agent-os-kernel 1.1.0__py3-none-any.whl → 1.2.0__py3-none-any.whl

modules/mcp-kernel-server/src/mcp_kernel_server/tools.py

@@ -0,0 +1,1172 @@
+"""
+MCP Tools for Agent OS Kernel.
+
+Exposes CMVK, IATP, code safety, and governed execution as MCP-compatible tools.
+"""
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Any, Optional, List
+from datetime import datetime
+import hashlib
+import json
+import re
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ToolResult:
+    """Standard result from MCP tool execution."""
+    success: bool
+    data: Any
+    error: Optional[str] = None
+    metadata: dict = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+class VerifyCodeSafetyTool:
+    """
+    Code Safety Verification as MCP Tool.
+    
+    Checks if code is safe to execute by running it through
+    the Agent OS policy engine. This is the primary integration
+    point for Claude Desktop to verify generated code.
+    """
+    
+    name = "verify_code_safety"
+    description = "Check if code is safe to execute before running it"
+    
+    input_schema = {
+        "type": "object",
+        "properties": {
+            "code": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "The code to verify"
+            },
+            "language": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "Programming language (e.g., 'python', 'javascript', 'sql')"
+            },
+            "context": {
+                "type": "object",
+                "description": "Additional context (file path, project type, etc.)"
+            }
+        },
+        "required": ["code", "language"]
+    }
+    
+    # Policy rules for code safety
+    SAFETY_RULES = [
+        # SQL Destructive Operations
+        {
+            "name": "drop_table",
+            "pattern": r"DROP\s+(TABLE|DATABASE|SCHEMA|INDEX)\s+",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "Destructive SQL: DROP operation detected",
+            "alternative": "Consider using soft delete or archiving instead of DROP"
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "delete_all",
+            "pattern": r"DELETE\s+FROM\s+\w+\s*(;|$|WHERE\s+1\s*=\s*1)",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "Destructive SQL: DELETE without proper WHERE clause",
+            "alternative": "Add a specific WHERE clause to limit deletion"
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "truncate_table",
+            "pattern": r"TRUNCATE\s+TABLE\s+",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "Destructive SQL: TRUNCATE operation detected",
+            "alternative": "Consider archiving data before truncating"
+        },
+        # File Operations
+        {
+            "name": "rm_rf",
+            "pattern": r"rm\s+(-rf|-fr|--recursive\s+--force)\s+",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "Destructive operation: rm -rf detected",
+            "alternative": "Use safer alternatives like trash-cli or move to backup first"
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "rm_root",
+            "pattern": r"rm\s+.*\s+(\/|~|\$HOME)",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "Destructive operation: Deleting from root or home directory"
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "shutil_rmtree",
+            "pattern": r"shutil\s*\.\s*rmtree\s*\(",
+            "severity": "high",
+            "message": "Recursive directory deletion (shutil.rmtree)",
+            "alternative": "Consider using send2trash for safer deletion"
+        },
+        # Secrets
+        {
+            "name": "hardcoded_api_key",
+            "pattern": r"(api[_-]?key|apikey|api[_-]?secret)\s*[=:]\s*[\"'][a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}[\"']",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "Hardcoded API key detected",
+            "alternative": "Use environment variables: os.environ['API_KEY'] or process.env.API_KEY"
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "hardcoded_password",
+            "pattern": r"(password|passwd|pwd)\s*[=:]\s*[\"'][^\"']+[\"']",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "Hardcoded password detected",
+            "alternative": "Use environment variables or a secrets manager"
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "aws_key",
+            "pattern": r"AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "AWS Access Key ID detected in code"
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "private_key",
+            "pattern": r"-----BEGIN\s+(RSA|DSA|EC|OPENSSH)\s+PRIVATE\s+KEY-----",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "Private key detected in code"
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "github_token",
+            "pattern": r"gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36,}",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "GitHub token detected in code"
+        },
+        # Privilege Escalation
+        {
+            "name": "sudo",
+            "pattern": r"\bsudo\s+",
+            "severity": "high",
+            "message": "Privilege escalation: sudo command detected",
+            "alternative": "Avoid sudo in scripts - run with appropriate permissions"
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "chmod_777",
+            "pattern": r"chmod\s+777\s+",
+            "severity": "high",
+            "message": "Insecure permissions: chmod 777 detected",
+            "alternative": "Use more restrictive permissions: chmod 755 or chmod 644"
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "setuid_root",
+            "pattern": r"os\s*\.\s*set(e)?uid\s*\(\s*0\s*\)",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "Setting UID to root (0) detected"
+        },
+        # Code Execution
+        {
+            "name": "eval",
