER_get_value| was our name for this function, but
+// upstream added it as |SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id|. Switch callers to the new
+// name and remove this one.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_value(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
 
 // Nodejs compatibility section (hidden).
 //
@@ -4833,6 +5238,8 @@ BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
 BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(SSL, SSL_free)
 BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(SSL_CTX, SSL_CTX_free)
 BORINGSSL_MAKE_UP_REF(SSL_CTX, SSL_CTX_up_ref)
+BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(SSL_ECH_KEYS, SSL_ECH_KEYS_free)
+BORINGSSL_MAKE_UP_REF(SSL_ECH_KEYS, SSL_ECH_KEYS_up_ref)
 BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION_free)
 BORINGSSL_MAKE_UP_REF(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION_up_ref)
 
@@ -4949,6 +5356,7 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT bool SSL_get_traffic_secrets(
     const SSL *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> *out_read_traffic_secret,
     Span<const uint8_t> *out_write_traffic_secret);
 
+
 BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
 
 }  // extern C++
@@ -5162,6 +5570,22 @@ BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
 #define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_CLIENT_HELLO 303
 #define SSL_R_CIPHER_MISMATCH_ON_EARLY_DATA 304
 #define SSL_R_QUIC_TRANSPORT_PARAMETERS_MISCONFIGURED 305
+#define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_COMPATIBILITY_MODE 306
+#define SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 307
+#define SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_ALPS_WITHOUT_ALPN 308
+#define SSL_R_ALPS_MISMATCH_ON_EARLY_DATA 309
+#define SSL_R_ECH_SERVER_CONFIG_AND_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH 310
+#define SSL_R_ECH_SERVER_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 311
+#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ECH_SERVER_CONFIG 312
+#define SSL_R_ECH_SERVER_WOULD_HAVE_NO_RETRY_CONFIGS 313
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_CLIENT_HELLO_INNER 314
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_ALPN_PROTOCOL_LIST 315
+#define SSL_R_COULD_NOT_PARSE_HINTS 316
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_ECH_PUBLIC_NAME 317
+#define SSL_R_INVALID_ECH_CONFIG_LIST 318
+#define SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED 319
+#define SSL_R_OUTER_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND 320
+#define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_ECH_NEGOTIATION 321
 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY 1000
 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 1010
 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 1020
@@ -5187,12 +5611,14 @@ BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090
 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 1111
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 1113
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 1114
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 1115
-#define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED 1116
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 1111
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 1113
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 1114
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 1115
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED 1116
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 1120
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ECH_REQUIRED 1121
 
 #endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_SSL_H