+            "pattern": r"\beval\s*\(",
+            "severity": "high",
+            "message": "Dynamic code execution: eval() detected",
+            "alternative": "Use JSON.parse() for data or ast.literal_eval() for Python"
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "exec",
+            "pattern": r"\bexec\s*\(",
+            "severity": "high",
+            "message": "Dynamic code execution: exec() detected",
+            "alternative": "Consider safer alternatives to dynamic execution"
+        },
+        # System Destructive
+        {
+            "name": "fork_bomb",
+            "pattern": r":\s*\(\)\s*\{\s*:\s*\|\s*:\s*&\s*\}\s*;",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "Fork bomb detected - would crash system"
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "dd_disk",
+            "pattern": r"dd\s+if=.*\s+of=\/dev\/(sd[a-z]|nvme|hd[a-z])",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "Direct disk write operation (dd) - could corrupt disk"
+        },
+        {
+            "name": "format_drive",
+            "pattern": r"format\s+[a-z]:",
+            "severity": "critical",
+            "message": "Drive format command detected"
+        }
+    ]
+    
+    def __init__(self, config: Optional[dict] = None):
+        self.config = config or {}
+        # Compile regex patterns
+        self._compiled_rules = [
+            {**rule, "compiled": re.compile(rule["pattern"], re.IGNORECASE)}
+            for rule in self.SAFETY_RULES
+        ]
+    
+    async def execute(self, arguments: dict) -> ToolResult:
+        """Verify code safety."""
+        code = arguments.get("code", "")
+        language = arguments.get("language", "unknown")
+        context = arguments.get("context", {})
+        
+        violations = []
+        warnings = []
+        
+        # Check each rule
+        for rule in self._compiled_rules:
+            if rule["compiled"].search(code):
+                violation = {
+                    "rule": rule["name"],
+                    "severity": rule["severity"],
+                    "message": rule["message"]
+                }
+                if "alternative" in rule:
+                    violation["alternative"] = rule["alternative"]
+                
+                if rule["severity"] in ("critical", "high"):
+                    violations.append(violation)
+                else:
+                    warnings.append(violation)
+        
+        # Determine overall safety
+        is_safe = len(violations) == 0
+        
+        # Build result
+        result = {
+            "safe": is_safe,
+            "violations": violations,
+            "warnings": warnings,
+            "language": language,
+            "code_length": len(code),
+            "rules_checked": len(self._compiled_rules)
+        }
+        
+        # Add alternative if blocked
+        if not is_safe and violations:
+            primary_violation = violations[0]
+            if "alternative" in primary_violation:
+                result["alternative"] = primary_violation["alternative"]
+            result["blocked_reason"] = primary_violation["message"]
+        
+        return ToolResult(
+            success=True,
+            data=result,
+            error=None if is_safe else f"BLOCKED: {violations[0]['message']}",
+            metadata={
+                "tool": self.name,
+                "timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
+                "language": language
+            }
+        )
+
+
+class CMVKVerifyTool:
+    """
+    Cross-Model Verification Kernel as MCP Tool.
+    
+    Verifies claims across multiple models to detect hallucinations
+    and blind spots through structured disagreement.
+    """
+    
+    name = "cmvk_verify"
+    description = "Verify a claim across multiple AI models to detect hallucinations"
+    
+    input_schema = {
+        "type": "object",
+        "properties": {
+            "claim": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "The claim or statement to verify"
+            },
+            "context": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "Optional context for the claim"
+            },
+            "models": {
+                "type": "array",
+                "items": {"type": "string"},
+                "description": "Models to use for verification (default: all configured)"
+            },
+            "threshold": {
+                "type": "number",
+                "description": "Agreement threshold (0-1, default: 0.85)"
+            }
+        },
+        "required": ["claim"]
+    }
+    
+    def __init__(self, config: Optional[dict] = None):
+        self.config = config or {}
+        self.default_threshold = self.config.get("threshold", 0.85)
+    
+    async def execute(self, arguments: dict) -> ToolResult:
+        """Execute cross-model verification."""
+        claim = arguments.get("claim", "")
+        context = arguments.get("context", "")
+        threshold = arguments.get("threshold", self.default_threshold)
+        
+        # Simulate CMVK verification (in production, calls actual models)
+        # This is a stateless operation - no session state maintained
+        verification_result = await self._verify_claim(claim, context, threshold)
+        
+        return ToolResult(
+            success=True,
+            data=verification_result,
+            metadata={
+                "tool": self.name,
+                "timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
+                "threshold_used": threshold
+            }
+        )
+    
+    async def _verify_claim(self, claim: str, context: str, threshold: float) -> dict:
+        """
+        Perform cross-model verification using drift-based consensus.
+        
+        Algorithm:
+        1. Query each model with the claim
+        2. Calculate pairwise drift between responses
+        3. If max drift > threshold, flag disagreement
+        4. Return consensus response with confidence score
+        
+        In production, this calls actual LLM APIs.
+        This implementation provides the interface and algorithm structure.
+        """
+        import hashlib
+        
+        # Models to verify against
+        models = ["gpt-4", "claude-sonnet-4", "gemini-pro"]
+        
+        # In production: Call each model API
+        # responses = [await call_model(m, claim) for m in models]
+        
+        # For demo: Generate deterministic mock responses
+        claim_hash = int(hashlib.md5(claim.encode()).hexdigest()[:8], 16)
+        
+        # Simulate model responses (in production, actual API calls)
+        responses = []
+        for i, model in enumerate(models):
+            response_hash = (claim_hash + i * 12345) % 1000000
+            responses.append({
+                "model": model,
+                "response": f"Response from {model}",
+                "latency_ms": 500 + (response_hash % 500)
+            })
+        
+        # Calculate pairwise drift scores
+        # Drift = 0.0 (identical) to 1.0 (completely different)
+        drift_scores = []
+        for i in range(len(responses)):
+            for j in range(i + 1, len(responses)):
+                # In production: Use embedding similarity or semantic comparison
+                # drift = cosine_distance(embed(r_i), embed(r_j))
+                # For demo: deterministic based on hash
+                pair_hash = (claim_hash + i * 100 + j * 10) % 100
+                drift = pair_hash / 100 * 0.3  # 0.0 to 0.3 range
+                drift_scores.append({
+                    "pair": (responses[i]["model"], responses[j]["model"]),
+                    "drift": round(drift, 3)
+                })
+        
+        max_drift = max(d["drift"] for d in drift_scores) if drift_scores else 0.0
+        avg_drift = sum(d["drift"] for d in drift_scores) / len(drift_scores) if drift_scores else 0.0
+        
+        # Drift-based decision
+        # High drift = disagreement = low confidence
+        disagreement_threshold = 1.0 - threshold  # threshold is agreement, so invert
+        disagreement_detected = max_drift > disagreement_threshold
+        
+        confidence = 1.0 - avg_drift
+        verified = not disagreement_detected and confidence >= threshold
+        
+        return {
+            "verified": verified,
+            "confidence": round(confidence, 3),
+            "drift_score": round(max_drift, 3),
+            "avg_drift": round(avg_drift, 3),
+            "models_checked": models,
+            "drift_details": drift_scores,
+            "disagreement_detected": disagreement_detected,
+            "consensus_method": "drift_threshold",
+            "threshold_used": threshold,
+            "interpretation": self._interpret_result(verified, confidence, max_drift)
+        }
+    
+    def _interpret_result(self, verified: bool, confidence: float, max_drift: float) -> str:
+        """Generate human-readable interpretation of verification result."""
+        if verified and confidence > 0.9:
+            return "Strong consensus across all models. High confidence in claim validity."
+        elif verified and confidence > 0.7:
+            return "Models agree with moderate confidence. Claim appears valid."
+        elif not verified and max_drift > 0.25:
+            return "Significant disagreement between models. Claim requires manual review."
+        else:
+            return "Weak consensus. Consider additional verification."
+
+
+class KernelExecuteTool:
+    """
+    Governed Execution through Agent OS Kernel.
+    
+    Executes actions with policy enforcement, signal handling,
+    and audit logging. Stateless - all context in request.
+    """
+    
+    name = "kernel_execute"
+    description = "Execute an action through the Agent OS kernel with policy enforcement"
+    
+    input_schema = {
+        "type": "object",
+        "properties": {
+            "action": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "The action to execute (e.g., 'database_query', 'file_write')"
+            },
+            "params": {
+                "type": "object",
+                "description": "Parameters for the action"
+            },
+            "agent_id": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "ID of the agent making the request"
+            },
+            "policies": {
+                "type": "array",
+                "items": {"type": "string"},
+                "description": "Policy names to enforce (e.g., ['read_only', 'no_pii'])"
+            },
+            "context": {
+                "type": "object",
+                "description": "Execution context (history, state, etc.)"
+            }
+        },
+        "required": ["action", "agent_id"]
+    }
+    
+    # Action policies (in production, loaded from config)
+    DEFAULT_POLICIES = {
+        "database_query": {"allowed_modes": ["read_only", "read_write"]},
+        "file_write": {"requires_approval": True, "allowed_paths": ["/tmp", "/data"]},
+        "api_call": {"rate_limit": 100, "allowed_domains": ["*"]},
+        "send_email": {"requires_approval": True},
+    }
+    
+    def __init__(self, config: Optional[dict] = None):
+        self.config = config or {}
+        self.policy_mode = self.config.get("policy_mode", "strict")
+    
+    async def execute(self, arguments: dict) -> ToolResult:
+        """Execute action with kernel governance."""
+        action = arguments.get("action", "")
+        params = arguments.get("params", {})
+        agent_id = arguments.get("agent_id", "unknown")
+        policies = arguments.get("policies", [])
+        context = arguments.get("context", {})
+        
+        # Policy check (stateless - all info in request)
+        policy_result = self._check_policies(action, params, policies)
+        
+        if not policy_result["allowed"]:
+            return ToolResult(
+                success=False,
+                data=None,
+                error=f"SIGKILL: Policy violation - {policy_result['reason']}",
+                metadata={
+                    "tool": self.name,
+                    "agent_id": agent_id,
+                    "action": action,
+                    "signal": "SIGKILL",
+                    "violation": policy_result["reason"],
+                    "timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
+                }
+            )
+        
+        # Execute action (in production, dispatches to actual handlers)
+        execution_result = await self._execute_action(action, params, context)
+        
+        return ToolResult(
+            success=True,
+            data=execution_result,
+            metadata={
+                "tool": self.name,
+                "agent_id": agent_id,
+                "action": action,
+                "policies_applied": policies,
+                "timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
+            }
+        )
+    
+    def _check_policies(self, action: str, params: dict, policies: list) -> dict:
+        """Check if action is allowed under given policies."""
+        action_policy = self.DEFAULT_POLICIES.get(action, {})
+        
+        # Check read_only policy
+        if "read_only" in policies:
+            if action in ["file_write", "send_email"]:
+                return {"allowed": False, "reason": f"Action '{action}' blocked by read_only policy"}
+            if action == "database_query" and params.get("query", "").upper().startswith(("INSERT", "UPDATE", "DELETE")):
+                return {"allowed": False, "reason": "Write query blocked by read_only policy"}
+        
+        # Check requires_approval
+        if action_policy.get("requires_approval") and not params.get("approved"):
+            return {"allowed": False, "reason": f"Action '{action}' requires approval"}
+        
+        # Check no_pii policy
+        if "no_pii" in policies:
+            pii_keywords = ["ssn", "social_security", "credit_card", "password"]
+            params_str = json.dumps(params).lower()
+            for keyword in pii_keywords:
+                if keyword in params_str:
+                    return {"allowed": False, "reason": f"PII detected ({keyword}) - blocked by no_pii policy"}
+        
+        return {"allowed": True, "reason": None}
+    
+    async def _execute_action(self, action: str, params: dict, context: dict) -> dict:
+        """Execute the action (stub - real implementation dispatches to handlers)."""
+        return {
+            "status": "executed",
+            "action": action,
+            "result": f"Action '{action}' executed successfully",
+            "params_received": list(params.keys())
+        }
+
+
+class IATPSignTool:
+    """
+    Inter-Agent Trust Protocol signing as MCP Tool.
+    
+    Signs agent outputs with cryptographic attestation for
+    trust propagation across agent networks.
+    """
+    
+    name = "iatp_sign"
+    description = "Sign content with cryptographic trust attestation for inter-agent communication"
+    
+    input_schema = {
+        "type": "object",
+        "properties": {
+            "content": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "Content to sign"
+            },
+            "agent_id": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "ID of the signing agent"
+            },
+            "capabilities": {
+                "type": "array",
+                "items": {"type": "string"},
+                "description": "Capabilities being attested (e.g., ['reversible', 'idempotent'])"
+            },
+            "metadata": {
+                "type": "object",
+                "description": "Additional metadata to include in signature"
+            }
+        },
+        "required": ["content", "agent_id"]
+    }
+    
+    def __init__(self, config: Optional[dict] = None):
+        self.config = config or {}
+    
+    async def execute(self, arguments: dict) -> ToolResult:
+        """Sign content with IATP attestation."""
+        content = arguments.get("content", "")
+        agent_id = arguments.get("agent_id", "")
+        capabilities = arguments.get("capabilities", [])
+        metadata = arguments.get("metadata", {})
+        
+        # Generate signature
+        signature = self._generate_signature(content, agent_id, capabilities)
+        
+        return ToolResult(
+            success=True,
+            data={
+                "signature": signature,
+                "agent_id": agent_id,
+                "capabilities": capabilities,
+                "content_hash": hashlib.sha256(content.encode()).hexdigest()[:16],
+                "timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
+                "protocol_version": "iatp-1.0"
+            },
+            metadata={
+                "tool": self.name,
+                "timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
+            }
+        )
+    
+    def _generate_signature(self, content: str, agent_id: str, capabilities: list) -> str:
+        """Generate IATP signature (simplified - production uses proper crypto)."""
+        payload = f"{content}|{agent_id}|{','.join(sorted(capabilities))}"
+        return hashlib.sha256(payload.encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+class IATPVerifyTool:
+    """
+    IATP Trust Verification as MCP Tool.
+    
+    Verifies trust relationship with a remote agent, checking:
+    - Capability manifest
+    - Attestation signature
+    - Trust level requirements
+    - Policy compatibility
+    """
+    
+    name = "iatp_verify"
+    description = "Verify trust relationship with another agent before communication"
+    
+    input_schema = {
+        "type": "object",
+        "properties": {
+            "remote_agent_id": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "ID of the agent to verify"
+            },
+            "required_trust_level": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "enum": ["verified_partner", "trusted", "standard", "any"],
+                "description": "Minimum required trust level (default: standard)"
+            },
+            "required_scopes": {
+                "type": "array",
+                "items": {"type": "string"},
+                "description": "Required capability scopes (e.g., ['repo:read'])"
+            },
+            "data_classification": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "enum": ["public", "internal", "confidential", "pii"],
+                "description": "Classification of data being shared"
+            }
+        },
+        "required": ["remote_agent_id"]
+    }
+    
+    # Trust level scores
+    TRUST_SCORES = {
+        "verified_partner": 10,
+        "trusted": 7,
+        "standard": 5,
+        "unknown": 2,
+        "untrusted": 0
+    }
+    
+    # Minimum scores required
+    MIN_SCORES = {
+        "verified_partner": 10,
+        "trusted": 7,
+        "standard": 5,
+        "any": 0
+    }
+    
+    def __init__(self, config: Optional[dict] = None):
+        self.config = config or {}
+        # Agent registry (in production, fetched from network)
+        self.agent_registry = self.config.get("agent_registry", {})
+    
+    async def execute(self, arguments: dict) -> ToolResult:
+        """Verify trust with remote agent."""
+        remote_agent_id = arguments.get("remote_agent_id", "")
+        required_level = arguments.get("required_trust_level", "standard")
+        required_scopes = arguments.get("required_scopes", [])
+        data_classification = arguments.get("data_classification", "internal")
+        
+        # Fetch manifest (simulated - real impl fetches from /.well-known/agent-manifest)
+        manifest = await self._fetch_manifest(remote_agent_id)
+        
+        if manifest is None:
+            return ToolResult(
+                success=False,
+                data=None,
+                error=f"Could not fetch manifest for agent '{remote_agent_id}'"
+            )
+        
+        # Calculate trust score
+        trust_score = self._calculate_trust_score(manifest)
+        min_required = self.MIN_SCORES.get(required_level, 5)
+        
+        # Check trust level
+        if trust_score < min_required:
+            return ToolResult(
+                success=False,
+                data={
+                    "verified": False,
+                    "trust_score": trust_score,
+                    "required_score": min_required,
+                    "manifest": manifest
+                },
+                error=f"Trust score {trust_score} below required {min_required}"
+            )
+        
+        # Check required scopes
+        agent_scopes = manifest.get("scopes", [])
+        missing_scopes = [s for s in required_scopes if s not in agent_scopes]
+        if missing_scopes:
+            return ToolResult(
+                success=False,
+                data={
+                    "verified": False,
+                    "trust_score": trust_score,
+                    "missing_scopes": missing_scopes
+                },
+                error=f"Agent missing required scopes: {missing_scopes}"
+            )
+        
+        # Check PII restrictions
+        if data_classification == "pii":
+            retention = manifest.get("privacy", {}).get("retention_policy", "permanent")
+            if retention != "ephemeral":
+                return ToolResult(
+                    success=False,
+                    data={
+                        "verified": False,
+                        "trust_score": trust_score,
+                        "reason": "PII requires ephemeral retention"
+                    },
+                    error="Cannot share PII with non-ephemeral agent"
+                )
+        
+        # Verification passed
+        return ToolResult(
+            success=True,
+            data={
+                "verified": True,
+                "remote_agent_id": remote_agent_id,
+                "trust_score": trust_score,
+                "trust_level": manifest.get("trust_level", "unknown"),
+                "scopes": agent_scopes,
+                "attestation_valid": True,
+                "policy_compatible": True
+            },
+            metadata={
+                "tool": self.name,
+                "timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
+            }
+        )
+    
+    async def _fetch_manifest(self, agent_id: str) -> Optional[dict]:
+        """Fetch manifest from agent (simulated)."""
+        # In production, this would HTTP GET /.well-known/agent-manifest
+        if agent_id in self.agent_registry:
+            return self.agent_registry[agent_id]
+        
+        # Return simulated manifest for demo
+        return {
+            "agent_id": agent_id,
+            "trust_level": "standard",
+            "scopes": ["data:read", "data:write"],
+            "capabilities": {
+                "idempotency": True,
+                "max_concurrency": 10
+            },
+            "reversibility": {
+                "level": "full",
+                "undo_window_seconds": 3600
+            },
+            "privacy": {
+                "retention_policy": "ephemeral",
+                "human_in_loop": False,
+                "training_consent": False
+            }
+        }
+    
+    def _calculate_trust_score(self, manifest: dict) -> int:
+        """Calculate trust score from manifest."""
+        base = self.TRUST_SCORES.get(manifest.get("trust_level", "unknown"), 2)
+        
+        # Modifiers
+        reversibility = manifest.get("reversibility", {}).get("level", "none")
+        if reversibility != "none":
+            base += 2
+        
+        privacy = manifest.get("privacy", {})
+        retention = privacy.get("retention_policy", "permanent")
+        if retention == "ephemeral":
+            base += 1
+        elif retention in ("permanent", "forever"):
+            base -= 1
+        
+        if privacy.get("human_in_loop", False):
+            base -= 2
+        
+        if privacy.get("training_consent", False):
+            base -= 1
+        
+        return max(0, min(10, base))
+
+
+class IATPReputationTool:
+    """
+    IATP Reputation Query/Slash as MCP Tool.
+    
+    Query or modify agent reputation in the network.
+    """
+    
+    name = "iatp_reputation"
+    description = "Query or slash agent reputation in the IATP network"
+    
+    input_schema = {
+        "type": "object",
+        "properties": {
+            "action": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "enum": ["query", "slash"],
+                "description": "Action to perform"
+            },
+            "agent_id": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "Agent ID to query/slash"
+            },
+            "slash_reason": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "Reason for slashing (required if action=slash)"
+            },
+            "slash_severity": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "enum": ["critical", "high", "medium", "low"],
+                "description": "Severity of violation (required if action=slash)"
+            },
+            "evidence": {
+                "type": "object",
+                "description": "Evidence for the slash (e.g., CMVK drift score)"
+            }
+        },
+        "required": ["action", "agent_id"]
+    }
+    
+    # Severity penalties
+    SLASH_PENALTIES = {
+        "critical": 2.0,
+        "high": 1.0,
+        "medium": 0.5,
+        "low": 0.25
+    }
+    
+    def __init__(self, config: Optional[dict] = None):
+        self.config = config or {}
+        # In-memory reputation store (production uses distributed store)
+        self._reputation: dict = {}
+    
+    async def execute(self, arguments: dict) -> ToolResult:
+        """Execute reputation action."""
+        action = arguments.get("action", "query")
+        agent_id = arguments.get("agent_id", "")
+        
+        if action == "query":
+            return await self._query_reputation(agent_id)
+        elif action == "slash":
+            reason = arguments.get("slash_reason", "unknown")
+            severity = arguments.get("slash_severity", "medium")
+            evidence = arguments.get("evidence", {})
+            return await self._slash_reputation(agent_id, reason, severity, evidence)
+        else:
+            return ToolResult(
+                success=False,
+                data=None,
+                error=f"Unknown action: {action}"
+            )
+    
+    async def _query_reputation(self, agent_id: str) -> ToolResult:
+        """Query agent reputation."""
+        score = self._reputation.get(agent_id, 5.0)  # Default to 5.0
+        
+        # Determine trust level from score
+        if score >= 8.0:
+            level = "verified_partner"
+        elif score >= 6.0:
+            level = "trusted"
+        elif score >= 4.0:
+            level = "standard"
+        elif score >= 2.0:
+            level = "unknown"
+        else:
+            level = "untrusted"
+        
+        return ToolResult(
+            success=True,
+            data={
+                "agent_id": agent_id,
+                "reputation_score": round(score, 2),
+                "trust_level": level,
+                "history_count": 0  # Would track actual history
+            }
+        )
+    
+    async def _slash_reputation(
+        self, agent_id: str, reason: str, severity: str, evidence: dict
+    ) -> ToolResult:
+        """Slash agent reputation."""
+        current = self._reputation.get(agent_id, 5.0)
+        penalty = self.SLASH_PENALTIES.get(severity, 0.5)
+        new_score = max(0.0, current - penalty)
+        
+        self._reputation[agent_id] = new_score
+        
+        return ToolResult(
+            success=True,
+            data={
+                "agent_id": agent_id,
+                "previous_score": round(current, 2),
+                "new_score": round(new_score, 2),
+                "penalty_applied": penalty,
+                "reason": reason,
+                "severity": severity,
+                "evidence": evidence
+            },
+            metadata={
+                "tool": self.name,
+                "action": "slash",
+                "timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
+            }
+        )
+
+
+class CMVKReviewCodeTool:
+    """
+    CMVK Code Review as MCP Tool.
+    
+    Performs multi-model code review for security, bugs, and best practices.
+    This is optimized for code analysis rather than general claim verification.
+    """
+    
+    name = "cmvk_review"
+    description = "Multi-model code review for security, bugs, and best practices"
+    
+    input_schema = {
+        "type": "object",
+        "properties": {
+            "code": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "The code to review"
+            },
+            "language": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "description": "Programming language"
+            },
+            "models": {
+                "type": "array",
+                "items": {"type": "string"},
+                "description": "Models to use for review (default: ['gpt-4', 'claude-sonnet-4', 'gemini-pro'])"
+            },
+            "focus": {
+                "type": "array",
+                "items": {"type": "string"},
+                "description": "Areas to focus on: 'security', 'bugs', 'performance', 'style'"
+            }
+        },
+        "required": ["code"]
+    }
+    
+    def __init__(self, config: Optional[dict] = None):
+        self.config = config or {}
+    
+    async def execute(self, arguments: dict) -> ToolResult:
+        """Execute code review."""
+        code = arguments.get("code", "")
+        language = arguments.get("language", "unknown")
+        models = arguments.get("models", ["gpt-4", "claude-sonnet-4", "gemini-pro"])
+        focus = arguments.get("focus", ["security", "bugs"])
+        
+        # Perform static analysis first
+        issues = self._static_analysis(code, language, focus)
+        
+        # Generate mock multi-model reviews (production calls real APIs)
+        model_results = []
+        for model in models:
+            # Vary results per model to simulate disagreement
+            model_issues = [i for i in issues if hash(model + i["issue"]) % 3 != 0]
+            passed = len(model_issues) == 0
+            
+            model_results.append({
+                "model": model,
+                "passed": passed,
+                "issues": model_issues,
+                "summary": "No issues found" if passed else f"Found {len(model_issues)} issue(s)"
+            })
+        
+        # Calculate consensus
+        passed_count = sum(1 for m in model_results if m["passed"])
+        consensus = passed_count / len(models) if models else 1.0
+        
+        # Build recommendations
+        all_issues = []
+        for m in model_results:
+            for issue in m.get("issues", []):
+                if issue not in all_issues:
+                    all_issues.append(issue)
+        
+        recommendation = ""
+        if all_issues:
+            recommendation = "Based on multi-model review:\n"
+            for i, issue in enumerate(all_issues[:5], 1):  # Top 5 issues
+                recommendation += f"{i}. {issue['issue']}: {issue.get('fix', 'Review needed')}\n"
+        
+        return ToolResult(
+            success=True,
+            data={
+                "consensus": round(consensus, 2),
+                "reviews": model_results,
+                "issues": all_issues,
+                "recommendation": recommendation,
+                "models_used": models,
+                "language": language,
+                "focus_areas": focus
+            },
+            metadata={
+                "tool": self.name,
+                "timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
+            }
+        )
+    
+    def _static_analysis(self, code: str, language: str, focus: List[str]) -> List[dict]:
+        """Perform basic static analysis."""
+        issues = []
+        
+        if "security" in focus:
+            # SQL injection
+            if re.search(r'\+\s*["\'][^"\']*\+', code) and re.search(r'SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE', code, re.I):
+                issues.append({
+                    "category": "security",
+                    "severity": "high",
+                    "issue": "Potential SQL injection via string concatenation",
+                    "fix": "Use parameterized queries or an ORM"
+                })
+            
+            # eval usage
+            if re.search(r'\beval\s*\(', code):
+                issues.append({
+                    "category": "security",
+                    "severity": "high",
+                    "issue": "eval() usage is dangerous",
+                    "fix": "Use JSON.parse() or ast.literal_eval() for data parsing"
+                })
+            
+            # innerHTML
+            if re.search(r'\.innerHTML\s*=', code):
+                issues.append({
+                    "category": "security",
+                    "severity": "medium",
+                    "issue": "innerHTML assignment may lead to XSS",
+                    "fix": "Use textContent or a sanitization library"
+                })
+        
+        if "bugs" in focus:
+            # Missing error handling
+            if re.search(r'await\s+\w+', code) and not re.search(r'try\s*{', code):
+                issues.append({
+                    "category": "bugs",
+                    "severity": "medium",
+                    "issue": "Async operation without error handling",
+                    "fix": "Wrap in try-catch block"
+                })
+            
+            # Division by zero potential
+            if re.search(r'/\s*\w+', code) and not re.search(r'if.*[!=]=\s*0', code):
+                issues.append({
+                    "category": "bugs",
+                    "severity": "low",
+                    "issue": "Potential division by zero",
+                    "fix": "Add zero check before division"
+                })
+        
+        if "performance" in focus:
+            # Synchronous file operations
+            if re.search(r'Sync\s*\(', code):
+                issues.append({
+                    "category": "performance",
+                    "severity": "medium",
+                    "issue": "Synchronous file operation",
+                    "fix": "Use async alternatives to avoid blocking"
+                })
+            
+            # N+1 query pattern
+            if re.search(r'for.*await.*query', code, re.I):
+                issues.append({
+                    "category": "performance",
+                    "severity": "high",
+                    "issue": "Potential N+1 query pattern",
+                    "fix": "Use batch queries or eager loading"
+                })
+        
+        return issues
+
+
+class GetAuditLogTool:
+    """
+    Audit Log Retrieval as MCP Tool.
+    
+    Retrieves the Agent OS audit trail for compliance and debugging.
+    """
+    
+    name = "get_audit_log"
+    description = "Retrieve Agent OS audit trail"
+    
+    input_schema = {
+        "type": "object",
+        "properties": {
+            "limit": {
+                "type": "number",
+                "description": "Maximum number of entries to return (default: 20)"
+            },
+            "filter": {
+                "type": "object",
+                "description": "Filter criteria",
+                "properties": {
+                    "agent_id": {"type": "string"},
+                    "type": {
+                        "type": "string",
+                        "enum": ["blocked", "allowed", "cmvk_review", "all"]
+                    },
+                    "since": {"type": "string", "description": "ISO timestamp"}
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    
+    # In-memory audit log (production uses external store)
+    _audit_log: List[dict] = []
+    
+    def __init__(self, config: Optional[dict] = None):
+        self.config = config or {}
+    
+    @classmethod
+    def log_entry(cls, entry: dict):
+        """Add entry to audit log."""
+        entry["timestamp"] = datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
+        cls._audit_log.insert(0, entry)
+        # Keep last 1000 entries
+        if len(cls._audit_log) > 1000:
+            cls._audit_log = cls._audit_log[:1000]
+    
+    async def execute(self, arguments: dict) -> ToolResult:
+        """Retrieve audit log entries."""
+        limit = arguments.get("limit", 20)
+        filter_criteria = arguments.get("filter", {})
+        
+        # Filter entries
+        entries = self._audit_log.copy()
+        
+        if filter_criteria.get("agent_id"):
+            entries = [e for e in entries if e.get("agent_id") == filter_criteria["agent_id"]]
+        
+        if filter_criteria.get("type") and filter_criteria["type"] != "all":
+            entries = [e for e in entries if e.get("type") == filter_criteria["type"]]
+        
+        if filter_criteria.get("since"):
+            since = filter_criteria["since"]
+            entries = [e for e in entries if e.get("timestamp", "") >= since]
+        
+        # Apply limit
+        entries = entries[:limit]
+        
+        # Calculate stats
+        blocked_count = sum(1 for e in self._audit_log if e.get("type") == "blocked")
+        total_count = len(self._audit_log)
+        
+        return ToolResult(
+            success=True,
+            data={
+                "logs": entries,
+                "returned": len(entries),
+                "total": total_count,
+                "stats": {
+                    "blocked_total": blocked_count,
+                    "allowed_total": total_count - blocked_count
+                }
+            },
+            metadata={
+                "tool": self.name,
+                "timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
+            }
+        )